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PLATO'S

APOLOGY AND CRITO;

WITH

NOTES.

BY

W. S. TYLER,

GRAVES PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

NEW YORK:
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TO

PROFESSOR FELTON,
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITIC

Is Dedicated,

AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,

AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD

FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,

AND HIS PHILO-HELENIC SPIRIT.
PREFACE.

The "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's Crito and the narrative part of the Phædo; and among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments, have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret Plato dropped for a time entirely out of the academic course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete Græca Majora, or in the imported editions of foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach
of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the Gorgias, and Professor Lewis's profound Annotations on portions of the Laws, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato superseded, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound, moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind, that the present edition of the Apology and Crito is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "divine," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The Apology, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours, gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has
seen this, and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the Apology the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how pure from the impractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the Apology may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the Gorgias, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed, that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather (not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-Platonic, for it has all the palpable
and marked peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to go before the reader with a brief analysis of the piece, with an expression of the astonishment of Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers, who have represented nothing as it is, and a declaration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple truth, in the same plain and simple language which he has been accustomed to use in his every day conversations; and as this is his whole office as an orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he speaks the truth. (17, 18, λ.) This exordium, if it does not set forth Plato's beau ideal of true oratory, in contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the forum and the schools, yet it no doubt exhibits the author's idea of the style and manner in which Socrates actually defended himself when on trial for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates of the Apology excluding all artificial rhetoric, all appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with the simplicity and directness, the frankness and fearlessness of a phi-
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Nae ego haud paullo hunc animum malum, quam eorum omnium fortunas,
quid de hoc judicaverunt. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 42.

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of self-knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, e.); though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that he was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, like Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, a. b.)

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, c.) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, d.) They
confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, e.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them.
whether he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrupter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeached and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, b.; 26, a.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punishment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assumed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares, how young men can be made either better or worse. The argument, by which Socrates exculpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reasoning, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary; and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against
the argument here, but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching "other divine things," and if there are "divine things," then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching δαιμόνια, he must needs recognize δαιμονες; and if δαιμονες, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, b.; 27, e.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which had destroyed many other good men, and would probably destroy him. "Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?"
"Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the great question for a man to ask, is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory."

(28, B. C. D.) "I should behave strangely," he continues, "if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils." (28, E.; 29, A. B.)

"If you were to assure me of my acquittal in

\textit{case I would} pledge myself to abandon this phi-
sophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command; and this is for your highest interest. (29, c.; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, d. e.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human, that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue? And all this without any pecuniary compensation; for among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me
of receiving pay for my instruction; and if they had, my poverty would have been a sufficient witness against them." (30, e.; 31, c.)

If any were disposed to ask, why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor* which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the demos, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, a. b.) He

* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.
had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, c. d.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also, that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, d.; 34, b.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the
judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not justice, but piety also, forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)
With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a majority of only six votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, a.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would be for their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, b. c. d.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, a.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good.
should he propose an alternative penalty, which would be a certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment? That were to subject himself to the power and caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance to be. (37, B. C.) Exile? His countrymen could not endure his instruction and reproof, much less would strangers. (37, D.) And for him to keep silence, though they would not believe it, were to disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite impossible. (37, E.) To live without examining himself and others were no life to him—were a life not worthy to be lived by any human being. (38, A.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss of property was no evil. But he had not property enough. If indeed a mina (about $17) would suffice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus bade him propose thirty minae, he would adjudge himself to pay a fine of thirty minae, and give these friends as his security. (38, B.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He doubtless expected it would, and intended it should. The last chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia is devoted to a statement of the reasons, and those
for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was condemned to death. And in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him, that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, c. d. e.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it*—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, a. b.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come after him; and the only

escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, c. d.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, e.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, a. b.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself, might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in that case, all time would seem no more than one
such dreamless night. (40, c. d. e.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, a. b. c.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more, that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them
the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or any thing else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time that we depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates's; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and in-
vested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power.* This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction—this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the Apology.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the Crito, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the Apology, in a strain of rapt and inspired

eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land: "On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his home in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream
was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural, than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c.; 46.) "But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will believe that these things are, as they are in reality, and that not you, but myself, am responsible for my death." "Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the
multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them.” “I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise.” The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the Apology: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. “But they do just what they happen to do.” (44, ν. c.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates’s life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change
of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, B.; 47, A.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, B. C. D.); that by acting unwisely and unjustly, the soul is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, E.; 48, B.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an
injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, A. seqq.); that the well-being of our country depends on the sacredness of the laws and the obedience of the citizens (50, B.), and our country should be obeyed and reverenced as a more sacred thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends (51, A. B.); that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to have a right to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment on her acts as she does on his (50, E.); that every citizen who remains in a free country, which allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions (52, A.; 53, A.); and that by escaping the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and make himself an object of suspicion as an enemy of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, and even in Hades (53, B.; 54, B.). As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form more than human and enthroned in unearthly
majesty; and they are heard, in meek yet authori-
tative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the in-
justice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course
which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too,
catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as
it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priest-
ess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other
voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the
voice of God) commands him: "The voice of these
expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable
to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge
any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain.
This way God leads; and in this way let us follow."

The Crito, like the Apology and the other dia-
logues that were written soon after the death of
Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical
and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the
charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the
other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea
of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation
to the state. And, it is not too much to say, it ac-
complishes both these objects perfectly. It is a
triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates,
setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and
showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men
would deem an overscrupulous regard for the con-
stituted authorities, even in an unjust and
euous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At the same time, it sets forth a perfect pattern of the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an unrighteous sentence (so long as it was according to the form of law, and since it concerned only himself, while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democracy could force him to do wrong to others), and with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying himself a willing victim before the laws and on the altar of his country.

As a work of art, the Crito ranks very high—higher than the Apology; though, we think, the latter is capable of full vindication in this light, and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of art, than is commonly supposed. But the Crito, though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the moral of the dialogue is everywhere conspicuous, yet it is conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama. The unities of time, place and impression, are perfectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which now bears the name of “The Prison of Socrates.” The hour is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most intimate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the execution of his unjust sentence. The characters are
of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditionary caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is περί πρακτέου, or, WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think, that not the desirable and the expedient only, but the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and
compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understandings. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia æque afficiat et commoveat legen-tium animos necesse est, atque Socratis in virtute constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse." And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, convinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshipping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The Apology and the Crito bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and in-
spiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we see him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the model of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction, that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.
The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Förster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

17  ΣΑΡ. Ι. "Ο τι μεν ύμεις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πε-πόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ὄλγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθομην· ὦντω πτωθών ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀλήθεις γε, ὡς ἔτοσ εἶπεν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ φυτῶν ἐν ἑδαύ-μασα τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐψεύσαντο, τούτο, ἐν ὃ ἔλεγον, Β ὥσ χρήν ύμας εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἔξαπατη-ηθε, ὡς δεινοὶ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθήναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὅπε ἐμοῦ ἔξελεγκῆσονται ἔγραφ, ἑπειδὰν μηδ᾿ ὅπωστιοι φαύνομαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἐδοξεὶν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν ὁτοὶ λέγειν τῶν τάληθη λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοσιν, ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄν ἔγνων ὅτι κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ὑήτωρ. ὁτοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὅπερ ἔγω λέγω, ἢ τι ὃ οὐδὲν ἀλήθεις εἰρήκασι· ύμεῖς δ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἀκου-σεῖτε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δί, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπτημένοις γε λόγους, ὅπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ἐνώμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσιμημέ-νοις, ἀλλ᾿ ἀκουσεῖτε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὑνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ὃ λέγω, καὶ μη-δεὶς ὑμῶν προδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήτου
πρέποι, δὲ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἀλκίᾳ, ἄσπερ μειρακία, πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς υμᾶς εἰσίνειαι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάντες, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι. εἰάν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι’ ἄσπερ εἰῶδα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἣν υμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἀλλοθεί, μήτε ἰαυμάξειν μήτε ἱωρυβεῖν τούτου ἐνεκα. Ο ἔχει οὐκ ὑποσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐπὶ γεγονός πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα. ἀνεχόμενον υἱὸς εἶ νῦν τῇ διανοίᾳ λέγεων. ὡσπέρ οὖν ἂν, εἰ(μ) ὑπὸ τὸν ὄντως ἔνωσιν ἐκχυγάσαν οὖν, ἔνωσις ἔγραφες δήποτε ἀλήθειας τὸν μοί, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, εἷς οἰκίας ἐν ἠλπί ἐδέχασθε, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τούτῳ ὑμῶν δέομαι δικαίον, ὡς ἂν ἔμοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως εἶν — ἵσως μὲν γὰρ τι χείρων, ἵσως δὲ βελτίων ἄν εἴη — αὐτὸ δὲ τούτῳ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσεχεῖν, εἰ διεκαίρα λέγω, ἢ μηδὲ δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἄρετή, πρὸς τὰς ἀληθή λέγειν.

Σαρ. Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δικαίος εἶμι ἀπολογοῦσιν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου γενομένα καὶ τῶν πρώτων κατηγορούσι, ἔτειτα δὲ πρὸς ταύτην καὶ τῶν ὑπεραν. Ἕμως γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦσιν γεγονόσι πρὸς υμᾶς καὶ πάλιν πολλά ἴση ἐντα καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγώ μᾶλλον ρεξαύθημα ἡ τούτο συμβή. Ἀνωτέρα, καὶ πρὸς τῶν καὶ τούτων δεινοσί, ἄλλα ἀκούσσεις δεινοτέρα, δὲ ἄνδρες, οἱ υμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδὸς παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπείδη τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοί οὓς ἀληθές, ὅσα ἐστὶ τῆς Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἄνηρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φρονίμησισ.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντᾶ ἀνεμπήκος, καὶ τὸν ἦπτο
Οὔτως κρέιττω ποιεῖν. οὗτοι, ὁ ἀνὴρ Ἱλιαῖοι, ταὐτ
τῷ τὴν φήμην κατασκευασθείς, οἱ ἐσφορὶς ἕως ὁμοι
κατηγοροῖ. ὁ γὰρ ἀκούσας γινομίη τοὺς ταῦτα
εἶπεν τότε ὦ θεὸς νομίζεις, ἐπειτὰ εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ
κατηγοροὶ πῶλοι καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν κατηγοροῖς
τεῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς τάντα τις ἱλικία λεγομένης πρὸς ὑμᾶς,
εἷς ἄν μελετᾶτας παῖς ὃτε, εἰνοὶ ὅ
μιον καὶ μείρακι, ἀτεχνῶς ἔργησαν κατηγορουμένης
ἀπολογομενοῦν αὕτης, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀνοίγοτον ὅτι
οὕτῳ τῷ ἀνοίγονται ταῖς ἀπεικονεῖται καὶ εἰπεῖν.

Ἡ δή τις κοιμοδοτοῖς τυγχάνει ἡν, ὅσοι τε φύλο
καὶ διαβολὴ χρωμένοι χρῶς ανετείλον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
πετέιμενοι ἄλλους πείλοντες, οὕτως πάντες ἀπορο
τατοὶ εἰσίν. οὕτῳ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσθαι ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν
καὶ αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα οἷον ἐλεγχζαι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκ
ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ σκέματεῖν ἀπολογομενοῦν τε καὶ
εἰπεῖν μηροῖς ἀποκρινομενοῖς. Ἀποψάλτεις ἡν καὶ
ὕμεις, οὐτὲ ἐν γίγαν, διὸ ὄντος μου τῶν κατηγορῶν
γεγονέτοι, ἐτέρους μὲν τῶν ἀρτί κατηγοροῦντας,

Σετέροις δὲ τοὺς πιλαί, ὅσο εἶχα λέγαμ. καὶ οἴνοιτε δεῖν
πρὸς ἐκεῖνος προτοῦ ὑπὸ ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ ἐχῶν
ὑμεῖς ἐκείνου πτεροῦ ἠκουσάτε κατηγοροῦσιν, καὶ
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τούτη τῶν ἑστεροῦ

10 Ἐναν, ἀπολογητέαν δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἱλιαῖοι, καὶ
ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὑμῶν ἑξελέσθαι τὴν διαλογὴν, ἢ ὕμεις
ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταῦτα ἐν ὑμῶν ἔλθον
χρόνος. Βουλοῦμαι μὲν ὑμᾶς ἂν τούτῳ ἑξελέσθαι, εἰ
τοὺς ὑμεῖς καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμαῖ, καὶ πλέον τί μὲ πους.
καὶ ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτῷ γιαλετὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὁ ἄνω τι με λατάναι ὅτι εἶναι· ὅμως τούτο μεν ἢ ἡ προτήτη τῶν αὐτῶν φιλον, τω̣ς δὲ με λεγόμενον καὶ ἀπολογούμενον.  

§ 3. Αναλάβομεν ὑπὸν ἐν ἀργήν, τὸ καθηγομένον εὔσχημον· ἢ πρὸς ζήμῃς διαβολὴν, ἢ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς πληγήν. Μελήτου μὲν ἔγραψα τὴν γραφὴν ταυτήν. Β Εἰνε. τῇ δὲ λέγομεν διεμπάλλον οἱ διαβάλλομεν·  

οὐκ ἔννοιαν κατέρρευσαν τὴν αὐτομοσίαν δεὶ ἀπανθωρναὶ ἰδιαίτερα; περὶ τὸν καταβολὴν τὴν αὐτομοσίαν δεὶ ἀπανθωρναὶ ἰδιαίτερα;  

τῶν ἐποιών λογῶν κρεῖττων πριν, καὶ ἀλλοῦς ταῦτα ταύτα διδασκῶν. Τοιαύτης τις ἑτερασμός ταῦτα ἐρωτήσατε καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοτέλειᾳ κοιμομένη.  

Σωκράτης ηὗτος ἔρχεται περιπέμπομεν, φασκούσαν· τὸν Αριστοτέλει καὶ ἄλλην πολλήν ἄλλην·  

ὧν ἕγαν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπιστήμην καὶ σοφὸς ἄνθρωπος· οὐκ ὡς ἀπειράμενον λέγω τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἑπιστήμῃ, ἐὰν τῆς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἑστι. μὴ πως ἕγαν ὅτι Μελήτου τοιαύτας δίκαια φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἑμοὶ τούτων, ὃ καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτε μετεστί.  

μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν τῶν πολλῶν παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιον ὑμᾶς ἄλληλοις διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσιο πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνοι διαλεγόμενοι· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσιν· φράζουσα τόν ἄλληλον, ἐὰν τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι, ὅμως οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσιν· ὑμῶν ἄλληλοις διαλεγόμενοι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσθει, ὃτι τοιαύτα ἑστι καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἑμοὶ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν λέγομεν.  

§ 4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὔδὲν ἑστιν,
οὐδὲ γ’ ἐξ ὑμῶν ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἑγὼ πανεύθεν ἐπιχειρῶ
Εὐανθίων καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀλήθες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οὖς τ’ ἔχῃ πανεύθεν ἀνδρότους, οὕτερον Θερίας τε ὁ
Δεαπτίων, καὶ Πρώτικος ὁ Κέιων, καὶ Ἡπτίκος ὁ Πλεῖος.
τούτων οὖρ εκαστὸς, οἱ ἀνέφει, οίως τ’ ἐστιν τῶν εἰς
ἐκαστὸν τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οὐσ ἔρει τοῖς ἐκαστοῖς
πόλεσι τούτων προσελθεῖν ἔσχειν ο家都知道 οὐ δοῦλων, τοὺς
πειθόντες ταῖς ἐκείνους ἐξουσίας απολυτόν τοῖς
τοῖς. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀλλοίς αὐτὴ ἐστὶ Πάριως ἐνάδει σοφὸς,
ὁ ἐγὼ πανεύθεν ἐπιθεώρησα· ἐτυχόν γαρ προσελθὼν
ἀνδρὶ, δὲ τετελεστεὶ χρήματα, σοφιστᾶς πλεῖον ἡ ἐνιωθότας
οἱ ἀλλοί, Καλλία τὸ Ἡπτίκου, τούτων οὐν
ἀνηρμὸν εἴτεν γαρ αὐτῷ δύο νίες—Ω Καλλία,
η ὧν ἔγω, εἰ μὲν σοι τῷ νίεν πῶς ἡ μορφὰς ἐνεγετὰν,
καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάτην λαβέν μαι
καὶ ἡμετέρωσαν, δὲ εἰμὲλετε αὐτῷ καλὸν τὸ καλάδω
ποιήσαν τὴν προστίχυν, ἐκ τῆς ἢ τῶν ὑποκοινοῦν τῆς ἢ τῶν
τῶν ἡπειρικῶν τῆς ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν τῶν ἢ τῶν ἐπικοι
ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστάτην, τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν νῷ ἔγεις ἐπιστάτην
λαβέν; τῆς τῆς ποιμαντικῆς ἐρήμης, τῆς ἀνθρώπης τῆς
καὶ ποιμαντικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶν; οἰμαί γὰρ σε ἐκέχει
καὶ οἱ τῶν τῶν ζῴαντων τινῶν ἐστὶ τοῖς ἔφειρεν ἢ
οὐ; Πάριως γέ, ἢ ὧν ἔγω, καὶ ποικίλους;
καὶ πόσου δοιδασκεῖ; Εὐηνος ἐσθι, ὁ Σωκρατες, Πάριως,
πειτε μοῦν. Καὶ εγὼ τὸν Εὐηνος ἐμικαλιστα, εἰ
ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔγεις ταύτην τὴν τεχνήν καὶ υἱόντως έμμε
ὀλοκληρωθείς. γνών καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαταλημμήν τοῖς καὶ
ο ήμερώμην αν, ει ηπιστάμην ταύτα. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ
ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι.

Καπ. V. Τι πολλαβαίνον αὐτὸ τις υμῶν ἱσως. Ἀλλ’,
ὁ Σώκρατες, το σου τι αὐτὸ πράγμα; τὸ δεν αἰ οἰκε-
τονίας το γὰρ σοι αὐτὸ τα γεγονός; ἐν γὰρ διήτου, σου γε ὧν ὑπὲρ
τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἐσεὶς
tοσαυτῇ δόμῃ τε καὶ λόγῳ γεγονείν, εἰ μη τε θραττεῖς
ἀλλοτί ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγει ρῦν ἔμων, τι ἐστὶ, ὑπὲρ μὴ
ήμερως τερί σου αὐτοσχεδιασμένω. Ταὐτὶ μοι δοκεῖ
δικαία λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ ὑμῶν πειράσομαι ἀποδεί-
ξαι, τι ποτ’ ἔστι τούτῳ, ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τά τε ὄνομα
cαὶ τήν διαβολήν. ἀκούστε δὴ. καὶ ἵσως μὲν δοξῶ
tοιν ὑμῶν παλί, εὖ μὲντο ἴστε, πᾶσαι ὑμῖν τὴν
ἀλήθειαν ἔρω. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δε
οὐδὲν ἂλλ’ ἡ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχηκα.
ποιῶν δέ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀνθρώπην
σοφία. τῷ δοτὶ γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός,
οὕτω δὲ τάχι ἄν, οὔς ἄρτι ἐλεγοῦ, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’
ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἰεν, ὥς εἰκέχω, τῇ λέγω. οὐ Ε
γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼνε αὐτήν ἐπίσταμαι, ἂλλ’ ὅτις φησὶν ἑυ-
θεῖας τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῆς τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὁ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μὴ θυρεῦσθε, μηδὲ ἄν δόξῳ τε
ἡμῖν μέγα λέγειν: οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι ἔρω τῶν λόγων, ἢν ἄν
ἡμῖν, ἂλλ’ εἰς ἀληθείαν ὑμῖν τῶν λέγοντα ἀνοίγω.
tῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τῆς ἑστὶ σοφία καὶ οἶα, μάρτυρα
ὑμῖν παρέξουμε τοῖς ἔθεον τῶν ἐν Αἰθήνοις. Χαίρε-21
φῶντα γὰρ ἴστε ποι. οὕτως ἐμὸς τε ἑταῖρος ἢν ἐκ νέον,
καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν
φυγήν ταύτην καὶ μεῖς ὑμῶν κατῆλθεν. καὶ ἴστε δὴ,
Όσος ἦν Χαίρεφων, ως σφοδρὸς ἐγ' ὅ τι ὄρμησειε. καὶ
dὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἔλθων ἐτὸλμησε τούτο μαν-
teūσασθαι, — καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ ἡρυβείτε, ὡς ἀν-
dρεσ. ἦρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις ἠμοῦ εἴη σοφότερος. ἀνείλεν
οὖν ἡ Πυθίαι μιδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι
ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖ-
νος τετελεύτηκε.
ήμων οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ′ οὕτως μὲν οἶναι τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ἵστερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι. ἐσκα οὖν τοῦτον ὑπεράνειαν ναοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὥστε ὅτι οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεύξετε ἐπὶ ἄλλον ἣ τῶν ἐκείνων δοκούματος σοφώτερον εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταύτα ταύτα ἐδοξέ. καὶ ἐντεύξατα κάκειν καὶ ἄλλοις τολμᾶτι ἄπηρ-χόμνη.

ΣΑΡ. VII. Μετὰ ταύτῃ οὖν ἡδή ἐφέξθη ἕα, αἰσθανομένος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδομένως, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἄναγκαιον ἐδοξέ οὖν τῷ θεῷ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἓτεόν οὖν, σκοπεύοντι τὸν χρησμὸν τῇ λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντάς τοὺς τοι δοκούμας εἰδέναι. καὶ ἕτε τὸν κόσμον, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἔνδρον. — δεῖ 22 γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ταληθῆ λέγειν — ἢ μὴ ἔγω ἐπαθὼς τὸν τουτοῦτον τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλλον ἐνδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξέ ἔμοι ὁλίγον δὲν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδείκυτο κατὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκούματες φαινότεροι ἐπιευκάστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἐχέιν. δεῖ δὴ ἕμων τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅσπερ πόνος τῶν πονοῦντος ἢν μοι καὶ ἀνθελεγκτός ἢ ματελα ἔχειτο. Μετὰ γὰρ 35 τοὺς πολυτικοὺς ἕα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιήσας τοὺς τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοὺς τῶν διφαράμησι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ηνταύθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφόρος καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτών ἀμαζευστερον ἐκείνων ὅρτα. ἀναλαβάνοις οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἐμοί ἐδοξέκει μάλαστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἄν αὐτῶν τῇ λέγοιεν, ἐρ ἄμα τι καὶ ἀνθέλεγκτος τῷ ἐπτείνειν, ὅ ἄνδρες, ταληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ἐπείτεν. ὡς ἐπος γὰρ
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΩΣ.

eπειδή, ὀλγούν αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ παρόντες ἀν βέλτιων ἔλεγον περὶ δὲν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγραμον οὖν καὶ οὲ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλγῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιεῖν, ἀ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἀστερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοῦδοι καὶ γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσασι δὲ οὔδεν ὁν λέγουσι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἄμα ἡσύχημα αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν πολὺς οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι, ἀνθρώπων, ἀν ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, τι αὐτὸς οἴνομεν περιγεγογείναι ὁστερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

§ 2. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ὁ ή σε ἐμαντῷ γὰρ ἐξαύδεστα οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένοι, ὡς ἔτοι εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ ἤ ἡ ἐφίλοι ὅτι εὐφησομί πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἐφεύσην, ἀλλὰ ἐπισταντο δέ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπιστάμη καί οὐκ ταύτης σοφότεροι ἤσαν. ἀλλ' ὁ ἀνδρὸς Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξασάν ἐχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὁστερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημοσιογοι. διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζονται ἀκατος ἢ καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτή ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπεκρυπτεῖν. ὁστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαντῶν ἀνερωτάν ὑπὲρ τὸν χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἃν οὔτως ὁστερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὃν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἡ ἀμφότερα ἡ ἐκείνων ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρυπτήμην οὖν ἐμαντῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυστελοὶ ὁστερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

§ 3. Ἐκ ταυτησι δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὅ ἂν ἄρ ἀνδρὸς Ἀθηναίοι, πολλὰ καὶ μὲν ἀπεχθεῖα λοι ἔγνωσα
καὶ οἶαι χαλεπῶταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὅστε πολλάς διαβολός ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονεῖναι, ὅν ὡμη δὲ τοῦτο λέγε-σθαι, σοφός εἶναι. οἴονται γὰρ μὲ ἐκάστοτε ὁι παρόντες ζῷα ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφόν, ἐὰν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξῃ· τὸ δὲ κυνωνεύει, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὅπι τὸ θεὸς σοφός εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ φαίνεται τούτη ὁ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκε-χρηστικῇ δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὑμῶν, ἐμὲ παραδείγμα ποιοῦ-μενος, ὥσπερ ὅτι εἶ ἐπίστασιν, ὃ ὁ Οὐθος ὑμῶν, ὁ ἀνθρώ-ποι, σοφοτάτος ἐστὶν, ὅστις ὃσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν, ὃτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ ἐγὼ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα ὁλοκληρών σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βου-θᾶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὥστε ὃν ἐστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας ὅστε τὰ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου ὅστε τῶν οἰκεῖων, ἄλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμί διὰ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείας.

Σερ. X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτους οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπεκολου-θοῦντες, οἷς μάλαστα σχολὴ ἐστὶν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτῶματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶναι ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· καὶ παῦε, οἷοι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τί ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅλης ἡ σοφία. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὁπ' αὐτῶν ἐξετάζωμεν ἐμὸι ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τής ἐστὶ μιαρῶτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὰν τῆς αὐτοῦ
Δεικτά, ο οίκοι και οι διδάσκοντες έχουν μεν ούδέν είπεών, άλλα όγυνοσίων, ένα δὲ μή δοκώσιν ἀπορείν, τά κατά πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφόυντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὃτι τά μετέωρα καὶ τά υπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοῦς μῆ νομίζειν, καὶ τῶν ἄττω λόγον κρεῖττο ποιεῖν. τά γὰρ ἀλήθη, οίμαι, οὐκ οἱ ἐξελομένες λέγετε, ὃτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἀτε οὖν, οἰμαῖ, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ Εὐπολλοὶ, καὶ Ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πτιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλῆκασιν ὑμῶν τά ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ 'Ανυτὸς καὶ Ὀυκόν, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχώμενος, 'Ανυτὸς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν 24 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Ὀυκόν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἤρημῶν. ὡστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, 'Αχαμάξωμ' ἂν, εἰ οἶός τ' εἶχαν ἐγὼ υμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὁλικον χρόνον, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονοῦσαν. Ταῦτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὡς ἄνδρες 'Αχαμαξόμενος, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμίκρον ἀποκρυφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγοι οὕδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καλτοὶ οἶδα σχέδων, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. δ' καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τάληθη λέγω καὶ ὃτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἢ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τᾶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα Β' ἐστι καὶ εάν τι νῦν εάν τις ἤσθησητε ταύτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

Συμπόν. XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὃν οἱ πρῶτοι μου καθηγοροὶ καθηγοροῦν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἰκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς ἐμὰς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολον, ὅς φησίν, καὶ τοὺς ύστερους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὕτες γὰρ δὴ, ὅσπερ ἐτέρως τούτως.
διντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐτή την τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὄνοι. Σωκράτης φησίν ἄδικειν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ πόλεις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαμόνια καίνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλήματο τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἄδικείν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἄδικείν φησι Μέλητον, ὅτι ὁ φύσις ἡμεῖς ἡμαῖς, ῥᾴδιος εἰς ἀγάπην καὶ ἔστας ἀνδρῶν, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κόλοσσα σα, ὃν τούτῳ τούτῳ πάντως ἐμέλησεν. ὃς δὲ τούτο ἑπτῶς ἔχει, πειράζομαι καὶ ἕμιν ἐπιδεξάμη.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

δωφελούντων. τί δαί δή, οὔδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους
25 ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τί δαί οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ
οἱ βουλευταί. Ἀλλὰ ἢρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκ-
κλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;
ἡ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι.
Πάντες ἢρα, ὅσο εἴπετε, Ἀνυμαῖοι καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ
ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἄγω δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέ-
γεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γὰρ ἐμοῦ
κατεγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ

Β ὑποτι σοι δοκεῖ ἔχεις; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-
οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνδρωποὶ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τὶς ὁ
dιαφθείρων; ἡ τοῦνατὼν τοῦτῳ πάντως μὲν τὸς ὁ
βελτίους οἶος τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλον ἄλλον τῶν καὶ ἐκ

ιππωτι·

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάντερ εὐνόω τι καὶ χρῶνται ὑποτι,
dια-
φθείρουσιν; οὔχ οὖτως ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ὑπο-
τιν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἔως; πάντως δή ποι,
εάν τε οὐ καὶ Ἀνυμαῖος οὐ φήτε εάν τε φήτε. πολλὰ

γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰς περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν

μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρω. οἱ δὲ ἀλλοί ὁφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ

γὰρ, ὁ Μέλητε, ἰκανῶς ἐπιδεικνύσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲν τούτῳ

ἐφρονείς τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἁποφαίνεις τὴν σαυ-

τοῦ ἀμελείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὁν ἐμὲ
eiságεις.

ΣΑΡ. Χ.Π. Ἐτὶ δὲ τῇ ἐπί ἐπί, ὁ πρὸς Δίος Μέ-
λητε, πότερον ἔστιν οίκειν ἀμειων ἐν πολῖταις χρη-
στοῖς, ἡ ποιήσας; ὃ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι

χαλεπῶν ἔρωτον ὁμίχλος μὲν ποιητοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργά-

ζουσι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκαλούς οὕτως, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ

Δἀγαθοὶ τί; Πάνω γε. Ἐστὶν οὖν δεός βουλευταί ὅπω
τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ γαθεί καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρί
νεσθαι. ἦσθ' ὡστὶς βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δήτα.
Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα
tοὺς νεατέρους καὶ πονηρότερους ποιούντα ἐκόντα ἢ
ἀκούτα; Ἐκόντα ἐγὼ γαί. Τι δήτα, ὦ Μέλητε; το-
σούτων συ ἐμοὺ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλι-
kόσθε ὡν, ὡστε σύ μὲν ἐγνωκας, ὡτι οἱ μὲν κακὸι κακὸν
τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ Ε
ἀγαθοὶ ἄγαθῶν ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσούτον ἀμαθίας ἤκου,
ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἄγνωσθι, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω
τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,
ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσούτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φήσῃ σὺ;
ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι ὦ πεῖδομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, ὡμοι δὲ οὐνῦ
ἄλλον ἀνδρότων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ ὦ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ 26
diaφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεῦδε. εἰ
dὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκούσων ἀμαρ-
tημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἴδια λα-
βόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν
μάδω, παύσομαι ὦ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ εὐγγενεῖσθαι
μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ
eἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσσως δεομέ-
nους, ἀλλ' ὦ μαθήσεως.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙΒ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο
μὲν δῆλον ἢ δὴ ἐστὶν, ὦ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μέλητῳ τοῖς
τοῖς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡμοὶ
dὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς μὲ φήσι διαφθείρεω, ὦ Μέλητε,
toῖς νεατέροις; ἢ δῆλον δή, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἠ
ἐγκατώ, ὦ δεις διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεις οὔ τὸ πόλε

νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαμόνια καίνα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι
dιδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν
θεῶν, δὲν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ
ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι
ομαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζεις εἰναι
tως θεοῦς, καὶ αὐτός ἀρα νομίζω εἰναι θεοῦς καὶ οὐκ
εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικεῖ, οὐ μέντοι
οὐσπερ γε ἢ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἔτερους, καὶ τούτ' ἔστιν ὁ μοι
ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἔτερους· ἡ παντάπασι μὲ φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν
νομίζειν θεοῦς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦ-
tα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὡθα-

Δισθείρει Μέλητε, ἵνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἔλατον οὐδὲ
σελήνῃ ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἰναι, ὡστερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄν-
θρωποι; Μᾶ Δι', ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν
ἕλιον λίθον φησίν εἰναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἄνα-
ξαγόρου οἱεί κατηγορεῖν, ὁ φίλε Μέλητε· καὶ οὗτο
καταφρονεῖς τῶν καὶ οἱ εἰσὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπεῖρος γραμμά-
tων εἰναι, ὡστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τα Ἄναξαγόρου βι-
βλία, τοῦ Κλαξομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων, καὶ
δὴ καὶ οἱ νεοί ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μανθάνουν, ὡς ἐξειτὶ
Εὐνοτε, εἰ πάνιν πόλλοι, ὄραμα ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας
προμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελάω, ἐὰν προσπονήται
ἐαυτῷ εἰναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὗτος ἄτοιχα βύτα. ἀλλ' ὁ
πρὸς Διός, οὕτως σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεοῦ εἰναι;
Οὐ μὲντοι μᾶ Δι', οὐδ' ὄπωστιοιν. Χ' Ἀπιστός γ' εἰ, ὁ
Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πάνυ εἰναι
ὑβριστής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνός τὴν ἱπατίν.
ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράψα-σαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ὡσπέρ αἶνυμα ἐπιτιθέντι διαπειρῶ-μένῳ, Ἄρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοὶ χαριευτικομένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαιπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἑναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπέρ ἂν εἴ ἐποίη Άδικεὶ Σωκράτης θεός οὐ νομίζω, ἀλλὰ θεός νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο ἐστὶ παλιόντος.

ΣΑΡ. ΧV. Εὐνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταύτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὡσπέρ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἡμᾶς παρηθησά-Β μην, μέμνησθε μοι ἢ Ἰορμβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῇ εἰσδότῃ τρόπῳ τούς λόγους ποιόμαι.

'Εστιν ὅστις ἀνδρὼτων, ὃ Μέλητε, ἀνδρώτεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνδρώτων δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα Ἰορμ-βεῖν. ἔσθ' ὅστις ὑποτένησον μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἵππηκα δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητάς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἀριστεῖ ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοῖς. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐτὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας ο δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἄμω ψυχῆς, ὅτι μόνῳ ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτοῦ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκούν δαιμονία μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζει καὶ διδάσκεις, εἰτ' οὐν καίνα εἴτε παλαιά· ἅλλ' οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω εν τῇ ἀντιγραφή. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δὴ πολλῆ
Ἀναγκῇ νομίζειν μὲ ἔστιν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθημι γάρ σε ὀμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει.

ὅτους δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεούς γε ἱγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παιδέως; φής ἢ οὐ; Πάννυ γε. Οὐκοίν εἰπέρ δαίμονας ἱγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φήσι, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη δ' ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαρίειτθεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἱγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἱγείονται πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἱγούμαι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ δαίμονες θεῶν παιδέως εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀλλῶν, ὃν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἄν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παιδέως ἱγούτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὀμολογοὺς γὰρ ἀν ἀτοποὺν εἴη, ὀστερὸν δ' ἄν εἰ τις ἱπτῶν ἔμεν παιδέως ἱγούτο ἢ καὶ δυνὸν τοὺς ἱμῶνος, ἱπτῶν δὲ καὶ δυνὸς μὴ ἱγούτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὁ Μέλητος, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτως σὺ ταύτα οὐχὶ ἀποτελόμενοι ἡμῶν ἐγράφω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὡς τι ἐγκαλοῦσ εἵμοι ἄλλης ἄδικημα· ὅτως δὲ σὺ τινα πείδως ἄν καὶ σμικρῶν νοῦν ἐχούτα ἄνθρωπων, ἢς [οὗ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἀνδρός] ἐστὶ καὶ δαίμονια καὶ θεῖα ἱγείσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἱρας, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἔστιν.

Cap. XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδίκως κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ικανὰ καὶ ταύτα· ὅ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπέχεισθα γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὐ ἵστε ὅτι ἄλλης ἑστί· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρῆσει, ἐἀντερ αἰρῆ, οὗ Μελήτος, οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ὧ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνοι, ἂ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ
ἀγαθὸς ἄνδρας ἦρθεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή.

'Ἰσως δὲ ἀν ὦν εἴπω τις, Εἴτε οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιούτων ἐπιτίθεμαι ἐπιτηδεύσας, εἰ δὲ κινδυνεύεις μνη ἀποδανεῖς; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἀν δικαιοῦν λόγον ἀντείπομι, ὅτε Οὐ καλὸς λέγεις, ὁ ἄνδρατη, εἰ οἶει δεῖν κινδύνου ὑπολογὶζεις δι' τοῦ ζην ἡ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὃφελὸς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δικαια ἡ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ.

φαίλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σφ λόγῳ εἰεν τῶν ἡμιδέων ὅσοι ἐν Τρολα τετελευτήκασιν, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέττος νῖός, δι τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατέφρονησα παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὡστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομένῳ Ἐκτόρα ἀποκτείναι, δεῦς οὔσα, οὔτωσι πως, ὁς ἐγκαλεῖ, Ω παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσῃς Πατρόκλον τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτόρα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποδανεῖ· αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεδ' Ἐκτόρα πότιμος ἐτοίμως· ὃ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλγιώργησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας Θώτεν τῷ ζην κακὸς ὡς καὶ τοῦς φίλους μὴ τιμωρεῖ, Ἀυτίκα, φησί, τεθνατό δίκην ἐπιθείς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ὡς μὴ ἐνιαύτε ἐν κακογέλαστος παρὰ ἡμοὶ κορονίσων. Ἄγος ἀροῦρης, μὴ αὐτῶν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχεις, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἄν τις ἐαυτὸν τάξη ἢ ἂγασάμενος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοιτε κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.
CAP. XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεῖν ἂν εἰδῆς εἰργασμένον, ἐδώ αἵρεσις Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ, ἔτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐταττων, ὁσ ὑμεῖς ἐλέσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαια καὶ ἐν Αμφιτόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἐταττων ἔμενον, ὡσπέρ καὶ ἄλλος τοῖς, καὶ ἐκκυνδύνουν ἀποθανεῖν, τρῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήλην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλωσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ἔρη καὶ ἔξετάζοντα. 29 ἐμαντόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἡ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πράγμα λίπομι τὴν τάξιν. δεικνύν μὲν ἂν εἰ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ πιάνει με δικαίος εἰςάγοντι τις εἰς δικαιοστηρίον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς εἶναι, ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδίως θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφῶς εἶναι, οὐκ ὡς τῷ χάρα τῷ θάνατον δεδείεαι, οἱ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀπίνῃ ἡ δοκεῖν σοφῶς εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἄστιν ὧς οὐκ οἰδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τῷ θάνατῳ οὐδὲ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνδρόπορο πάντων μέγιστον τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδαισε δ’ ὡς εἴ eιδότες, ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ὁ θεὸς ἁμαθία ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδησις, ὅτι τοῦ οἰεστει εἰδέναι ὧς οὐκ οἰδεν; ἐγὼ δὲ, οἱ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνδρόπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφότερον τοῦ φαίνῃ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδος ἢ καὶ ἐπηρεὶ τῶν ἐν Ὄλιου ὦτις καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῇ βελτίων, καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνδρόπορῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, οὐδὲ οἴδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὧς μὴ οἴδα εἰ ἁμαθαὶ ἐντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ ὁ φεύξομαι. ἢ μὲν οὖν ὧς οὐς ἠμίλε, ἢ ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχήν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύτερο
εἰσελθεῖν, ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφεύγῃσεν ἢ ὅτι ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖσες ἐπιτυθέντες & Ἑξελθείς διδάσκεις πάντες πανταπαί σιαφθαρψοντας, ἐξ ἢ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε, ὦ Ἑξελθείς, νῦν μὲν Ἁνύτω οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφεμέν σε, ἔτι τοῦτο μέντοι, εἰ ὅτι μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβεται μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εὰν δὲ ἄλλος ἐτί τούτῳ πρᾶττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ἄτερ εἴποι, ἔτι τοῦτος ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναιοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ Ὁσὶ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐωστερ ἄν ἐμπνεό καὶ οἷός τε ὃ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφοῦν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος τα καὶ ἐνδεικνυμένους ὅτι ἄν ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἴτιπερ εἰώθα, ὦτι, ὦ Ἀριστε ἄνδρον, Ἄθηναιος ὅν, πόλεως τῆς μεγάλης καὶ εὐδοκιμίας τῆς εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ισχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελοῦμενος, ὅτις σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτις ὡς βελτίωσθ' ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ ὡδε φρονίζεις; καὶ εάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφιβατηκή καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀφῆσον αὐτῶν ὡδε ἀπειμα, ἀλλ' ἐρώτησαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτήσασθι ἄρετῆν, φάναι δὲ, ὁνειδῶ, ὦτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλεχιστοῦ ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανλάτερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα τιθα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτι τις ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ἕτερῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοὐσ ἄστοις, ὅσῳ μοι ἑγνυτέρῳ ἐστὶ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ Ὁσιος, εὖ ἠστ. καὶ ἔγω ὀλομαι οὐδὲν τως ὑμῖν μείζον
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

άγαθον γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεοτέρους καὶ πρεσβύτερους μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ

Β οὗτο σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τοῦ ἐρήμου ἐρται. 45. λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἀλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνδρῶποις ἀπανταὶ καὶ ἰδία καὶ ἐνδονῖα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγουν διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἀν εἶ θελαστερά. εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησίν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνω ἂν, ὅ ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναίοι, ἢ πείθε 

σε Ἄντων, ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφετέ, ἢ μὴ ἀφετέ, ὃς ἐμοῦ ὁ οὐκ ἀντίστοιτο ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τε 

ινάναι.

ΚΑΠ. XVIII. Μὴ ἀπορεῖτε, ὅ ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναίοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμελεῖτε μοι ὁς ἐδεήσην υμῶν, μὴ ἀπορεῖν ἐφ' ὃς ἄν λέγων, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὄνησεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄτα ὑμῶν ἐρείν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' ὃς ἵσως βοηθηθεσθε. ἂλλα μηδαμός ποιεῖτε τούτο. Εὖ γὰρ ἱστε, ἐὰν ἐμε ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὅντα, ὁδὸν ἤγω λέγων, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείξων βλάψετε ἢ ύμᾶς αὐτοὺς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἄλλων βλάψευεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄντωνυς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ὁἷομαι λεῖτος ἐίναι ἀμείναν ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χελώνονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνημέν μεντ' ἄν ἵσως, ἢ ἐξελάσεις, ἢ ἀτυμάσεις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἵσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ὁἷομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἂ οὗτος νυνι ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκους ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνυναι. νῦν οὖν, ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἄθηναίων.
πολλοῦ δὲν ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητη περὶ τὴν τού Θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ραδίως ἄλλοι τοιούτων εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρου εἴπεῖν, προσκεκλεμένοι τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡσπερ ἴπποι μεγάλοι μὲν καὶ γενναλφ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωδεστέρον καὶ δεομένω ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύστος τυφοῦ· οἱν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθείκεναι, τοιοῦτον τινα, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίξων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ἀλλήν πανταχοῦ προσκαδί-ει ἔως τοιοῦτος οὐν ἄλλος οὐ ραδίως ὑμῖν γενησεται, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἔμοι πείδησθε, φείεσθε μού. ὑμεῖς δ' ἵσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάξοντες ἐγείρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειδήμενοι Ἀνύτω, ραδίως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε, εἰτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καὶ δευδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ Θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψῃ εἰρήμενος ὑμῶν, ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὅλῳ τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδοσθαί, ἐν Ἰένδε ἂν κατανοήσατε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνδραπίνῳ ἐοικε τὸ Β ἐμὲ τῶν μέν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνεχεσθαί τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελομένων τοσαύτα ἤδη ἐτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἄει, ἵδια ἐκάστῳ προσίτων, ὡσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφόν πρεσβύτερον, πείδουντα ἐπιμελείσθαι ἄρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνοι καὶ μισθῶν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγου· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοῖ, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι, τάλα πάντα ἀνασχύνεσθ' οὐτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτ' ὡς ὑπὸ ὁλ' τε ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχυννη-
Ο σαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, δός ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἔπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ γιτήσα. Ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, δός ἂληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

Cap. XIX. Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δύοιεν ἄτοπον ἐίναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἱδία μὲν ταῦτα ἐμμυθουλεύω περιων καὶ πολυπραγμονὸν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὕμετρον ἐμμυθουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστίν ὁ χρείας ἐμοῖ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον

Δ γύγνηται [φωνῇ], ὅ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἑτκώμοις. Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἔμοι δὲ τούτ’ ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῇ τις γνωριμένη, ἢ ἄταν γένηται, ἂει ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, δ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. τούτ’ ἐστίν ὁ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντίος. εὔ γὰρ ἵπτε, δ ἂνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχειρήσα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, Ἐπάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλῃ καὶ οὔτ’ ἂν ἕμαι ὅφελής οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἂν ἐμαυτὸν. καὶ μοι μή ἀκῆθος ἐλέγοντι τάλην ἥ’ οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν ὅς τις ἀνδρῶπων σωφρότητα οὔτε ἕμαι οὔτε ἄλλο τρέξαι οὐδὲν γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δικαιολοίπον πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει

32 γύγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίον ἔστι τὸν τῷ δυτὶ μαχοῦμεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δίκαιου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει δίλγων χρόνον σωφρόσυναι, ἁδικεῖτε, ἀλλ’ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

Cap. XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγιόγει ὑμῶν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὁ χρείας τιμάτε, ἐργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τα ἐμοὶ ἐμμυθοβεβηκότα, ἵ’ εἰδήτε, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθῳμι παρά τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσαι ἢ ἀνα-
τον, μὴ ὑπελκον δὲ ἀμα καὶ ἄμ' ἀν ἀπολοίμην. ἔρω Neighbor, ύμων φορτικα μὲν και δικανικα, ἀληθη δε. 'Ενώ γάρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀγαναζου, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχην οὐδεμιαν πώποτε ἔρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δε καὶ ἐτυχεν ἢμῶν ἢ φυλὴ Ὀντιοχαὶ πρυτενεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους, τοὺς ἐκ τῆς υμαικς ἐβούλευε δὲ ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑπερφρ χρόνῳ τάσιν ύμων ἐδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτανεών ἤκαντιώδην ύμων μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοῦ νόμου, καὶ ἐναντία ἐσφημάτων καὶ ἐτοσίων ἄντων ενδικοίναι με καὶ ἀπαγεῖν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ύμων κελεύοντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δυκαλού θημνο μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἡ με' ύμων ο γενεσθαι μη δικαια βουλομένων, φοβησέντα δεσμάν ή Θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἢν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. 'Επειδὴ δὲ διλαγραία ἔγενετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐ μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Ἡσλον προσεταξαν ἄγαγείν ἐκ Σαλαμίνως Λέοντα τῶν Σαλαμίνων, ἵν' ἀποδάνοι οὰ δὴ καὶ ἂλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλομένοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτίων. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὖ λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἔρξα αὐ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἔμοι Θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ δ μὴ ἀγροκότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὅτιον, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτοι δὲ τὸ πώς μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἀρχη οὐκ ἐξεπλήξεν οὕτως ισχυρὰ οὕσα, ὡστε ἄδικον τι ἐργάζασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Ἡσλον ἐξήλθομεν, οὶ μὲν τέτταρες ὁχοντο Ἁθοντιον καὶ Ἱγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρχομη ἀπόδικα σκάδε. καὶ ἑσως ἂν διᾶ ταῦτ' ἀπεδανον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ἀρχ.
Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ύμῶν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΙ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἰσεῖς τοσάδε ἐτή διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπραττόν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιος ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τὸς δικαίου καὶ, ὡσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε εἰ πού τι ἐπράξα, τοιούτοις φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτος, ούδεν πάσοτε ἐνυγχωρήσας οὐδέν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλο οὔτε τούτων οὔδεν, οὔς διὰ διαβάλλωσις μὲ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἰναι, ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πάσοτη ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τῖς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιδεύμει ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος, εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πάσοτε ἐφιδίνησα. οὐδὲ Β. χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνου διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνον δ' οὖ, ἂλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίω καὶ πένητε παρέχω ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρωτίας, καὶ εάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὅν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούκες ἐγώ, εἴτε τις χρηστός γυνεῖται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίους τὴν-αὐτάν ὑπέχομι, διὶ μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν μηδὲν πάσοτε μάθημα μήτε ἔδιδαξα. εἰ δὲ τῖς φησιν παρ' ἐμοὶ πάσοτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ τί τι μή καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ λογεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἅληθῆ λέγει.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΠ. Ἀλλ' διὰ τί δή 'ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ οἱ ἁλροῦνι τινες πολών χρόνων διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκό-γετε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· πάσαν ύπὼ τὴν ἁλήσειαν ἐγώ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούόντες ἁλροῦσιν ἐξεταξομένοις τοῖς πρισμένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσί δ' οὐ· ἐστι γὰρ οὐκ
ἀνδὲς. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὸς τρόπῳ. φάτερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεαλ μοῦρο μετὰ ἀνθρώποι καὶ ὅτι οὖν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἄλλη ἐστι καὶ εὐδελεύτα, εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ τοῖνεν τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρῃ, τοὺς δὲ ἔλεγε καὶ ἔλεγεν. ὅτε τοῦτο, εἰτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνώσαν, ὅτι νέοις οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακῶν πῶτοτε τῷ ξυνεθοῦσα, νῦν αὐτοὺς ἀναβαινομεν ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἠθελοῦν, τῶν οἰκεῖων τινῶν τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἰπέρ ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπετέθεσαν αὐτοῖς οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμερέσθαι. παρά τοῦ δὲ πάρεσσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ έκταν-θοί, οὕς ἐγὼ ὀρὼ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτοσι, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τούδε πατήρ· ἐπετα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφέττιος, Αἰσχύλου τούδε πατήρ. ἔτη Ἀντιφών ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὔτοσι· Ἑπιγένεως πατήρ. Ἀλλοι τούλιν οὔτοι, ὃν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνας, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεοδότιδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου· καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ἐκείνος τις αὐτοῦ καταδεικτεί —, καὶ Πάραλος ὑπὲ, ὁ Ἀποδόκων, ὁ Ἰεάνης ἀδελφὸς· ὅδε τε τῆ 'Αδείμαντων, τῆ 'Αριστωνος, οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὔτοι Πλάτων, καὶ Διαντόδωρος, ὁ 'Απολλόδωρος ὁδὲ ἀδελφὸς. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ύμῖν εἰπέν, ὅπως πολλοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρακάσφεσαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τὸτε ἐπελάθητο, νῦν παρακά-σφεσαί, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦ-
τοῦ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πάντως νῦν εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακῷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέ-
Βλητός καὶ Ἀντός. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι
tάχ’ ἀν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι,
πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα
ἀλλον ἔχουσιν λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ’ ἢ τῶν ὅρθων
τε καὶ δίκαιων, ὅτι ἐπιώσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ,
ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι; —

(ΣΑΡ. ΞΧΠ. Ἐπει δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ὃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχω,
ἀν ἀπολογείσαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ ἀλλα ἵσως
τοιαύτα. Τάχα δ’ ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειν ἀναμνη-
σθε οὖν, ἐι ὃ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττων τοῦτοι τού ἀγώνος
ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δι-
kαστάς μετὰ πολλῶν διακρύνων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀνα-
βιβασάμενος, ἵνα τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους
τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἄρα
τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δοξαίμη,
tὸν ἐσχάτων κίνδυνον. τάχ’ ἂν οὖν τις ταύτα ἐννοήσας
ἀδιάδεστον ἀν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθείς αὐτοῖς
τοῦτοις θεῖοτο ἂν μετ’ ὀργῆς τὴν ψήφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν

Δούτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ ἔγινε, εἰ δ’ οὖν, ἐπιει-
kῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων, ὅτι Ἐμοὶ,
ὁ ἀριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν τοῦ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι, καὶ γὰρ
τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Όμήρου, οὔ, ἐγὼ ἂν ἄπο ὅρατον οὐδ’,
ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ
οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νιεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τρεῖς,
εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἦλλ’ ἄμως οὐδέν
αὐτῶν δεύτερο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ὑποθετικ
φίλασσαι. Τι δέ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ αὐθαυδιζόμενος, οὐκ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς ἄτιμά-
ζον· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν Ἀρράκεως ἔγγιν ἐχον πρὸς Δάνατον Ἡ Ε-
μή, ἀλλ' Ἀρράκεως πρὸς οὖν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν
καὶ ὃλη τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων
οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικώνθε δυνα καὶ τούτῳ τούνομα
ἐχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἄλλης εἰτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν
dεδογμένου γέ ἐστι τὸν Ζωκράτη διαφέρειν τω τῶν
πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οί δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν ἢ
εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἄνδρεια εἴτε ἄλλη ἡ τινιοῦν ἀρετή το-
ὐτοί τοίς ἐσονται, αἰσχροῦν ἢ εἰτ', οἴουστε ἐγὼ πολλάκις
ἑώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίννοντε δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι,
Δαμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους
πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὡσπερ Ἀρράκεως ἐσομέ-
νων, εάν ὑμεῖς αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀποκτεῖντε· οὔτ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦ-
σων αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὡστ' ἂν τινα καὶ
tῶν ἐξεον ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναῖων
εἰς ἀρετήν, οὐδ' αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ B
ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκήρυσσιν, οὐτοὶ γυναικῶν οὐδὲν
diaφέρουσι. ταῦτα γὰρ, οὐκ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτε
ἡμᾶς χρῆ τοιεῦν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅτιον εἶναι, οὔτ',
ἀν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμῶς ἑπιτρέπειν, ἀλλ' τούτο αὐτὸ
ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολύ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖτο τοῦ
tά ἐλεεινά ταύτα ὅραμα εἰςἀγοντος καὶ καταγέ-
λαστον τήν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἴσοιχίαν ἄγοντος.

Carp. XXIV. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὁ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ
dικαιῶν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲν
deμεινον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ δεδάσκει καὶ πελείν. οὖ
γὰρ εἰπτοῦτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, εἰπτὶ τῷ καταχαρ
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΙΣ.

ζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ κρύνει ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοιον ὡς χαρμεῖσθαι ὅσ ἐὰν δεκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ διὰκόσμει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκούν χρῆ οὐτε ἡμᾶς ἐδίξειν ἡμᾶς ἐπιτροπεῖν, οὐδὲτεροι γὰρ ἐὰν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄξιον με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πράττειν, ὃ μήτε ἤγοι μαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὁσιά, ἀλλὰς τε πάντως ἡ Δήμος, μᾶλλον μέντοι καὶ ἁσεβεῖς φευγοῦσα ὑπὸ Μεγίστου τουτου. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείδομι ἡμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεισθαι βιαζόμενον ὃμομοκότας, θεοίς ἐν διδάκτουμι μη ἤγεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνὸς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγορηθήν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὶ οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεὶ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅς ουδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέπει καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀριστα εἰναι καὶ ἡμῖν.

ΕΤΟΣ. ΧΧV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἁγιασκεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβῆκεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονε τῷ γεγονός τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἄριστον. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὴν ἐγγυνε υἱῶν παρὰ ὀλῦν ἐσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ. νῦν δὲ, ὡς δοκεῖ, εἰ τρεῖς μῶν μυετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποστεφευγὴ ἂν. Με λητοῦ μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποστέφευγα καὶ οὐ μᾶνον ἀποστέφευγα, ἀλλὰ ταυτὶ δήλον τούτῳ γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη "Ἀντως καὶ Δύκων κατηγορησώμεθεν", ἐμοὶ, καὶ ὁ χρίσος δραχμῶν, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸν τέμπυτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων."
Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἄνδρας θανάτου.

Εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν τίνος ὑμῶν ἀντιμιμήσομαι, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναῖος; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἤξιας; τί οὖν; τί ἤξιος εἰμι παρεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἦσυχιαν ἤγον ἀλλ’ ἀμελήσας διότεροι οἱ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ ὀικονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἦσομοσιῶν καὶ στάσεως σεων τῶν εἰ τῇ πόλει γαγομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὑπὶ ἐπικεκέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὅστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ὑμτα σώζεσθαι, ἑντάθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ ἀλλοὶ μὴς ὑμῶν 1, 2, 3, μὴς ἐμαυτὸ ἐμελλὼν μηδὲν ὅφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδίῳ ἐκαστὸν ἦν ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἐνεργεία ἢ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἑντάθα ἦν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πεῖθεν μὴ πρὸτερον μὴτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελείας, πρὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελείας ἢ ὅτις ὅς ἑλτός καὶ φρονιμότατος ἐσται μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὸν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τῶν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπιμελείσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παραδείχθην τοιοῦτος ὁ; ἀγαθόν τι, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναῖος, εἰ δεῖς γε κατὰ τὴν ἤξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμάσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἄγαθόν τοιοῦτον, ὁ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοι. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι εὐργέτη, δεομένῳ ὃγεν σχολήν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οἷς ἔσδ’ δ’ τι μάλλον, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναῖος, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μάλλον ἢ εἰ τοῖς ὑμῶν ὑπὲρ ἢ ἐνυφώδη ἢ ξεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάδαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεὶ εὐδαμονίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι. καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφής οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δεόμαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τῷ
Δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν
πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως.


cap. xxvii. Ἡσώς οὖν ὕμων καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων
παραπλησίως δοκόλ ἕτερον ὦστ’επὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ
τῆς ἀντιβολῆςς, ἀπαυγαδεῖτομενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ τοιώδες μᾶλλον.
πεπεισμαί ἐγώ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων,
ἀλλὰ ὕμᾶς τούτο ὦ πελεὼ· ὄλγου γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλή-
λοις διειλέγεμεθα· ἔτει, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἤν ὕμων νόμος,
καὶ ὦστε καὶ ἀλλοις ἀνθρώπων, περὶ Ἡσανὸν μῆ μεν
Βήμεραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπεισθητε ἀν.
νῦν δ’ οὐ μηδίων ἐν χρόνῳ ὄλγορ μεγάλας διαβολὰς
ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγώ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν
πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσεως καὶ κατ’ ἐμαυτοῖ
ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἂξιός εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι
tοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτός. τι δεῖσαι; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτο,
οὗ Μελητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φήμι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐτ’ εἰ
ἀγαθὸν οὐτ’ εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἐλωμαί
ὅν εὐ οἴδ’ ὧτε κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο τιμησάμενος; τό-
ὀτέρου δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεὶ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ,
δου-
λεύνοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καλισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα; ἀλλὰ
χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἔως ἰν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταυτῶν
μοί ἔστιν, ὀπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μιο χρῆ-
ματα, ὅπως ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσομαι; 
ἐσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτο τιμήσατε. πολλὴ μὲν ἄν
με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχΟΥ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως
ἀλόγιστος εἰμι, ὅστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι
ὕμεις μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἴοῖ τε ἐγένεσθε ἐν-
φυκέων τὰς ἐμᾶς διατρεβᾶς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὕμων
βαρύτεραι γεγοναί καὶ ἐπιφθονότεραι, ὡστε ἐχτεῖτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλαπήναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἰδούσι ῥαῦλος. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς ὁμιλοῦσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένη καὶ ἐξελαυνομένη ἦν. εὖ γὰρ οἴδ' ὅτι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐλθὼν, λέγοντος ἔμοι ἀκροάσοντι οἱ νέοι οὕπερ ἐνίδε. κἂν μὲν τούτοις ἀπελαύνω, οὕτω ἔμε αὐτοὶ ἐξελὼσι, πεἰδήνες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέ-Ερες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΒ. *Ἱσος οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Συγών δὲ καὶ ἱσνικίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐχ οίος τ' ἐσεῖ ὡμῶν ἐξελὼν ζήν; Τούτῳ δὴ ἔστω πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεισιά τινας ύμων, εάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ ἄρτῳ ἀπει-θέν τούτ' ἐστι καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἀδύνατον ἱσνικίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πεισεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰροφενομένοι· εάν τ' αὐτ' λέγω, ὅτι 38 καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἂγαθὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τούς λόγους ποιεῖνθαί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὁν ύμεῖς ἔμοι ἀκόουες διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτῶν καὶ ἄλλων ἐξετάζοντος, ὅ δὲ ἀνεξ-ταστὸς βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐτί ἤτον πεισεσθέ μοι λέγοντε· τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἕγω φημι, ὦ ἀνδρές, πειδήνει δ' οὐκ ῥάδιον. Καὶ ἐγώ ἁμ' ὁσικισμαί εμαυτῶν ἄξιον κακοῦ οὐδενὸς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἄν χρημάτων ὡσα ἐμελ-λον ἐκτίσειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ·—οὐ γὰρ ἔστω, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην εκτισάς τοσοῦτον βουλεύθην· μοι τιμήσαι. ἦσος δ' ἂν δυναίμην εκτί-σαι ἓμιν μνήμ' ἀργυρίου· τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμᾶσαι.
Πλάτων δὲ ὤδε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ
Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλάδωρος κελεύουσι με τριά-
kοντα μοῦν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι τιμῶμαι
οὖν τοσοῦτον ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίοι
οὕτωι ἀξιόχρεοι.

0 ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙ. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὃ ἄν-
dρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βου
λομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτό-
νατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ μὲ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ
καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν
περιεμένατε ὅλων χρόνου, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἀν
ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἠλκίαν, ὅτι
πόρρω ἥδη ἐστὶν τοῦ βίου, Ἰάνατον δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ
τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ

Δι καταψηφισμένους Ἰάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς
tοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἰσως μὲ οἶεσθε, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἀπο-
rία λόγων ἔαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἀν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ
φήμην δεῖν ἀπαντά ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν
τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐὰν ὁλωκε, οὐ
μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντιᾶς καὶ τοῦ
ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς υμᾶς τοιαύτα, οἳ ἀν ὑμῖν μὲν
ξίδιστ' ἢν ἀκούειν, ἡρμούντος τε μου καὶ ὄνομομένου
ἔκα καὶ ἀλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια
ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἑγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἰδόθε υμεῖς τῶν
ἀλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήσθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ
κωδύον πρᾶξαι οὖδ' ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι
μεταμέλει ὁτιωσ ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνᾶναι ἡ ἐκεῖνος ἔχων
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκη οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἀδικεῖν.
οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανάσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεῦξεται πάν 89 
ποιῶν Θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆ-
λον γίγνεται, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγῃ καὶ ὁπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἱκετεῖλαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκό-
των· καὶ ἂλλα μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσίν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς 
κινδύνοις, ὡστε διαφεύγειν Θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾷ 
πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἄλλα μὴ οὐ τούτ’ ἡ χαλεπόν, 
ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, Θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλα πολὺ χαλεπώτερον 
ποιηρλαῖ· Θάττον γὰρ Θανάτον θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν 
ἀτε βραδὺς ὅν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου B 
ἐάλων, οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἀτε δεινοὶ καὶ δέξεις ὅντες 
ὑπὸ τοῦ Θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπειμα 
ὑπὸ θανάτον δίκην ὕψων, οὕτωι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς 
ἀληθείας ὑφικτότες μοχθηρλαῖ καὶ ἄδικλαν. καὶ ἔγωγε 
τῷ τιμήματι ἐμένω, καὶ οὕτωι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν που 
ἔσωσον οὔτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἴμαι ἀυτὰ μετρίως 
έχειν. 7

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΧ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ υμῖν 
χρησμοφόρησαι, ὡς καταφησισάμενοι μοι· καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ O 
ἦδη ἑνταῦθα, ἐν δὲ μάλιστ’ ἄνδρωποι χρησμοφόρους, 
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ 
ἔμε ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν υμῖν ἢξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν 
ἔμον Θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν υἱ Αἰ’ ἢ οἷαν ἐμὲ 
ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰμένοι ἀπαλλά-
ξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ υμῖν πολὺ 
ἐναντίον ἀποβῆσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλείους ἐσονται 
ὑμᾶς οἱ ἔλεγχοιτε, οὗς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, υμεῖς δὲ 
οὐκ ἰσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἐσονται ὅσον νεώτε-

οοί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἶμα-
σὺς ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ἀνειδι-
ζέων τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ξέπε, οὐκ ὄρθως διανοεῖ-
σετε· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτή ἡ ἀπαλλαγή οὐτε πάνυ δυνατή
οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνη καὶ καλλιστὴ καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ
tοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ’ ἔτοιν παρασκευάζειν,
ὅπως ἔσται ὁς βέλτιστος. Ταύτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς
καταψηφισμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

Εʹ ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΧΙ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένους ἰδέως ἂν
dialexθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος,
ἐν δὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολιαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὗτοι ἔρχομαι
οἱ ἔλθοντα μὲ δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, δὲ ἄνδρες, παρα
μεῖνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνου· οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει διαμ

40 ήλογήσαι πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἐως ἐξεστίν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς
φίλους οὖν ἐπιδείξαι ἔθελο τὸ· νῦν μοι ἐξυμβεβηκός
τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἔμοι γὰρ, δὲ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ—ὑμᾶς
γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὄρθως ἂν καλοῦν—δαμασίων
τί γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσδυνάμη μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαίμονο
ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνή ἄει ἢ
καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναποθομένη, εἰ τι μέλλομεν μὴ
ὅρθως πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ἐξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὦρατε
καὶ αὐτοί, ταύτη, ἀ γε ὡς οὐδείς ἃν τις καὶ νομίζεται
ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὖτε ἐζήσατε ἐσέθεν οἶκο-
Β. Θεον ἡμανώθη τὸ τοῦ Ἱεσοῦ σημεῖον, οὐτε ἤνικα ἄνε-
βαινον ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτʼ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἔρειν· καὶ τοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις
πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐ-
δαμοῦ περὶ ταὐτὴν τὴν πράξειν οὔτʼ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδένι οὔτʼ
ἐν λόγῳ ἡμανώθη μοι. τι οὖν αὐτοῖο εἶναι ὑπολαμ-

βάνῳ; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρώτησεν κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ἐξυμβεβηκὸν.
κόσ τούτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὖκ ἔσῃ ὡς ἱμαῖς ὁρῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, δοσί οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεῦχαναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γεγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσῃ ὡς ὡς ἱπποτικὸν ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσόδος σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλὼν ἐγὼ ἄγαθὸν πρᾶξειν.

CAP. XXXII. Ἐννοοῦσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυνῶν γὰρ Ἐατερὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τεῦχαναι· ἡ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἰσθήσεως μηδὲν μηδεμιάν μηδέν ἔχειν τὸν τεῦχεωτα, ἡ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυχόναει οὕτα καὶ μετολήξονς τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνδέενδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἰον ὑπνοι, ἔπει-δὰν τις καδεύδων μηδ' ὅναρ μηδὲν ὀρᾷ, δαιμόσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ Θάνατος. ἔγω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἰ τυχε ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἧν ὀυτῷ κατε-δαρθεῖν, ὡστε μηδ' ὅναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραδέχεται ταύτη τῇ νυκτί δέοι σκέψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πότας ἁμείνων καὶ ἢδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτός βεβλω-κεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἰδίωτη τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἄν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας. εἰ δὲ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ Θάνατος ἔστι, κέρδος ἔγγοραι λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νῦξ. εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ ἀποδημησάι ἔστιν ὁ Θάνατος ἐνδόει εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἀρα ἐκεί εἰσὶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεῦχεωτες, τι μεῖζον ἄγαθόν τούτον εἴη ἂν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς "Αἰδοῦ, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων ὧν
τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τούς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἴτε καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθις καὶ Διήθις καὶ Τρυπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι, οὕσοι τῶν ἡμιδέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἡ αὖ Ὁρφεὶ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μούσαῖοι καὶ Ἡσιόδος καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐπὶ τόσοφ ἂν τις δέξατ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἔδειλο τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοι γε καὶ αὐτῷ ἐπαυμασθῇ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβή· Βαυτόδις, ὅταν ἐντύχωμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Ἀιάντε τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τίς ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἀδικον τεθηκέντ' ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἑκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄνδρες εἴη· καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὡσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τίς οἴσται μὲν, ἐστι δ' οὖ. ἐπὶ τόσοφ δ' ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταλ, δέξατο ἐξετάζαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τρολαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιᾶν, ἡ Ὁδυσσέα, ἡ Σίνυφον, ὃς ἄλλοις μυρίοις ἂν τίς εἴτοι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὐ δῆπος τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἵ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τέ γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεστέροι εἰσίν οἵ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἔνδαλε, καὶ ἦδη τὸν λαυτὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσίν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστιν.>
λείται ὑπὸ δεδω τὰ τούτον πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἦδη τεῦναν καὶ ἀπηλλάξαν ραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν δοκεῖ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καὶ τοῖς οὐ ταυτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ καταψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἔξιον μέμφεσθαι. Ε

Τοσοῦτο μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς νιεῖς μου, ἐπειδ' ἦδης θησαυροῦν, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτ' ἄντα λυπούντες, ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσων, ἐὰν ὑμίν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ πρώτου ἐπιμελείσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι ἐναι μηδὲν ὑπέφθε, ὦν οἶδέκετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ ὑμίν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὑπὲρ δει, καὶ οἴονται τι ἐναι ὑπέφθης οὐδενός ἔξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταυτ' ποιήθη, δικαία πεπονθὼς ἐγώ ἐσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτὸς τὲ καὶ οἱ νιεῖς. 42

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἕμοι μὲν ἀποθανοῦμενος, ὑμῶν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὑπέτεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἐχρονοὶ ἐπὶ ἀμείνου πράγμα, ἀδηλὶ πάντι πλὴν ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

43 ΣΑΡ. Ι. Τι τηνικάδε ἄφθασι, δι Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὸ ἔτη ἔστων; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα; ΚΡ. ὁ Ὀρέστης βαθύς. ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅτως ἤξελσεν οὐ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι. ΚΡ. Ἀννήθης ἦδη μοι ἔστων, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύορ φοιτάν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ. ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικώς Β πάλαι. ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπήγειρός με, ἀλλὰ συγῆ παρακάθησαί; ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δί, δι Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ ἂν αὐτὸς ἤξελσον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τῇ ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι, θαυμάζω ἄνευ-μενος, ὡς ἤδωσ καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ταύτης ἡγείρον, ἵνα ὡς ἤδιστα διάγγει. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ὑπὸ καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρετάσσῃ ἡμοῖορά, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, δι Κρίτων, πλημμελέστε εἰή ἀγανάκτειν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, δὲ δὲ ἦδη τελευτᾶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, δι Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἡμοῖοραῖς ἀλλικαντάγον, ἄλλοι δὲν αὐτοῦς ἐπιλύεται ἦ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγα- νακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἐστι ταῦται ἄλλω
τι δὴ οὖτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, δὲ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπῆν, οὐ σοι, ὡς ἔμοι φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ θαρ-ρείαν, ἢν ἡγώ, ὡς ἔμοι δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ἄν ἐν-έγκαιμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὐ τοῦ δὲ ἢ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἢξεῖν τήμερον ἐξ ὁν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἠκούστες τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ κατα-λιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτῷ. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἤξεῖ τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐριον ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν βίων σε τελευτάν.

ΣΑΡ. Π. ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ', ὁ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλου, ταύτῃ ἔστω... οὐ μεντοι οἴμαι ἢξεῖν αὐτῷ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτῳ τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. Ἕγῳ σοι ἔρωτε πότε γάρ ποι ὄστεραί δει με ἀπο-44 ἰνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἄν ἔλῃ τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασὶ γέ τοι ἢ τοι δι τοῖς τούτων κύριοι. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοινν τῆς ἐπιφύτης ἂμερας οἴμαι αὐτῷ ἢξείν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρο-μαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίον, δ ἐώρακα ὅλον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐνεταῖ με. ΚΡ. Ὁν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίον; ΣΩ. Ἑθοκεί τίς μοι γνυὴ προσελθόςκα κἀκεὶ καὶ εὐειδῆς, λευκα ἢμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν,'Ω Σώ-Βρατες, ἢματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φιότην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοι. ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

ΣΑΡ. ΙΙΙ. ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἐσικεῖν. ἀλλ', ὁ δαιμό- νεῖ Σώκρατες, ἐτί καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πεῖδοι καὶ σῶστητι· ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐ μία ἔμφορα ἔστων,
CRITO.

... άλλα χωρίς μὲν τῶν ἑστερῆσθαι τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεύον, ὁπον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἐτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς ὑδάξω, οἵ ἐμὲ καὶ σε μὴ σαφῶς ἤσασιν, ὡς οἴως τῶν σώζειν, εἰ ἤδελθον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματος, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχῶν εἰθα ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φλοῦν; οὐ γὰρ πεισοῦνται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς σοι αὐτῶς οὐκ ἤδελθον αὑτῷ εἶναι ἐνέδει χρῆσιν, μετὰ πρὸς υἱομομένους. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἦμῖν, ὃ μακάρει Κρίτων, οὐτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτελεστάτοι, ὃν μᾶλλον ἠξίων φρουτίζειν, ἤγγισσαν αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξειτο, ὅσπερ ἂν πραξῆν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὅρας δὴ, ὧτι ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σῶκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεως. αὐτὰ δὲ δὴλα τὰ παρόντα νῦν ὃτι οἰοὶ τ' εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδον, ἕαν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβηκαί ἡμένος. ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ωθέλον, ὃ Κρίτων, οἰοὶ τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοὶ τε ἤσαν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλὸς ἂν εἰχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδὲτερα οἰοὶ τε· οὑτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὑτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο, δὴ τὸν τύχους.

Ε. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε δὲ, ὃ Σῶκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεί γα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύον, μή, ἐὰν σοι ἐνδείξῃ έξέλη, ὃι συνοικίαν ἦμιν πράγματα παρέχοσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνδείχῃ ἐκκλέφασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποθαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα τι πρὸς τοῦτοι παθεῖν; εἰ γὰρ τὶ τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἐσον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ τὸν δίκαιον ἐσμέν σώσαντες.
περιγραφή του τόπου τού κίνδυνον καί, ἐὰν δέη, ἔτι τούτου μεῖξι. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πειδον καὶ μὴ ἄλλως πολει. ΣΩ. Καὶ ταύτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλα. ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταύτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εὔδε πολυ τάργυρίων ἔστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαι σε καὶ ἁγαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾶς τούτος τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὔδεν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοὶ ἁργυρίοι; σοι δὲ ἱπάρχει μὲν τὰ Β ἡμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἔγυμαι, ἰκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἶ τι ἔμοι κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ἐξοιο οὐτοὶ ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τούτο ἁργυρίον ἰκανόν, Συμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὡστε, ὡσεὶ λέγω, μήτε ταύτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτῶν σώ- σαι, μήτε ὁ ἔλεγχε ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρὴ σαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσ ὅτι ἂν ἄφικη ἀγαπή- σουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλητ οἰς Θετταλίαν ἴναι, εἰς τὸ ἐμοί ἐκεῖ ἔξενοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶσαι καὶ ἀσφαλείαν σοι παρέξονται, ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

Β. "Ετι δὲ, ὁ Ὁδόρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτῶν προδοῦναι, ἔξου σωθήναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτῶν γενέ- σαι, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐξήροι σου σπεύσαιεν τε καὶ ἐσπευσαν σὲ διαφθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ τούς νιεῖς τοὺς σαυτῶν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὐδὲ σοι ἔξου καὶ ἐκβρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσει οἰχήσεις ὁ καταλητῶν, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο
πράξουσι· τεῦξονται δέ, ὅσ τὸ εἰκός, τειοῦτος, οἰάπερ
εἰσὶ δέ γίγνεσθαι εν ταῖς ὀρφανοῖς περὶ τοὺς ὀρφα-
νούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρή ποιεῖσθαι παίδας, ἢ ξυνιδιαται-
πωρείν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παίδευοντα· σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς
τὰ ραθυμότατα αἴρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δὲ, ἀπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἔλοιπο, ταῦτα αἴρεῖσθαι, φα-
σκοντά γε ἢ ἀρετής διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖ-
Εσθαί. ὃς ἔγνωκε καὶ ύπερ σοῦ καὶ ύπερ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν
ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δοξῇ ἄπαν τὸ πρόγμα τὸ
περὶ σὲ ἀνανθρί τινι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἢ
ἐἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἦξο
μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο,
kαὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τούτι, ὃς περὶ κατάγελοι τῆς
πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινι καὶ ἀνανθρί τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διασπε-
θεῖν εφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὗτοις σε οὐχὶ ἔσώσαμεν, οὔδὲ
σὺ σαυτῶν, οἶνον τε ἐν καὶ δυνατόν, εἶ τι καὶ σμικρὸν
ἡμῶν ὀφελός ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὥρα, μὴ ἀμα-
τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἢ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἄλλα βουλεύ-
ου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἐτὶ ὥρα, ἄλλα βεβου-
λεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς
ταῦτα πάντα δὲ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμενοῦμεν,
ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶνον τε. ἄλλα παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ
Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως πολεῖ.
νο βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ᾤδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὁμοίοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὐς-🔗
περ καὶ πρότερον ὑμῖν ἔαν μη βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ πάροντι, εὖ ἴσῳ, ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὕτω δὲ ὁ πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὀσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολυττήσαι, δεσμὸς καὶ Ἰανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοπούμεθα αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτων τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὦν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ἡ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ. ἦ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποδηνόσκειν καλῶς ἔλεγεν-🔗
το, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἀρὰ ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἦνεκα λόγου ἔλεγετο, ἥν δὲ παιδιά καὶ φλαρία ὡς ἄληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δὲ ἔγογγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς Κρίτων, καυχὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἄλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὅσον ἔχω, ἡ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν, ἡ πεισόμεθα αὐτὸς. ἔλεγετο δὲ πως, ὡς ἐγώ μαί, ἐκάστοτε ὥσποτά ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὀσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ὡς οἱ ἄνδροι πολλοὶ δοξάζουσι, δέοι τάς μὲν ἔ
περι πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τάς δὲ μη. τοῦτο πρὸς Θεών, ὡς Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τάνδρωπεια ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μὲλλειν ἀποδηνόσκειν αὐτο-41
ρινο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούνῃ ἡ παρούσα ἕμφορά. σκότει δὴ· οὖν ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πά-
σας χρή τάς δόξας τῶν ἄνδρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τάς μέν, τάς δ ὑ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ
οὗ; τί φῆς; ταύτα οὖχι καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Κα-
λῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τάς δὲ
πονηρὰς μὴ; ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Χρηστάλ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν
φρονίμων, πονηρὰλ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς
δ' ὦ;

ΟΑΡ. VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέ-
βγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον
παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῦν
προσέχει, ἡ ἐνὸς μόνου ἔκεινον, δὲ ἀν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς
ἡ παιδοτρίβης ὦν; ΚΡ. Ἕνος μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς
ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔκεινον, ἀλλὰ µὴ τοὺς τῶν
πολλῶν. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή. ΣΩ. Ταῦτῃ ἀρα αὐτῷ πρα-
κτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἑδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν
τῷ ἐν δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνωται µᾶλλον ἢ ἢ
ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Εἶλεν.

Ο οπειθήςας δὲ τῷ ἐνι καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν
dοξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ
µηδὲν ἐπαινώτων ἀρα οὐδὲν κακόν πείσεται; ΚΡ.
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ
ποτὶ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; ΚΡ. Δή-
λον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τούτῳ γὰρ διάλυσιν. ΣΩ. Κα-
λῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὔτως, ἵνα
µὴ πάντα διώκεισθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κα-
κῶν, περὶ ὑν εὖν ἢ βουλή ἢµίν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν
πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἠµᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταῦταν,
ἠ τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς, εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίνως, ὅν δεὶ καὶ, αἰσχύνε-
σθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι µᾶλλον ἡ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἡλιοφάνες.
λους; φ έι μη ἄκολουθον, διαφθερόμενεν εκείνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, τοῦ μεν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγύρνετο, "τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἦ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτο; ΚΡ. Οὐ" μαι ἐγώγε, ὥ Sigmarances.

ΣΑΡ. Β.ΕΠ. τήδ' ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γυνομένου, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσόδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διωλόμενον ἡ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίτε ὀντῶν δόξη, ἡ ἀρα βιωτῶν ἡμῖν ἐστί, διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἐστι δὲ που τότε τὸ σῶμα. ἦ οὐχί; ΚΡ. Ναὶ. Σ.Τ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτῶν ἡμῖν ἐστι μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σ.Τ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐκείνου ἀρα ἡμὶν βιωτῶν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίσσω; ἡ φαυλότερον ἡγούμενα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος εκείνο, ὃ τι πότ' ἐστι τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὴ τὲ ἄδικα καὶ ἡ δι-48 καισάτη τὸ ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σ.Τ. Ἀλλὰ τιμώτερον; ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε. Σ.Τ. Οὐκ ἀρα, ὃ βέλτιστο, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τὶ ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τὸ ἐπαίτων περὶ τῶν δικαιῶν καὶ ἄδικων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλθεια. ὡστε πρώτον μὲν ταύτη οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δέξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαιῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἑναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἀν τις, οἷοι τ' ἐσθοῦν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτηνύναι.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὥ Sigmarances. Β Σ.Τ. Ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἀλλ', ὃ διαιμάςι, οὕτος τε ὁ λόγος, δυν διενεργοῦμεν, ἐμοῦν δεκεῖ ἐπὶ ὁμοίοις εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τὸνδε αὐ σκόπει, εἰ ἐπὶ μένει ἡμῖν ὧ οὐ, δι' οὐ τὸ τὴν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέων, ἀλλ'
τὸ εὐ χὴν. ΚΡ. 'Αλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐ καὶ
calóς καὶ δικαίως ὑπὶ ταύτων ἐστὶ, μένει, ἢ ὦ μένει. ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΣΑΡ. IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογομένων
tούτῳ σκέπτεσθην, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθέντε πειρά-
σθαι ἐξιέναι, μὴ ἀφιεντὼν 'Ἀθηναίων, ἢ ὦ δίκαιον.
cal ἐάν μὲν φαύνηται δίκαιον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ,
eὐμέν, ὡς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τοὺς ἀναλώ-
σεις χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παῖδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς
ἀληθῶς ταύτα, ὁ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἃ τῶν ῥαδίων
ἀποκτεινούντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων ἢ ἂν, εἰ οἶοι τῇ
δόξαν, οὕτως ἦν, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ',
ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκέπτευον ἢ
ἡ ὑπὲρ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξειμαι καὶ
χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθέντε ἔξαζομαι

καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔξαγοντές τε καὶ ἔξαγόμενοι, ἢ
τῇ ἀληθεὶς ἀδικήσομεν ταύτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κἂν
φανώμεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἐγγαξόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲ ὑπολο-
γίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἀποδινήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ
.jfaceίαν ἄγοντας, οὕτε ἄλλο ὁμοῦ πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ
ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὁ Σώ-
κρατεῖ, ὅρα δὲ τὶ δρῶμεν. ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὁ γαθέ,
κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντί-
Ελεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, παύσαί  ἢδη, ὁ μα-
κάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγου τῶν αὐτῶν λόγου, ὡς χρῆ
ἐνθέντε ἀκόντων 'Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπείνας· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ
πολλοὺ ποιοῦμαι πεῖσαί σε ταύτα πράττειν, ἄλλα μὴ
ἀκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῆν ἀρχὴν, ἐάν σοι
ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρω-

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λουσ; φι εἰ μη ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθειροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεδα, δι τῷ μέν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγγύνετο, τῷ δὲ ἄδικῳ ἀπόλλυτο. ἡ οὖν ἦν τούτο; ΚΡ. Οὐ μαί ἐγγογε, ὁ Σάκρατες.

ΚΑΠ. Β. ΣΩ. Ἀρρέ δὴ, εἰάν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑμείνων μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ δια-

φθειρομένον διολεσμοὶ πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαί-Χ

όντων δύση, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἔστι, διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δὲ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὖχ; ΚΡ.

ΝΑΠ. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἔστι μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμός. ΣΩ.

Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λαβῆται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὄννησι; ἡ

φαυλότερον ἤγομένα εἰναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τι

ποτ' ἔστι τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὴ τῇ ἄδικᾳ καὶ τῇ δι-

καίσιν ἔστιν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμός. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμώτε-

ρον; ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὁ βέλτιστο, πάντω ἡμῖν συν τοι φροντίστεον, τί ἔροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ

ἡμᾶς, ἄλλ' ὃ τι ἐπαίτων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων,

ὁ εἰς, καὶ αὐτή ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ

οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖται, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δώ-

ξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν

καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἄλλα μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἷοι τ' εἰσίν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτηνύονται.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σάκρατες. Β

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγει. ἄλλ', ὁ δαμάσκη, οὕτω τε ὁ

λόγος, ὃν διελθύσαμεν, ἐμονῇ δοκεῖ ἐτὶ ὁμοίος εἰναι

τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὐσκότεροι, εἰ ἐτὶ μένει

ἡμῖν ἡ οὐ, ὅτι οὗ τὸ ξύν περὶ πλείοστον ποιήσῃ, ἄλλα
ΚΡ. 'Αλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὁτι ταύτων ἐστι, μένει, ἥ ὅπερ μένει. ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΚΑΡ. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέων, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθέντε πειρᾶ

Ο σωτεὶ ἔξειναι, μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἥ οὐ δίκαιον·
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ,
ἔδωμεν, ὃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τὸ ἀναλώσ

σως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παιδῶν τροφῆς, μὴ ὅσ
ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ὑ τῶν ῥαδίων
ἀποκτισμένων καὶ ἀναβιωσκόμενων γ᾽ ἀν, εἴ σοι τε

ἔσταν, οὔτει ξοῦν νῦ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ᾽,
ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρέει, μὴ οὐδεν ἄλλο σκεπτῶν ἢ

ἡ ὑπὲρ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ
χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτως τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθέντε ἐξάσουσι

ἐκαὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἡ

τὴ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσωμεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· καὶ

φαίνομεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲ ὑπολογῖζομενοι. οὐτ᾽ εἰ ἀποδημήσειν δεῖ παραμένοντες καὶ

ἀντιχυῖαν ἀγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιών πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ

ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὁ Σώ-

κρατεῖ, ὅρα δὲ τὶ δρῶμεν. ΣΩ. Ὦκος, τότε, καὶ εἴ τῇ ἰχεῖς ἀντιλέγεις ἐμὸς λέγοντος, ἀντὶ-

Ελεγε, καὶ σοι πεῖσομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἦδη, ὁ μα-

κάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρῆ

ἐνθέντε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπίεναι· ὅς ἐγὼ περὶ

πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πεῖσαι εἰ ταύτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ

ἀκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, εἰώ σοι

ἀκανὼς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἰερω-
καὶ διαφθείρωνται; τί ἐροῦμεν; ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα
tοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχω, ἀλλιώτερε καὶ ἀλλωστε
eἰπεῖν ἵνα τοῦτο τοῦ νόμου ἀπολύσαμεν, ὡς τὰς
dῖκας τὰς δικαιοσθείσας προστάτευε κυρίας εἶναι.

ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις
cαὶ οὐκ ὄρθως ἡ τὸν δίκην ἐκρίνε; Ταῦτα ἡ τί ἐροῦμεν;
ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῦν Δί, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΠ. Χ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὁ
Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὀμολογήτο ἡμῶν τοις καὶ σοι, ἢ
ἐμμένειν τοῖς δίκαιοις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν
αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι ὁ
Σώκρατες, μὴ ἡμῶν τὰ λέγοντα, ἄλλο ἄποκρίνουν,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰς αὐτὰς ἤρθαμε τῷ ερωτᾷν τῷ καὶ ἄποκρί
cνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τι ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῶν τοις καὶ τῇ πόλει δ
ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαται; οὐ τῷ ὦτῳ μὲν σε ἐγεννή
σάμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ ἡμῶν ἔλαμψεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ
πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσε σε; φράσοιν οὖν, τούτους ἡμῶν
tοὺς νόμους τοῖς περὶ τοῖς γράμμοις, μέμφει τι ὅσο σὺ
καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι φαύνη ἂν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς
περὶ τῆς τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τοις παιδείαν, ἐν ᾗ
καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύεσθε; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ
ἐπὶ τούτους τεταγμένου νόμου, παραγγέλλετος τῷ
πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μοναρχῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύ
eιν; Ὡς καὶ, φαύνη ἂν. Ἐπεὶ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένεσθε καὶ τοῖς
ἐξεταράχθησαν καὶ ἐπαιδεύθησα, ἔχουσιν ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον
μὲν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐκογονυς καὶ δούλος,
αὐτὸς τοῖς καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦτ’ οὕτως ἔχει,
οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μη, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινῇ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλους καταφρονεῖν, ὀρκώντας τὰ ἄλληλον βουλεύματα, σχίστει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐν μάλα πότερον κοινωνεῖ καὶ εὐνοικεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχιμεία εἰνενδεχθεὶ βουλεύμουνοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε θρόνος ἐχόντος οὕτω τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὕτω τοῦ αὐτοπειθεῖν οὕτω κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρόντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἕτε δοκεῖ, σοι δ᾽ εἰ πη ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδαξε, εἰ δὲ ἐμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τούτο λακοῦ: ΚΡ. 'Ἀλλὰ ἐμένων τε καὶ εὐνοικεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. Σ.Ω. Δέγω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ μετὰ τούτο, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον δ᾽ ἄνωτις ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ οὕτω ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαιρεθεῖσθαι: ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙ. Σ.Ω. Ἔκ τούτων δὴ ἄδρεῖ. ἀπίστευτες ἐν-δὲ ἦμεισ μὴ πείσαντε τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τῷ ποιητῷ, ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὸ ἢκιστα δεί, ἢ οὖ; καὶ ἐμεθυμοῦμεν ὡς ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίους οὕσιν, ἢ οὖ; ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, δ᾽ Σώκρατε, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ἐρωτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἔσω. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ ὥδε σκότει, εἰ μελλοντιν ἦμιν ἔνθεν εἰς ἀποδιδοθέεσθαι ἐμι. ὡς οὖ, δὲν ὑνομάζοις τοῦτο, ἔλθοντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸς τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτητο· Εἰπτε μοι, δ᾽ Σώκρα-τες, τι ἐν νη ἐχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλο τι ἐν τούτῳ τῶν ἐργά, ὃ ἐπικεφεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέοις ἐκαὶ ἐξήπτασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σον μέρος· ἥ δοκεῖ σοι οἷον τε ἐτί ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετρά-φθαι, ἐν ἂν αἰ γενόμεναι δικαί μηδὲν ἴσχυσιν.
τομενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οὐ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειρά-49

Σ. Οودεν τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικη-

tέου εἶναι, ἢ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέουν τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ

ουδαμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἄγαθὰν οὔτε καλῶν, ὡς

tολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογή-

ητ; ὅπερ καὶ ἀρτί ἐλεγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ

πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι εὐ ταῖς ταῖς ὁλγαῖς ἡμέρας

ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰς, καὶ πᾶλαι, ὁ Κρίτων, ἀρὰ τηλικοῦδὲ

γέροντες ἀνδρεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγόμενοι

ἐθαμαίνει ημᾶς αὐτούς παῖδων οὗδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ Ὁ

πάντως μάλλον οὕτω έχει, ὅπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν;

εἴτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐτὶ

tῶν ὑπὲρτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραστερα, ὅμως

τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῇ ἀδικούντε καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν

τυγχάνει διά παντι τρόπῳ; φαμέν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

Σ. Ουδαμῶς ἀρὰ δεὶ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δήτα. Σ. Οὐ
dε ἀδικούμεν διά ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴνοntai, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεί ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνε-0

tai. Σ. Τὶ δέ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεὶ δή που, ὁ Σώκρατες. Σ. Τὶ δέ; ἀντ

tακακουργεῖν κακός πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ,

δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Ουδαμῶς. Σ. Τὸ γάρ

που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνδρῶπος τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν δια

φέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθὴ λέγειν. Σ. Οὐτέ ἄρα ἀνταδι

κεῖν δεὶ οὔτε ποιεῖν οὐδέν ἀνδρῶπον, οὐδὲν ἄν

ὁτων πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὁρὰ, ὁ Κρίτων, ταῦτα

καὶ ὁμολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαι ὁμολογής. οἴδα

γάρ, ὅτε ὁλγαῖς ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς
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tes, ταῖς αὐτὶς εὐεξεσθαί, εὑπερ ποιήσεις ἢ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὖχ ἦκοστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἰπομι, διὰ τι δή; ἵσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτωντα, λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τήν ὁμολογιαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα
Β ἡμῶν τούτων τεκμηρία ἔστων, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφέροντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφέροντως ἔρεσες, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ Ἰεωρίαν πότετε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔξηλθες, δ' τι μὴ ἄπαξ εἰς Ἡσιόμον, οὔτε ἄλλοσε νοῦδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημᾶν ἐποίησον πότετε, ὃσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι άνδροποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἐλαβὲν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ
Ο ἡμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὗτοι σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἠροῦ, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς καὶ ἡ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησον, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοῦν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἔξην σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὃσπερ νῦν ἁκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι, σὺ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἠροῦ, ὡς ἐφησθαί, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς Ἰάννατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείρας, πράττεις τε
D ἂντερ εἰ δοῦλος φαιλούσατο πράξεις, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καὶ ἂς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, φάσκον-
ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκόροι τε γιγνομένα καὶ διαφεβρονταί; τί ἐροῦμεν, οὐ̄ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχω, ἀλλασσεῖ καὶ ὡτερ, εἰπέν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκαιας τὰς δικαιοθείας προστάτει τυρίας εἶναι; ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν; ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νη Δλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, οὐ̄ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταύτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοι, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαιαι αἷς ἢ τῷ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόμενον, ἱσως ἃν εἴποιεν, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ τῇ δικαίᾳ τῇ πόλει τὸ πόλις τοῦ ἄποκρινον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἱσχύει τὸ ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τι ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπικεκριμένας ἡμᾶς ἀποκλίνοντα; οὐ πᾶς τὸν μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσε σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτους ἡμῶν τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τοῖς γάμοις, μέμφει τί ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνει οὖν. ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἢ ἢ καὶ τῇ ἐπαιδεύσεις; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέτατον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτων τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μονωσίᾳ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύσει; Καλῶς, φαίνει οὖν. Ἐλευ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένον τε καὶ ξενώνας καὶ ἐπαιδεύσεις, ἔχουσιν ἃν εἰπέν πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἤσθαν καὶ ἐκγενος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ οἴ τοῦς οὕτως ἔχει.
νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοὺς δικαστὰς τὴν
Ο δόξαν, ὅστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις
γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἔστι, σφόδρα ποιοῦ ἄν
νέων γε καὶ ἀνωτῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεύς ἐίναι.
πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ
tῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμωτάτους; καὶ τούτῳ ποιοῦντι
ἀρα ἄξιων σοὶ ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτου καὶ
ἀναισχυντῆσεις διαλεγόμενοι· τίνας λόγους, ὃς Σῶ-
κρατεῖ; ἢ οὔτερ ἐνδάδε, ὥς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύ-
νη πλείστον ἄξιον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ
οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἰεὶ ἄσχημον ἄν φανείσθαι τὸ τοῦ
ΔΣωκράτους πράγμα; οἶει δὴ γε χρῆ. Ἄλλα ἐκ μὲν
tούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖτο, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θεττάλλαν
παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἔχει γὰρ ἄπτῃ πλείστη
ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἵσως ἂν ἠδέως σου ἄκος
ὡς γελοῖον έκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἄπειδῷραςκε, σκευήν
τὸ τινὰ περὶθέμενον, ἢ διαφόρων λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα ὅλα
δὴ εἰώδασιν ἐν ὀκενάμεσαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ
τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἄντι
Εὐμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ δύτως, ὃς τὸ εἰκός,
ἐτόλμησας οὐτω τὴν γλύσχρον ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔτιν, νόμος τοὺς
μεγίστους παραβὰς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἑρεί; ἵσως, ἂν μὴ τινα
λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὃς Σῶκρατεῖ, τολλά καὶ
ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀν-
θρώπους καὶ δουλεύον—τὰ ποιῶν ἢ εὐσχοῦμενον ἐν
Θεττάλλα, ὅστερ ἐπὶ δείπνων ἀποδεδημηκός εἰς Θετ-
ταλλαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περί δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
διὰ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἄλλα δὴ τῶν
παιδῶν ἕνεκα βούλει ἐτιν, ἵνα αὐτούς ἐκδρέψῃ καὶ

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των ἢτον τὴν πατρίδα. Τι φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΣΠΙ. ΣΔ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνειν ἢν ἢςοι οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπικεφαλέως δράν ἢ νῦν ἐπικεφαλεῖς. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκδρέφαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὅπι οὐδὲ τῇ ἡμείν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις πάσι πολλαῖς, ὄμως προσαγορεύομεν τῷ Δ ἔξωσιαν πεποηκέειν ἈΘηναίων τῷ Βουλαμένῳ, ἐπειδόν δοκιμάζην καὶ ἐρημάζει ἐν τῷ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὁ ἢν μὴ ἄρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἔξειναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπειναὶ ὅποι ἢν βούληται. καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἔμποδόν ἐστιν ὅπου ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τις βούληται ἡμῶν εἰς ἀποκαλεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἄρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς ταῖς καὶ τῇ πόλις, εάν τε μετακεῖν ἄλλοτε ποι εἰς ἔλλοι, λέγειν εἴκεισθε, ὅποι ἢν βούληται, ἐχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅς δὲ ἢν ἡμῶν παραμένῃ, ὅρων ὁκ ἂπο τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τάλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἢ ἂς φαμέν τοῦτον ὁμολογήκειν εἴργην ἡμῶν ἢ ἂς ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν ποιήσει ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πείθομενον πριγῇς φαμέν ἄδικείν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὐσιν ἡμῶν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσει, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσεις ἢ μὴ πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τε ποιούμεν, προτείηται ἢμῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἢς ἢς ἢς τούτων ποιεῖν ἢ ἂν κελεύομεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφείν τοῦτω φειδέναι ἢτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΠΔ. Παρὰς δὲ φαμεν καὶ σὲ, ὁ Σὼκρα-
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ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέχεισθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἢ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὔ ἡκιστα Ἀθηναίων σε, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς μᾶλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἶπομι, διὰ τί δὴ; ἵσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτωντο, λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μᾶλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκὼς τυχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίην γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὡ Σωκράτε, μεγάλα Ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμηρία ἔστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρε- σκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμευς, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτε ἐπὶ θεοίλαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔξηλθε, ὅ τι μὴ ἀπαξ εἴς Ἰοιμὼν, οὔτε ἀλλοσε οὐδαμώς, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὡστερ οἱ ἄλ- λοι ἀνδροτοί, οὔφ ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὔδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ Ὡμένι καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἠροῦ, καὶ ὁμολόγεις καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῦδες ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησο, ὡς ἁρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τολυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξήν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἴ ἔβουλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἱκουσή ποιῆσαι, συ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἁγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθναίσαι σε, ἀλλ’ ἠροῦ, ὡς ἐβηθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατου νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐκεῖνους τοῖς λόγοις αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφείραι, πράττεις τε Ὅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαὐλότατος πράξειν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνήκασ τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ’ ἦν ἡμᾶς χιβδιοῦν πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, φασκου-
τέσ σε όμολογηκέναι πολυτεύθες καὶ ἡμᾶς ἔργην, ἄλλ' οὐ λόγον, ἢ οὐκ ἄληθήν. Τι φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἡ ὀμολογώμεν; ΚΡ. Ἀνάγγη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίην ἢ ξυνθῆκας τόσ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς καὶ ὀμολογίας παραβάσεις, οὐχ' ὅπ' ἀνάγγης ὀμολογήσας, οὔτε ἀπατηθεῖς, οὔτε ἐν ὅλῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθές βουλεύσασθαι, ἄλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξήν σοι ἀπίεναι, εἰ μὴ ἥρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιω ἐφαινούτο σοι ἡ ὀμολογία εἰναι. οὔ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ὡς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φής εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἔλληνών πόλεων οὔτε τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἄλλ' ἐλάττων εἶ αὐτής ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὔτω σοι διαφέρομεν τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἥρεσκαν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δήλων ὅτι· τόσ γὰρ ἄν πόλεις ἀρέσκοι ἀνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὀμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθη, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθοῦν.

ΚΑΡ. ΧV. Σκοτει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαιμαρτῶν τι τούτων τι ἄγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτοῦ, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτεύκους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κεφυνεῖ· Β ἱσοῦ ἢ σοι οἱ ἐπιτεύκους καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγους καὶ στερηθήμασι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δὴλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἔλαν εἰς τῶν ἐγκύκλια τῶν πόλεων ἔλθω, ἢ Θῆβας ἢ Μεγαράδε,—εὐνομοῦντας γὰρ ἀμφότεροι—πολέμοις ἡμεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτεία, καὶ ὅσοντερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψοντα· σε διαφθορά ἡγούμε-
νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοὺς δικασταῖς τήν
Οδόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τήν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις
γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύσ ἐστι, σφόδρα ποιν ὄνειρον ἀν
νέων γε καὶ ἀνωτῶν ἀνδρῶπων διαφθορεύσ εἶναι.
πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ
tῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τούτο ποιοῦντι
ἀρα ἄξιον σοι ἢ ἢν ἔσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ
ἀνασχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενοι—τίνας λόγους, ὃς ἴω
κρατεῖ; ἡ ὅπιστε ἐνιάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύ-
nη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνδρῶποι καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ
οἱ νόμοι· καὶ οὐκ ὅπις ἄσχημον ἄν φανεῖσθαι τῷ τοῦ
ΔΣωκράτους πράγμα; οἱς δαί γε χρή. Ὅλλ ἐκ μὲν
tοὔτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἢξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν
παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη
ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἵσως ἄν ἢδεως σοῦ ἀκούσεις
ὡς γελοιοις ἐκ τού δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδιδρασκες, σκευήν
τέ τυνα περικέμενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἡ ἀλλα οἷα
δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ
tὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὁτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ
Εσμικροῦ χρόνον τῷ βίῳ λουπῶν ὡτός, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς,
ἐτόλμησας ὡστὶ γλίσχρως ἐπικυρέως ἔστην, νόμους τοὺς
μεγίστους παραβάσας, ὡδεῖς δὲ ἐρεὶ; ἵσως, ἄν μὴ τῶν
λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὃς ἴωκρατε, πολλά καὶ
ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀν-
δρῶπους καὶ δουλεύον—τι ποιῶν ἡ εὐσχούμενος ἐν
Θετταλίᾳ, ὁπιστε ἐπί δείπνου ἀποδεδημηκκὸς εἰς Θετ-
tαλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
54 τῆς ἀλλῆς ἀρετῆς ποὺ ἢμῖν ἔσονται; Ὅλλα δὴ τῶν
παιδῶν ἐνεκα βούλει ζην, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκδρέφης καὶ
παιδεύσης; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγῶν Ἰρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τούτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ξύντος βέλτιον Ἰρέψεις καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξύννυτος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτίθεντο οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον εἰγὸς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἕαν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἰπερ γέ τί ὁφελὸς αὐτῶν ἐστι τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηθείων εἶναι, οἷος ἦλθι Β ἦν χρῆ.

Cap. XVI. Ἀλλα, διὸ Σῶκρατε, πειθόμενος ἡμῶν ὑμῶν τοῖς σοῦς τροφεύσῃ μήτε παίδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ξύν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἑλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεί ἄρχουσιν· οὕτε γὰρ ἐνδάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἁμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαίωτον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδεὶς, οὕτε ἐκεῖσε ἄρικομένῳ ἁμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδυκημένος ἀπεί, εἶαν ἄπιθες σοι, ὦ ὑπ’ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἄλλα ὑπ’ ἀνδρώπων· εἰκὸν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὅμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους, οὐς ἦκιστα ἐδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ξύντε, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν "Αἰδοὺ νόμοι οὐκ εὑμενῶς σε ἑποδέξονται, εἰδότες, ὃτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχειρήσας ἀπολέσαι το σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πελησι Κρίτων ποιεῖν ὑ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

Cap. XVII. Τάυτα, διὸ φίλε ἐταίρη Κρίτων, εὖ
ξοδι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἢ ἡχη τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ ξοδι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δο- κοῦντα, εάν τι λέγῃ παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὃμως μέντοι εἰ τι οἷεὶ πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖν νω, ὁ Κρί- Ετων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ύφηγεῖται.
NOTES.
NOTES.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

A. "O τι... κατηγόρων. In what manner you have been affected by my accusers, i.e. by their harangues, which had immediately preceded the defence of Socrates. Since πεπόνθατε denotes the receiving of an action, it is followed by ἵπτο, as if it were a passive verb. C. 556; K. 249, 3; Mt. 496, 3.* So ἵπτ' αὐτῶν just below; and in like manner ab in Latin. The accusers or prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus, 19 B., and Lycon, 23 E. — ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The trial of Socrates took place before the Heliaea, the most numerous and popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court at Athens, which consisting in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens (though they usually administered justice in sections of 500 each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the populace, its members might well be addressed by the same honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, instead of the more distinctive title ἄνδρες δικασταλ. The 6,000 Heliasts were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. Cf. Wachsmuth's His. Ant. Sec. 47. On the constitution of this court see, besides Wachsmuth, Meier’s Attic Process, Smith’s Dict. of Antiqu., and

* C. stands for Crosby’s Grammar; K. for Kühner’s Middle Grammar; and Mt. for Matthiae’s, second edition.
Grote's Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. chap. 31. On the compliment implied in the title 'Ἀντιγώνος', cf. 29 D.—δ' οὖν. But then, however that may be.—διλίγου, sc. δειν, literally, to want little = almost. C. 622; Mt. 355, obs. 2. Cf. διλίγου δειν, 22, Α.—ιμ- αυτοῦ ἐπελαιάζων, forgot myself, i. e. my true character.—οὐ δὲ εἰσίν εἰσίν εἰρήκασι, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsey, ibid.—αὑτῶν ἐν ἐξαιμασα, etc. One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated, viz. this. αὑτῶν relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while τῶν πολλῶν is the partitive gen. after the same word ἐν. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. χρη. Al. χρή. But the imperf. ind. implies the non-performance of the duty: you ought to have been on your guard, as you have not been. Mt. 505, obs.; K. 260, R. 3.—ἐξαπαντῆτε. The subj. follows the past tense of the ind. (χρη) to denote that the danger of being deceived still continued: you ought to have been on your guard, and ought still to be, lest you be deceived. C. 602; K. 345, 5; Mt. 518, 1.—μὴ ἀλήθευσεν. μὴ rather than οὐ regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf., from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: that they should not be ashamed. C. 647; K. 318, 4; Mt. 608, 5.—ὅτι = because.—ἐργάζονται, by the fact, the actual trial.—μὴ δ' ὑποστειοῦν. Observe the emphasis: not even in any way whatever.—αὐτῶν, of them, or in them. εἰ μὴ ἄρα = nisi forte, unless perchance. Often used ironically: unless forsooth. K. 324, a.—λέγεται depends on δείκνυ = pow- erful (literally, terrible) to speak.—εἰ ... λέγουσιν may be rendered, if they mean this.—οὐ καὶ τούτους, not after their example. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not according to their exempli-
fication of it, since they, as he proceeds to say, had spoken little or nothing that was true.—ἡ τι ὅν ὁδὲν = little or nothing, next to nothing. Mt. 487, 8.—πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: τὴν δίκην ἀληθεύσατα εἰπὼν.—οὐ μὴν μὰ Δί, κ.τ.λ. Not, however, by any means, Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me.—ἀσπέρ οἱ τούτων, sc. λόγοι ἡσαν. In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. λόγοις is the object of ἀκούσσετε, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they shall hear. According to Stallbaum, ὀνόματα = singula nomina, ἰματα = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, ὀνόματα = nouns, ἰματα = verbs.

C. πιστεύω γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments.—δήποτε, as usual, is somewhat playful = methinks, to be sure.—τῆς τῆς ἡλικίας, est: mihi homini id etatis—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti positum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Cf. D.—πλάττοντι takes the gender of μεσακίας, and usually implies more or less of fictitious and false ornament.—εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι, to come into your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly.—παρείμα. Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: παρίμα = admitto, παρείμα = ad me admitto volo, i. e. precor, deprecor.—Καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ, κ.τ.λ. Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere. Cf. Mat. 21, 12: τὰς τραπέζας τῶν κολλοβιστῶν.

D. ἐκι χὰρ ωὐσαί. For the fact is thus, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asynedeton).—ἀναβεβήκα, sc. the βημα, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his βημα or ele沃
ed stand in the court. — ἡς ἐχάδε λέγειν. The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see Mt. 337; K. 274, 3; C. 395.—δισερπ ὁμν ἄν. This ἄν belongs to the apodosis with ἔφενεγκανώσκετε, where it is repeated (δήνον ἄν). It stands with δισερπ to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with εἰ, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. K. 261, 3. Cf. Gorg. 447, D, and other examples cited by Stallb. in loc.—τὸ δὲντ = in fact. So very often, especially in Plato.—ζινοζ, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher’s note ad loc.—δισερπ. C. 446; K. 242, γ; Mt. 441, 2, α.

18 Α. Καὶ δῆ καὶ νῦν, and indeed now also. The construction is irregular. We should expect αὐτοκαὶ νῦν, so also now, answering to δισερπ.—δικαίον, being just, i. e. a reasonable request. It is in apposition with τοῦτο, which is further explained by the infinitives εἰν and σκοπεῖν, the demonstrative preparing the way for the infinitives and calling attention to them. Mt. 472, b; K. 304, 2.—στὶ ... δοκῶ, as it appears to me at least; literally, as I appear. The Greeks are fond of changing the impersonal construction into the personal. K. 307, R. 6 and 7; C. 551; Mt. 264, 5.—τῆς μὲν ... εἰμ. It is difficult to see in this harmless parenthesis the un-Platonic self-praise which Ast finds in it.—αὐτὸ τοῦτο, this very thing, i. e. this single point, viz. whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the reflexive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for an infinitive. K. 304, 2; Mt. 472, c.—δικαίος = the virtue, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. K. 244, R. 1; C. 487, 4; Mt. 264, 5.—δικαίος εἶμι instead of δικαίων ἔστι with the acc. and inf.;
another example of the personal for the impersonal construction. Cf. note on δοκεῖ, above. It is treated as a species of attraction by Mt. 297, and C. 551.—τὰ πρῶτα μου γειτῶν κατηγοροῦμαι, those things which have been first falsely charged upon me, or charged upon me being false. Cf. δίκαιον, above.

B. πολλὰ ἡδὶ ἑτη explains πάλαι, which is altogether indefinite: for some time, many years now.—τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντίοχον. Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. Anytus is named, as being the most popular and at the same time the most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offence at Socrates partly on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), induced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution. According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr. Vol. 8, ch. 68. Cf. Stallib. and Smith’s Dict. of Biog. and Mythol., Anytus.—οἱ . . . παραλαμβάνοντες, who taking the mass of you from your boyhood, sc. as it were, under their instruction.—ὡς ἵστη, κ.τ.λ., saying, there is one Socrates, etc. The introductory particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is here, and often in Greek, followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted in English. C. 609; K. 329, R. 3.—σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, a philosopher. Compare the Latin sapiens. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the ignorant multitude. Cf. Grote, His. Gr. Vol. viii. pp. 479–485, Eng. ed.—τὰ τε μετέωρα φρονιστής. φρονιστής governs the acc. as retaining the active force of φρονίζων. Mt. 422; C. 424.—τὸν ἄρτω . . . πολὺ, making the weaker the stronger argument, or, as it is often expressed, making the worse appear
the better reason. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum caussa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. Schleiermacher renders, making wrong right, and cites Aristotle as saying (Rhet. 2, 24) that it was done by bringing up against the truth, in some one view perhaps improbable, an opposite probability or apparent truth. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into every thing in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against him the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against them—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and in philosophy. Cf. below, 23, D: τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγοντες.

C. Ἐπανεκδόσεις denotes the manner or means of their power and formidableness; hence it is without the article.—οὔτε ἔσευς νομίζεις, do not even believe in the existence of the gods. This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe.—ἐπειρα... ἔτι δὲ καὶ = then... still further also; or in the second place... in the third place also.—ταῦτα τῆς ἡλικίας. Explained by πάιδες ὑμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.—ἀν... ἐπιστεύσατε. Observe the peculiar force of the past tense of the ind. with ἀν: you would have believed, so. had it been possible, as it was not. C. 603 and 604; K. 339, l. 6, cf. 340
1. — ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, accusing me in my absence. The form of expression (ἐρήμην, sc. δίκη) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear.—ἀτεχνῶς = altogether. Previous to Forster's, the editions connected ἀτεχνῶς with μειράκια. But as Schleiermacher well says, ἀτεχνῶς almost always connects itself with what follows, and it would not properly attach to μειράκια, since μειράκια, lads, are older than παιδεῖς, small boys.—εἰ ... τυγχάνει δὲν implies no uncertainty: εἰ = in case, or when. The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is named below, 19, C ; though Cratinus, Amphisias, Eupolis, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. φάνηκαί διαβολῆς χρώμενοι = φάνηκαί διαβολῆς, in the spirit of envy and calumny.—οἱ δὲ introduces another class of persuaders, as if οἱ μὲν had preceded with φάνηκαί . . . χρώμενοι, the one being the envious and calumnius, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates.—ἀπορώτατοι, most inaccessible (ἄν and πόρος), most difficult to approach and convince. Cf. Lysis, 223, B: ἀποροὶ προσφέρεσθαι.—ἀναβιβάσασθαι . . . ἐντανθοί, to make . . . come up hither, i.e. summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: for my benefit, cf. ἵξελίσσαι, 19, A.—ἀντῶν is partitive genitive = any of them.—δοσπερ . . . ἀποκρυμπίνω, to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to confute while no one replies. The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by τε καί. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc.

E. Ἀτιῶσατε = existim ate. So rendered by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.—ἐκείνους, those, sc. earlier and more remote accusers. ἐκείνος refers to the more remote idea, though, as in this instance, it be to the latter word or clause.
19. *Εἰν. Well, be it so. Schleiermacher: *wohl*. It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic.—*ἐξελίσσαμι*. Cf. note on ἀναβιβάσσαμι, 18, D.—τὴν διαβολὴν . . . χρόνῳ. *The calumny* (misconception produced by calumny) *which you have entertained a long time*, this to eradicate in so short a time.—τούτῳ οὖν γενίσσαμι, sc. the eradication of false impressions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by καὶ πλίον . . . ἀπολογούμενον, and to accomplish something by my defence. On πλίον τι ποιεῖν = *proficere aliquid*, to get on or forward with a thing, to gain something by it, see Lexicon.—*εἰ τι ἁμείνον, κ.τ.λ.*. The sequel shows, that he not only doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his defence rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with the expectation or desire of success.—*Ἀναλάβωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*. *Let us take up anew, from the beginning*. He has advertised to the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before mentioned it.—*ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή*, the false opinion of me. Cf. εἰναι τῇ σῇ, good will to you, Gorg. 486, A; C. 503; K. 302, R. 2; Mt. 466, 2.—με ἑγαρύφαστο τὴν γραφήν ταύτην. For the force of the middle voice, see C. 559, d; K. 250, R. 2; Mt. 492, c. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γραφήν, and the direct object με), see C. 435; K. 280, l. Render: *has preferred against me this indictment*. γραφή is a public indictment for a criminal offence; δίκη is applicable either to public or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφή, it denotes a private suit.

B. ὧσπερ οὖν, κ.τ.λ. *Therefore just as it is customary to read the bill of indictment presented by formal accusers, so must we read theirs*. ἀντωμοσία is primarily the oath of a
party at aw, and then the bill or form of indictment.—peryγαζεται, is over-busy, excessively curious.

C. τοιαύτη τις, something like this. He does not profess to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1.—ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ. The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aristophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal character, sitting in a basket in the air (as the gods were represented in the machinery of the Attic drama), and uttering declamations as windy as his position. Very different explanations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility, and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socrates. But this supposition does not accord either with the comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. Had Plato regarded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or as having occasioned his master’s death, he never would have introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the poet’s tomb such an epitaph as the following: “Jupiter, wishing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of Aristophanes.” Others have thought that Aristophanes really mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teachings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the matter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Soc-
rates, who was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as "a host who furnished a large company an agreeable entertainment." There was enough of general resemblance between him and them in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met the Sophists on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproach in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγέλου Ἀθηναίοι. And surely never was comedian furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become familiar as he stood and stared or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others, in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to
make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stalib. ad loc.; Smith's Dic. of Biog.—περιφερόμενον, sc. in a basket (κρεμάζειν), cf. the Clouds, 225 seqq.—ἀροβατέων. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: ἀροβατέω καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἤλιον. Cf. the Clouds, ibid.—διὰ...περὶ ἐπαιν. Observe the anastrophe and the position of περὶ, as in English: which I know nothing about.—λέγω, sc. the foregoing = I say this. ἀτυπάζων governs ἐπιτημην. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge! sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.—ἀλλὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. But I must speak, for, &c.

D. αὐτοὺς ἴμων τοὺς πολλοὺς. The greater part of yourselves.—ἐκ τούτων, Ἁλ. τούτων. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: from this. Cf. K. 241, R. 3; Mt. 472, 5.—περὶ ἐμοῦ is placed before ἓ for emphasis = which the many say about me. —τούτων, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the worse the better reason, &c.—οὐδὲ γ’εἰ, κ.τ.λ. We should expect oüte answering to the oüte in the previous clause, but oüde γε is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before τούτων ἀληθείας.—χρήματα πράττομαι. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied also by Xenophon, Mem. 1, 2, 60.
E. ἐπεῖ καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The Attics use ἐπεῖ often like γιὰς = for, and sometimes, like quum in Latin, it may be well rendered although. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true.—Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος, κ.τ.λ. He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Lecr. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. 1, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xep. Mem. 2, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat., Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elis, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith's Dict. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote's Hist. Gr. vol. 8, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it can hardly be doubted that, for the most part, their influence was hostile to morals and religion, and they deserved the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them.—τοὺς νέους would regularly be the object of πείσεως, depending on οἷος τὲ κατέρι, instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have πείσουσι. It should be observed, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology.—πολίτῶν is partitive genitive after ὃ: who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whomsoever they please of their fellow-citizens.—
προσέδωσα: and besides (paying them money) to feel under obligation to them.

A. ἐπεὶ = γάρ, for, cf. note, 19, E. Schliciermacher renders it by the German ja.—δὲ...ἐπιθημωνῦντα, of whose sojourn here I lately became aware. The reference is to Evenus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the Phædo, 60, D, and Phædrus, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who informed Socrates of Evenus’s stay in the city, was proverbially rich (ὁ πλούσιος, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. Protag. 314, B, C; Xen. Symp. 1, 5; Aristoph., Birds, 285. See also Boeck’s Pub. Econ. Athens, vol. 2, p. 242.

B. ἀπετύχως. Acc. of specification: in the virtue (or excellence) becoming them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word δίκαιος of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The “Great Teacher” abounded in this method of instruction.—ἡν δ’ ἄν ὄτρος. And this (overseer) would have been, etc. The past tense of the indicative with ἄν is appropriate to a conclusion preceded by a supposition contrary to fact. C. 603; K. 329, 6; Mt. 508, b.—τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, that which is appropriate to man and also to the state.—πνεύμην μνών = some $88. This was a small sum in comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minæ. With the Greek μνᾶ compare the Latin mina and our word money.—ἰμπελῶς, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the style of teaching and to the price of tuition = so properly (literally, in tune),
so excellently in both respects. He says, there is great urbanity in the expression. If Socrates had said, ὁτας ἐντελῶς, he would have too clearly ridiculed Evenus and so Callias. He used therefore a word, by which, while he seemed to praise Evenus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the avarice of the other Sophists. Forster renders it by concinna, Ast, commodo, Schleiermacher, vortrefflich, Cousin, a bon marché. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the Laws, 776, B, 760, A.

C. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: but I cannot thus pride myself, for etc. γὰρ in such connection may be rendered really, certainly: but I really do not know. Cf. K. 324, R. 1; C. 661, 2.—ἐπολέσθοι. Compare our take up.
—τὸ σοῦ τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα, your business, what is it? The emphasis is on your: you deny any acquaintance with the profession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, is your business, profession, or pursuit?—οὔτεν περιττότερον, nothing more or other, nihil aliud. Cousin: rien de plus ou autrement. Schleiermacher: nichts besonders. Stallbaum renders: nihil curiosius.—ἐπείρι, then, in that case, I suppose so much talk and discussion would not have arisen, as has arisen. γέγονεν stands where ἂν ἐγένετο would regularly have been used, to denote that this bruit has actually arisen. The next clause, ὅ μή τε ἐπράπτεις, κ.τ.λ., is a repetition of the condition already expressed in the first clause, σοῦ γς οὔδὲν . . . πραγματευομένου, for the sake of greater clearness and emphasis. The style is manifestly colloquial.

D. τί νορ’, quid tandem. In questions, nōrī, like tandem, indicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the won-
nder of the inquirer.—πό ὁ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, both the name, sc. of a wise man, and the calumny connected with it.
—εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστη, κ.τ.λ. Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth. Observe the omission of ὅτι. So in Crit. 54, D, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐκά, δὸ γα, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere after εἰ ἔστη.—ἀλλ' ἡ. It has been usual in the grammars to explain this combination of particles (which occurs after a preceding negative or after a question implying a negative), as equivalent to ἀλλο ἡ, with the accent changed (ἀλλὰ ἡ) and then lost (ἀλλ' ἡ). Cf. C. 671, 2; K. 322, R. 10. But no sufficient reason is given for the change of the accent. Besides it is often preceded by ἀλλο, cf. infra, 34, B: ρίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον . . . ἄλλ' ἡ, κ.τ.λ. Perhaps it is better to adopt the explanation of Stallbaum, Phaed. 81, B, viz., that it is a combination of two different constructions into one. It being allowable to say either οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλα, or οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ, these two constructions are combined in this, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλ' ἡ.—ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην, pray what sort of wisdom this. The clause takes the construction of σοφίαν in the preceding (acc. after διὰ). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in the questions and answers of the dialogue, cf. C. 651, E; K. 300, C.—ἡπερ ἐστὶν ἡσυχ, κ.τ.λ. Just that, perhaps, which is, etc.—τῶ ὅρω, in reality. ταύτην, in this, acc. of specification. So σοφίαν in the next clause.

E. ἡ καρ' ἀναρωπον, than pertains to man, quam pro homine, cf. Mt. 449.—ἡ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω, or else I know not what to call it—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident.
—ἐνὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἰμῷ, for the sake of calumniating me. For this sense of ἐνὶ, cf. K. 296, τ. c.; Mt. 585. For τῇ ἰμῷ, instead of the objective gen., ἰμοῦ, cf. note, 19, A.—μὴ ἵππουση. Do not raise a tumult against me, or as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, do not hiss me = ne obstrepatis. The
reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf.
ote, 17, A. For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with μὴ and its
compounds, cf. C. 598; K. 259, 5; Mt. 511, 3.—μηδὲ ἀν,
not even if.—ἀξιόξρεων, responsible, primarily in regard to
money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, B.—
μέγα λέγειν, properly denotes boasting, as μέγα φρονεῖν does
pride. In the later Greek, it meant to say something marvellous.
But it was the seeming pride and arrogance of what he
said, which, he feared, would give offence, and which did actu-
ally give offence to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. as cited
below, 21, A; also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the
μεγᾶληγορία, which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his
defence.—τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, ei δὴ τις ἐστι σοφία καί οἶα, for of my
wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is, &c.
By a somewhat peculiar attraction, σοφία is drawn from the
principal into the subordinate clause.

A. Πον = I suppose.—ἐμὸς ἐταῖρος. Hence often attacked
by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere.—ἐγνέφυρε ... 
kατήλθε, he went with you in your recent exile and with you
returned. The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of
the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which
having taken place quite recently, is called τῆν φυγὴν ταίτην.
This allusion was calculated to recommend Chaerophon
to popular favor. Words compounded with κατά (κατηκό, κα-
τέρχεσθαι, &c.) often denote a return home to one’s country,
town, harbor, as words compounded with ἀνά signify the de-
parture from such a resting place. Away from home is ὑπ’,
return is δοῦν.—ὁ γ σφοδρὸς. Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104,
501, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. 2, 3; Plat. Gorg., Charm.,
&c. pass.—καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ Ἴορβίζετε, and, I repeat it, do
not be raising a tumult. It will be observed, that the aor.
subj. is used in the first request (μὴ Ἴορβίζεσθε above), but in
the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request
not to do it at all; the latter is more definite, and means: don’t be doing it, as you are doing and will be very liable to do while I proceed, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. C. 570, seq.; K. 257, 1; Mt. 501. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates’ Defence did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15.—ήρετο γὰρ δὴ. The Greeks use the particles, γὰρ, δὴ, οὖν, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use I say. Mt. 615, 616.—ἀνείλευ, responded, literally, took up, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Socr. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144.—δὰ δειλήσας, sc. Chærecrates, Xen. Mem. ii. 3.
—οἶνοι ... ἑκεῖνοι. Cf. note, 18, E.

B. τί ποτε, what in the world. Cf. note, 20, D.—ξῦνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὡν. After ξῦνοιδα, συγγυμνῶσκω, &c., the participle expresses that of which one is conscious, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the nom. or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the dative. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: ἐμαυτῷ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένοι. C. 614, 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 548, 2. μέγα and σμικρὸν are adverbial accusatives. C. 440, 441; K. 278, R. 1; Mt. 425, 1.
—τί σοὶ ποτε λέγει, what in the world then, I say, does he mean? οὖν is resumptive like γὰρ, above, 21, A; and λέγει is best rendered, as it often is, by the English mean. Below the same form of expression follows ἡπόρουν, instead of the oratio obliqua, δ τί ... λέγωι. C. 610; 345, 5; Mt. 529, 5.—τετεια ... ἑττατομη, but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, τί ποτε λέγει) somewhat as follows. τουοῦτος usually refers to the foregoing, τουοῦσθε to the following (cf. note, 37, A).
but not always. C. 513, 516. Cf. τουαίτη τίς, 19, C, and note, ibid.—ἡλιος stands without a connective, because this clause is in opposition as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, ibid. The reader will observe that all such clauses or sentences are asyndetic; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek begins with some connective particle, δὲ, καὶ, γὰρ, ὥσπερ, &c.

C. ὃς . . . ἥλιος, supposing, that there, if anywhere, I should confute, etc. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.—ἵτιν ὅντως. Cf. note on ὃς ἦταν, 18, B.—οὔ δὲ ἐμὲ ἦφαγα, but you (sc. the oracle) said I (sc. was wiser).—πρὸς δὲ . . . ἥλιον, in looking to whom I met with such an experience.—καὶ διαλεγόμενοι. Kai connects διαλεγόμενοι to διασκορπῶν (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates) is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with μοι. It is a species of anacoluthon. C. 344; Mt. 311.

D. ἔννοεσθι is both temporal and causal = from that time and for that reason.—πρὸς ἐμαυτῷ . . . ἐλογιζόμην, I reasoned with myself.—τούτων μὲν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. The μὲν implies, that something else may be said or found to be true in reference to some other man. It has no δὲ or other particle correlative to it, but prepares the mind for the further examinations which follow. The μὲν after κινδυνεῖ is correlative to ἀλλ’, after which follows again the more usual correlative οὐτὸς μὲν . . . ἐγὼ δὲ. After ὃσπερ ὥσπερ ὥσπερ, ὥσπερ is understood.—οὐδὲ denotes not an inference but a correspondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: while I, just as in fact, and as I have already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I know.—σμικρὸ τινὶ δὲ—
notes the *degree*, and αὐτῷ τὸν τρόπον the *respect* in which he is wiser. C. 418, 3, 419; K. 285, 3; Mt. 400, 6, 8. The tyro will observe the difference between μὴ and οὐδὲ, the contingent and the absolute negative, well illustrated in the clause ἀ μὴν ἄδικα, κ.τ.λ.: *what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I know.*

Ε. δὲ ἀπειρήσωμεν. These words connect with each of the preceding participles, but in the different relations of the *fact* and the *cause*—with αἰσχρομενος, δὲ would strictly require to be rendered *that*; with λυπούμενος and δεδώσα, *because.*

—τὸ τὸν ζευγ. C. 477; Mt. 284.—ὑτέων οὖν, σκοπούντι. Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct narration, and gives us the *very language* of his heart at the *time* when he made this examination: *I must go then* (thought I), *in investigating the oracle what it meant,* to all, etc. σκοπούντι agrees with μοι implied as the dative of the agent after ὑτέων. For χρησμὸν, put as the object of σκοπούντι instead of the subject of λέγει, see C. 425, 4.

Α. μὴ τὸν κίνω. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey’s notes, ibid. In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: τὸν Ἀγαμητίων ζευγ., which perhaps shows that the oath was of Egyptian origin. See Mitchell’s note, D, App. to Aristoph. Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, &c., refers the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented several other formulæ as substitutes, such as by the dog, by the oak, by the goose, &c. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, infra, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. i. 5, 5. iii. 10, 9. iv. 2, 9, et al.—οἱ μὲν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ. An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B.—διήγον δέιν. Cf. note 17, Α.—τοῦ πλείστου is governed by
The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φαυλότεροι and ἐπιεικέστεροι. — πλάνη, wandering, sc. to visit and examine the reputed wise men. — ποιοῦσα agrees with μοῦ implied in ἐμὴ. — πόνος alludes to labors like those of Hercules. — ἵνα ... γένοιτο: that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable, i.e. in addition to all his labors, also (καὶ) to bring about a result the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer’s Defence of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum ad loc.

B. ὡς ... καταληψόμενος. Cf. note 21, C. ἐν ἄυροφόρῳ καταληψόμενος contains an allusion to the detection of a criminal in the very act. — μιλιστα πεπραγματεύσατο: to have been most carefully composed. — διερώτων ἂν. The imperfect with ἂν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say. C. 594; K. 260, B; Mt. 599, a. So below, ἄν βελτίων ἠλεγον: almost all who were present would speak better (i.e. give a better account) than they (the poets) of the poems which they themselves had composed. Wolf renders οἱ παρῶντες, qui hic adsumunt, sc. the judges of Socrates! and Smith, with a total misapprehension of Stallbaum, whom he professes to translate, renders ἄν βελτίων ἠλεγον, used to think best of those poems which they themselves had composed!

C. οὐ σοφία, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by art, but by an inspiration which displaces reason. The fundamental difference between real sciences or art, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspira-
tion, is an idea, on which Socrates often and earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass.; Grote’s Hist. Gr. vol. viii. p. 579, Eng. ed.—οἱομένων. C. 633; K. 310; Mt. 549, 4.—εἰναι ἀνθρώπων. C. 627, a; K. 307, 5; Mt. 536.—ἀλλα, like its antecedent τὰ ἄλλα, is acc. of specification, and σοφοφωτάτοι is understood in the predicate after ἥσαν: in which they were not, sc. the wisest.—τῷ αὐτῷ οἷομενος περιγεγονόναι: supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which I surpassed also the politicians. Cf. 21, D.

D. τελευτῶν, lastly. C. 632; 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.—εἴμαι...εἰπεῖν. Cf. note, 21, B.—ὅς ἐστις εἰπεῖν. Cf. note, 17, A.—τοῦτο: in respect to this. C. 395; K. 273, R. 20; Mt. 336.—δημοσιογοι is subject of ἔδοξαν. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by καί, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison οἱ ποιηταῖ, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: καί ἐνεύζει...δος καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.—τὰ ἄλλα τὰ μέγυστα, e. g. the administration of the government, to which, as understood by Forster, Stallbaum, and others, Socrates particularly refers.—ἀνερωτάν, to ask again, as in the case of the poets and the politicians.—ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: nomine oraculi. Stallb.

E. δεξαίµν, in the sense of prefer, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim.—ἀμφότερα is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns σοφιάν and ἁμαρτίαν = both the things. C. 450; K. 241, 2; Mt. 437.

A. σοφός εἰναι explains δογμα τοῦτο = called this name, sc. 23 to be wise. To be is superfluous in English, but εἰναι often follows verbs of calling. C. 434, N; K. 269, R. 1; 420, 1. σοφός is nom. instead of acc., because in the mind of the speaker, himself is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said ἄπεξεθης γέγονα instead of ἄπεξεθη μοι γεγόνασι. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited.—ἀλλα ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω:
in which I may chance to confute another, or in whatsoever I may confute another. The ἀν makes the expression indefinite and general, and may be expressed either in connection with the relative (whatev'er), which it usually follows, and with which it often combines, or in connection with the verb (may chance). Cf. C. 606; K. 260, c; Mt. 527.—τὸ δὲ: but as to the matter of fact. It is strengthened by τὸ δεῦτε = in reality. The article with ὤδε indicates that which is so opposed to something else, that it ought to be regarded as true. So Ast ad Pol. 363, and approved by Stallbaum. The fuller formula, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, is often used in the same way. See examples in Stallbaum.—ἀλγοῦ τῶν ... καὶ οἴδεικα: a little and indeed nothing. So often μικρὰ καὶ οἴδειν = little or nothing. So atque in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τῶν, cf. ἢ τί ἢ οἴδειν, 17, B, and note ibid.—καὶ φαίνεται ... Σακράτης: and he seems to say this (sc. that he is wise) not of Socrates. Instead of τοῦτον, oū most of the early editions have τοῦτον. For two acc. after a verb of saying, cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—προσκεχρήσατα: made use of my name besides, i.e. incidentally, for another purpose.

B. ἄσωτερ ἀν εἰ οἶνοι: as if he would say. There is an ellipsis of ποιῶτο or some such verb, constituting an implied apodicosis, with which the ἀν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D: ἄσωτερ οὖν ἄν: according to the god, i.e. in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii. 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament.—καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ τῶν ξίνων, κ.τ.λ.: both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise. Partitive gen. after τῶν. ——τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e.g. below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e.g. Mem. i. 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens.——πε
νίκ μυβία: the greatest poverty. πενία = paupertas, poverty; πτωχεία = egestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Κεον. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called πίνης, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minae; cf. also 38, B.

C. οἱ τῶν πλουσιοτάτων. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the multitude were awakened against him.—ἐίρα instead of καὶ εἰρα, as we often use then for and then between two verbs.

D. ἀλλ’ οἱ χ αὖροις, but not with themselves, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. αὖροις, sc. the young men, but this would require ἐκεῖνος.—τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, B.—ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα, κ.τ.λ., sc. διαφείρει τοὺς νέους διδάσκων; that he corrupts the young by teaching things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods, &c.

E. Μελητός μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν. Al. Μελητός. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad tragic poetry. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basileus, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and “rendition” of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 3; Andoc. De Myster.—Ἀντός ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν. He was a leather dresser, and, besides sharing with other “mechanics” in the resentment.
provoked by Socrates's exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offence at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See note 18, B. In Plato's Men. (91, A–C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he should get himself into trouble.—Λύκων ἐπὶ τῶν ῥητόρων. Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, Wasps, 1301. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Socrates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc., and Smith's Dict. Ant.

24 A. ἀρχόμενος. C. 632; K. 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.—ταύτῃ ἔσται ὑμῖν... τάλης. This is the truth for you, sc. which I promised to tell you, cf. 17, B.—τοὺς ἄνδρες ἔπεμψανοι. I incur hatred by the same, sc. τάλης. On the sentiments of this and the following clause, cf. John viii. 46, v. 43; Gal. iv. 16.

B. τῶν ἄγαντον τε καὶ φιλόπολιν. These epithets are applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without irony. φιλόπολης differs from φιλόπολις, according to Stallb., as friend of Athens from friend of Greece.—αὕτη γὰρ δή... λάβωμαι αὐτοῖ: for now again let us take up on the other hand. The language implies some formality and gravity in the examination of this, as also of the former accusation.—ἐσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τούτων ὄντων καθηγοῦν: inasmuch as these are different accusers, i. e. another class, a second, in contradistinction to the first, whom he has just disposed of.—ἀντιμοσιαν. Cf. note, 19, B. —πως ἄλλα, nearly as follows. Cf. τουαίη τίς, 19, C, and note ibid. The order of the points in the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, Mem. v. 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives
it on the authority of Phavorinus, as still existing in due form
in the second century, in these words: "Socrates is guilty in
not recognizing the gods that the state recognizes, but intro-
ducing other new divinities; and he is guilty also of corrupting
the youth. Penalty death."

C. ἐγώ δὲ γε, but I for my part. The γε is omitted in the
earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.,
on the authority of the best MSS.—σπουδὴν χαριεύς κεραυνοι,
serio ludit; literally, jokes in earnest. It is an example of the
figure called oxymoron. It is explained by the following par-
ticipial clauses. Meletus seemed as if he must be merely jok-
ing, playing a part, when he pretended to feel so much concern
about matters (such as the education of the youth and the
worship of the gods) on which he never had bestowed an anxious
thought; and yet he made a serious business of it when he
 rashly (πριβώς) brought men to trial (εἰς ἡγώνας καθιστάς ἀν-
βαπτίσαι).

D. δικαῦο, hither, γε being understood, or instead of ἐρξαυ.
So in Iliad and Odyssey sometimes, and elsewhere in Plato.
The law allowed the parties in a suit to question each other,
and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note,
25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account,
as Socrates knew how to use it by his method of question and
answer.—ἄλλο τι. This formula, or the fuller, ἄλλο τι ἣ, is
often used, especially in Plato's Dialogues, simply to ask a ques-
tion, implying an affirmative answer, like ἐκεῖν, or nonne, only
with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. O. 541, N;
K. 344, 5, g; Mt. 487, 9. Render: do you not, etc.—ὅπως
... ἐσοῦνα. ὅπως, with the fut. ind., denotes more continu-
ance as well as more certainty than ὅπως with the aor. subj.
Here the object is to express a permanent state of excellence
among the youth. Cf. C. 601; K. 330, 6; Mt. 519, 7.—μέλον
γε σοι, especially (γε) since it so concerns you. The part. agree
with the foregoing question understood, with which it forms an acc. absolute. C. 638; K. 312, 5; Matthiae calls it nom. abs. 564 —τῶν ... διαφείρουσα, him who is corrupting them.—εἰσάγεις, literally, bring in, sc. to court, cf. 29, Α: εἰσάγεις ... εἰς δικαστήριον. Here, however, it is followed by a dat. of the persons, before whom he is brought, sc. the judges (τουρωαί). Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said εἰσάγεις. It may usually be rendered impeach, or prosecute.

E. νη τήν "Ηρα. Cf. note, 22, Α.—τι δαί δή. δαί, a lengthened form of δή, expresses surprise, astonishment, and is used only in questions with τι and πῶς. K. 316, 7; Mt. 603. —ἀκροαταί. The spectators, at trials of any interest before the Heliaec, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still more under popular influence.

25 Α. οἱ σουλευταί. The members of the βουλή, or senate, of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of senators are perhaps here intended.—'Ἀλλ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. But then, Meletus, may not perchance those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young? The μὴ implies some fear or anxiety, lest it may be so.

B. οἱ μὲν βελτίων πουούντες αὑτούς, sc. δοκοῦσιν, supplied from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and therefore without a connective.—ρυγνωρίου τούτου πῶς. Adverbial acc. = all the reverse of this.—πάντως δὴ ποὺ, altogether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. οὐ, instead of μὴ, follows the conditional particle (εἰ), because it unites with φησι to convey one idea, οὐ φησὶ = deny. K. 319, 2, h; Mt. 608, 1.—εἰ ... διαφείρει. The use of the ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the supposition: if (really, as you affirm) only one corrupts them. O. 603, ζ; K. 339, 3, a; Mt. 524, 1.—οἱ ἄλλοι, the rest, all others.
C. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, but it is not so, for; or but really, cf. note, 20, C.—ζ Μέλητε ... ἀμήλειαν ... μεμελήκε. A play upon the name: O Careful One, you show your want of care, that you have never cared, &c.—εἰσάγεις, cf. note, 24, D.—ζ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε. The πρὸς Δίως seems to be placed between ζ and Μέλητε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: O thou before Jupiter Careful One.—τοὺς δὲι ... ἐνυτα. δει, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, in every case, i. e. in each instance, in which the supposition holds.

D. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλήλως τὸ ἐρωτήμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ.—τηλικούτου, at my time of life, sc. so old, i. e. 70, cf. 17, D. τηλικόσθη, at your time of life, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E. The words both mean the same, viz., either so old or so young, according to the connection.

E. ταύτα, acc. of the respect.—οἶμαι ... οὐδένα, sc. πεισθαι σοι. C. 661, 1. So in the next clause, there is an ellipsis of διαφέςαρσα with ἄκω, and still further on of ποιῶν with παύσομαι. Throughout this passage, Socrates manifestly takes the ground, that virtue is coextensive with knowledge. It is impossible for any man to injure others without injuring himself; and no man who really knows this, will wrong another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So in Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who knows temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer anything else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man does what seems to him best, and if he knows what is best, he will do it, and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 20; Arist. Ethic. Eudem.
1, 5 Protag. 345; Gorg. 460, and Prof. Woolsey's remarks upon it in his Introduction.

26 B. ὅτι καὶ τὴν γραφὴν, ἤν ἐγράψα, sc. με φὴς διαφασίσεως τοὺς μετέρων, repeated from above.—οὐ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα is the obj. of διδάσκων placed where it is for emphasis.—ςὲ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἵστιν, of whom our discussion now is. Ζη is objective genitive.

C. Καὶ αὐτός ἂν, and I myself accordingly.—οὐ μιντοῦ, κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recognizes, but others, and this is what you accuse me of; that (I teach them to believe that there are) others; or do you say that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself, and that I teach others this doctrine. Observe the correlation of οὕτε—τε, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and irregular sentence. Σεοῦς usually omits the article after νομίζειν, ἡγεῖσαι, &c. = believe in gods.

D. ἵνα ὁ. C. 539, 2, a; K. 344, R. 6.—οὔδε . . . οὔδε, not simply correlative, like οὕτε . . . οὕτε = neither . . . nor, but emphatic = not even . . . nor yet. Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible, that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with ἡλιον and σελήνην, cf. C. 485, a; K. 244, R. 3, c; Mt. 264, 5. Μά Δι', sc. οὐ νομίζεις, which is understood from the foregoing question. Μά is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either ναϊ or οὔ; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. K. 316, 4, and Stallbaum ad loc.—Ἀναξάγορος. Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. 2, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot iron, as some understand it, or stone, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. 4, 7, 7, and the moon an
earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras.—οὐκ εἰδέναι. For οὐκ, instead of μή, see note on οὐ φεύρε, 25, B.

E. Καὶ δὴ καί, and moreover also. The sentence which follows is ironical; δὴ is the object of πραμίνοις.——εἰ πάνυ πολλοῖ, δραχμῆς, for a drachma at the very highest. πολλοῖ, like δραχμῆς, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. pro Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Ath. 2, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith’s Dict. Antiq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there.——ἄλλως τε καί, κ.τ.λ., especially when they are so absurd; literally, for other reasons and also (in particular) they being so absurd.——οὐσωσί, thus entirely and absolutely.——Ἀποκέρατος χ’ εἰ... δοκεῖσ. Cf. note on δικαίος εἰμι, 18, A.

A. ζοικ... διανωπομιν, for he seems like one having 27 composed (i.e. he seems to have composed) as it were an enigma, testing the question, Whether will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know, etc. In the earlier editions καί is inserted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma in order to test. Cf. Gorg.: τίπραξα έσκτην διατίμαισα.
νποδήσα, κ.τ.λ. = having divided herself into four parts and thus put on, or in order to put on, &c. For the use of the part. after ἔσχες, cf. C. 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 555, obs. 2. Compare also the note on ἡνοῦθα with the part. 21, B.— ἐμοῦ χαρινείζομένου. γινώσκω, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Mt. 349, 1.—δοπερ ἄν. Cf. note, 17, D.—ἡ...λέγειν, in what manner he seems to me to speak these contradictions.

B. ἐν τῷ εἰωθῶν τρόπῳ, in my usual method, sc. of question and answer.—ἀλλα καὶ ἄλλα, one after another, again and again.

C. δαμόνα μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι. δαμόνα is here constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates τὸ δαμόνον by divinum quidam, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun (meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from ἱππεκα πράγματα, ἄνδρονεια πράγματα, &c. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes ibid.), and which would more properly be called divine things, than divinities.—ὦς ὄνησας: what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are—que tu m'oblige. Cousin. Α1. ὄνησας.—μόγις = tandem aliquando, Stallb. —ἀλλ' οὖν δαμόνα γε νομίζω, but then I believe in divine things at all events, sc. whether they be old or new, i. e. though they be new ones as charged in the indictment.—ἀντιγραφὴ = ἀντωμοσία, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.
NOTES.

D. ἢτοι Ἄρων γε ἢγοῦμενα ἢ Σεῶν παιδας. The word ἀθικοῦς, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous with Σεῶν; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes signifies bad as well as good beings of a superhuman order, thus approaching to the New Testament sense of demons or evil spirits.—τοῦτο... χαριεμίζεσα, this would be wherein I say (27, A), that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe in gods, since at all events I believe in demons. The last clause repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of the sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the conclusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many by which his style is made to resemble the language of conversation.—ἐν δὲ καὶ λέγοντι, from whom forsooth they are said to be. The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. C. 651, e; K. 300, b; Mt. 595, 4.—ἡ καὶ ὁν. Forsterus delendam censebat hanc particularam (ἡ); sine caussa idonea; nam ἡμίνωτα dici possunt, et ἐπτην παιδες, et ἡνων παιδες. Fischer. That is, mules may have horses or also asses for their male parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to male parents.

E. ὁνικε limits ἐγράψω; ἀντοπιράμενος denotes the end in view = for the purpose of testing me, and ἀποκράτων the cause = because you were at a loss.—ὁνικε δὲ αὐτό, κ.τ.λ. But that you should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding, that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertaining both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human ingenuity. I have enclosed ὅτι in brackets, because, though
found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schleiermacher, and Cousin.

28' Ἀλλὰ γὰρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defence to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr.—καὶ τοῦτ'... αἰρή, and this it is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction.—ἀλλὰ... φεσώσοι. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτ' at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses.—οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μη ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ, and there is no reason to fear lest it should (that it will) stop with me, i. e. that I shall be the last victim.

B. Ἐν' οὐκ αἰσχύνει. Ἐν' in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as πορεῖ does surprise and wonder, cf. note, 20, D.—τοῦτ' ἦν ἦ τεμνάναι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κινδυνοῦ, literally, the danger of living or dying, i. e. the prospect of life or death.—ἄνδρα, a man emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄνδρων. It is the subject of ὑπολογιζομαι.—ὅτου... ὥθελος ἐστιν, who is of any use, however little. ὥθελος more frequently takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage, compare Crito, 48.
C. οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ = especially; literally, both the others and (in particular) the son of Thetis. For ἄλλοις τε καὶ = especially, cf. note, 26, E. The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. II. 18, 90–125.—παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, in comparison with (properly, alongside of) submitting to any thing dishonorable.—τιμωρήσεις. This verb takes after it a dative of the person avenged, together with an accusative of the person on whom, or the thing for which vengeance is taken—ὅπως you shall avenge Patroclus your friend for his murder; or, as we say avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend.—αιῶνα γὰρ τοι. κ.τ.λ.; the very words of Thetis to her son, II. 18, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on ὅπως which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by δὲ.

D. Κακὸς ἄν denotes the state in which to live were to be dreaded more than death: to live being a bad man, that is, an unfaithful friend and a cowardly soldier.—Αἰῶνα τελεῖν ... δὲ ὡς ἀρείης. Parts of two Homeric verses (II. 18, 98 and 104) brought together.—μὴ ... ὅτε, you do not suppose, do you, implies a wish, that you should not suppose.—οὖν γὰρ ἐκεί. Cf. note, 17, D.—οὖν ἄν, whereever, cf. note, 23, A.—ὁ ἰπτ’ ἄρχοντος ταχησίς. Anacoluthon for ὁ ἰπτ’ ἄρχοντος ταχησίς, which would correspond with ἦ ἡγεσάμενος βέλτιον; instead of which we have ἰπτ’ ἄρχοντος ταχησίς, corresponding to ἐαυτῷ τάξην, as if the first ἦ had preceded τάξην, instead of ἡγεσάμενος.—πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, before, i. e. more than the dishonorable.

E. εἰς εἰργασμένος. Heindorf makes ἐργάζομαι here, as he says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum, with good reason, renders εἰς εἰργασμένος, I should have perpetrated (not merely done).—εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μὲ ... τότε μὲν οὖ ... τοῦ δὲ ζεοῦ ... ἐνταῦθα δὲ, if, when on the one hand the commanders ... then on the one hand I ... but when on the other hand
the god . . . then on the other hand Ι, &c. On this peculiarly emphatic doubling of μέν and δε, cf. K. 322, R. 1; Mt. 622, 5. — ἵππεν (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact; λίπομι (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed, that the preposition ἐν is used to denote the locality of this battle, while ἐν is used with Ποσιδαία and Άμφιόλει. Whenever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated ἐν Δηλίῳ (cf. Xen. Mem. 3, 5, 4, and Robbins's note ibid.), whereas in other battles ἐν is the usual preposition. The reason seems to be, that Delium was properly the name of the temple of Apollo, and, though the city received the same designation, the old association forbade its extension so as to embrace the surrounding country, where the battle was fought.

29: A. δεινὸν μέντ' ἐν εἰη, a strange thing indeed it would be. It is a repetition or resumption of δεινὰ ἐν εἰη εἰργαζόμενος at the beginning of the section.— ὁς Ἀληθῶς. ὁς gives emphasis to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (οὗτος), and also of an appropriate verb: εἰσάγοι οὗτος ὁς Ἀληθῶς εἰσάγοι. — εἰσάγοι εἰς δικαστήριον. Cf. note, 24, D.— τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, to man, i. e. mankind. C. 470, A, 1; K. 244, 2.

B. Καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., and this, how is not this ignorance which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what he does not know.— τοῦτο καὶ εἰσάβςα, in this respect and here, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority strictly to this single point.— τῷ, in any thing, dat. of the respect.— τοῦτῳ ἂν, sc. φαίνει εἰνα, I should say that it was (i. e. that I was wiser) in this.— οὗτῳ καὶ οἷος τοι corresponds
to οἴκειδός, which is equivalent to δοσσερ ὅν οἴδα.—τῇ βελτίων, καὶ τῆς καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, the better, whether god or man.—πρὸ ὦν τῶν κακῶν ὄν, κ.τ.λ., in preference therefore to the evils which I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good, that is, I will never shun the latter more than the former—the uncertain more than the certain. Cf. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, 28, D.

C. ἀπωτήσαντες = ἀπετήσαντες, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, disregarding. τῇ ἄρχῃ with a negative means, not in the first instance, i. e. not at all.—εἰσέλθειν for εἰσάγεσθαι, to be brought in hither for trial.—ἀποκτείναι, to put me to death; i. e. condemn me to death. So Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 5.—ἄν ... ἐπιτηθευόντες ... διαφθαρήσονται. On the use of ἄν with the fut. ind. which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see K. 260, 2, (1); Mt. 599, d; and Stallb. ad loc. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect ἄν with ἐπιτηθευόντες only = ἄν ... ἐπιτηθευόνει ... καί ... διαφθαρήσονται. But it is more natural to suppose, that ἄν gives a contingent sense to διαφθαρήσονται also.—ἐπὶ τούτῳ μὲν ὅτι ἐφ' ὦτι, on this condition, however, that you do not longer, &c. ἐφ' ὦτι is equivalent to ἔστε, and is accordingly followed by the inf. C. 530; K. 341, R. 5; Mt. 479, a.

D. εἰ ὦν ... ἀφικέτε. ὦν is here resumptive = I say. It will be observed, that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (εἰ μὲ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφικέτε ... εἰ μοι πρὸς ταύτα ἐπικούτε ... εἰ ὦν με, ὁπερ ἐπικούν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικέτε), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (ἀφικέτε) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances, the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (ἐπικούτε, ἀφικέτε), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἄν (ἐπικού μ' ἄν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis.—ἀπαύγομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ. Ἀνθρώποις τάξιν μὲν εὐθείᾳ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ.
NOTES.

[23, a]

γεσαῖ est aliquem salutare ita ut eum amplectoris; φιλεῖν salutare aliquem ita, ut eum osculoris. Hec loco significant haec verba: grato latoque animo vestram humanitatem et clementiam amplexor atque veneror. Stallbaum.—πείσομαι μᾶλλον τῷ ἡτοφῇ ἦμιν. Cf. Acts v. 29.—οὐ μὴ πανσωμαι. οὐ μή, with the subj. instead of the fut., is used in strong denial. Cr. 595, δ; K. 318, 7; Mt. 517.—ἄει, continually, from time to time.—ἰσχύς, strength of mind, intellectual and moral power, particularly fortitude and the kindred masculine virtues, as appears from what follows.

Ε. ἄπειμι. The present of εἰμι and its compounds is generally used by the Attics in a future sense. So in English, I go or am going = I shall or will go.—φάναι δέ, but to say that he does. In Laches, 187–8, Nicias gives a very similar though more minute account of the manner in which Socrates would hold every one he conversed with to the work of self-examination: "You do not seem to know, that whoever is nearest to Socrates in reasoning, just as in relationship, and whoever approaches him in conversation, even though he should begin to converse at first on some other subject, he will, with infallible certainty, be brought round in the discussion, till he is obliged to give an account of himself, in what manner he is now living, and how he has lived his past life; and once caught in it, Socrates will not let him go, till he has well and beautifully put all these things to the test ... and I almost knew, long ago, that our discussion now, being in the presence of Socrates, would not be about the young men, but about ourselves."

50 Α. Καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ. Cf. καὶ ἰετῷ καὶ ἀναρωτῷ, 29, ο, and note ibid. Verbs of doing and saying more commonly take the indirect as well as the direct object in the acc. K. 280, 2, R. 2; Mt. 415, obs. 1.—δορφ, by as much as. The full construction would require a corresponding demonstrative
(τοσούτῳ) with μᾶλλον, denoting the degree of difference. C. 419; K. 285, (3), c; Mt. 400, 8.—ἐγγυτέρω may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that to which there is a nearness. C. 394, cf. 399; K. 273, R. 9, cf. 284, 3, (2); Mt. 339, cf. 386, 6. That in which, or in respect to which, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. C. 395, cf. 418; K. 274, 3, cf. 285, 3, b; Mt. 337, cf. 400, 6. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum’s note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: ὅς ἐν ἐγγυτάτῳ Σωκράτους ἦ λόγῳ ἄστηρ γένει. —τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ ζεῦ οὐρεσίαν, my service to the god. The dat. to or for can follow substantives. C. 409; Mt. 390.—μηδὲ οὖν σφόδρα, no, nor so zealously, cf. note on μηδ’ ὀπωσδέοις, οὖν, 17, B.

B. λέγων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less.—εἰ... διαφεύγω. Cf. note, 25, B.—ταῦτα ἤν εἶθε βλασφήμα, these instructions and persuasions must be injurious. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 8: how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting.—οὐδὲν λέγει, he says nothing, that is, he is utterly mistaken. Cf. Laches, 195, B; N. 1: ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σωκράτε, Λάχης ἐπιζυμεῖν καὶ με θανάτῳ μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτος τις εἶναι. Διὰ Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαι γε ἀποφήμαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις. So τί λέγειν is to say something, i. e. to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12.—πρὸς ταῦτα, wherefore, literally, in reference to these things, in view of them.—ἡ πειθεσθε... ἢ μὴ, that is, unconditionally—don’t propose any conditional acquittal, like that: suggested 29, C; since I would not on any condition (ἂν refers to an implied condition) do differently, not even if I must die (strictly and emphatically be dead) many times over.
C. Ἐπὶ ἀπουβίβαστος. Cf. note, 21, A. Socrates here enter upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offence at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Is there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness. It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God.——ἐμεῖναι μοι ὅσι ἔργον ὑμένω, persevere for me in what I asked of you, i.e. continue to extend to me the favor which I requested of you.—μὴλα ζῶρ ὕπνοι, for I am about now (ὁν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) to say also some other things (besides those already said) at which perhaps you will cry out. This clause is connected by γὰρ ὑπ' (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one, (ἐμεῖναι, κ.τ.λ.)——οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἰδώνος, for he would not even be able, sc. if he wished. ἄν referring to an implied condition. C. 604, N. a; K. 260, 4, a; Mt. 515, obs.

D. οὖ . . . ἐπιτυγχάνει = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: nicht in der Ordnung. Cousin: pas . . . au pouvoir. Stallbaum: neque legibus divina sapientia respondere.—ἀμείνοις ἄνθρω, for a better man to be injured by a worse, instead of ἀμείνοις ἄνθρω, that a better man, &c., the design being to link it more closely with οὖ . . . ἐπιτυγχάνει. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely
quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Diss. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers, as Orig. gen, Theodore, &c. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 45, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, cannot make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man.—ἀποκτείνει. Cf. note, 29, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = procure my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement.—ἀμμίσθεν denotes not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but deprivation of civil rights. Cf. Forster ad loc.—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ., but these this man (viz., the prosecutor) probably supposes, and many another man perchance, to be great evils. τις here gives an indefinite extension and application to ἄλλος, like many a in English.—ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, intell. οἶμαι μέγα κακόν. Stalib. —πολλοῦ δὲ ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσασα, I am very far from making a defence for my own sake. Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἐγὼ with ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ = I for myself. C. 672, note; K. 348, 10.—ὑμῖν, dat. after δῶν. Cf. note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

E. ἄτεχνος ... προσκείμενον, really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to, &c. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of being attached to, involves also the active signification of pressing upon or following up, as a gadfly does a horse, to suit which the word was chosen.—μῦκτος may mean a spur or a gadfly. Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Ast, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεστείκειν, and προσκαλεῖν
apply better to a gadfly. Moreover this makes the comparison more ridiculous (γελοιότερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. Out of regard to these reasons and to the life and point of the whole passage, I incline to agree with Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, &c., in taking μύστικος in its original and proper sense of a gadfly.—οἶκων, as afterwards modified by τοιούτων τιμα signifies something of this sort. τοιούτων τιμα is placed where it is, to introduce more easily the following clause.

31 A. ίσος is often strengthened by τάχ’ ἄριστον and is equivalent to μαγχαρ.—ἀχθόμενον ... πευκόμενον. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; ἁν gives a potential sense to the participle (κρούσαςτες), C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 598, 6: but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would (or will) strike at me, and hearkening to Anytus, rashly put me to death.—κρούσαςτες still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does ἐπικέμψετε, send upon you.—ὅτι δ’ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, κ.τ.λ., but that I now am just (τυγχάνω ἓν) such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact. The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forget fulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (οἱ γὰρ ἐνροσίνιν ξοικε). Compare Cousin’s translation and Stallbaum’s note ad loc.

B. ἀνίχεσας τῶν οἴκεων ἀμελομένων, to suffer my private affairs to be neglected, literally, to hold myself up over them being neglected. ἀνίχεσας denotes superiority, and hence takes a genitive usually with a participle. K. 275, 1; Mt. 358. It will be seen, that both ἀνίχεσας and πράττεω express continued past action, in other words, they are imperfects.—
eîxov ãv tûn lônov, I should have had some reason, i.e. my conduct would have been explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission.——tôîro ... àpavasxurhêsoi, to reach this (such a) pitch of shamelessness.

C. ἡ ἐπαράξαμην ... ἡ ἤγησα, that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one. πράττεσαι = exigere (ex-agere), ausmachen, make money.——ἰκανοῦ ... πενίαν, for sufficient, I think, is the witness (observe the article τῶν μάρτυρα) I bring forward, that I speak the truth, viz., my (well-known) poverty. Cf. note, 23, B.

D. γίγνεται [φωνῇ]. The suggestion first made in Forster's edition and adopted by most editions since, is certainly probable, that φωνῇ, though found in all the copies, has crept in from the margin, since it is needless here, has no influence on the structure of the sentence (being followed by the neuter pronouns δ and τοῦτο), and is not only repeated in the next clause, but is there accompanied by τίς, as it hardly could be if it had already been used just before.——ζεῖν τι καὶ δαμόνω, something divine and demoniacal, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of superhuman, or proceeding from δαιμόνες. Cf. note, 27, D.——ἐπικωμαῖον, calumniating or satirizing after the manner of the ancient comedy. Cf. Fischer ad loc. The reference is to the ἔτερα δαμόνια κανά of the indictment, 24, B.——δὲ ἀπορρέει ... προτρέπει δὲ ὀπὸρε. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. 4, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunc quam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e.g. Phaed. 242, B, C; Theæt. 151, A), appear to ascribe to the
voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only
a general statement of the fact, whereas here we have a more
definite and precise explanation of the manner; for, after all,
the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive
from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that
he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher’s note ad
hunc loc., and Appendix to Robbins’s Memorabilia. As to the
nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he, elsewhere calls it
(ἡ μαρτικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαίμονιον . . . τὸ τοῦ ζεύγου σημεῖον, 40, A), there
has always been much discussion, and the question may still
perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that
Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particu-
lar δαιμόν, guardian genius or tutelar divinity, whose special,
if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such
idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other
passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned.
Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to
the conclusion, that the δαιμόν of Socrates was nothing more
than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his
own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the pas-
sage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language
of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it.
After a diligent comparison of the language of Plato and Xen-
ophon, together with such light as Plutarch, Cicero and subse-
quent writers have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any
room left for doubt, that Socrates meant by his φωνή, and ζεύς
τι καὶ δαίμονιον, very nearly that same divine teaching and
guidance which good men in every age have believed to be
communicated to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer
and in the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet
not from within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens,
oracles, dreams and visions. Cf. below 33, C; εἰς μαρτεῖον καὶ εἰς
ἐνυπνίων, κ. τ. λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no intimation of a
tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A, B, C; Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 3, 4; 1, 4, 15, 18; iv. 3, 13; iv. 8, 1. See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch, De Genio Socratis.

E. ἀπολάλη ... ὀφελήκη. This form of the pluperfect is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the common form, cf. ἔνυηθεν ... ἔθεκα, 22, D. Observe the repetition of ἄν in each disjunctive clause (πάλαι ἄν ... οὗτ ἄν ὑμᾶς ... οὗτ ἄν ἐμαντῶν) and compare the examples in Stallb. here and at Gorg. 475, E.

E. οὗ γάρ ἐστιν ... ὀφείλεται οἴδειν ... ἐναιστιομένος. Socrates shows himself no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the company and sympathy of most of the literary men and philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little respect or affection—and had little reason in their personal relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of "opposition" to the existing government, whether democratic or aristocratic, insomuch that he was deemed quite an impracticable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 20, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and "rendition" of a fugitive from oppression, 20, C; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2, o.

A. Καί εἰ μελλεῖ. Καί εἰ, even if, is to be distinguished from εἰ καί, although. καί εἰ concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by ὁλίγον χρόνον); εἰ καί concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 832; Stallb. ad loc.; and K. 340, 7.—μή δημοσιεύειν. In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 15. Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that
he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating
as many others as possible to be good citizens and able states-
omen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his
own person.—οἶδ' ἂν ἐνί ὑπεικάζομε, I would not yield in the
least to any one whatever. οἶδ' . . . ἐνι is more emphatic than
οὐδενί; and ὑπεικάζομε is an intensive form instead of the com-
mon ὑπεικαζομε, verbs ending in αἰειν, εἰειν, &c., being intensives.
This strengthened form is regarded by some as an aorist, cf. C.
299. But they are not accented as aorists (the inf. is εἰκαζειν,
not εἰκαζεῖν), nor are they found to have the force of aorists.
Cf. Hermann Progr. de Verbis Græcorum in αἰειν, εἰειν, and
εἰειν exeuntibus; Stallb. ad loc.; Woolsey ad Gorg. 488, A;
ad Antig. 1096; K. 162. In the next clause, we have ὑπεικων,
because there no emphasis is required.—μὴ ὑπεικων δὲ, κ.τ.λ.,
and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish.
The first ἄμα belongs with ὑπεικων, the second, strengthened
by καί, with ἀναλοήμεν. Cf. Fischer ad loc.—φορτικά μὲν καὶ
δικαίωμα, displeasing and wearisome indeed. δικαίωμα has refer-
ence primarily to pleadings in the courts of law, which are apt
to be tediously minute and circumstantial. Some take it here
in the sense of boastful.

B. ἄλλην μὲν . . . ἑβουλευσα δὲ, I never held any other
office, but I was a member of the βουλή, or council of five hun-
dred. See the same fact, and βουλεύειν used in the same sense,
Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή Ἀντιοχείς, the tribe to
which Socrates belonged, viz., Antiochis.—πρυτανεύοντα, pre-
siding, i. e. furnishing the prytanes, who acted as presidents
both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the
ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and
these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided dur-
ing about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days.
Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were sub-
divided into five bodies, of ten men each, each of which presid-
ed during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i.e. during one week. Out of these ten proedri (as they were called) for the week, an ἐπιστάτης or chief president was chosen by lot, who presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was ἐπιστάτης on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 2: ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος.—τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς. The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the case before us, the battle at Argo, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. B. I. C. 7.—τοὺς οἷς ἀνελομένους, who did not bring away for burial the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedemonians at Arginusae), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or finished their work, till the dead were buried. So the Iliad was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror, which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they
would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad.—τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας. Cf. C. 669, a; K. 300, 4; Mt. 596, a.—ἀξιόους, together, by one vote, cf. μιᾷ ψήφῳ. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—παρακόμως. The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 37: κρίνεσσαι δίχα ἑκατον.—ὡς . . . ἕδοξε. Xenophon says (Hel. 1, 7, 39), they soon repented of it and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people.—ἐγὼ μόνος, κ.τ.λ. The prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 15.—μηδέν ποιεῖν. C. 665; K. 318, 8.—ἐιδεικνύονται ἄκαπάγειν, to indict me and lead me away to punishment.—βοώντων. See in Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

C. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ολγαρχία . . . οἱ τριάκοντα. There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedaemonian influence; and when at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedaemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were after known as the thirty, or the thirty tyrants.—μὲ πέμπτον δυνῶν, myself and four others. C. 511, 5; K. 303, R. 4, e; Mt. 469, 9.—Διόνυσα τὸν Σαλαμίνων. A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants.—ἀναπλήσαι αὐτῶν, to complicate with their own crimes.

D. εἰ μὴ ἄγροποις, if it were not too rude (rustic) an expression, is an apology for the use of οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians.—τοῦτον δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει, for this, I say, I care every thing. τὸ πᾶν is an adverbal or synecdochial acc. the exact opposite of οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν.—ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἄρχη, κ.τ.λ., for, me (emphatic both in form and position) that government (of the
thirty), strong as it then was, did not so terrify. — ἡγαγὼν 
Λέοντα. He was put to death. Xen. Hel. ii. 3, 39. — ψιχόμην 
ἀπὸ ωκίδε, went immediately home. — διὰ ταχέων = ταχέως. 
The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only four years. 
E. τοσάδε ἔτη, so many years as I have lived. — ἵππαρτον. 
The imperf. denotes continued action. — τοῖς δίκαιοις, the 
things that are just = justice. — διὸ ἔτη, as one ought al-
ways to do — this is implied in the present. — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος 
ἀρκόναυτα οἴδεις, sc. διεγένετο, would have lived so many years. 
A. τουτόσον φανοῦμαι, shall be found (on examination) such 33 
a man, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in any 
thing contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. 
— ἐμοὶ μαζητὰς εἶναι. Socrates was charged by his enemies 
with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince 
of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. 
They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither 
they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his 
disciples, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a 
teacher. Hence he never called his hearers μαζηταί, but ό 
συνώντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. 
1, 2. — τὰ ἐμαυτῶν, my proper business, my appointed mission, 
already described as assigned him by Apollo. 
B. μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὗ, sc. διαλίγομαι, but in case I not 
receive pay, not converse. — παρῆκα, I give liberty to 
question me to rich and poor alike, and to every one who may 
wish, εάν τις = παντὶ δοτὸς ἂν. Stallb. — τὴν αἱτῶν ἵππιομοι, 
bear the responsibility. — ἀποκρινόμενος, answering, has refer-
ence to the Socratic method of question and answer, and is 
equivalent to entering into conversation. — τούτων . . . ἄν . . . 
μὴν. Of (in respect to) these (alleged disciples) I should not 
justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever prom-
ised, etc. 
C. ἃτι ἀκούωνες χαρακοῦν, κ.τ.λ. This clause may depend.
directly on έτον, or may constitute the answer to the question διὰ τι, κ.τ.λ. = they do it, because they are pleased. Most editions prefer the former, Stallbaun the latter reading. I have adopted the former because of its greater ease and naturalness. The same words are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle ἄκοιντες stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, ἔγεταζομένου, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb χαί-ρουσιν follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., ἔγεταζομένους, κ.τ.λ.—τεύτα, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not.—παντὶ τρόπῳ. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. I, 1, 3) specifies οἰνωνίας, ζυσίας, φήμας, συμβολικ.—εὐλεγετα, strictly, easy to be confuted; but here, easy to be tested and proved.

D. εἰ γάρ δι, for if really.—χρην δὴν θαύμου, they ought surely. The imperfect implies that they had not done it.—ἐὰν τινες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ... νόησιν ὁδον αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ., both if any of them, after having become older, became conscious that when they were young, etc. Instead of εἰς the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic εἰ δὲ. So below, 40, D, E, εἰς δὲ μηδεμία αὐτοίς ... εἰ δὲ αὖ οἷον ἀποδήμησαν. So δὲ is sometimes antithetic to τέ, and ὀνείρει to οὐσί.—αὐτοῖς, themselves, in contradistinction from their relatives. So αὐτοῖς in the previous clause.—μεμνημονεῖ depends on χρημα in the antithetic member of the sentence, the force of which still continues.—ιστανότει. Cf. Cr. 659, γ; K. 300, 4, R. 8.—Κρίτων οὗτος, this Crito here. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same deme (δημούργος) or ward as Socrates, viz., Alopece, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A.
E. Λυσανίας. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60.—δ Σφιτρίος, of the deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern times, by several names.—Αλσείνου, usually called the Socratic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The extant dialogues, however, which bear his name, and which have been edited by Fischer, are not genuine.—δ Κρισινίων, of the deme Cephisia. This Antiphon is to be distinguished from the orator and from several others of the same name. The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 12), as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59.—τοίνυν, moreover, is not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only here, e. g. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Αντονόδορος. Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adimantus, de Repub. 357–368, 548; Apollodorus, Phæd. 59, A, 117, D; Xen. Mem. iii. 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most devoted follower of Socrates. Theages and Plato also were favorite disciples.—κατα-δενεῖν = Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus Nicostratum fratrem rogare, ne me accuset et contra me testetur Stallb.

A. μάλαυτα μέν is correlative to εἰ δὲ τόρε. The best time 34 for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he ought especially to have called them—was in the course of his argument before the court; but if he forgot it then, &c.—παραχαρᾶ, give way, yield him the floor as we say, or in the technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify during my water (the measure of time by the clepsydra).
B. ἄν λόγον ἵκοιν βοησοῦντες, might have a reason for helping me, i.e. for defending me, right or wrong.—ἀλλᾶ ἢ. Cf. note, 20, D.—εὐνίσασι Μελήρῳ, κ.τ.λ. Comp. note, 21, B.—Εἶν. Cf. note, 19, A. Socrates here concludes his direct defence, ἀ μὲν ἀπολογεῖοςαί τοιαῦτα, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life.—Τάχα δ᾿ ἢν, κ.τ.λ. Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demos. adv. Timocr.; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e.g. Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.—ἐγὼ δὲ οἰδὼν ἀπα, κ.τ.λ., while I, as ought to have been expected (ἀπα), will do none of these things.—καὶ ταῦτα, and that, too, when incurring, &c.

D. οὐκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἕγωγε, εἰ δ’οὖν, for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind. For ἀξίω, cf. 19, D; for οὖν, 21, A.—καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου, and well I may have, for in the very language of Homer. Acc. in apposition with a sentence, C. 324, 8; K. 266, R. 2; Mt. 410. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 163, where Ulysses, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung from men and related to them.—νικᾶς γε . . . τρεῖς, and sons even, men of Athens, three of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note.—μετάκαιν, a young man, sc. Lamprocles, who is called μέγας in Phaed. 65,
and is introduced in Xen. Mem. π. 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother.—παιδία, small children, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phaed. 3, where they are called σμικροί. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

E. ἄλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ., but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question. He barely hints at this as one reason for his course, but dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion.—πρὸς δ᾽ οὖν δόξαν, however that may be, in regard to reputation both mine and yours, &c. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, ἄλλ᾽ οὖν δεδομένον, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed.—ηλικίως, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D.—τοῦτο τούτομα, sc. σοφός, cf. 23, A.—ψεύδος, the subs. is often associated with the adj. δεόδε, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. τι εἶναι. C. 518, β; Mt. 487, 5.—ὡςπερ ... ἐσομέ-35 νον. C. 640; K. 312, R. 13; Mt. 568, 2.—καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι, to be even any thing whatever, i. e. to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable.

C. χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, but irrespective of the reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative οὐδὲ should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is not even right. The second οὐδὲ is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = no nor, or nor even.—καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια is to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing.—ταύτα, sc. τὰ δίκαια = justice.—ὁμόμοιον. The oath of office taken by the δικασταὶ, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e. g. Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best
judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Demost. adv. Lept. 118.

D. ἀλλος τε πάντως ... μιᾶς μέντοι καί, both every other way, to be sure, especially, however, when accused of impiety, &c., cf. note on ἀλλος τε καί, 26, E.—οὐφώς γὰρ ἂν, cf. note, ἀσπερ ὕπν ἄν, 17, D.—Ἑυός ... εἶναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods.—νομίζω τε γὰρ, &c. Ἑυός, for I both believe in them.—ὡς οἰκεὶς = more than any.—καί ὅπως ἐντρήσω καί τῇ ἑυός κρίνω, and I commit it to you and the god to decide. This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομίζω τε ... καί ... ἐντρήσω), and in that connection it implies, that he shows his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed, that Socrates here uses the singular τῇ ἑυός, though he has been using the plural just before. He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τῶν ἑυός τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defence and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (ἀγώνες ἁμαρτολ.),—and charges of impiety were of this sort, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser to
propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμᾶσθαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι), and then the judges decided between these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol. viii. chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schömann, and Smith's Dict. Antiq.: Ἀγώνες ἀνήρ καὶ τιμητοί. The accusers of Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death, he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, C; Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by proposing any counter-assessment, and even claimed reward instead of punishment as his due, the judges took offence and sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology, caps. 25–29.

Α. τὸ μὲν μὴ ἄγανατεῖν depends on ξυμβάλλεται. The article simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the infinitive alone. Mt. 543; C. 622. The μὲν is correlative to δὲ at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμᾶραι δ' οὖν.—ἀλλα τε . . . καὶ, both many other things conspire to cause, and especially, it has happened to me not unexpected, cf. note on ἀλλα τε καὶ, 28, C. The full and regular construction would have been καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτο ὅτι οὐκ ἀνωπιστον, κ.τ.λ. ἐλπίς and its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well as hope. So spes and sperare in Latin, cf. Virg. At sperare Deos memores fandi atque nefandi.—ἐπ' ἐλίγον . . . παρὰ πολύ. παρὰ implies comparison, for I, for my part, did not suppose it would be thus by little, but by much, sc. that the votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. K. 297, π. (2); Mt. 588, c.—εἰ τρεῖς μόναι, κ.τ.λ. We have here taken the liberty to depart from the reading of Stallbaum, since he has departed (as we think without sufficient
reason) from the reading of most of the MSS. and all the standard editions. His reading is τριάκοντα. If that were the true reading, the majority against Socrates must have been twice that number, viz., sixty; and a majority of sixty could hardly have seemed to Socrates surprisingly small, nor would he have added μόνα to so large a number as thirty. The difficulty is created by a passage of Diog. Laert. 2, 41, in which he says, that Socrates was condemned by a majority of 281 votes, i.e., as the passage is usually interpreted, there were 281 votes against him. If a change of 3 votes would have secured his acquittal, there must have been 275 in his favor, and the whole number of votes must have been 556. But for such a number of dikasts, it is argued by Stallbaum, there is no authority, since the Heliasts usually sat in sections of 500, 1000, 1500, or some such multiple of a single section. See note, 17, A, and authorities there cited touching the constitution of the Heliaca. But examples are not wanting of such fractional sections, as 200, 400, 700, &c. Neither can we be sure, that all the jurors that were impanneled were present or voted in every trial. There does not, therefore, seem to be a sufficient reason for departing from the commonly received and most obvious reading and explanation of the passage.—μετέπεσον, fallen over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for acquittal.—ἀποπεφείγη. For this form of the plup. see note 31, E.—ἀνεβακη, &c. Upon the βῆμα to aid Meletus in the advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B.—χιλιας δραχμάς. The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes, was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeiture (ἀντιμία) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of public prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103; in Mid. 23; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath. chap. 9, 11. Socrates argues, that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential
of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleier. ad loc.—τὸ πέμπτον μέρος. Observe the force of the article, the required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply τὸ μέρος in the same way, the required portion.

B. ὁ ἀνὴρ, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter.—τιμᾶται is middle voice. The usage in regard to assessment and counter-assessment (τιμᾶσθαι and ἀντιμᾶσθαι) has been explained above.—ἡ δῆλον, or is it needless to ask—is it evident, etc.—πανεῖν refers to corporal punishment, ἀποθῖσαι to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105.—ὅ τι μαζῶν differs from τί μαζῶν only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered because, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: because I did not keep quiet (and what had I taken into my head, literally, learned, that I did not). Cf. Mt. 567; C. 631; K. 344, R. 5. See also Schleierm. and Stallb. ad loc.—δινεῖν οἱ πολλοί, sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται, not caring for those things which the mass care for. Cf. Mt. 634, 3.—τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, not the other magistracies, for the specifications which precede are not all magistracies, but the rest, sc. the magistracies. So Gorg. 473, C: πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξίνων = the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So οἱ ἄλλοι is often used.—ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates.—ἐπιεικήστερον . . . σώζομαι, too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things.

C. ἐνταῦθα, for ἐνταὐθοί, as we often use there for thither. C. 659, δ; K. 300, R. 7. Below ἐνταῦθα is equivalent to ἔν ἔν
νοῦτο, answering to ἐπὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν and ἵνα is redundant: but to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit, to this (literally, there) I went.—τῶν τε ἄλλων ... ἐπιμελεῖσαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their adjuncts. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. vi. 25, 33.

D. τιμᾶσαι here also is mid.: to assess myself. Compare E, below: εἶ ὁ δὲ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσαι. —τοῖον τὸ τί, instead of τοῖον ὁδον, to make it more indefinite; such a good of whatever kind it may be, ας, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlativeis: μᾶλλον πρέπει ὁπώς ὥσ, where we should expect μᾶλλον ... ἢ or ὤτος ὥσ, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρῶτερον μηδὲ ὁπώς σφόδρα ὥσ, except that there μηδὲ is interposed between πρῶτερον and ὁπώς, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt. —πίνητι. Cf. note, 23, B.—εὐεργέτης, a public benefactor, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes.—ἐπὶ τῇ ημερῇ παρακελεύσει, for your admonition, i. e. to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the objective gen.—ἐν πρυτανεῖο σεισμαῖ. The Prytaneum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where the Prytanes and some other magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a εὐεργέτης who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself
wholly to the instruction of the citizens.—πολύ γε μάλλον. Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to himself much more at least than to such.—ἵππω, a race horse under a rider; ἕνωρηϊς, a two horse chariot; ἤεύγεις, a general term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by more than two horses, and may be rendered four horse chariot.

—Ὁλυμπία, at the Olympic games. The acc. (Ὀλυμπιάδα or Ὀλύμπια) more frequently follows νικάν. See Lex. under νικάω.—δοκεῖν εἰναι ... εἶναι. Socrates was an uncomprising enemy of all seeming, and often exposes the folly, as well as the baseness of it, since the best way to seem to be good (in whatever excellence), is to be good. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 7, 1. —ό μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δείμαι, sc. because he is rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He here has respect to the πέντε above, as in the preceding clause he refers to the εὐρύγεια. He is a real benefactor, and he is really poor. He both deserves and needs to be provided for in the Prytaneum.

A. παραπλησίως ... ὀσπερ περὶ τοῦ ὀίκτου καὶ τῆς ἀνθιβολής 37 σεως. The reference is to chap. 23, where he scorns to resort to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he does this αὐθηδίζουμενος, from arrogance. Here he employs the rare word ἀνθιβολής instead of the usual ικετεία.—τοιώνον ἄλλα τοιῶδε, not such as that, but such as this; not such as you suppose, but such as I proceed to explain (cf. note, 21, B), i. e. it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me.—ἰκώ εἰναι is stronger than ἱκῶν alone. It means, so far as depends on my will. C. 623, N.; K. 306, R. 8; Mt. 545.—πείσω sometimes takes two acc.—διελέγειςα. The perf. has respect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was concerned.—ὁσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις. He probably has
particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates,
in common with most of the philosophers, highly reverenced,
and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided
capital trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. τον κακοῦ, some evil, i. e. any punishment. So τοιοῦτον
τινὸς, any thing of this sort. It is gen. of price or penalty,
and is accompanied with the dat. of the person (ἐμαυτό) on
whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen
in οὗ Μιλητός μοι τιμᾶτα, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B.
—ἡ μὴ πάσω. Ἡ is interrogative: shall I do it through fear
that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of that I do not
know whether it is a good or an evil? —ἐλωμαι, subj.
aor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the
future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: shall I choose
or those things which I know to be evil, sc. imprisonment, ban-
ishment, &c. We have in this sentence another example of
that usage which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions
condensed into one. The author might have said: ἑλωμαι τι
τοῦτων ἢ ἐν οἴδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, or ἑλωμαι τι τῶν, ἢ ἐν οἴδα, κακῶν
ὄντων. But instead of either we have parts of both. Cf.
Stallb. ad loc.

C. τῷ ἀεὶ κακισταμένη ἀρχῇ, the ever shifting government.
The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, &c.,
were chosen annually (one from each of the ten tribes, with
a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while
to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty
tyrants as might chance to be established from time to time
(such is the exact force of ἀεὶ κακισταμένη) over the public
prisons. Cf. note on αἰ, 25, C.—ὑλλὰ ταῦτα ... ἄγον, sc.
perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and there-
fore would never be released.—τιμήσωμαι ... τιμήσατε. Ob-
serve the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the
accuser and the accused, and the active of the judges.
D. ἄριστερα, too burdensome.—οἱ δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while others, however (or forsooth), will bear them easily. Cf. note, 34, C.—κἂν μὲν τοίνυν ἀπελαίωσα, κ.τ.λ., and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city.—ἰκέλωσι is Attic fut. C. 200; K. 117, 1; Mt. 181, 2.

E. ἡμῖν, for us, in respect to us, is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. C. 410, Note; K. 284, 10, d; Mt. 387.—ἰκέλωσι, sc. into exile.—ὡς εἰρωνευομένως, supposing that I spoke ironically.

A. δὲ ἀνεκτάστος, κ.τ.λ., and that a life without inestigation is not worth living, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on λέγω δὲ, and ἀνεκτάστος, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense.—ταῦτα δ', this on the other hand. δὲ emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. Cf. Mt. 616, 3.

B. δόσα ἡμελλόν ἐκτίσεως, as much as I was about to pay, i.e. as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἱβλάβην implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not assess himself to the amount of any evil, for he did not deserve it.—νῦν δὲ ... οὐ γὰρ, but now I cannot amerce myself in a sum of money, for I have not got it.—αὐτοί δ' ἔγγυασαν. Intell. φατι, quod continetur precedenti verbo κελεύομαι. Stallb.—ἀξιόχρεος. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about $500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen, that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty,
which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known, that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal, now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defence. The vote is now taken touching the penalty. Socrates is condemned to death by a majority of 83 votes. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a suppliant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. Οὐ πολλοῦ . . . χρόνου. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature.—ἡμαμα ἔγειρε καὶ αἰλίαν, you will have the name and blame, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For ἤμα, cf. note, 17, A.

D. τόλμη καὶ ἀναισχυνίας, i. e. what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. ἕαυ τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν, below, 39, A.

E. τὸ ἔρε, sc. while making my defence, before sentence was pronounced.— ἱκεῖνος, sc. ἀπολογησόμενος, having defended myself in that way.
B. ἄρε... ἄν, as... being = inasmuch as I am.—δεινοῖς 39 is the opposite of προσβούτης, and ἰδεῖς of βραδός. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death.—Σανάτων δίκην δόλων, having incurred sentence of death.—ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge.—ἀφληκτός μοιχηρίαν καὶ δικιάν = having been convicted of wickedness and injustice.—μετρίως ἔχειν, to be suitable, i. e. well.

C. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i. e. the sequel, or consequence.—χρησμοφοβοῦν, ὅταν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (Il. 16, 351 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (Il. 22, 358 sqq.); cf. also Phaed. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 30; Cic. de Div. 1, 30; Sex. Empir. Math. 9, 20.—οἷον ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόωμε. For the double acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 1; Mt. 421, obs. 4.—τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου, from giving proof of your life, i. e. from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.

D. ἀποκτείνουσε ἄδρόπος, by putting men to death.

E. ἐν ὃ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄρχολιαν ἄγοναι, while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whether when I have come, I must be put to death, i. e. before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) get ready to lead me away to prison.

A. τί ποτε νοεῖ, what in the world it means, or what can 40 be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D.—ἀνδρεὶς δικασταί. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἀνδρεὶς Ἄνδραίοι. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court
whom he now addresses were judges indeed, that is, administrators of justice.—ἡ γὰρ εἰσόδου μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαμοσίου, for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity. Cf. 31, D, note ibid. Schleiermacher considers ἡ τοῦ δαμοσίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ δαμοσίον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντική, φωνή, &c., it is not τοῦ δαμοσίου, but τοῦ Ἡσοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading.—καὶ πάντα ἐνι ὑπεροφίς, even on very trifling occasions. πάντα is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis.—ἀ γε δὴ οἷς ἐν τῶν καὶ νομιζέρα, which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered. The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἴμαι and νομιζώ here implied and habitually observed.

B. τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονόν. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. iv. 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defence.

C. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut.
Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Qvæst. 1, 41; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, &c., &c.—δούλη γὰρ ἡτατον. Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phædo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato's views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropædia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us.—οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι, of such a nature as to be nothing, i. e. to be annihilated. So be low, D: οἷον ὑπνος, and E: οἷον ἀποθημῆσαι.—κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, according to what is said, i. e. the common opinion.—τῆς ψυχῆς, dat. for the gen. C. 411; Mt. 389, 3.—τοῦ τόπου. The gen. of the place from which, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb.—τοῦ εἴσειν, for τοῦ εἴσασθαι, because of the motion expressed by μετοίκησε. εἰτε δή μηδεμία. This εἰτε has its correlative in εἴ δ' αὖ below, E, which is only more emphatic than another εἰτε. Compare ὑπὲρ...οὕτε ἕν, 19, E, and note ibid.

D. ἐγώ γὰρ ἄν οἷμαι introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the ἄν falls on εἰπέν several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). οἷμαι itself and δίον are also repeated.—μηδὲν ιδεῖ αὐτὴν, not only a private individual. C. 671, 12; K. 321, 3. The reader need not be informed, that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. 14, 231; 16, 672; Od. 13, 80; Catul. 5, 5; Hor. Od. 1, 28, 15.

A. εἰς ᾿Αἴδου, to Pluto's, sc. house or realm. So we omit 41 the word house after the owner's name, and the word church after the name it bears.—Minos τοῦ καὶ Ῥάδαμανθοῦ, nom. by attraction to the relative οἴσερ. Minos and Rhadamanthus
were brothers (hence closely connected by τε καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Ἀγεμ. Ἀκας, who reigned in Ἀγίς, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Pelcus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter the inventor of the plough and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. 11, 568 sqq.); Rhadamanthus in Pindar (Olymp. 2, 137 sqq.); when Ἀκας was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E), these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamanthus to souls from Asia, Ἀκας to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (153), he sits in judgment on earth; and as others, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there, which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers, whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (ὁς τῶν ἡμεῖσαν δικασῆ ἐγένομεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίῳ).—ὶν πόσι ἐν τίς δι diets ἄν ἴμακ; Quanti tandem aestimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quast. 1, 41, 98.—ἐνὶ ἰμυγε, κ.τ.λ., for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon. Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Ulysses. The story
of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. 11, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. ἀντιπαραβάλλω τι...οὐκ ἂν ἂδεις εἶν. This clause is explanatory of the foregoing, hence it is without a connective, and hence also the participle in the dative answering to ἵποιγε. 

—τὸ μέγιστον is in apposition with the following proposition. In this proposition, the participle ἐξεράγωντα is in the accusative agreeing with the subject of διάγειν, with which οὐκ ἂν ἂδεις εἶν is again understood.—τὸν ἐνὶ Τροίαν ἐγκύωντα, sc. Agamemnon, to see whether he was really as great, and Ulysses as wise, and Sisyphus as crafty, as the Poet represents them to have been. Hom. II. 8, 178; Od. 9, 19; II. 6, 153.

C. ἄμφιχανον ἂν εἶν εὐδαιμονια, would be an immense sum of happiness. The genitive is partitive. Or it can be, as Ast supposes, a genitive of specification — in respect to happiness. 

—τοῦτον γε ἐνεκα, sc. for conversing with men and examining them — they do not, methinks, for this put men to death there, as they do here.—ἐν τὶ τοῦτο = one thing, viz., this. The τι first states it indefinitely; then τοῦτο is added to define it. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. άπέλλαχαι πραγμάτων, to be set free from the business and troubles of life.

E. ταῦτα ταῦτα γνωτίζεται ἀνερ ἐγὼ ἄρας ἁλύσων, i.e. besiege them with warnings and expostulations. γνωτίζω here takes a double accusative, as a verb of doing ill. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μὴν ἄνευ, if they think they are something when they are nothing. The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. vi. 3.
CRITO.

43 A. ἡμικάδε, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. ἡμικά and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the hour of the day.— ἕ γε ἡμι ἐν ἑστίν, or is it not still early in the morning? Buttman writes ἡμί (without the iota subscript); Fischer ἡμί; the earlier editions ἡμί, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into ἡμί after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians.—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, certainly it is, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato's Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. πάνυ γε is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, C. The πάνυ expresses assent, the μὲν and γε restriction, and οὖν accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say.—ἡμικά μᾶλλον, what time of day about. μᾶλλον, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness.—Ὅρης ἡμί, very early dawn. ἡμί is simply morning; ὥρησ is the dawn or rising of the day. ἡμί adds emphasis, very early. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, &c. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages.—ἐπακουώς, to hearken and hence open the door for admittance. ἐπωρ gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder how it happened that he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accus.
tomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phædo, 59, D.
—τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. I have said in the Preface, perhaps the
same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which
now bears the name of “the Prison of Socrates.” Professor
Felton says: “undoubtedly; I read the Phædo there, and when
I came to the passage where Crito says, the sun is yet upon
the mountains, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo!
the shadows covered the valleys, but the sun still lingered on
Mars’ Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus.” —καὶ τι καὶ εὐερ-
γέτηρα, and he has also been somewhat obliged by me.
For the omission of the augment. in εὐεργέτηρα, see C. 188, N.; K. 126,
R. 1; Mt. 167, 6.—Ἐσπευκὸς πᾶλα, a considerable time since.
B. εἴη πᾶ, then how did it happen, that, &c., expressive
of surprise.—οὖν δὲ αὐτὸς ἔμελος, I should not have myself
preferred to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow, sc. if I had
been at liberty to choose simply for myself; but for your sake
I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This
reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐπιτη-
δές εἰς οὐκ ἔμειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγης.—ἐν τοσαύτῃ, sc. so
much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your
peaceful slumbers. τὸ preceding ἄγρυνμα shows that τοσαύτῃ
belongs not only to ἄγρυνμα, but also to λύπη = so much both
sleeplessness and sorrow.—ὡς ἡδέως = ὡς οὕτως ἡδέως. So
below, ὡς ῥᾶδιος = ὡς οὕτω ῥᾶδιος. Stallb.—διάγης. The
subjunctive after a past tense denotes continuance to the
present time.—τρόπου, turn of mind, or manner of life, hence =
character, Lat. mores. For the gen., see C. 372; K. 274, f;
Mt. 366, 5. As to the sentiment, compare Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 2.
—ἡμικυτῆρα δύτα, a man of my age, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.
C. ἀλλ’ οἶδ’ αὐτός εἰπὶνται, κ.τ.λ., but not at all does
their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune,
literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. τὸ ἄγανκ-
τειν is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from
D. δόκει μὲν. μὲν is not unfrequently used, especially after δόκει, ὁμα, and the like verbs, without the corresponding έ expressed, but implying some such clause as συφως δόκει σοι. Here, however, δόκει μὲν is employed with that -Attic
urbanity, which avoids positive assertions, even when no
doubt is intended, for just below he says: δῆλον αὖν, ἐτὶ ἦξεν
τῆμερον. Sunium was the south-eastern promontory of Attica.
—τῷχν ἀγάπη. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often
used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the
mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod
bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a
striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of
death.

A. ποι, I suppose, ni fallor.—τῇ τιπεραίᾳ τῇ ἄεν ellen = 44
the next day after the ship may arrive. τιπεραίᾳ is followed
by τῇ because it involves a comparative.—Φασὶ γέ τοι δῇ, so
say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these
things, sc. the Eleven. Φασὶ is emphatic, they say so to be
sure, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be
mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. The restrictive
particles, γέ τοι = so much at all events cannot be denied, viz.,
that they say so. δῇ then positively affirms the same thing:
they certainly say so. Cf. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 191, 192, and
Hermann ad Viger, p. 790.—τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας, the coming
day, i. e. the day about to dawn = to-day.—τῆς ἐτέρας, the
second day = to-morrow. Socrates means of course the same
days which Crito above calls τῆμερον and αὔριον.—διάρνον πρό-
tερον, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams
before midnight the ancients deemed false.—κυνουέιεσ =
δικίως in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning,
see explained in Stallb. ad loc., and in the Lexicons.—ἐν
καρφῷ τιν, quite opportunely.

B. ἦματι κεῖν τριτάτω, κ.τ.λ. These are the words of Achilles
declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to
Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day.
Hom. Il. 9, 363. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommo-
dation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream
is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the
general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue,
Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions,
and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he
was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could
be more natural or probable, than that his approaching de-
parture to another world, which he talked of by day and med-
itated on by night, should present itself before him in his
dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homer-
ic Poems.—ἐναργεῖ, clear, i. e. easy to be understood.—μὲν
οὐν = imo vero, nay but. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 373.—δαυ-
μῶς is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its
own proper signification only respectful, yet sometimes applied
in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or
severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded
that it was in its nature a term of reproach, as well as of
honor. Compare δ ἡμᾶρις Κρίτων below, and our My dear
sir, My excellent fellow.—ἐτί καὶ νῦν, yet even now, implies
that Crito had previously plied Socrates with unavailing argu-
ments of the same kind.—οὐ μία, not one merely. Al. οἴδε
μία.—χαρίς μὲν . . . ἐτί δὲ, besides the first place sustaining
the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall in the second place incur
the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of μὲν and δὲ
in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the twofold evil.
The correction of Wolf, νοῦ ἐντερῆσαι for σοῦ ἐντερῆσαι of
the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions.
—οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ. This combination has the same emphasis
of negation as οὐ μὴ = such as there is no reason to expect that
I shall ever find.—ὡς οἶδος τ' ἄν σε σῶζειν. The ὡς belongs
with the participle ἄν, not, as Buttmann and some others have
taken it, with the infinitive ἀμελησαι, and performs here the
office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of de-
noting the ground or supposition on which Crito would appear
to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: as if I was able, i.e. supposing that I was able to save you—a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.

C. τίς ἂν αἰσχρὸν εἰπή ταύτης δόξα, ἦ δοκεῖν, what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed. Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἦ. C. 461, 3; K. 323, R. 5; Mt. 450. It will be observed, that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root.—δοσις ἂν πράξει, just as they were done, however that may be. ἂν denotes contingency, and may be expressed with δοσις = in whatever manner, or with the verb = however that may be.

D. αὕτα δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρών. Al. δῆλοι by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additus esset haec: ἦτο Ἰππίνον πολλῶν ἐξουσιασμένα ἕστιν, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravius eloquitur, dicens: ἦτο οἶοι τέ εἰσον οἱ πολλοί. Stallb.—εἰ γὰρ δεῖσι. C. 599, N; K. 259, R. 6; Mt. 513, obs. 3.—ἐνα ... ἡσαυ. The past tense of the indicative here implies, that they are not able. C. 601, 8; K. 330, 5; Mt. 519.—οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον, κ.τ.λ. The noble sentiment is here implied, that so long as the multitude cannot alter a man’s character for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, πολίνις ... τόχωςι, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. ἔκρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμητεί, do you not at least feel some solicitude for me, &c. The particles imply a fear that he does. —οἱ συνοφάνται. The word is well explained in the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in Smith’s Dictionary 8
of Antiquities.—πρόγνωσα παρέχωμεν, make trouble.—καὶ ἐπὶ ἔτσι, eπὶ ἔτσι, k.t.l., either to lose even all our property, or at least large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional heavier penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death, cf. below, 53, B. —τασον αὐτὸ χαίρετ, bid it farewell, that is, dismiss the fear.

45 A. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ποιόν δίκαιον ἐσμεν, cf. C. 551; K. 307, R. 6. For ποιόν, cf. note, 44, A.—μὴ τοινυ φοβοῦ. The sentence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in μὴ ταῦτα φοβοῦμεν, below, B, and is there followed by the correlative clause, μὴ τε ἐγερ. τούτους is contemptuous, like the Latin iste, cf. below, 48, C: τοὺς τῶς πολλάς, and Demoethenes, passim—ς εἰτέλεισ, sc. εἰσο, how easily they can be bought. Crito knew this from his own experience, cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9, 1.—ἐν αὑτῶν, for them, sc. to bribe them.

B. ἵππαρχει, is ready for your use. ἵππαρχει is added to express the idea, that his property alone is, in his opinion (ἐς ἴομαι), sufficient. Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 33, D.—ξίνον. Simmias and Cebes were Thebans, cf. Phaed. 59, C.—ἀποκάμψε, desist from the effort. Crito takes for granted that, in itself considered, irrespective of the danger to his friends, Socrates must desire, and make effort, to save himself. ἀποκάμψε is more frequently followed by a participle, though sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. Cf. C. 633; K. 310. —ἐγέρει ὑπὸ δικαστηρίαν, cf. Apol. 37, C, D.—ς τι χρῆσαι σανατ, what to do with yourself. Cf. C. 432; K. 278, 4; Mt. 409, 6.—Ἀλογο, by attraction for ἀλογο. C. 527, R.; K. 332, R. 13; Mt. 474.

C. οὐδὲ δίκαιον. οὐδὲ is emphatic, not even right.—οἰκονόμασι te καὶ ἱσανοῦ. See the same combination of the opt. with the ind.—of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40, A: οἰκονομήν ἀν τίς καὶ νομικɛται.

D. οἶχής καταληπτῶν. C. 637; K. 310, 4, 1; Mt. 559, c.
It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in haste to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκτρέψατι and ἐκπαιδεύσατι, to bring up and educate completely.—τὸ σὸν μέρος, so far as you are concerned. Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must of course be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. II. 22, 490); and so far as Socrates was concerned, his children would be left to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do.—χρῆ. Αἰ. χρῆν.—βασιλευόμενα is the opposite of ἄγαλμα καὶ ἀνθρῶπος.

B. Καὶ ἑίσοδος τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., both the coming in of the case into court, cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελλοῦσι τῆς δίκης εἰσέλθαι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.—ἐξένθι μὴ εἰσέλθαιν. He could have avoided coming to trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced.—αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγαλμα, κ.τ.λ. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges.—κατάγελος. Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πρότασις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the εἰσόδος, ἀγῶν, and κατάγελος of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented.—διασκεδαιμονέας ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν is epexegetical of τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦτο: and finally this almost farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have escaped us through some sloth and unmanliness of ours.

A. εἰ τι ... δεῖλος ὑμ. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The force of the perfect is seen not only in βεβουλεύσατω, but also in περηκάζωμαι = to have consulted, to have been done.—ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ., impossible and no longer practicable.

B. ἡ προσμυνία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the copula
(ἐστίν), cf. C. 547; K. 238, R. 8; Mt. 306. For the sentiment compare the words of Paul to the Galatians, iv. 17: καλὸν δὲ ζωλοῦσαι ἐν καλῷ.—τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἀλλο πείδεωσαι ἡ τῆς λόγῳ. The strongest argument, in other words, the truth, as it appears to his mind, after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by Socrates as his best friend, and the only one to whom he yields a controlling influence.

C. πλείω limits μορμολύτητος, as it is construed by Stallbaum; not ἐπιπέμπουσα, as it is construed by Buttmann.—δεσμοῖς καὶ ζανάτοις. Observe the force of the plural, and compare Paul’s emphatic enumeration of his sufferings, 2 Cor. xi. 23: ἐν κόποις, ἐν πληγαίς, ἐν φυλακαῖς, ἐν ζανάτοις.—μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεν. Cf. note, Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates, who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.—ἀναλάβομεν, resume for further consideration.—ἐκάστοτε, in every instance, sc. when we were discussing the subject.

D. Κατάδηλος is for κατάδηλον, being attracted by λόγοι. C. 551; K. 329, R. 4; Mt. 297.—ἀρα = forsooth, as it seems. Cf. K. 344, 3, and note, Apol. 34, B.—ἄλλως = temere, without reason.—δεδε ἐκὼ, sc. in danger of losing my life.—τι λέγεις, to say something, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. Π. 1, 12.

47 A. διὰ γε ταυτρωτεία, in all human probability.—ἐκανῶς is explained below by καλῶς.

B. τούτο πράττων, practising this, making a business of it. So πρακτέω, below. We see here Socrates’s fondness for illustrations drawn from the common pursuits of life.—καὶ ἰδεστείον γε, yes, and eat and drink. γε = yes. So καὶ οὐκ εἰς γε, Apol. 34, D, might be rendered, yes, and some. The eating and drinking here come within the province of the ἑτρός, as the gymnastic exercises come under the direction of the παιδοτρίβης.
D. ἀλογάνειμαι καὶ φοβεῖμαι. These verbs are often followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person before whom one must be ashamed and afraid, especially to do any thing dishonorable or wrong.—ἐγίγνετο ... ἀπώλευτο. The imperfect has reference to what was said in former discussions, cf. at the beginning of the chapter: πῶς αὐτὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο.

E. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαινότων δόξῃ, by obeying not the opinion of the wise; but of the unwise, is implied in the antithesis by the position of μη. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 6: καὶ μη ἀ οἶνε δοξάζων = not what he knows, but what he does not know.—Σ ... λοβάρα, which the unjust injures. The editions before Bekker changed Σ to δ. But the MSS. all have Σ, and λοβάρασαι may be followed either by the accusative or the dative.—φανλότερον = cheaper, less valuable, the opposite of τιμώτερον, below.

A. τί ... ἡμᾶς. τί for δ τί, cf. Cr. 535; K. 344, R. 1; 48 Mt. 488, 1. For the two acc. cf. O. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.

B. οὗτος τε ὁ λόγος, κ.τ.λ., is correlative to καὶ τῶν αἰ σκόπει. To the suggestion, that the multitude have power to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we have gone through with nor make it any less conclusive, or in any way different from what it was, before his life was endangered; and in the second place, he says, consider also, whether this doctrine, once admitted by us, abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well,—τῶν ὁμολογημένων, things that are generally agreed upon; different from τῶν ὁμολογημένων, things that have been agreed upon in the discussion.

C. ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων, 44, E, seqq.; δῶξις, 45, B, seqq.; παιδών τρόφις, 45, C, D.—μη, sc. ἡρα. C. 602, 3. ἡρα is expressed below, 49, D.—ῥάπιος, lightly, rashly.—καὶ ἀναθεωρομένων γ' ἄν, yes, and would restore them to life again.
For the force of ἀν with the participle, cf. C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 597, 1.—τούτων τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οἰδενι ἔν τῷ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason.—ο ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ, the argument so establishes the point. This use of αἰρεῖ arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. ratio vincit, Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 115, et al.—καὶ χρήματα τελοῦστε ... καὶ χάρης. Zeugma, τελοῦστε being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἄγοντες being required with χάρης.—καὶ αὐτοῖ, κ.τ.λ., and whether we shall do right ourselves both in leading out of prison, and in being led out.

D. μὴ οὖ διη, κ.τ.λ., we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer any thing else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong, i.e. we must not take the consequences into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong. Before μὴ οὖ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must not take into account, etc. Cf. C. 602, 2, 3; K. 318, R. 6; Mt. 517, obs. 4.

E. ἐστι ἕγω περί πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., as I esteem it of great importance to persuade you to do this, but not to do it against your will, i.e. I am exceedingly desirous to pursue the course I am pursuing with your consent (persuaso te, so Ficinus and Bekker), and not against your will. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Elberling, and the majority of commentators, make στ the subject of πείσαι, and understand ἐμε as its object, and ἐμοὶ with ἀκοντος. But besides the improbability of πείσαι being followed by its subject, and omitting its object, it does not accord with the sentiments and character of Socrates that he should say, I deem it of great importance that you should persuade me to leave the prison, which would then be the meaning of the passage.—σοι ἠκανῶς, to your satisfaction.
A. ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι = ἐκόντας ἀδικεῖν δεῖν. Cr. 642; 49 K. 284, R. 6; Mt. 447. 4.—καὶ πάλαι ... ἁρα, and so for a long time we, men of such advanced years.

B. ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον, or rather.—ὁμως, yet, i. e. whatever may be the consequences.—τοῦχανει δὲ, turns out to be.—όσο οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται. The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, cf. Mem. Cap. iii.: αὕτη ἐστὶν ἄνδρος ὁρετῆ, ἢκανόν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὗ τοιεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἵκροις κακῶς. Eurip. Fragm.: ἔχερον κακῶς δρᾶν ἄνδρος ἡγούμαι μέρος. But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

C. οὐ φαντασία, it seems not, that is, it seems that we must in no case do an injury.—οὐδὲ ἄν ὅπως, κα.λ., not even if he suffer any thing however severe by them.—κοινώνεις, whether you hold these opinions in common with me, and think as I do.—τῆς ἀρχῆς, the premise, or first principle of the argument, sc. that it is never right to do an injury, &c. To τῆς ἀρχῆς, as the premise, τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ stands opposed as the conclusion.

A. ἀπίστες ἐπικέντε, in going out hence, sc. from prison. 56 This clause is to be connected, not only with ποιοῦμεν, but also with ἐμισάμεθα, whether in going out hence ... we abide by what we have admitted to be right.—τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, the commonwealth. So Cic. in Verr. ii. 46, 114; communi Siciliae.—ἀλλὰ τι ἤ = nonne, do you not.

B. ἀνεπτρόφασα, be immediately subverted. For this force of the perfect, cf. C. 584; K. 255, R. 7; Mt. 500.—αι γενόμεναι δίκαι, the judgments that have been rendered.

C. ὡς Ἡδίκεις γὰρ ἡμᾶς. The ὡς in direct quotations is pleonastic. The γὰρ refers to an implied cause: we do right to escape, for the state did us an injustice, sc. when it pronounced sentence against us.—τὸ ἐρωτῶν ὦ καὶ ἀνακρίνεος. The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known
method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called "the Socratic method."

D. πρῶτον μὲν. The second question, which answers to this as the first, is found in ἀλλὰ τοῖς πέρι τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν, κ.τ.λ., and is introduced with ἄλλα instead of ζητεῖν, in consequence of the intervening question, μέμφετε τι, κ.τ.λ.——διάμβανε, imperfect to denote the process through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had διάβα—ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ, i. e. in physical and mental education, cf. Republic 376, Ε: ἡ μὲν [παιδεία] ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστικῇ, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσικῇ. The former comprehended the whole exercise and training of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire discipline and culture of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the muses. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the taste and the emotions, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., γράμματα, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith's Dict. of Antiq., Gymnasium. Aristotle, in his Politics, viii. 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, γραφική.

Ε. δεύτερος. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.—καὶ σὺ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. Al. καὶ σοι. Both readings have good MS. authority. But the regular construction would be δὲ...δικαίων εἶναι, and the σὲ is changed to σὺ by attraction to οἶει.—ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἔρα σοι τὸν πατέρα. The unusual position of σοι (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. σοι is dat. after ἐξ ἑσον.

51 Α. ἔρα. Cf. note, 46, D.—καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., is an emphatic repetition of πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, &c., above.—ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀφετῆς ἐπιμελώμενος is added in bitter irony.—
παράς, one's country, indefinite, and hence without the article. So μητρός and πατρός above. Cicero (de Off. i. 17, 57) has a similar sentiment: cari sunt parentes, etc. Sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

C. πείσεως depends on δεῖ, implied in ποιήσεως.

D. τῷ ἔξωσιαν πεποιηκέναι, by having given liberty.—δοκιμάσας, when he has been examined and approved, i.e. admitted to the rank of a citizen, al. δοκιμάσῃ.—ἔξωσαι depends on προαγορεύομεν.

E. ὠμολογηκέναι ἔγραψ denotes a "tacit compact," but one of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some political philosophers of modern times find the origin of society and government.—ἡ μὴ, of a surety. These particles are used especially in confirmation of an oath or promise, cf. Hom. II. 1. 77; Xen. Anab. 2, 3, 27. Al. ὑμῖν. The present, πείσεως, denotes obedience in general, or as a habit. Al. πείσεως.

A. προτίμενων ἴμων, κ.τ.λ., sets forth the peculiar rights and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterwards, if they are found to be oppressive. προτίμενων is better taken with πείσει, and ἐφίλεντων with ποιεῖ, a new clause commencing with διὰ. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation of the style of conversation.—ἐνίκεσεως = will be implicated in, or obnoxious to. So ἐνοχος = obnoxious, cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1, 64: πῶς ὅτι ἐνοχος ἄν εἰς τῇ γραφῇ.—ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Cf. note, 43, C: ἐν τοῖς ἑλέντα.

B. διαφερόντων, preeminently above.—σκωρίαν, a spectacle, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attendance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of singular satisfaction with Athens.—σταυροῦσαν. Cf. ἐν Ποσείδαια καὶ ἐν Ἀμφίπολι καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλία, Apol. 28, E, and note 8*
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Hbid.—ἐνεμέλια first governs πολέως and ἔμμεθω in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. εἰδέμενα, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc., referring to those genitives, a desire of another city or other laws—to know them.

C. τὰ τὲ ἄλλα καὶ, besides all the rest, &c. of your acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on ἄλλα τε ... καὶ, Apol. 36, A.—φυγήτης ἁμῆνας. Cf. note, Apol. 31, D.—οἰχείνει, respect, lit., feel ashamed before.—ἐνεμέλια, regard, lit., turn yourself towards.—Ἀλλα τι οὖν ἐν φαίεσὺ, if do you not then, they would say, violate, &c., lit., do you do anything else than violate. The ἐν would regularly follow φαίεσὺ, but when two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with φαίεσὺ or φαίεσὺ), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf. Hermann on the particle ἐν.

E. ἐν ἔσεῖν ἐβδομήκοντα. Cf. Apol. 17, D.—οὐτε ἐκεῖδαίμονα ... οὐτε Κρήτην. These states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Republic 544, C; Legg. 634.—δὴ = scilicet. ἵκαστος = quotiescunque de his loqueris. Stallb.

53

A. ἵν ἦμιν γε πείς. Sub. ἄλλ' ἐμμενεῖς.

B. τῇ τούτων πολιτεία, to the polity of these men, instead of these states, as if πολίτων, instead of πολέων, had preceded. Examples of this figure (συνεσὶ) are frequent in Plato.—βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς, κ.τ.λ., that is, will confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that they will be regarded as having decided the case right.—τάς τε εἰνομομένας ... τοὺς κοσμωτάρους, the cities that have good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law and order.—τίνας λόγους, what discourses, Socrates? such forsooth as you utter here, that, &c. ἦ is strictly or, and ἀνασυγγενής διαλεγόμενος is understood after it.—ἐν φανείσια. Cf. note on ἐν ... διαφανήσωσα, Apol. 29, C.

D. ἀπαρεῖς, you will depart, lit., carry away, remove.—
εἰκεῖ γὰρ ... ἀκολασία. The Thessalians were infamous for their vices. Cf. Demos. Ol. i. 22: ταῦτα γὰρ (τὰ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν) ἐπιστὰ μὲν ἦν δήποτε φώσει καὶ δεὶ πᾶσιν ἀναρώσεις; and Athenaeus, vi. 260, B: ἀκολαστοῖ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσελγεῖς, and many other passages from different authors.—σκευήν, a cloak or wrapper sufficient to cover the whole body, as is implied in περιζέμενος. The word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage.—Διφύρα is a dress of skins, worn by rustics, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise.—Σχήμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or personal appearance, as the Latin habitus also is often used.

E. ἵσυς, ἀν μὴ, κ.τ.λ., perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise, i. e. if you do offend any one, you will hear, &c.—ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει, κ.τ.λ., so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly. The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of Thessaly.—ποῦ ἡμῖν ἵσουρα; what will become of them—where shall we find them?

A. Ἀλλὰ δὴ—at enim, at inquiies. Stallb.—τί δαί; why, pray?—ἀκολαύσωσιν is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense.—ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, or not this indeed, sc. ποιήσει, i. e. you will not take your sons to Thessaly.—αὔτοῦ, here, in Athens.

B. οὖτε γὰρ ἐνζάδε ... οὖτε ἐκεῖνε, neither here in this life ... nor when you come thither, into another world. These two clauses beginning with οὖτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὐδὲ are only emphatic additions to the former.

D. οἱ κορυβαντιῶτες, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these
rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing any thing else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of the God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God—let us obey.

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