PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

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THE PROEM

TO THE

IDEAL COMMONWEALTH OF PLATO

[AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LANGUAGE AND METHOD
OF THE 'SOCRATIC' DIALOGUES]

WITH INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

BY

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PREFACE.

The construction of the ideal commonwealth in the Republic does not begin till the eleventh chapter of the second book. The composition of the work as a whole is discussed in the following Introduction §§ 57 sqq., and it is there sufficiently shewn that we may either detach the first book as an independent dialogue, or divide from the remainder, as the 'Proem,' all the matter which leads up to the words γίγνεται τούνν πόλις (Steph. p. 369 B). For the purposes of a modern educational book the latter division is preferable, inasmuch as the first ten chapters of Book II., intended by Plato to link his 'Socratic' discussion περὶ δικαίου to his more advanced Platonic philosophy of the state, are only an elaboration of arguments more briefly urged in Book I., and are still concerned purely with the subject of Justice. The μακρολογία of the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus is useful also as a lesson in Platonic style, of which the dialectic βραχυλογία of the first book affords but a partial notion. Whether for instruction in Greek or in Plato it is manifestly profitable for both portions to be studied together.

The present edition of what I have called the 'Proem' is primarily intended for the use of classical students in the Universities and the higher forms of schools.
For their purposes the analysis of the matter and the comments thereupon—which are, it is hoped, strictly relevant to the text—have been designed to serve as an introduction to the study of the 'Socratic' dialogues in general. The notes have also been written with the same intention in regard to Platonic Greek. Apart from their intrinsic value as classic monuments of thought and style, the books of Plato, as of other Greek writers, are read, and will continue to be read, for the study of Greek philology, and an editor of an educational volume can only use his best judgment in determining how far he may seasonably consult the interests of that study. It cannot be held that the last word has been said upon the niceties of either Greek in general or Platonic Greek in particular, nor, to judge from prevailing texts, are certain well authenticated points of grammar, form and usage so generally recognised as they should be. The notes, therefore, while dealing with exegesis in its various departments, do not neglect the discussion of such forms and uses as seem to be involved in the establishment of the exact text and the determination of Greek as Plato wrote it.

Meanwhile the contributions to textual criticism are addressed partly to the University student (who may be assumed to neglect no department of philological study), and partly to the consideration of more advanced scholars. The critical footnotes do not represent a full *apparatus criticus*, but only a selection of such matter as appears helpful to the critic of the special text or instructive to the general student of philology.

In the preparation of this book I have derived the usual help from Bekker's variorum edition of Plato and from Stallbaum. I have also had before me the recent suggestive work of Jowett and Campbell, and have found
the essays of Professor Campbell of much assistance. M. Lutoslawski's new *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* has aided in establishing views at which I had already arrived concerning the date of the first book. No one who has studied the work of Grote and Zeller can very well say how much he owes to them; nor, in the region of the text, is it easy to assess one's debt to Schanz. It would be ungrateful not to mention also the indirect help derived from a previous use of Mr Adam's scholarly editions of separate dialogues. His critical text of the *Republic* has come to hand only after the completion of my own work and in time to permit of no more than a brief mention at one or two points in the critical notes. I find that I differ from Mr Adam in respect of sundry forms adopted in the text, and that fact serves as a justification after the event for certain notes which might possibly have been thought superfluous.

I am much indebted to Dr Leeper, Warden of Trinity College in this University, for rigorously examining the proofs of the entire work and affording me the ready help of his ripe learning and taste. More than ordinary thanks are also due to the reader at the Cambridge Press, whose conscientious watchfulness has prevented no few inaccuracies, sometimes more than typographical, from appearing in the book.

*University of Melbourne, 1900.*
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INTRODUCTION.

I. THE FIRST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC AND ITS CONTENTS.

1. The Republic is a narration by Socrates himself of a certain dialogue in which he bore the chief share.

   a. The Platonic dialogues are variously introduced. The author was naturally as desirous of avoiding a uniform machinery as of avoiding a monotonous style.

   (i) For the most part they are immediately, and without preface, dialogues, Socrates being merely one of the personae, who are distinguished for the reader just as they are in a drama, or in Landor’s Imaginary Conversations, by prefixing the name of the speaker in each instance. This is the case with the Laches, Euthyphro, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Philebus, &c., and is therefore in itself no mark of either earlier or later production.

   (ii) The Republic, like the Lysis and Charmides, begins as a narrative told by Socrates. This device necessitates the frequent and rather embarrassing use of ‘said I,’ ‘said he’; but, on the other hand, it allows of picturesque touches of personal description, and makes it possible to impart a background.

   (iii) In the Parmenides the device is varied. It is not Socrates who reports the dialogue, but a certain Cephalus, who repeats what was narrated to him by Antiphon. So in the Symposium Apollodorus relates how he told to a companion a Socratic dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus.
(iv) In the Protagoras and the Euthydemus methods (i) and (ii) are combined. Each piece opens as a conversation between Socrates and a friend, but continues as a narrative, in which Socrates rehearses the discussion to his companion and enlivens it with dramatic touches.

(v) It is also possible to combine devices (i) and (iii). Thus the Phaedo begins as a conversation between Phaedo and Echecrates, which leads to the relation by Phaedo of a Socratic dialogue on the immortality of the soul. In the Theaetetus Euclid and Terpsion are conversing at Megara: Theaetetus is mentioned; and this recalls a dialogue which Theaetetus had once enjoyed with Socrates and had reported to Euclid, who wrote it out. Euclid does not, however, repeat the dialogue from memory, but has it read by a slave.

b. It may be added that in the first class, the dialogues pure and simple, there is a noticeable distinction between the regular custom of the earlier pieces (e.g. the Laches or Crito), in which the preliminary conversation is made to lead up to the discussion proper, and the abruptness of the later productions (e.g. the Philebus or even the Meno), in which the pretence of an excuse for the disputation is abandoned and the discussion opened without prelude of any kind.

2. The dialogue is reported to an audience of four persons—Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates and another unnamed—on the day after its alleged occurrence.

a. The former fact does not appear in the Republic itself, but is proved by the opening of the Timaeus, where the same persons (except the nameless fourth) meet, on the morrow of this narration, to carry on the dialogue of the Timaeus.

There Socrates exclaims eis, δύο, τρεῖς. ὃ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἦμιν, ὃ φίλε Τιμαῖε, ποι, τῶν χθές μὲν δαιμονίων, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐστιατόρων; That the 'feast' was the Republic is stated in the words (Tim. 17 B, C) χθές ποιον τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ῥηθέντων λόγων περὶ πολεμείας ἦν τὸ κεφάλαιον, οἷα τε καὶ ἐξ οἷων ἀνδρών ἀριστῆ κατεφαίνετ' ἀν μοι γενέσθαι.

3. Socrates and Glaucon had been down to the Peiraeus to the first festival of Bendis. Well pleased, they were starting cityward, when Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, caught sight of them and

The gathering at the Peiraeus.
sent a slave to stop them. **Polemarchus, Adeimantus, Niceratus** and some others soon came up. After a playful threat of compulsion, followed by temptation in the shape of a reminder that there is to be a παρακλήσ and an opportunity of good talk with the young men, Polemarchus induces Socrates to accompany him home, where they find Lysias and Euthydemus (brothers of Polemarchus), **Thrasymachus** of Chalcedon, Charmantides, **Cleitophon**, and the aged **Cephalus**. The last named has just been sacrificing in the court, where he is now comfortably seated amid a ring of chairs. [327 A—328 C]

A. a. The notion of the dialogue as the suitable form for philosophic writings (employed, we are told, by the Eleatic Zeno before it was used by Plato) arose from familiarity with the drama and with its development, the mime. Of the latter, which is drama (or dramatic sketches) in prose and dealing with ordinary life and character, Sophron of Syracuse (cir. 450 B.C.) and his son Xenarchus were famous composers, and with these Plato is known to have made himself specially familiar. In the same city the comic poet Epicharmus had previously made a great step towards familiarising the reading world with philosophy in the form of dramatic dialogue, and the legend goes that Plato slept with the works of Epicharmus under his pillow. His own earlier compositions have much of the 'mimic' character. The words of Aristotle (Poet. i. 7), rightly understood, imply his recognition of a decided similarity between τῶν Σώφρωνος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τῶν Σωκρατικοῦς λόγους.

A little social scene, with the picturesque accessories and accidents of real conversation, passes before the reader's eye. The figures of the dialogue are plainly visible, moving against a certain background and in a certain environment. Their various characters are sketched with that subtle economy of strokes which is part of the 'mimic' genius, whether in the material of language or of form and colour, a genius of ἡθοποιία in which Plato is inferior to none.

The opening of the Republic affords one example out of many of the 'mimic' element in Plato. The closest analogies from a formal point of view are in the Charmides (‘I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas &c.’) and the Lysis (‘I was going
from the Academy straight to the Lyceum...and when I came to the postern-gate &c.’). Here the narrator gives us the picture, as Phaeo does in the dialogue of that name, or as Socrates himself again does in the Euthydemus. At other times the easy skill of Plato makes the components of the sketch come out incidentally in the conversation, as in the Laches or the Gorgias. The dramatic attitude of the parties, when it is not described in narrative, is sometimes indicated by the interlocutor. For instance, instead of ‘Polus was reluctant to reply’ we have Socrates saying ‘why don’t you answer?’ (Gorg. 468 c, d.)

For the perfection to which Plato could carry the art when he chose we must look to the Protagoras and the Symposium, with their exquisitely humorous touches and inimitable suggestions of the life-like. If the wedding of philosophy to the mime is anywhere complete, it is undoubtedly in these two dialogues.

b. In his later years the more dogmatic Plato comes to abandon the dramatic setting, and leaves us without any mise-en-scène or any opportunity of visualising the dialogue. In his earlier work he would generally delude us into believing that the conversation was actually held. ‘The place is there to this day to prove it.’ The persons who take part are living flesh and blood, so real and recognisable that the dialogue (it appears) must also have been real. Moreover the talk comes about so naturally, that it seemingly must have come about just in that way. This delusion Plato seeks to impart with his chance meetings ‘in the palaestra of Taureas,’ or ‘in the new palaestra near the postern’ (Lysis), or ‘in the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus’ (Protagoras), or ‘in the dressing-room of the Lyceum’ (Euthydemus), or ‘in the porch of the King Archon’ (Euthyphro), or in the prison of Socrates (Crito and Phaedo), or under the plane-tree by the Ilissus (Phaedrus). Sometimes, it is true, the place does not appear, as in the Laches or Meno; but these cases are exceptional.

Plato no doubt also appreciated the livelier interest which naturally attaches to the real, particularly in a small community like Athens, where the personality of every prominent man was familiar to the reader, or where, at least, the recollection of him was current. Talk, even fictitious, by well-known characters possessed an attraction which could
not in all cases belong to an undisguised essay. The method of Socrates was invariably conversational, the method of dialectics. This was universally known, and in his Socratic period Plato had no choice but to adopt the form of dialogue. And if the dialogues were to be put in the mouth of Socrates, a historical personage, the other personae also should be historical. The question would then arise 'Where and when was this conversation held?,' and it is by the touches above described that Plato imparts the required air of verisimilitude as well as the charm of vivacity.

B. a. It is, of course, hardly more necessary to believe that any such dialogue as the Republic actually did take place than it is in the case of an Imaginary Conversation of Berkeley or Landon. It is therefore futile to attempt to fix a date for its occurrence. Socrates, indeed, employed his dialectic upon so many occasions of which Plato may be supposed to have taken notes¹, that the early, or 'Socratic,' dialogues may be largely based in point of substance upon what Socrates really did at some time say, or, more probably, was in the habit of saying. Plato would certainly recall in fairly exact outline the Socratic arguments concerning justice, temperance, courage, friendship, piety and other ethical subjects. He would also naturally recall the humours and ironical forms of expression and the dialectical tricks habitual to Socrates, together with certain incidents which had occurred during his disputations with well-known sophists and others. It may even be the case that Plato had knowledge how on some occasion at the Peiraens Socrates did discourse on the subject of justice, or even of an ideal politeia. This we may grant as possible, without admitting it to be in the least necessary. We can hardly go further. The art and style of Plato are his own, whatever Socrates may have suggested. If Socrates supplied the basis, the superstructure is Plato's.

b. In the elaboration of his work Plato exercises the usual artistic disregard of mere literal facts of chronology and environment. In this he resembles the dramatist, whose imaginative creation is φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαστέρον ἱστορίας (Arist. Poet. ix. 3). To a certain

¹ Compare the manner in which Theaetetus reports a dialogue to Euclid, while Euclid writes it out, fills it in, and obtains corrections from Socrates.

Reality and dramatic date of the dialogue of the Republic discussed.

Plato not concerned at anachronisms in his dialogues.
extent the artist in his μίμησις must necessarily conceive of
time and place, a dramatic date and scene; but he is not
fastidious about maintaining every circumstance in strict
accord with historical fact. A gathering of the characters
precisely as described at the opening of the Republic can,
perhaps, hardly have occurred. There is no information
obtainable as to the year of the first recognition of Bendis-
worship, but, as regards the presence of the parties concerned,
Boeckh (Kleine Schriften iv. 437 sqq.) fixes upon B.C. 411 as
the date at which their meeting is most conceivable. Against
this we have, indeed, the doubtful authority of pseudo-
Plutarch (Vit. Orat. iii. p. 835) for the statement that
Cephalus was already dead by B.C. 443. Whether this be true
or not¹ is of little importance, for, even if Plato did conceive
of a date as definite as B.C. 411 (which is highly unlikely), he
certainly did not think it of any consequence whether
Cephalus was alive or not in that year, and whether the
speakers could or could not have made at that time certain
references which they do make in the dialogue. In B.C. 411
Socrates was in his fifty-eighth year—an age which the
Greeks called old. Yet his remarks to Cephalus imply that
he is still sufficiently remote from old age. On the other
hand, in B.C. 411 Polydamas had not made the name (Rep.
338 c) which he won in the year 408; and it was not till
B.C. 393 (six years after the death of Socrates) that Ismenias
the Theban (Rep. 336 A) became πλαύστης and developed
power. Obviously there will exist anachronisms in the case
of any year upon which we choose to settle.
Nor are such anachronisms found only in the Republic. In
the Laches Socrates is young as compared with Nicias and
Laches. But the dialogue takes place after the battle of
Delium (B.C. 424), when Socrates must have been forty-six,
and Nicias can hardly have been much, if any, older. In the
Euthydemus the grandson of Alcibiades τοῦ παλαιοῦ takes
part in the dialogue. But Alcibiades died, at the age of
forty-six, only five years before Socrates himself. In the
Gorgias, of which the dramatic date is B.C. 405 (since the
affair of Arginusae happened 'last year'), Nicias is spoken of
as still alive, though he died in B.C. 413. Pericles also is
'lately dead.' In the Symposium, of which the dramatic
date is B.C. 416, reference is made to the way in which
Mantinea was treated by the Lacedaemonians thirty-one years

¹ It almost certainly is not. See the remarks on Cephalus below (C).
later (b.c. 355). In the Menexenus Socrates, who died in b.c. 399, alludes to the peace of Antalcidas, which belongs to the year 387. The chronological difficulties of the Protagoras are pointed out in Athenaeus v. 218 b sqq. History is manifestly viewed from the later standpoint of the writer Plato, and not from the contemporary standpoint of the dialogi personae.

C. It remains to speak of the several persons present in the company.

CEPHALUS was a wealthy Syracusan, of whom his son Lysias, the orator, says (c. Eratosth. 120) that ‘he was persuaded by Pericles to come to Athens, and there he dwelt for thirty years, without any litigation on the part of himself or any of the family, either as plaintiff or defendant.’ Considering the litigiousness of the Athenians, this remark indicates that he was indeed ἐκολος (Rep. 329 d, 330 a). As the career of Pericles did not even begin till about the year 470 B.C., and as he would hardly be in a position to invite Cephalus till some years later, it is very improbable that the date assigned to the death of Cephalus by the pseudo-Plutarch (viz. before b.c. 443) can be correct. Moreover it is inconceivable that Plato should not have had some personal knowledge of the man; and yet Plato was not born till about B.C. 428.

The family were, of course, μετακοι. Cephalus was in all probability a manufacturing merchant, since Lysias and Polemarchus are afterwards proprietors of a shield-factory.

The name was not uncommon, and the Cephalus who narrates the dialogue of the Parmenides was from Clazomenae. There is unhappily a tendency to confuse persons of the same name and of approximately the same date.

POLEMARCHUS, the son of Cephalus and master of the house in this dialogue, is mentioned in the Phaedrus (257 b) as a votary of philosophy, in the words Δυσίαν τῶν τῶν λόγων πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παθε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφιαν δὲ, ἄσπερ ἄδελφοι αὐτῶν Πολέμαρχος τέτραπτα, τρέψον. From that place and his familiar behaviour here it is tolerably clear that he belonged to the coterie of Socrates. Lysias (c. Eratosth. l.c.) describes how an attack was made under the tyranny of the Thirty (b.c. 404) upon disaffected meticcs, among whom his brother Polemarchus was condemned to drink hemlock. The
same fact is reported by Plutarch (De Esu Carn. π. 4), by
whom he is called Πολέμαρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος.
It is not easy to see why Jowett ascribes to him `the frankness
and impetuousness of youth.' He is evidently a man of
mature standing, inasmuch as he is not only the householder,
but also speaks (328 λ) of going out `to talk with the young
men.' That the aged father should nevertheless speak of his
sons as νεανίας or even νεανίσκοι (328 υ) is an eminently
natural touch. They are his `lads.'
LYSIAS (who takes no part in the dialogue) is the well-
known orator of that name (458—378 b.c.). In the Phaedrus
(228 λ) he is called δευτόρατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν, and a speech in
his style, dramatically attributed to him, is given and adverse-
ly criticised (235 λ sqq.). From the views which Plato held
concerning the vices of rhetoric it is natural that he should
entertain none too favourable an opinion of Lysias.
EUTHYDEMUS, the third son of Cephalus, is otherwise
unknown. The sophist Euthydemus (brother of Dionysos-
dorus), in the dialogue with that title, is a different person,
a Chian.
CHARMANTIDES `of Paiania' does not appear to be men-
tioned elsewhere. His position in the text would suggest that
he was an adherent of Thrasymachus.
CLEITOPHON, `son of Aristonymus,' interposes (in Rep.
340 λ, υ) in such a manner as to indicate that he is a partisan
of Thrasymachus. That the latter should have his supporters
in the company is in the manner of Plato, and is dramatically
desirable.
Cleitophon lends his name to one of those dialogues of
uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Plato.
This brief piece begins in an un-Platonic style with the words
`somebody told us lately that Cleitophon, son of Aristonymus,
in conversation with Lysias, found fault with the Socratic
discussions and could say nothing too good of talk with
Thrasymachus,' and continues with references to the Republic
and its argument concerning Justice. Finally (410 c) Cleito-
phon complains that Socrates is not, positive enough for him
and that therefore πρὸς Θρασύμαχον, ὁμιλεῖ, πορεύομαι καὶ
ἄλλοτε ὅτι άναμαι, ἀπορῶν.
GLAUCON, son of Ariston, is the brother of Plato and
Adeimantus. His generosity with money (Rep. 337 υ), his
courage both moral (357 λ) and physical (368 λ), and his
talent (367 ε), are illustrated in the present portion of the Republic, but in 548 ε his character is more deliberately stated, under a pretext which shews that Plato was bent on complimenting a brother whom he admired. Plutarch (On Brotherly Love 484 ε) remarks on Plato's desire to render his brothers famous by bringing their names into his finest works, 'as Glauccon and Adeimantus in the Republic.' In the passage mentioned Glauccon is contentious (φιλόνικος), but not stubbornly self-assertive (αὐθάδης). He is cultured and a good speaker. Elsewhere we learn that he is a sportsman, fond of dogs and game-birds (459 λ), and that he makes love (474 δ). He is, in fact, a type of the καλὸς καγαθὸς according to the Greek conception, an Alcibiades qualified by philosophy. His name occurs again in the Parmenides (126 λ) and in Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

ADEIMANTUS is appealed to in the Apology to say if any harm has been done to his brother Plato by associating with Socrates. The context implies that he is an elder brother, and in the Republic the same suggestion arises from his greater composure of tone. He is mentioned with Glauccon in the Parmenides (init.).

NICERATUS, son of Nicias, who takes no part in the dialogue, is mentioned by his father in the Laches (200 ν). He was put to death by the Thirty at the same time with Polemarchus. (Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 39, Lys. 18. 602.)

THRASYMACHUS of Chalcedon, the vulgar and blustering sophist of the Republic, was a personage of much higher repute than his treatment might lead us to suppose, and there can be little doubt that, through some special dislike, Plato has done him a certain injury. In the Phaedrus (261 c) he is mentioned with Gorgias and Theodorus as an authority on rhetoric, and Socrates styles him (267 c), in reference to his rhetorical commonplaces on pathetic subjects (the Ἑλεον ascribed to him by Aristotle Rhet. iii. 1), τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτῆτος ᾿Οδὼν σθένος, 'the mighty man of Chalcedon.' It is, perhaps, not without significance for the opening scene of the Republic that he is coupled with Lysias in Phaedr. 269 δ, and the appearance of the two at the house of Polemarchus may have been suggested by their common tastes, Lysias being an orator who practised the vices taught in the theory of Thrasymachus. To Plutarch (Symp. 616 δ) he was known as the writer of a treatise on 'Eminent men' (Ὑπερβάλλοντες),
to Cicero (Brut. § 39, de Or. iii. §§ 59 and 128) as one of the old masters of theoretical eloquence, like Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras and Isocrates. Cicero also speaks of him (de Or. iii. § 128) as a writer de natura rerum. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (de Isaeo 20) praises his skill, subtility and smoothness. According to Aristotle (Rhet. iii. 8. 4) and Quintilian (ix. 4. 87) he improved prose rhythm by making particular use of the 'paean' (e.g. ~ ~ ~ or ~ ~ ~).

Athenaeus (x. 454 ε) quotes the curious inscription on the tomb of 'Thrasymachus the sophist' at Chaleedon:

\[\text{τοῦνομα θῆτα μῶ ἄλφα σάν ὃ μῦ ἄλφα χεῖ ὦς σάν'.}\

\[\text{πατρὶς Καλχηδὸν, ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφία.}\

It was unfortunate for Thrasymachus and 'poetry' of this kind that his name was one of those which \textit{versu dicere non est}, and that, therefore, it had to be spelled.

That his character corresponded to his name appears from Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23. 29, where Herodicus is quoted for the poor \textit{mot alei ἥρασφαχος εἰ.}

D. The characters thus collected represent, according to Plato's custom, various types of mind. Socrates, of course, is unique in his way of regarding ethical questions, in the knowledge of his own ignorance, and in the desire to bring truth to birth by means of dialectics. Thrasymachus represents the shallow and aggressive certitude of sophistry, which deals in rhetoric. The orator Lysias and Cleitophon are presumably anti-Socratic. If so, their presence prevents Thrasymachus from standing unfairly alone in hostile company. Glaucon, Adeimantus and Polemarchus may be regarded as a set-off on the Socratic side. Polemarchus is the representative of traditional morality with (as we know from elsewhere) leanings to philosophy and an obvious liking for Socrates (327 b—328 b), although he is no master of the Socratic dialectics. Glaucon and Adeimantus are younger men of the Socratic coterie, sound in their instincts and ardent to be taught. The brief stay of Cephalus gives us a passing glimpse of a type of good old unquestioning probity. The \textit{ἄλλοι τινὲς} make up 'a full house.'

4. Cephalus welcomes Socrates, who should come oftener and make himself at home. Cephalus himself is too old to go to town. For his own part he finds that intellectual pleasure
increases as physical pleasures wane, and Socrates' talk will also be good for the 'lads.' [328 C, D]

Socrates replies that he is fond of talking to the very aged. They can tell what it is like to be 'upon the threshold of eld.' How does Cephalus find it? [328 D, E]

Cephalus will be candid. Old men, like 'birds of a feather,' often flock together to lament that their pleasures are over, or that their relatives slight them. The complaint is perverse. Many old men—Sophocles, for instance—rejoice to escape the tyranny of appetite. The real cause of the trouble lies in the character of the individual. [329 A—D]

5. 'But,' says Socrates, 'you are rich, and that may make the difference.' Cephalus retorts after the manner of Themistocles to the Seriphan. True, a man of character (ἐπιεικής) cannot bear a poor old age; equally, a man without character cannot bear a rich old age. [329 E—330 A]

a. Most of the matter here is borrowed, though without mention of Plato, in the De Senectute of Cicero. His translation is tolerably close, and the continuity only slightly broken up, so that he makes no attempt to conceal his original. The words of the Republic 328 ε δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι χρήματα...ἐξαγγέλλει; are abbreviated (De Senect. § 6) into volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tamquam longam aliquidiam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit, istuc, quo pervenisti, videre quale sit. From 329 λ πολλάκις γὰρ ανερχόμεθα κ.τ.λ. to 329 Β οὖν οὖν τοῦτο ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλως is translated with some adaptation (§ 7). The anecdote about Sophocles is then deferred to § 47. The next words (329 c) εὖ οὖν μοι...ἀπωλλάξθαι are not rendered. Cicero resumes (§ 7) the translation of Rep. 329 ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων κ.τ.λ., and continues (§ 8), after a slight and necessary omission, with Rep. 329 ε—330 λ (fin.).

Again in De Senect. § 46 we meet with an imitation of Rep. 328 δ in the shape habeo senectuti magnam gratiam, quae mihi sermonis aviditatem auxit, potionis et cibi sustulit, a sentence much stiffened from the original. It may be worth while in
passing to note Cicero's rendering of εὐκόλοι as nec difficiles nec inhumani, and of the difficult ἐπιεύχθης by the flat sapiens.

6. 'But did you make your money or inherit it?'
   'Something of both.' [330 B]
   Socrates has asked the question because Cephalus is not in love with his money, whereas self-made men are as fond of it as poets of their own poems or parents of their own children. [330 C]
   'What is the greatest blessing that Cephalus owes to wealth?' [330 D]
   'One which might not seem the most likely. It is that wealth precludes the danger of committing injustices, and, as a guilty conscience torments with the fear of retribution in another world, so the consciousness of truth and fair dealing and of being out of debt to God and man is the greatest of boons.' [330 D—331 B]

7. Socrates catches at the mention of justice and the conception of it implied in the words of Cephalus.

'BUT WHAT IS JUSTICE?'

a. The subject of the Republic is introduced at this point in an apparently casual manner, although, perhaps, the precise form of words with which Socrates turns the conversation into a discussion is marked by somewhat less ease than in some other dialogues. The conversational 'on-glide,' so to speak, is not quite so smooth as a captious reader might desire. Cephalus has not used the word δικαιοσύνη. That, indeed, would be of little importance if a word cognate to δικαιοσύνη had occurred at the end of his speech. As it is, we are obliged to look back to 330 ν, ε, for ἄδικχαντα, ἴδικηκεν, ἄδικχματα, assisted by the words δικαλως καὶ ὀνέως in 331 Α. Nevertheless the speech as a whole is concerned with the clear conscience which comes of 'having done no injustice' by 'lying or cheating' or 'leaving debts unpaid.' This is enough to justify Socrates in asking 'But this "Justice" of which you speak—does it consist in the absence of lying and of unpaid debts?'

In the Charmides the discussion of σωφροσύνη is prompted by the observation of Critias that Charmides is σωφρονέστατος τῶν νυν. In the Laches the question 'What is Courage?'
arises out of a talk about a certain form of instruction in the use of arms. In the Lysis the mention of the friendship of Lysis and Menexenus leads to a discussion of φίλια.

b. The device is familiar in the Socratic dialogues proper, that is to say, in the dialogues written when Plato was still endeavouring to reproduce as closely as possible the Socratic attitude and method, and before he arrived at the metaphysical and dogmatic stages of his development,—stages which are Platonic and not Socratic.

It can hardly be doubted that the proceeding adopted here was characteristic of the real Socrates in conversation, whether with the young, who had never seriously meditated upon the terms they used, with the maturer citizen, satisfied with traditional morality in its practical effects, or with the sophist, who had arrived at some more speculative, often paradoxical, but mostly shallow notion concerning a question of ethics. In these conversations a remark might be dropped—often casually enough—containing a mention of 'justice,' 'temperance,' 'courage' and the like, and apparently taking for granted that the exact contents of the term needed no specification. Words like δικαιοσύνη, σοφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφίτης were in everyday occurrence. They tripped readily off the tongue. Some of those who used them had never asked when, precisely, an action is or ceases to be δίκαιον or σοφρον. Whether these 'virtues' were all one or different, whether virtue was teachable or not, whether it was possible to make sure of being virtuous without possessing a definite and consistently applicable criterion of action—these were questions about which the generality of people did not concern themselves. In a rough and ready way, partly from training and partly from intuition, they entertained what seemed to be a fair working conception of the various virtues, and with this they were satisfied.

Of this vagueness of apprehension and therefore precariousness of conduct Socrates was sadly, if humorously, aware, and the casual utterance of the term was his opportunity for demonstrating with what ignorance it was used.

At the same time there was current a series of saws and maxims, chiefly drawn from the poets and other 'sages,' from Homer downwards, which might be taken as practical definitions of
moral ideas. Greece had its more or less recognised 'cate-
chism.' The usual type of respectable citizen was prepared
to guide his conduct by the maxims derived from a sort of
'family Bible.' Sometimes it was the quotation of such a
saw which gave Socrates his chance to demonstrate its
inadequacy. More often appeal would be made to these
dicta, during the dialogue, by those whom Socrates was
pressing for the first degree of exactness.

There were, however, not wanting Greek minds of a more
speculative or sceptical bent, which pondered over the basis
of ethical conceptions and the origin of conventional
ethics. The sophists (of whom more will be said below) had
often prepared themselves to take up some positive attitude
in regard to such matters. This, to Socrates, was the worst
attitude of all, especially if the sophist 'taught'
others—unless the 'teacher' had, perchance,
really arrived at 'knowledge' and not simply
at dogmatic 'opinion.' To know is the key to right action;
to think one knows when one is ignorant must lead to wrong
action. Hence no sooner did a sophist let fall, in the presence
of Socrates, a remark implying knowledge in the domain of
ethics (including politics), than he found himself required
to stand and deliver before all the dialectical force of which
Socrates was capable. If his 'knowledge' proved sound,
none so grateful as Socrates to learn it; if unsound, none
should be so thankful as the sophist himself to be delivered
from the moral disease of a false opinion.

c. A comparison of the Memorabilia of Xenophon with the
plain indications of Plato's Apology shews
that Socrates frequently went out of his way
to provoke discussion with those who were
not, at the moment, particularly disposed for
it. In the Apology (21 c sqq.) he is made to
describe the way in which he went and cross-examined
statesmen, poets and craftsmen, and proved their ignorance.
His motives were naturally misconceived. They were too
high and sounded too ironical. Much of the ill-will raised
against him—an ill-will which was largely popular and
extended beyond any mere circle of discomfited antagonists—
was due to an inopportune and apparently gratuitous resolve
to exercise his powers of disputation. ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς
ἐξετάσεως πολλαὶ ἄπειχειαὶ μοι γεγόνασι (Apol. 22 ε). That
he should 'spoil for a fight' with an inflated sophist—though there is no reason to suppose that all sophists were inflated—was natural in a community so intellectually keen, so leisured, and so personal as Athens. But Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) shews how deliberately he could plot a discussion, not with a sophist, but with a youth still 'too young for the ἀγορά,' the 'handsome Euthydemus,' whose fault consisted in his having made a large collection of books of 'poets and sophists' with the intention of becoming pre-eminent τῷ δόνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν. Socrates waylays him, lures him into a conversation, and sends him away crushed and disgusted with himself. The defence for such conduct lies in the honest 'mission' of Socrates and the beneficial results which might follow, as they did ultimately in the case of Euthydemus (Xen. l.c. § 40), though they failed in so many others (ibid.). It is probable, however, that the fine tact of Plato has divested the tone and practices of Socrates of certain elements which often gave offence through being misunderstood.

d. The aim of Socrates is the discovery of 'knowledge,' i.e. the knowledge of things in their 'essence,' the knowledge of their 'definition,' the knowledge by which alone we can in all cases direct our action so that it is virtuous. So far, however, he has only arrived at the knowledge that he is ignorant. Others have manifestly not yet learned so much. They mistake for knowledge what is only opinion (δόξα), unreasoned, traditional, or sophistic. Until they are made aware of their delusion and clear their minds for a new beginning, their conduct must be inconsistent and perverse. His 'mission,' therefore, is to disabuse men's minds, to convince them that they are ignorant, and to get them to join with himself in the search for ultimate truth. His method is dialectical, the method of the ἐλεγχος. He has, from the nature of the case, nothing to teach. He is simply a fellow-student with his opponents and interlocutors. They are assumed to have a common object, the bringing to birth of the truth. Unsparring dialectics are the proper obstetric instrument. 'Authority,' to him, is nothing: his own opinion is nothing: what he requires is that the interlocutor himself shall be made to testify by his reason. Cf. Gorg. 472 β ἐγὼ δέ, ἐὰν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἔνα δντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὃν λέγω,
Is Justice no more and no less than ‘truth and paying back what one receives’?

Or is this sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For instance, if a friend lent you weapons, afterwards went mad, and then demanded his arms, it would be unjust to restore them, or to tell him the exact truth?

To this Cephalus agrees. [331 C]

**8.** Then this is no definition of Justice—‘telling the truth and paying back what one receives’ (ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἀν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι)?

_a_. The characteristic—and new—feature of the philosophy of Socrates lay in his search for general conceptions. In other words, in regard to any ethical idea, he sought for a ‘definition’ (ὅρον or λόγος), which should describe its essential nature, its τί ēστιν, that which makes it what it is amid all the variety of particular applications. Hence Aristotle (Met. xiii. 4. 1078 b) says of him Ἡσιάκος δὲ περὶ τὰς ἑθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητούντος πράτου...ἐκεῖνος εἰλόγως ἐξήτει τὸ τί ēστιν...δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἂ τις ἀν ἄποδοι Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ’ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους (‘inductive reasoning’) καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου (‘general definitions’).

The inductive reasoning is his method of arriving at the definition, i.e. by gathering from particular cases the general conception. Xenophon dwells upon this resolve to discover τί ἢ κακάτων ἠγια τῶν δύνατον in Mem. iv. 6. 1, and gives frequent illustration of it in other parts of his Socratic Memoir. Socrates has not, it is true, reached scientific soundness in the application of his own method, inasmuch as his particular cases are anything but exhaustive. Nevertheless he deserves all credit for the method itself. For more on this question see Zeller Socrates and the Socratic Schools c. v.

_b_. In the ‘Socratic’ dialogues (e.g. the Euthyphro, Lysis, Charmides and Laches) we generally find a series of definitions tested and thrown aside, and these regularly advance from the popular
to the more philosophical. Thus the first definition of
'courage' attempted in the Laches is 'remaining at one's
post,' but gradually we progress to 'understanding of what
deserves to be feared' (see Jowett's Introduction to that
dialogue). Also (as will be found in the first book of the
Republic) the result is simply destructive, no definition being
reached.

Polemarchus interjects. 'The definition is correct, if we
are to believe Simonides.'

Cephalus seizes the opportunity of handing over the
discussion to his son, whom Socrates playfully assumes to
be his heir.

Cephalus retires to attend to the sacrifice. [331 D]

c. The retirement of Cephalus, while dramatically desirable, is
gracefully made. Cicero had observed the
propriety of the proceeding and imitated it.
In Epist. ad Att. iv. 16 he observes quod in
eis libris, quos laudas, desideras personam Scaevolae, non eam
temere demovi, sed feci idem quod in Πολυτελή deus ille noster
Plato. Cum in Piraeum Socrates venisset ad Cephalum,
locupuletem et festivum senem, quoad primus ille sermo haberetur,
adest in disputando senex; deinde, cum ipse quoque com-
modissime locutus esset, ad rem divinam dicit se velle discedere,
neque postea revertitur. Credo Platonem vix putasse satis
consomnum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo ser-
mone diutius retinuisset.

Not only would it be inartistic to ask the aged man to remain
through the discussion. He is too old to be troubled about
questions of 'the new morality,' and it would obviously be
bad taste to submit so amiable and venerable a person to the
rather mortifying dialectic of Socrates. He has nothing to
learn by remaining, since he must soon die in the faiths in
which he has lived, and he can play no part in the dialogue.

In the Laches the aged Lysimachus, and with him Melesias,
similarly withdraws from the discussion after the preliminary
(though in that instance much longer) conversation. They
sit by and listen, however. Lysimachus himself offers the
excuse (Lach. 189 c) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑπιλανθάνομαι ἡδὲ τὰ
πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὡν ἀν διανοηθῶ ἔρεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸ ἄν
ἀκούσω. ἐὰν δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλων λόγων γένωνται, οὐ τὰν μέμνημαι.
INTRODUCTION.

9. Socrates turns upon Polemarchus. 'What are the words of Simonides which you find so true?'

'That to return to each what is owing is just' (ὁτι τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀπὸ-
διδόναι δίκαιον ἐστὶν). [331 E]

a. It will be observed that this is no 'definition' of justice on the part of Simonides. He does not say that 'Justice consists in rendering to each his due,' but that 'rendering to each his due is just.' Yet Socrates does not remark upon the point. The laxity belongs to Plato, whose logical acumen and coherence—matters upon which more will be said later—leave much to be desired. Logic was in its infancy, and neither the correct forms of propositions nor the necessary distinctions of meanings were readily apprehended. It is a misconception to suppose that the 'inexperience of Polemar-
chus in dialectic is thus indicated' (Bosanquet A Companion to Plato's Republic p. 42). Plato's own slips are too numerous for us to believe that he would think his readers sufficiently nimble logicians—without further comment on his part—to detect a point so subtle to them, if so patent to us. Moreover cf. 332 c, where Socrates himself is the speaker.

10. Soc. One cannot readily quarrel with an inspired sage like Simonides. But I fail to grasp his meaning.

a. Both the appeal to the authority of a poet-sage and the spirit in which Socrates meets the citation are characteristic. σοφία was an attribute of the great poets, epic, gnomic, lyric or dramatic. σοφὸς was, indeed, a standing epithet of poets. Their writings, together with the sayings of the recognised 'sages,' formed for the Greeks not only a kind of Bible, as a body of moral teaching, but also a summary of practical wisdom, largely available in the shape of 'proverbs.' As here Simonides is quoted, so in the Meno (77 ν) 'a poet' is cited for a definition of ἀρετῆ as χαλέων τε καλοίς και δίνασθαι. 'As Homer says,' 'as Hesiod, Simonides, Pindar say'—these expressions corresponded among the cultivated Greeks not merely to the modern expressions 'as Shakspere says,' 'as Goethe says,' but also to 'as Solomon says,' 'as St Paul says.' There is, of course, the difference that a special sanctity is attached to the Bible which was never attributed to the Greek poets. Nevertheless even to the latter there was paid a greater and
more universal deference than is offered to the corresponding writers in modern literature. They represented not only thought expressed by genius, but also doctrine approved and ratified by the consent of generations of the Greek world. That poetry is primarily teaching was a view widely held in antiquity, and is not yet defunct. According to Plutarch (de aud. Poet. 1) ἐν ποιήματι προφιλοσοφητέον. Even contemporary poets claimed respect on that score (Ar. Ran. 1009). [See Professor Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art Cap. v.]

b. The outward attitude (ironically adopted) of Socrates himself to the poets and sages is one of respectful admiration—they are 'wise and divinely gifted'—but he does not surrender his judgment to their dictation. When their sayings are found to be untenable, he is reluctant to declare them in the wrong, but 'they cannot mean what we think they mean.' In his heart he was assured that the ignorance of true conceptions which he found in average humanity was shared also by the poetic 'sages' whom it quoted. This proverbial morality was not based on 'knowledge,' and was therefore a stumbling-block in the path of sound ethical practice. Socrates is compelled to demolish it. It would, however, have appeared highly presumptuous, and would certainly have been impolitic, to treat the established authorities with the rigour with which he handles the contemporary sophist. Moreover Socrates apparently, and the earlier Plato certainly, entertained a genuine admiration for the finer literature.

As Plato develops he makes his Socrates bolder in discrediting poetic wisdom. In the Protagoras he objects to the poets being brought into philosophic conversation because 'we cannot put them questions on the subjects of which they speak, and, for the most part, in quoting them people differ as to the poet's meaning: one says he means this, and another says he means that, and, all the time, they are talking about a thing which they can neither prove nor disprove! (οἴδεν δὲν οὖν...ποιητῶν, οὐς οὕτω ἀνερέσθαι οἴν τ' ἔστιν περὶ ὧν λέγοντες, ἐπαγχομένου τε αὐτοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διακεχομένοι δ' ἀδυνατούσιν ἔξελεγξαί 347 ε'). He even makes Protagoras claim (316 d) that 'Homer, Hesiod and Simonides' were sophists who 'put on poetry as a dis-
guise'; and, though this should not be pressed as representing exactly the opinion of Plato, there is little doubt that he regarded their opinions as intrinsically worth no more than those of the sophists. When in a later part of the *Republic* (Bk ii. ad fin.)—composed long after the first book—Plato boldly finds fault with Homer, Hesiod or Aeschylus, it is on the ground of the moral injury done by their fictions concerning the gods and the bad examples which they thus propose to men.

c. We may add the remark that the study and exegesis of poets tended, in the hands of a certain type of schoolmen whom we have always with us, to become sophistical and hair-splitting. See the treatment of a passage of Simonides in the *Protagoras* (339 A sqq.), where Socrates, if he is not acting a parody, is as great a sinner as the rest. Cf. also Charm. 161—163.

d. Of the poet-sages Simonides enjoyed a special reputation. He was ὁ σοφὸς almost *par excellence*, the fact being that, with less fervour and imagination than Pindar, he was the better suited to express moral sentiments, high but practical, in a finished form which brought them into general appreciation and currency. Moreover his width of sheer knowledge (which was especially valued in poets and included in their σοφία, just as it was expressed in the Roman epithet *doctus*) had remained an imposing tradition.

Suppose a man deposits something with another, loses his senses, and then asks for the return of his deposit.

The deposit is ‘owing’ (ὅφειλόμενον)?

But by no means to be ‘returned’ (ἀποδότεον) in such a case?

**P.** No.

**S.** Then Simonides means something else?

**P.** Of course. He thinks friends ‘owe’ to friends a *good* service, never the contrary.

**S.** Then when by ‘returning’ you hurt a friend, you do not ‘return’ what is ‘owing’?

**P.** That is what Simonides means.

**S.** But must we ‘return’ to an enemy also what is ‘owing’ to him?
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC. xxix

e. It is well to check the gradual shiftings in the meaning attached to words during the discussion.

δοφελευ is used
(i) of a concrete thing which does not belong to the holder, but is the property of some one else, and so ‘owing’:
(ii) of that which is morally ‘due.’ (Cf. the sense of the English ‘ought’ derived from ‘owe.’)
This includes appropriate behaviour, ‘due’ of Greek terms. in a certain relation.

ἀποδιδόναι (cf. reddere) is used
(i) of literally ‘returning’ a thing which is not one’s own;
(ii) of ‘paying’ ‘rendering’ certain conduct which is morally demanded by the situation. (Cf. ‘to pay reverence.’)
(iii) of ‘rendering’ in the arts (332 c) that course of procedure which the purpose demands, i.e. bestowing upon them the ‘due’ procedure.

The Greek admits of an equally natural use of δοφελευ and ἀποδιδόναι in these several senses (see note to the text on ἀποδιδόναι 332 c), but English varies its terms. To ‘pay back,’ to ‘pay,’ to ‘render’ cover only a portion of the sense respectively. For the argument here the shiftings are of little consequence, but there are many instances in which Greek reasoning was entirely confounded by the ambiguous or multifarious meanings of the terms employed. Cf. notes on εὐ ἐκ and εὐ πράττειν 353 D, E.

P. Certainly. And the return ‘owing’ is, in the fitness of things (ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει), some mischief. [331E—332B]

f. From this point it is assumed that Simonides himself asserts the duty of injuring enemies. Socrates makes Polemarchus read that meaning into the words of Simonides as a corollary, but it is not at all certain that the poet would have admitted that injury to enemies was an ὄφειλόμενον or even a προσήκον. The ordinary Greek view of our duty towards our enemy was, indeed, unlike the Christian (see note on 332 B ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει), but Socrates himself can rise superior to it (335 D), and, logically at least, it cannot be forced upon the poet. Hence the remarks in 335 E, 336 A are based on a needless assumption.

11. s. Then Simonides apparently talked in riddles. He used ‘owing’ for ‘fitting’ and meant ‘to return to each what is fitting’ (τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι) ? By ‘owing’ Simonides means ‘fitting.’
P. Well, what have you to say to it?
S. Suppose we asked him, “There is an art called the medical art. What thing ‘owing,’ that is to say ‘fitting,’ does it ‘render,’ and to what objects?”
P. Drugs, food and drink—to bodies.
S. And the art of cookery?
P. Seasonings—to dishes.
S. Then what is ‘returned,’ to what objects, by the art which would be called Justice?
P. Consistency requires the answer ‘Justice is the art which returns benefits and injuries to friends and enemies respectively.’ [332 C, D]

a. The assumption that justice is an ‘art’ or ‘craft’ is Socratic. To Socrates virtuous behaviour was the outcome of knowledge. It was the systematic application of definite ethical conceptions to the relations of life, in just the same manner as his special knowledge is applied by a craftsman or artist in the execution of his art. (Conditions of the will are not admitted by Socrates into the question. To understand justice is to use it, as well as to know how to use it.)

Analogies drawn from τέχναι were a characteristic mark, and often an irritating one, of the method of Socrates. The word includes both ‘arts’ (the ‘fine’ and ‘professional,’ ἔλευθεροι) and ‘crafts’ (βιαναυού τέχναι). The practitioners of all these are alike δημιουργοί. Socrates is quite as likely to draw an analogy from shoemaking as from music, or from carpentry as from medicine. He was not afraid to repeat himself in this respect. Cf. Gorg. 490 e—491 a: ΚΑΛ. ὡς ἂεὶ ταὐτά λέγεις, ὡ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐ μόνον γε, ὡ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΛ. νῦ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἂεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγελροὺς λέγων καὶ ιατροὺς οὐδέν παθεῖ, ὦσπερ περὶ τοῦτων ἡμῶν ὀντα τῶν λόγων. Similarly Alcibiades remarks (Symp. 221 e) ἄνως κακθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας των καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυσσοσβέσας, καὶ ἂεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταυτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὦστε ἀτεῖρος καὶ ἀνήλιος ἀνθρώπος πᾶς ἄν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσει. When Critias (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 37) says ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦ σκυτοτομούς καὶ βυσσοσβέσας καὶ ἀτεχνῶς γε οὐκ αἰτοὺς ἢ ἑκατέτρεφαί διαβρυλούμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ, Socrates replies οὐκόν
Then helping friends and hurting enemies is justice, according to Simonides?

a. i.e. according to the assertion unwarrantably forced upon him (§ 10 f).

P. Apparently.

S. Now the physician can help and hurt sick men in regard to health, and the navigator people at sea in regard to the dangers of the sea. How can the just man help and hurt? In what circumstances and in regard to what function?

P. In war, for or against. [332 E] In war.

13. S. But, as the physician is useless in the case of people not sick, and the navigator in that of people not at sea, is the just man useless in the case of people not at war?

P. Assuredly not.

S. Then justice is useful in peace also? In peace.

As agriculture is useful for the acquiring of produce, what is it for whose use or acquisition justice is useful?

P. For contracts (ξυμβόλαια).

a. Cases are ignored in which there may be justice applied to reputations, social claims &c. The whole trend of the discussion is towards an undue narrowing of the functions of justice.

S. That is to say, partnerships (κοινωνήματα)? [333 A] Now in draughts a good and useful partner is the draught-expert, and in building the builder, rather than the just man. What is that partnership in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist, as the latter is the better in a partnership of striking notes?

P. A money-partnership.

S. Hardly so, when money is to be used? In buying or selling a horse, the expert in horses is the better partner; in the case of a ship it is the nautical expert?
b. But justice is 'useful' in these cases. Even the ἴππικός and ναυπηγός need to be just. Socrates, however, would say that he is thinking of a partner—Justice in whom, being ἴππικός, acts simply άνα ἴππικός, peace-time i.e. acts with a single mind, solely as ideal seems to be practitioner of his art. Cf. 340 D, E. Nevertheless the exercise of justice is involved, and cannot be eliminated.

In what joint use of money is it the just man who makes the best partner?

P. Where depositing and safe-keeping are concerned.

S. That is, when the money lies idle?

Justice then is useful in the case of money (&c.) only when the money is useless?

When money or any instrument is in use, it is other arts which are useful? [333 E—D]

In that case justice can be of little consequence.

c. i.e. in time of peace. The whole department of τὸ προσπο- λεμεῖν καὶ ἔμμαχεῖν, mentioned in 332 E, is here ignored.

14. S. Let us see. In a fight the shrewdest (δεινότατος) to hit is also the shrewdest to guard himself?

Similarly the shrewdest to guard against disease is the shrewdest to implant it?

That man is a good (ἀγαθός) guard of an army who is shrewdest at 'stealing' (κλέψαι) the enemy’s plans?

P. Yes.

S. Then whatever a man is clever at guarding he is clever at stealing?

a. This universal conclusion based upon one or two instances is, of course, without warrant, even if we admitted the instances themselves.

b. The whole of this discussion is hardly to be taken seriously. In the early days of logic there was a natural delight in the exercise of sheer ingenuity, and the Platonic Socrates enjoys the mischievous fun of entangling opponents who make too ready admissions. To moderns trained in logical processes there is a certain puerility in much of this and similar exhibitions of nascent dialectics. The Euthydemus is cari-
cature, but the sophisms which are there humorous and undisguised are not without likeness to others of which Plato himself is often guilty. In that piece the sophist brothers are made to juggle with words in a way which appears very clever to them and is meant to be amusing to the reader, but which, to a modern, is often worse than transparent. If the sophists actually did deal in such puerilities, the fact shews the dialectical crudeness of the age. If they were invented by Plato, he would scarcely have invented them if he had not thought them sufficiently salted with cleverness to be readable.

P. It appears so.

S. Then, if the just man is clever (δεινός) at guarding money, he is clever at stealing it?

c. Of course, the answer is that the δίκαιος is a 'good' guardian only in the sense of being incorruptible. He will do the right thing by the deposit in his hands, but he need be possessed of no particular shrewdness. Indeed, the strictly just man is apt to be the last to comprehend the wiles of knavery.

There is the frequent (by no means necessarily conscious) trickery with Greek words. Thus δεινός = (i) a 'terrible man to' do this and that, and in this sense the just man is δεινός φυλάττειν ἀργόριον in virtue of his tenacious fidelity: (ii) 'clever' or 'shrewd' at this or that; and in this sense Socrates here uses it, though it is manifestly unwarrantable when applied to mere justice in guardianship, apart from other qualities.

Similarly ἀγαθός is either (i) 'good' in the sense of 'trustworthy' or (ii) 'good' in the sense of 'able.' φυλάξασθαι, throughout, is treated as if identical with φυλάττειν. κλέπτειν, again, is either (i) 'to steal' in the literal sense, or (ii) 'to get knowledge of and forestall.' It is only by the use of these words without regard to their fluctuating senses that the egregious conclusion is reached.

So the just man turns out to be a thief.

For this Homer no doubt is your authority, in what he says of Autolycus, and you are in good poetic company in saying that justice is a sort of art of stealing, though for the benefit of

Justice therefore is an art of thieving.
one's friends and the injury of one's enemies. [333 E—
334 B]

d. For the ironical politeness shewn towards both Homer and
Polemarchus see notes on 334 A (fin.), 334 B.

15. P. I don't know what I meant. But I still believe
that justice helps friends and injures enemies.

a. The same result of the Socratic dialectic appears in Alcib. i.
127 ὅ ἀλλὰ μᾶ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἀυτὸς ὀλ' ὑ τι λέγω. That it was generally
recognised appears from Meno 80 λ ὁ Σώκρατες,
ήκουν μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συνγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ ὁδὲν ἄλλα ἢ
ἀυτὸς τε ἀπορεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν, ὃς γέ
μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις καὶ με καὶ φαρμάττες καὶ ἀτεχνώς κατεπάφες,
ὡτε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δὲν
τι καὶ σκώψαι, ὄμωστασ εἶναι τὸ τε εἶδος καὶ τάλα ταύτῃ τῇ
πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ βαλαττλ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἄλει ἀρήσασκοντα
cαι ἀποτίμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖν. καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιούτων τι
πεποιηκέναι, ναρκάν. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸ
στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω τ' ἡ ἀποκρίνωμαι σοι.
Polemarchus is, naturally enough, not satisfied. He cannot
but feel that there has been something wrong somewhere.
So Callicles in Gorg. 513  ο οὐκ ολ' ἡντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὗ
λέγειν, ὅ Σώκρατες: πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τών πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ
σοι πεθομαι.

S. By 'friends' and 'enemies' do you mean those who
seem so, or those who are so?

P. One naturally makes friends of those
whom one thinks good (χρηστοὺς), and hates
those whom he thinks the contrary (πονηροὺς).

b. The answer introduces a new consideration, which, properly
considered, is irrelevant to the argument.
The question is whether the 'friends' (φίλοι)
are those who are 'thought to be,' or those
who 'are.' A φίλος is one who acts with φίλα, and Simonides
might retort that φίλοι are simply those who φιλούσι, and
that whether they are χρηστοὶ or πονηροὶ—in the sense which
Socrates attaches to these words—is not in point. The only
essential matter is that they should be friends. Plato, like
Aristotle (Eth. viii. 3), may, indeed, have conceived that
ideal friendship can exist only between good men, inasmuch
as a basis of sterling character is necessary for its continuance. Nevertheless that very arguable assumption has no right to appear here. Yet upon it, thus awkwardly introduced, the whole discussion turns.

It is hard not to believe that Plato was himself aware of the fallacy in the argument of Socrates here. Otherwise it is not readily explicable how he came to substitute ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ immediately below for χρηστοὶ and πονηροὶ. The latter terms, as used by Polemarchus, may denote respectively ‘soundness’ and ‘unsoundness’ (‘good and true’ and the contrary) in friendship itself. But Socrates takes the words in their familiar acceptation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the general moral sense, and Polemarchus does not pull him up, as he obviously should have done.

S. But we are fallible, and often misjudge in choosing our friends.

In such cases the good (ἀγαθοὶ) are made enemies and the bad (κακοὶ) friends?

It would then be just to help the bad and hurt the good?

P. It appears so. [334 C]

S. But the good are just and do no injustice?

c. That the ‘good’ are ‘just’ is an axiom which Socrates is content to borrow from the traditional morality. Even though he ‘does not know what justice is,’ he does not dispute that the ἀγαθοὶ are those who practise ἀρετή, and δικαιοσύνη is one form of ἀρετή.

Thus it is just to hurt those who do no injustice. [334 D]

16. P. We cannot allow that.

S. Well, then, it is just to hurt the unjust and to help the just?

P. That is better.

S. Therefore, when people have misjudged character (in choosing their friends), it is just to hurt their friends (seeing they are bad) and to help their enemies (seeing they are good).

We thus come to the exact opposite of the statement we attributed to Simonides. [334 E]

a. Though the words ‘the statement which we attributed to Simonides’ instead of ‘the statement of Simonides’ are
meant to be ironical, they are more literally accurate than Socrates appears to suspect (v. sup. § 10 f).

17. P. Logically it is so. But let us readjust our notion of friend and foe.

Instead of making the friend him who seems good (χρηστός), let us say ‘him who not only seems, but is, good’; and similarly with an enemy. [334 E, 335 A]

S. Then the good (ἀγαθός) will be a friend and the bad (πονηρός) an enemy?

You require an amending addition to our statement of justice; thus—‘it is just to help a friend, if he is good (ἀγαθός), and to hurt an enemy, if he is bad (κακός)?’ [335 A]

P. I am satisfied with that.

18. S. But is it right for a just man to hurt anybody at all?

P. Certainly: men who (as we now suppose them) are both bad and enemies.

S. But horses and dogs, when hurt, become worse; that is, worse in their excellence (ἀρετή) as dogs and horses?

Is it not the same with men?

P. No doubt.

S. But justice is a human excellence (ἀρετή)?

And therefore men, when injured, become less just? [335 B, C]

a. It need hardly be pointed out that the reasoning here is very inexact. There is no analogy between the ἀρετή of the animal and the ἀρετή of the man, even if we admit (what the dialogues sometimes discuss) the oneness of human ἀρετή. βλάπτειν is used of (1) physical injury, (2) other forms of damage. The injury done to horses and dogs is physical; the ‘injury’ done to men may take other shapes (e.g. loss of property, position, or reputation; mental pain, &c.). Physical injury to a horse or dog naturally renders it worse in respect of its ability to perform the functions of such an animal, which are physical. Physical injury to man (unless it is damage to the
brain) may only affect his performance of physical functions; while loss of property and position may affect neither these nor the moral functions (on which, indeed, it may have a wholesome effect). Mental pain, again, may exert no injurious influence on ethical practice. Men do not become less just because they are ‘injured’ in either sense.

P. It seems so.

19. S. But experts in music or horsemanship cannot, by the exercise of their respective arts, make men the contrary?

[See above § 11 a on analogy from the arts.]

Can the just, therefore, make men unjust by the exercise of justice, or, in general, the good make men bad by the exercise of excellence \( (\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta) \)?

P. Impossible.

S. Heat cannot cool, nor dryness moisten?

So, then, the good cannot injure?

But the just man is good?

a. It has been accepted above, § 15 (c), that the ‘good’ are just. Here the converse is stated on the same warrant, but not in the same broad sense. \( \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\dot{o} \) has both moral and non-moral meanings. It is the adjective of \( \alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta \) (‘excellence’). But \( \delta\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\sigma\omega\upsilon\nu\eta \) is an \( \alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta \). The \( \delta\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\sigma\omega\upsilon\nu\eta \) is therefore \( \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\dot{o} \) in that domain, just as the musician is \( \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\dot{o} \) in his and the horse-expert \( \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\dot{o} \) in his. Whatever may be the case when fully investigated, Socrates is not here committing himself to the statement that a just man is necessarily a ‘good’ man in the fuller sense.

Therefore the just man cannot injure either friend or enemy? [335 D]

P. That seems quite true.

20. S. Then if anyone says that it is just ‘to return to each what is owing’ and if this means that harm is owing to enemies and help to friends, he is no ‘sage’?

We will therefore make common cause against ascribing such a saying to Simonides or Bias or any other sage?

P. I am with you. [335 E]
s. I fancy it was said by Periander or some other wealthy and powerful person. Justice, then, is not this. What else can it be? [336 A]

21. Meanwhile Thrasymachus had been burning to break in. At this pause he was upon them like a wild beast.

A. a. The character of Thrasymachus is very unamiably delineated, and it is impossible not to feel that he had incurred the special personal dislike of Plato. If our knowledge of him were gathered only from the Republic it would appear incredible that he could have been a man of the high repute indicated by other writers (see above § 3 c). That his manner was conspicuously offensive is tolerably certain; otherwise Plato would hardly have cared or dared to give us the present representation of the sophist who ‘had to be held back’ from interfering, who ‘wanted to shew off,’ who ‘sprang upon us like a wild beast,’ who gives vent to a ‘sardonic cackle,’ who berates Socrates with disingenuousness, sneers at his ‘mock modesty,’ accuses him of picking other people’s brains without a thank-you, calls him a ‘gross buffoon’ (βδέλυπος) and a pettifogger (σουκοφάντης) and ‘my good fool’ (ευνθέστατε), tells him he ‘drivels,’ grows sulky and refuses to do more than nod his head, gets into a perspiration, and blushes ‘for the only occasion on which I ever saw him blush.’

He is not only rude, but vulgar; not only dogmatic, but snarling. His is not simply the overbearing behaviour of a Dr Johnson, who, ‘when his pistol misses fire, knocks you down with the butt.’ He is not merely arrogant and irritable. Plato meant to make him ‘no gentleman,’ and so contrast him the more forcibly with the suavity of Socrates:

b. No doubt ‘the mighty Chalcedonian’ actually had these faults, however much Plato may have coloured them. In the dialogues the sophists are as distinctly individualised as the rest of the characters. They were historical personages, and, as Plato sought to impart every element of verisimilitude to his conversations, he had no choice but to give recognisable outlines, even in a caricature. The pen-and-ink sketches of
Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus in the Protagoras are too delightful and convincing not to have been essentially true.

In the dialogues which bear their names Protagoras and Gorgias are treated by Plato with personal respect, however unmercifully their views may be impugned. If the little foibles of Protagoras and the atmosphere of admiration in which he moved are lightly satirised, and if he is made to grow slightly ruffled in the debate, he is all the time drawn as a man of polish and real ability, and as a chivalrous antagonist. In the Gorgias the special art of the sophist, rhetoric, is attacked and its vicious emptiness exposed, but, beyond a certain excess of vanity, there is nothing in the man himself to take from our esteem. He is as courteous as Protagoras in his bearing towards the vexatious Socrates. To these, who were men of real eminence and character, Socrates is deferential. It is clear that Plato, while disapproving of the sophist, esteemed the man of talent and breeding.

Hippias, whether in the dialogues of that name (one of which may be spurious) or in the Protagoras, meets with despiteful treatment, principally on account of his inordinate conceit. Polus (in the Gorgias) has much of the insolence of Thrasy-machus, which is tamed in a similar manner. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are meant to be frivolous and amusing impostors.

c. Plato is sometimes accused of positive misanthropy. The charge is not borne out by the dialogues.

It gains colour only from his treatment of the sophists and other wiseacres. To these his attitude is one of general antagonism. He followed Socrates in his onslaughts on the 'conceit of knowledge' passing itself off for knowledge. But he found this everywhere around him, both in the teacher (whether of rhetoric, ethics, or general savoir faire) and in the so-called practical man, who proposed legislation or directed affairs. Congenitally, no doubt, Plato was of a highly critical and somewhat supercilious turn of mind. In addition to this his culture was high, and, as an 'apostle of culture,' he looked from a superior eminence upon those who were not in a constant condition of self-criticism. The world, as viewed from his standpoint, was apt to consist of men of crude views or narrow views, of pretenders or Philistines. It needed sweet-
ness and light. Light was wanting even in the best cases, in a Protagoras or a Gorgias. Sweetness these did possess. But all the contempt of Plato's nature and style—at least in his earlier days—was bestowed on those who, lacking light, were obtrusively lacking in sweetness. Of these Thrasyvachus was the worst offender.

Whether the general attitude of Plato is a justifiable one is a question which we need not here discuss. It will be enough to point out again that the Socratic dialogues have a purpose—the examination of existing views, preliminary to the possible establishment of a sound basis for conduct. These existing views found expression chiefly in the professional sophists, second in the 'sages,' third in the representative citizen with his strict morality. The sophist, sage, representative citizen and man of affairs are therefore the natural personas whom Plato sets up for Socrates to assail. Truth to life in some cases, the requirements of literary vivacity in others, and the 'mimic' character of the dialogues, necessitate a lively handling in which personal idiosyncrasies play their part. The pieces are both philosophic dialogues and also little dramas of 'the humours.' It is by no means necessary to suppose that Plato, any more than Aristophanes, hated and despised his fellow-citizens in the ordinary intercourse of life.

[For a discussion of the relations of Socrates and the Sophists, with a defence of the latter, see Grote Hist. Gr. Pt ii. c. lxvii. (vol. 8 of the 12 vol. edition of 1869), and compare therewith the remarks by Jowett in his Introduction to the translation of the Sophistes pp. 376 sqq.]

'What is the use' cries Thrasyvachus 'of this foolish and disingenuous complaisance to each other? If you are in earnest, stop this perpetual asking and confuting, and give us something positive.'

B. A usual objection to Socrates was that he merely created difficulties to be left unanswered. Cf. Meno 80 α οδεν ἄλλος ἄντις τε ἀποφίλης καὶ τούς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀποφείν. His wholly destructive procedure was reputed to come of a mischievous or captious spirit. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 9 τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾶς, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ έθέλων ὕπεξεν λύγων οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενὸς. The same expres-
sion τὸ µηδὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι is used by Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 999 e.

Most people imagined that Socrates must be in a position to be positive in matters in which he could confute others. Apol. 23 λ ὁλονται γὰρ µὲ ἑκάστοις οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἄ ἄν ἀλλον ἐξελέγξω. If he pleaded ignorance and inability it was put down to his mock-modesty. A sophist like Thrasy-machus, failing to comprehend the honesty of Socrates' attitude and irritated at it, was anxious to have it appear that he refused to be positive simply to avoid being himself subjected to confutation.

And don't tell me that justice is 'obligation' (τὸ δέον) or 'the salutary' (τὸ ὁφέλιµον) or 'the best policy' (τὸ λυπητελοῦν) or 'the profitable' (τὸ κερδαλέον) or 'interest' (τὸ ξυµφέρον). I shall accept no such rubbish.

C. These definitions, most of which are practically synonymous, had apparently been enunciated in certain quarters and were in some vogue. Grote's remark (Hist. Gr. vol. viii. p. 235) that the answers offered to Socrates in the dialogues 'purposed to be the explanation or definition of a term...given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant' cannot apply to sophists and their pupils. As a fact these were much concerned with rendering to themselves 'an account of what it meant,' as Thrasy-machus' own definition immediately shews. Attempts to analyse justice had, of course, been made, and some had come to the conclusion that it was simply 'the best policy.' This notion is elaborated in Glaucon's speech in Book ii.

But Socrates had 'seen the wolf first.' He therefore still had the use of his tongue.

'Nay, Thrasy-machus: if we had been looking for gold we should not have been pretending, and justice is worth far more than gold. Clever men like you should pity our incompetence, not be angry.' [336 B—E]

22. Thrasy-machus (with a sardonic guffaw). 'The usual Socratic mock-modesty (εἰπωνεία)! Anything rather than answer!'
a. For the exact meaning of *eirwvela* see the note (337 λ) and the passage of Cicero there quoted. It appears in Apol. 37 ε, where Socrates pleads ‘If I say that it would be disobedience to the god to let people alone, you will disbelieve me ὃς *eirwneuménφ*’ (i.e. think I am pretending to humbler motives than I possess).

The passage to the modern sense of ‘irony’ is not difficult to trace. An air of ignorance which seeks to be taught goes with an implication that the person addressed is in a position to teach. To depreciate oneself in comparison with others is correspondingly to exalt those others. If the air of ignorance or the self-depreciation is only assumed, the ascription of knowledge or superiority to the other parties is equally a pretence, and therefore a disguised expression of contempt. Socrates was *eirwν* in both the Greek and the modern sense. His acknowledgment of ignorance, indeed, was genuine so far as it implied that he knew he had not arrived at true ‘knowledge.’ But his modest request for instruction from others was a pretence, and therefore ‘irony’ in the modern sense. He was perfectly satisfied that the sophists did not know and could not teach, and he was conscious of his own superiority over them. In the *Apology* he finds the oracle to be true that Socrates is the wisest of men, on the ground that he is aware of his own ignorance, while others—sophists, poets, politicians, craftsmen—are not.

To us there is pure ‘irony’ in the passage of the *Laches* (186 β) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγω δ’ι διδάσκαλός μοι οὖ γέγονεν τούτου πέρι. καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφιστάσι οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθοὺς, οὔτε μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντο μὲ οἷοί τ’ εἶναι ποιήσαι καλὸν τε κάγαθόν. αὐτὸς δ’ αὖ εὐρέϊν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατὸν ἔτι νυνὶ. Το Socrates’ opponents there was ‘mock modesty’ in such language, but they also smarted under the ‘irony’ implied.

The extent to which Socrates actually practised this characteristic *eirwvela* was perhaps excessive. In Symp. 216 ε it is said of him *eirwneuménον δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βλοῦν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ*, and probably anyone who reads the Socratic dialogues of Plato continuously, rather than in portions at different times, will occasionally find himself tiring of a device which is so entertaining in separate instances. ‘After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as
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a mere affectation; and those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox. Timon the satirist and Zeno the Epicurean accordingly described him as a buffoon who turned everyone into ridicule, especially men of eminence' (Grote H. G. Vol. vIII. p. 249). See also Zeller Socrates and the Socratic Schools (Eng. Trans.) pp. 126 sqq.

S. Nay. Ask a man what 'twelve' is, and forbid him to say 'twice six' or 'thrice four.' What can he say? Suppose one such answer happens to be right? At least suppose he thinks so?

T. Do you mean to give one of these forbidden answers?

S. Possibly: if inquiry leads me to it. [337 A—C]

23. T. What do you deserve, if I offer you a better account of justice?

S. Instructing, I presume.

T. Sweet innocent! I must have a fee.

S. When I get the money.

a. See note on ἀπότεισιν 337 d. To the ordinary world Socrates might have appeared, and, to judge from the references in Aristophanes and elsewhere, actually did appear, to be himself a sophist, though one of an unusual variety, his 'teaching' being purely negative and his method dialectic. Even the sophists might have regarded him as one of themselves. They were not of one school, and the fact that he was at variance with each and all of them would not have made him the less a sophist. There was, however, an important distinction which could not escape the notice of either the public or the sophists, and it is one on which Socrates is given to insisting. The difference lay in the fact that Socrates took no fees for his ἔμνονοια or dialectic discourses with his associates. He could not regard himself—who knew nothing—as a teacher (διδάσκαλος), nor his young friends as disciples (μαθηταί). They were simply (as the later terms go) ἐταῖροι or ὑμιληταί. Jointly with them he sought the truth (κοινὴ ἐσκότεις). As he had no wisdom or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) to sell, he could not honestly pretend to sell it.
INTRODUCTION.

The sophists, on the other hand, were avowed teachers. They professed to have something to impart, and they received payment for imparting it. Had Socrates been assured that the sophists were really dealing in a genuine commodity, he would not have shrunk from recognising their claims to remuneration, any more than he would those of a schoolmaster or of any δημοσυγος, whether as practitioner of the learned profession of medicine, the fine arts of painting and sculpture, or the crafts. As a fact their fees, to his mind, were obtained under false pretences. This is curtly expressed by Aristotle Sophist. Elench. 1 ο σοφιστής χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ’ οἴκ οὖσης.

b. But apart from the reasoned Socratic view there was also the popular objection. In any case the Greek view of ‘liberal’ professions was very narrow. Such professions as were allowed to be ‘liberal,’ but a military engineer (μηχανοποιός), for instance, was not (Gorg. 512 c). For sophists there was a special contempt, based partly upon the unanalysed notion that it was illiberal to charge fees for helping one’s fellow-citizens to wisdom and virtue, and partly upon the impression that sophistical instruction resulted in a confounding of words, and a fondness for ‘making the worse appear the better reason.’ The former consideration is expressly stated in Gorg. 520 ε περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, δυντ’ ἐν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἶη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ εἰκὴν διοικηθὴ ἦ τόλμω, αἰσχρὸν ν ενόµισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον δῆ. For the latter, the immoral ability was naturally dreaded by the Athenian public, since the practical exhibition of it would be in the assembly and the courts. The Athenian youths sought teaching of this kind not from a love of learning in the abstract, but with the same view as that with which young Romans studied rhetoric,—to fit themselves for a life of affairs.

A specially instructive passage may be found in the Meno (91 & sqq.), where Socrates, speaking to Anytus on behalf of Meno, who ‘wants to learn that wisdom and excellence by which men successfully administer their households and their states’ and treat parents, fellow-citizens and strangers ‘in a way worthy of a good man (ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ),’ suggests (ironically, of course) that he should go to τούτων τῶν ὑποχυμομένων ἀρετῆς διδασκόντων εἰναι καὶ ἀποφήματα
aύτος καυγος τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτον ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους. On learning that these are the 'sophists' Anytus breaks out 'May no relative or friend of mine, no citizen or foreigner, ever be so mad as to go and be corrupted by them, ἐπεὶ οὗτος ὁ φανερά ἐστι λάβῃ τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγενικών.' Socrates cannot believe that they get money for that. 'There is Protagoras, getting more money for this wisdom of his than Pheidias and ten other statuaries for indisputably beautiful works. Is it possible that Protagoras can have been for forty years ruining the material given him to work upon? And all the rest—can we suppose that they wittingly deceive and corrupt, or do they do so without knowing it? Or are they mad?' Anytus replies that it is those who pay them money who are mad.

In the Protagoras Hippocrates is eager to pay money to that sophist in order to be σοφός (310 d—e). Thereupon Socrates asks him what he expects to be made into by Protagoras, in the way in which he would be made into a sculptor by Pheidias. 'It would naturally be a sophist,' and Hippocrates blushes at the confession. Upon Socrates asking πρὸς θεῷν, οὐκ ἄν αἰσχύνοι εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας σαυτόν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; he is obliged to admit that he would be ashamed. This agrees with the popular attitude towards the profession. The Socratic objection is then pressed. The particular object sought by Hippocrates is to become δευτῆρ λέγειν. But that, says Socrates, involves knowledge of the subjects on which one speaks; and what is that περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστιν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν ποιεῖ; Hippocrates cannot tell. Protagoras, however, is not ashamed of being a sophist (317 b—c). He thinks frank 'confession is better than denying the fact.'

Long after philosophy, largely deriving from Socrates, had produced its special schools and systems, the payment of fees provoked expressions of contempt from writers like Lucian.

Glauccon and his friends are ready to club together to provide the fee, and Socrates, who cannot be positive 'because he does not know or pretend to know,' implores Thrasymachus to be liberal with his instruction. [337 D—338 A]
24. Thrasymachus is eager to shew off; but makes a
pretence of preferring to hear Socrates.

"Socrates goes round picking other people's brains without
so much as a 'thank you.'"

S. Nay, I pay my meed of praise, as you will find,
when you give the answer. [338 A, B]

T. Listen then. Justice is simply 'What
is to the interest of the stronger' (τὸ τοῦ
κρείττονος ξυμφέρον).

Why don't you praise?

a. The same definition, equivalent to the modern expression
that 'Might is Right,' and the same line of argument which
is pursued immediately by Thrasymachus, recur Legg. 714 c
sq. In all probability, therefore, it was a definition in current
repute. The sophists and men of the world largely held that
an abstract 'justice' had no existence. Justice was not φύσει
but νόμω, and the νόμος was determined by the governing
power in its own interests, or else (what amounts to the same
thing) by the majority (as τὸ κρατοῦν), which makes compacts
and passes self-denying ordinances for reciprocal protection.
 Cf. the remarks of Callicles in Gorg. 482 D sqq., and especially
483 B—D ὃντω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρεῖττον τοῦ ἡττονος
ἀρχεῖν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν.

S. I will praise, when I understand.

Polydamas, the athlete, is stronger (κρεῖττον) than we are.
A beef diet is to his interest (ξυμφέρει). You don't mean
that the same diet is to the interest of, and just for, those
less strong? [338 C]

b. Thrasymachus had not said that the interest of the stronger
is 'the interest' of the weaker also, but only that it is
'justice.' According to Thrasymachus τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρεῖττονος
is τὸ δίκαιον. In the crude ad absurdum illustration of
Socrates τὰ βόεια κρέα = τὸ τοῦ κρεῖττονος ξυμφέρον. The only
logical inference would be that, therefore, τὰ βόεια κρέα
represent what is δίκαιον τὸς ἡττος. Nothing can be said
of this being ξυμφέρον also.

25. T. Another of your malicious tricks, Socrates!
Some states are under a despot, some under a democracy,
some under an aristocracy.
That which is 'the stronger' (σπαρεί) in each is the ruling power.

Each form of rule makes laws adapted to its own interest (ευμφέρον).

In this shape this 'interest' is declared 'just' for the subjects, and its violation is punished.

Thus 'the interest of the stronger' is justice everywhere.

[338 D—339 A]

S. Now I understand. Whether you are right, remains to be seen.

You forbade me to say that 'interest' was 'just.'

a. The thinking (and therefore the expression) is lax. Thrasy-machus had said 'do not tell me that justice is τὸ εὐμφέρον.'

He had not said 'do not tell me that τὸ εὐμφέρον is just.'

True, you add 'of the stronger.'

T. A slight addition, no doubt!

S. I do not know yet. I agree that justice is some sort of 'interest,' but your specification needs examining.

[339 A, B]

T. Proceed.

26. S. You say, of course, that it is just to obey the ruling power?

But ruling powers are fallible?

They therefore sometimes make laws against their own interests?

Yet the subjects must obey, and that is 'justice'?

Therefore justice may be the opposite of the interest of the stronger. [339 C, D]

The point thus scored startles Thrasymachus, and Socrates briefly reviews and drives home the argument. [339 D, E]

a. Plato is aware that the point here made is a really good one and sound enough to secure universal approval. He is, therefore, evidently pleased with it and enjoys tasting it over.
27. A slight diversion occurs in a small passage of arms between Polemarchus (supporting Socrates) and Cleitophon (supporting Thrasymachus).

Cleitophon ends by trying to make out that Thrasymachus meant 'what the stronger thinks to be his interest.'

Socrates will consider that view if Thrasymachus chooses. [340 A—C]

28. Thrasymachus disowns it.

a. Of course Thrasymachus cannot be represented as novice enough to accept so elementary a correction. He may not possess ἐπιστήμη in the Socratic sense; he may be superficial; but his superficiality is not so patent as this. He adopts a nimble resource of experienced sophistry.

T. Do you think I call a man 'stronger' when he is going wrong?

S. I did, when you admitted that rulers were not infallible.

T. A quibble, Socrates!

Do you call a man a 'physician' when he is making a mistake in medicine? Is he a physician qua that mistake (καὶ αὐτῷ τὸν ὁ ἐξαμαρτάνει)? Loosely, no doubt, we say so; but strictly—and you are a stickler for strictness—no craftsman or artist makes a mistake. The mistake occurs where knowledge fails, and at that point the practitioner is no craftsman.

The 'ruler,' then, so far as he is a ruler, makes no mistake in legislating for his own interest. To obey his legislation is just. Therefore to do what is 'the interest of the stronger' is just after all. [340 C—341 A]

b. It is difficult for Thrasymachus to extricate himself, and he does it badly with a quibble. He had incautiously acknowledged that ἁρχοντες make mistakes as to their own interest. He does not frankly confess that he would not have made the admission if he had foreseen the consequences, but explains that he used the word ἁρχοντες in the lax popular sense (i.e. of persons actually exercising ἁρχή). But, as a fact, the ἁρχών, while ἁρχών in the ideal sense, makes no mistake in
his ruling. When he does make a mistake, he is not an ἀρχων for the time being. He becomes another character. It is only his legislation in the real character that we are to consider.

If he must quibble, it would have been easier for him to say that the ἀρχων, when making a mistake, is not really κριτής. But that way of putting it would not have suited Plato’s purpose.

29. s. So you think I quibble?
T. I know it; but it is useless with me.
S. Let us avoid the danger of it.
Do you henceforth mean by the ‘ruler,’ i.e. the ‘stronger,’ the ruler in your strict sense?
T. Yes. Now quibble, and do your worst.
S. I should as soon think of bearding a lion.
But enough of banter. [341 A–C]

30. Your physician—in the strict sense—is not a money-maker, but a healer of the sick? Your navigator is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor (though he is that incidentally).

There is an ‘interest’ (ἕμφερων) in each case?

The essential purpose of the art in each case is to look after that ‘interest’? [341 C, D]
T. Granted.
S. Has each art any other ‘interest’ than its own ideal perfection?
T. How do you mean?
S. It is not enough for a body to be a body. It must be sound. The art of medicine is required to look after the ‘interests’ of the body.

But is the art of medicine itself unsound or defective, requiring some further art to look after its soundness (its ‘interests’) and so ad infinitum?

Or is not every art—while it is what it pretends to be—complete and without defect?

Has it any other interest to look after than the interest of that which is the subject of the art?

PL. REP.
T. I suppose not.
S. Then the art of medicine, having no deficiency of its own, looks after the 'interest,' not of the art of medicine, but of the body, and so on? [341 D—342 C]

T. Apparently.

31. S. Well, the arts 'rule' over and are 'stronger' than that which is the subject of their exercise?

[Thrasymachus was very reluctant to grant this.]

Then no science (ἐπιστήμη) looks after the 'interest of the stronger,' but after that of the weaker and the subject?

[Thrasymachus sparrowed for a time, but was compelled to give in.]

Therefore no physician, no navigator, no other kind of 'ruler,' so long as he is strictly 'ruler,' looks after his own interest, but after that of the subject upon which his art is exercised? [342 C—E]

a. The arts are supposed to stand to those upon whom they are practised as government and superior strength stand to the governed and the weaker. A sophism of Socrates.

The 'subjects' of the arts obey the prescriptions of those arts. Consequently the practitioner of an art is in the same position relatively to those upon whom he exercises it as an ἄρχων and κρείττων is relatively to the ἄρχέμενοι and ἔπτομεν.

The analogy is, of course, skilful; but for its application to prove that an ἄρχων, in so far as he is an ἄρχων, considers the good of his subjects only, it is obviously fallacious, unless we beg the whole question by assuming for ἄρχων the sense of keeping a thing in good condition as manager and director. This is what Socrates actually does beg. Cf. inf. 345 ν τῷ ἄρχομενῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ.

The perfect 'art' of ἄρχειν, in the literal sense, and the sense meant by Thrasymachus, might rather be defined as the perfect art of keeping others in subjection. The perfect 'art' of being κρείττων is simply the perfect art of keeping other people down. There might be a perfect art of poisoning, and, so far as the poisoner was a poisoner and nothing else, he would consider only the perfection of his art. He might not, indeed, be considering his own 'interest,' but it would
certainly not be the ἐμφέρων of his ‘subjects.’ It would be simply the most effectual way of exercising his art upon his victims.

Arts are not all beneficent, and if, indeed, the most strict and single-minded application of a beneficent art necessarily means the greatest ἐμφέρων of the ‘subject,’ the most strict and single-minded application of the contrary kind would mean his greatest injury. The ‘subject’ (οὐχέρ ἐστι τέχνη) may be a victim instead of a patient, and the assertion that no sort of ἔμπετον aims at the advantage of the stronger is therefore one against which Thrasy machus might have made a better stand. And is the mere art of ‘being lord and master’ beneficent?

32. Thrasy machus, seeing the result, suddenly says:

‘Where is your nurse? You are drivelling.’

You cannot tell sheep from shepherd.

S. Why, precisely?

T. You seem to think that herdsmen look after the good of their herds, instead of after that of their masters and themselves.

[343 A, B]

(Here Thrasy machus enters upon a set speech.)

Now rulers stand to ruled as herdsmen to their herds.

‘Justice’ is the interest of the stronger, i.e. the ruler. It is the subject’s loss and another’s gain (ἄλλοτρον ἄγαθον).

Injustice is the contrary. It rules, and the ‘just’ obey, all for the good of the ruler.

In private contracts and in public dealings the just man always gets the worst of things and the unjust man the best.

The just man in office neglects his affairs and offends his friends by his probity: the case of the unjust man is just the contrary.

Take the most consummate injustice, ideal in form and opportunity—despotism (τυραννίς). It can rob, enslave, and so forth, with impunity, and win the envy of men.

Men do not shrink from doing, but from suffering injustice.
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Given injustice on a large scale, it is a stronger (ισχυρό-
τερον), finer-spirited (ἐλευθερώτερον) and more masterlike
(δεσποτικότερον) thing than justice.

And so justice is the ‘interest of the stronger,’ while
injustice is to one’s own interest. [343 B—344 C]

33. After this shower-bath of words Thrasymachus
rose to go, but the company insisted that he should stay.

a. For the μακρολογία of the sophists as opposed to the
question and answer of Socrates see § 41 a.

Socrates reminds him of the importance of the subject,
which involves the whole question how to live.

‘They will all be grateful if he will pity and help them
with his knowledge.’

S. For my part, I am not convinced. I cannot think
injustice—even with a free hand—more profitable (κερδαλεώ-
tερον) than justice.

Shew me my error.

T. What more can I do? Am I to cram the argument
into your mind?

S. Pray don’t. [344 D—345 B]

b. The idea is naturally repugnant to Socrates, whose creed
was that truth should be brought out of a man by discussion
(a ‘maieutic’ process), not crammed in by dogmatising.
(We may compare the two lights in which ‘education’ is
regarded.)

34. First keep to your premises, or, if you shift your
ground, do it openly.

Observe. You first defined your physician
as a physician ‘in the strict sense.’ When it
came to the shepherd, you forgot ‘the strict
sense,’ and you turned him into a feaster or a
money-maker, fattening sheep for his own
interest and not for that of the sheep.

But this is not the business of the ‘art of shepherding.’

a. It is perhaps scarcely worth while to treat all this seriously.
The art of shepherding might, indeed, be defined as the art
of making sheep most nearly realise the ideal sheep. But
‘ideal’ from what and whose point of view? It is an art which looks after making the best of its subjects: but ‘best’ from what and whose point of view?

Remember our admissions. No (art or) form of rule looks after the best (τὸ βέλτιστον) for anything else than its ‘subjects.’ [345 B—E]

35. Do you think your ‘true rulers’ in the different states rule voluntarily?

T. I am sure they do.

S. But no one voluntarily ‘rules’ in the other forms of rule (the arts). Men require payment, which implies that the benefit of the art goes to the subjects of it?

a. This would certainly not be admitted in modern, nor, we may suppose, in ancient times. The practice of art for the love of art is independent of any other reward than the glow of satisfaction in the exercise of an ability.

Now each art differs from others in having a special faculty (δύναμις)? It provides a special benefit (ωφελία), and not the same in all cases?

As the art of medicine provides health, so it is the ‘art of pay-getting’ (μισθωτική) which provides pay?

b. Such an art is, of course, not easily conceivable. A special ἐπιστήμη of the way to obtain pay in every circumstance in which pay comes into the question, and therefore applicable on scientific principles to all occupations and professions, is an idle abstraction which Socrates finds it necessary to conjure up. The notion is that an ἱατρός, for instance, while acting as ἱατρός and nothing else, is exercising the art of ἱατρική, the aim of which is simply to heal (ἰάσθαι) the subject of its exercise. This is the particular ωφελία in the case, and it is conferred on the ‘subject.’ Whether the ἱατρός is paid or not, has nothing to do with ἱατρική itself. The getting of pay out of his exercise of ἱατρική is a secondary or simultaneous occupation of the ἱατρός in another character. To do this in the best way requires an ‘art.’
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But the ὃτελαι in that case is the rewarding of the practitioner, and, while Socrates was erecting the obtaining of pay into an art, he might have been asked whether this art, at least, does not seek the advantage of him who practises it.

The fact that incidentally you earn pay while practising the art of medicine does not make medicine an 'art of earning pay' (μυσθηρητική) ?

Each art (we said) works a special benefit. Therefore any benefit which accrues to all practitioners of the arts must come from the common use of something else in addition to their proper art?

Thus the earning of pay comes from the additional use of the art of pay?

[Thrasy Machus assents with reluctance.]

Thus each art, in itself, attends to its own function, and benefits that which is the 'subject' in its department?

An art without pay is of no benefit to the practitioner, though it is just as beneficial to the 'subject'?

Therefore no one, as practiser of a given art and of no other, considers any 'interest' but that of the subject of his art? [345 E—347 A]

36. For this reason the ruler requires the inducement of pay, either money, or loss (ζημία) if he refuses?

Glauccon does not understand how 'loss' can be payment.

s. It is the inducement to the best men.

Ambition and avarice are reprehensible?

Accordingly, the good will not rule for either place or pay.

They must be compelled by fear of damage if they refuse.

The worst form of such damage is being ruled by worse men.

If a state were composed of good men office would be avoided as eagerly as it is now sought.

Thus it would be demonstrated that the genuine ruler does not look for his own interest, but for that of the subject. [347 A—E]
37. More important is the assertion by Thrasymachus that the life of the unjust man is preferable (κρείττω) to the life of the just.

It is of little use to count up and contrast the list of advantages on either side. It will be better to proceed by the previous method of reciprocal admissions. [347 E—348 B]

Come, Thrasymachus. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable (λυσιτελεστέραν) than complete justice?

T. I have given my reasons.

S. One of the two is an excellence (ἁρετή) and one badness (κακία)?

Justice is, of course, the ἁρετή and injustice the κακία?

T. A likely thing! Quite the contrary.

S. What! Justice is κακία?

a. It is unfortunate for the argument, when translated, that there are no English words sufficiently free to correspond to the Greek senses of ἁρετή and κακία. ἁρετή is not properly 'virtue' as we understand it. In the Gorgias (Meaning of ἁρετή and κακία.) ἁρετή implies excellence and desert, while κακία implies imperfection and demerit. Moral excellence and desert are equivalent to 'virtue,' moral imperfection and demerit to 'vice.' Nevertheless 'virtue' and 'vice' cover but one department of ἁρετή and κακία. ἁρετή may embrace intellectual or practical excellence, and κακία the opposite qualities. ἁρετή may correspond to that which evokes admiration of any kind, e.g. strength of character (even if the exertion of it is not strictly 'moral'), while κακία may denote weakness and foible. Hence (inf. ε) κακία and ἀλοχωσιον are set by chiasmus against καλὸν and λοχυρόν. Cf. 444 ε ἁρετή μὲν ὑγειά τε τις ἄν εἶ ὡς καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ ἀλοχοσ καὶ ἀσθένεια.

For these reasons Thrasymachus, regarding the practice of justice as serving the interest of the stronger, can go on to declare that it is 'egregious good nature,' which is a form of weakness and foible and therefore κακία; while the practice of injustice, being the serving of one's own interest, is εἰθονία and a mark of strength, and therefore ἁρετή.
Nevertheless the sense of ἀρετή and κακία tended early towards that of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ and some confusion arose. For this reason Thrasymachus, though he at first promptly grants that, of justice and injustice, one is an ἀρετή and the other a κακία, is not altogether prepared to call justice flatly κακία and injustice ἀρετή. He is for substituting milder terms, until driven to take up an uncompromising attitude (inf. ἐ). Had he kept the wider and narrower senses of ἀρετή and κακία distinctly apart, his position would have been easier.

T. No, but right royal good-nature (simpleness, quixotism, εὐθείᾳ).

S. Then injustice you call ‘bad-nature’ (κακοθείᾳ)?

b. For the half-truth in this retort see note on κακοθεὶάν 348 b.

T. No, good sense (judgment, εὐβουλία). [348 b, c]

38. s. Do you regard the unjust as possessed of wisdom (φρόνιμοι) and excellence (ἄγαθοι)?

a. The adjectives correspond to σοφία and ἀρετή respectively (inf. ἐ), and must be understood according to the senses attaching to those nouns (sup. § 37 a). The φρόνιμος is ‘practically wise,’ the ἄγαθος is a man of ἀρετή, of parts and quality, without necessary reference to ‘moral’ acts.

At the same time, since to the Socratic mind all virtue is knowledge, it would be quite conceivable that a man conventionally known as ἄδικος should turn out to be in reality the possessor of superior wisdom, and therefore of virtue.

T. Yes, when their operations are large. I am not thinking of pickpockets.

S. Of course. But do I really understand that you treat injustice as excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφία), and justice as the contrary?

T. I do.

S. Your position has grown more stubborn. If you had called injustice ‘profitable,’ but ‘weak’ or ‘disgraceful,’ my task would have been easier.

But of course you will call it also fine (καλὸν) and strong (ἰσχυρὸν)?

b. Since ἀρετή necessarily implies these qualities.
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T. Your prophecy is correct.
S. You are not jesting?
T. What does it matter whether I am or not? [348 D—349 A]

c. A side hit at a familiar attitude of sophists, as contrasted with the almost religious earnestness of Socrates in the cause of truth.

39. S. Well, let us proceed.
Would the just man be willing to have advantage over (or overreach) the just man?

a. The following piece of argumentation, however specious it might have appeared to the Greek mind, is perplexed for us, and its weakness betrayed, by the impossibility of representing πλέον δείκνυ and πλεονεκτεῖν consistently by any adequate term. Remarks upon its meaning and the fallacies which it involves are best reserved till the close of the argument (inf. § 40 g (i)).

T. No.
S. Nor the just performance (or circumstances, πράξεως)?
T. Not even if just.
S. But would he think it fair to overgo (πλεονεκτεῖν) the unjust man?

T. He would, if he could.
S. Whereas the unjust man would seek advantage over both just and unjust?

T. Yes.
S. Then the just man takes advantage over his unlike; the unjust over both like and unlike? [349 A—C]

T. Quite so.

40. S. Now the unjust man has wisdom (φρόνιμος) and excellence (ἀγαθός), and the just man neither?
The unjust man is like the wise and excellent; the just man is not?
T. If you are so-and-so, you must be like people who are so-and-so.
S. Well, each of the two is of the same kind as those whom he is like? [349 D]
a. An unwarrantable assumption, upon which, however, Socrates has to rely as a premise to the conclusion in 350 c.

From the fact that one person resembles another we are only justified in saying that he is τοιούτος in regard to the thing or quality in which he does so resemble him. Socrates ignores this necessary qualification of τοιούτος.

T. What of it?
S. One man is expert in music (μουσικός); another is not?

The expert has wisdom (φρόνιμος), the other has not?

b. i.e. relatively to what is required in music.

What a man is wise (φρόνιμος) at, he is good (ἀγαθός) at?
Well, in tuning a harp, an expert in music (μουσικός) will not covet something which 'overgoes' another expert?
He will do so with the non-expert (ἀμουσικός)?

c. i.e. he will naturally expect to 'arrive at more' (in the way of artistic success) than the unmusical man.

So in all cases of science and its contrary. The expert will be satisfied with the same as another expert (his like) in regard to the same performance (circumstance)?

T. I presume it must be so. [349 E, 350 A]
S. But the expert has wisdom (σοφός)?

And the wise has excellence (ἀγαθός)?

d. i.e. in the particular department.

Therefore the man of excellence and wisdom will not strive for more than his like, whereas the bad and ignorant will strive for more than both his like and his unlike?

e. There is nothing to prove this in the domain of the arts.

Therefore the just man is like the excellent and wise, and the unjust like the bad and ignorant?

And each is of the character of that which he is like?

f. i.e. according to the false assumption made above (a).

Therefore the just man, and not the unjust, turns out to be excellent and wise. [350 B, C]
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9. (i) The whole of the preceding discussion is puzzling and almost meaningless through the want of fixity in the terms in which it is couched. The point chiefly turns upon the floating sense of πλέον ἔχειν, which literally = 'to have more,' 'to come off better,' but which generally connotes an unfairness in the distribution. Where two persons have the same claims, but one fares better than the other, the one πλέον ἔχει, the other ἐλαττῶν. πλέον thus means 'too much' as well as 'more.' That the δίκαιος should be unwilling πλέον ἔχειν τοῦ δίκαλον is so far clear. That he should think it right to have an advantage over the undeserving δίκαιος is an axiom of equity. But it is not so evident how he could πλέον ἔχειν τῆς δικαλας πράξεως. Of πράξεως it must be remarked that it includes both 'doing' and 'faring' (cf. 332 ε). In the latter sense 'to have an advantage over the just state of affairs' is intelligible enough. In the former, 'to have an advantage over the just action' does not mean 'to get more out of a situation than just action permits' (a sense apparently simple enough, but not in keeping with the application to the arts in 349 Ν sq.), but 'to do (in the way of justice) more than the claims of exact justice warrant.' In other words ἡ δικαλα πράξεως is action which is just: there can be but one really just form of action in a given case: all δίκαιοι, so far as they are δίκαιοι in the absolute sense, will perform that same act in the same degree: so long as it is just, it cannot be more just: the δίκαιος will not, therefore, think of such a thing as being more just than the just action.' Jowett very aptly quotes Shakspere King John iv. 2. 28

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Hence Thrasymachus—who for Plato's purposes is assumed to have readily understood all this intricate train of thought—replies 'οὐδὲ τῆς δικαλας' 'no, not even than the just (action),' i.e. however just the action (and it might look as if one could not get too much of a good thing), the just man does not want to be more just (than the true point). This is by no means the same as if he had said οὐδὲ τῆς δικαλας πράξεως, although commentators seem not to have been sufficiently alive to the fact. πράξεως could not be omitted unless δικαλα bore all the emphasis.

Later the same πλέον ἔχειν is brought into the usual analogy
of the arts, where, corresponding to πλεον ἔχειν τῆς δικαιας πράξεως (as above explained), it is asked (349 e) if a musician ἄρμοστόμενος λύραν will be ready to 'overgo' ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν (which is a μονοική πράξις). The notion entertained there is that the μονοικός, qua μονοικός, can only seek to tighten or loosen his strings to the proper point required by the art of μονοική. There is only one such point, and all μονοικοί, as such, will seek that point and no more. There is no 'more' or 'less' in the matter. All real artists will therefore do and prescribe, and expect all other real artists to do and prescribe, precisely the same things in the same cases.

On the other hand the ἄδικος will always seek to over-reach (πλεονεκτεῖν). He will try for (unfair) advantage over the δίκαιος and the ἄδικος alike. Also he will seek to go beyond an ἄδικος πράξις by action still more unjust. As for the δίκαια πράξεις, it cannot be said that he will endeavour πλεον ἔχειν in the manner above explained for the δίκαιος, but he will, in another sense, try to get an advantage beyond 'what is warranted by a just course of conduct.'

It is evident that the expression πλεον ἔχειν fluctuates between the meanings 'to have more' (i.e. an advantage rightfully) and 'to have too much' (an advantage wrongfully). In this fluctuation is involved a quibble, which might easily be intentional. This, however, is not the only sophism in the context.

(ii) There is a certain speciousness in the whole argument, which we may thus summarise.

'Stop say that the unjust man, being φρόνιμος in the argu-

Sophisms kal ἀγαθός (341 d), is like the φρόνιμος kal ἀγαθός in general, while the just man is not. Well, we are to understand that the just and unjust are respectively of the same description as those whom each resembles. We will accordingly take resemblance as the criterion. I go on to prove that the ἐπιστήμων in the arts (who ἀγαθός) has no desire to overreach his like, while the ἀνεπι-

Sophisms στήμων, who is ἀμαθὴς kal kakόs, has that desire. But the ἄδικος desires to overreach, and is therefore like the ἀμαθὴς kal kakόs, while the δίκαιος has no desire to overreach, and is therefore like the σοφὸς kal ἀγαθός. But to be like implies (as we have said) to be of the same description. Therefore the ἄδικος is of the same description with the ἀμαθὴς kal kakόs. In other words, he is himself ἀμαθὴς kal kakόs.'
But the 'over-reaching' of the unjust man is, to begin with, hardly commensurable with the over-reaching of a craftsman in his craft. It is impossible to attach consistent meanings to the same word. If we attempt consistency, we are apparently led to something which Socrates would by no means desire, viz. this—An artist, *qua* artist, tries simply to attain to an ideal exercise of his art. Granted. But then is not the business of the ἄδικος, *qua* ἄδικος, to attain to an ideal exercise of his art of injustice, which involves over-reaching everybody? If the analogy of the arts is to be brought in, the μονσικός, λατρός, δίκαιος and ἄδικος are all φρόνιμοι καὶ ἄγαθοι in their own departments.

Again, if the μονσικός is φρόνιμος καὶ ἄγαθος, it is only in regard to knowledge and excellence in music that he can claim those titles. He is σοφός and ἄγαθος in regard to his ἐπιστήμη. This being so, why may not the ἄδικος be equally σοφός καὶ ἄγαθος in his particular ἐπιστήμη? Further there is practically no meaning in the remark that the ἀνεπιστήμων will 'overreach' both the ἐπιστήμων and the ἀνεπιστήμων. If it has a meaning at all, it is a pure assumption.

(iii) Even if we gave to the argument about 'over-reaching' more value than it deserves, the fact that the 'wise and good' do not overreach, while the just man also does not overreach, would merely shew that in that one respect he resembled the 'wise and good.' It would not prove that he himself was τουατός, i.e. wise and good. Because A is never B, and C also is not B, it does not follow that C is A.

41. All these admissions were wrung from Thrasy-machus, who was perspiring, and, for this occasion only, blushed.

Socrates resumes:

'In the next place you said that injustice was strong (ἰσχυρόν). You remember it?'

T. I do. But I am not satisfied as far as we have gone. If I speak, however, you will say I am making a speech.

So ask what you like, and I will nod or shake my head.

[350 D, E]

*a.* The objection of Socrates to long speeches during discussion is amusingly illustrated in the *Protagoras.* That sophist has delivered himself of a lengthy utterance, and Socrates (328 d) has The μακρο-λογία of sophists.
been 'spell-bound' by it. He ironically pretends to be waiting eagerly for more: 'but when I perceived that he had really done, I, as it were, gathered myself together.' He complains that Pericles or some other ἄνθρωπος might speak in that way, εἰ δὲ ἐπανέρχετο (τις) τινά τι, ὡσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἄποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, αὐτ' εάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρόν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτελεῖ εάν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ῥητηθέντες δῆλοιον κατατείνουσι τὸν λόγον (329 λ). But 'Protagoras is equally capable of either making fine long speeches or of dialectic question and answer κατὰ βραχύ,' and Socrates desires him to carry on the discussion in the latter way. At 334 Α Protagoras drops into oratory again, whereupon Socrates plaintively observes that he has 'a poor sort of memory' καὶ εάν τις μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλαγῶνοι περὶ οὗ ἃν ἢ ὁ λόγος. 'It is so easy for Protagoras to speak καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ.' At last, though after a struggle, Protagoras is induced to try altercatio rather than oratio.

The same position is taken up in the Gorgias (449 ο, c), where Socrates asks for question and answer instead of τὸ μήκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο. Polus (471 δ) is well trained πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικήν, but has neglected τὸ διαλέγεσθαι.

The objection, of course, is based on the difficulty of checking each link in the argument during the course of a long speech, and the consequent opportunity for sophisms, or, at any rate, for getting wide of the point by imperceptible degrees. In the dialectic process this danger appears to be avoided, and perhaps is largely so in real discussion between men of real intelligence. But in the Platonic dialogues the interlocutors assert so readily to palpable fallacies that their 'answers' do little towards keeping the discussion on sound lines.

In one amusing case, in the Gorgias (505 ν), Callicles asks Socrates whether he can't just as well ask and answer his own questions. Thereupon Socrates proceeds to interrogate himself as if he were Callicles. Later in that piece, however, he is led, as he confesses, to make a long speech because he finds nobody to answer him. In the later dialogues Socrates himself indulges freely in μακρολογία.

It may further be remarked that Plato is fond of reproducing or parodying the individual styles of speech employed by particular sophists. This is manifestly the case with the
speeches of Hippias, Prodicus and Protagoras in the dialogue named after the last.

S. As you please, but do so conscientiously. As for injustice being 'strong.' That might seem to be disproved already. But let us be exact. A state may be unjust and enslave others? But will it be able to do this, as the 'stronger,' without the presence of justice? T. Not if justice is wisdom. But I hold that injustice is wisdom.

S. Thank you for replying so nicely after all. But can state, army, pirates or thieves act in concert if the members are unjust to each other? Injustice begets feuds, justice begets unanimity?

T. Anything not to quarrel with you!

S. Many thanks. Then will not the presence of injustice cause faction (1) in a state, (2) between two persons?

It will thwart just action, and it will produce enmity internally, towards all opponents, and, therewith, towards the just?

It will do this (3) in the individual, and make him, first, incapable of consistent action, second, at enmity with himself and the just?

b. A similar transference to the individual occurs in Gorg. 491d of the ruler ruling himself. The remark is in keeping with a view developed later in the Republic that justice is the due relation and proportion of the component parts of the soul. In the "Οροι Συνεφίππου we have Δικαιοσύνη 'Ομόνοια τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ εὐταξία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς Ἀληθή. Nevertheless Thrasymachus might well have asked for some explanation.

T. Yes.

S. But the gods are just?

c. The existence of gods, and their justice, are assumed as axioms. In Theae. 176b 'the way to become like God' (δυσολογίας θεός) is to become 'just and pious with wisdom' (δικαίον καὶ δικίων μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι).
Therefore the unjust man will be the enemy of the gods and the just man their friend? [351 A—352 B]

d. Cf. Alcib. i. 134 c—e. Phileb. 39 e (δικαίος ἀνήρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγάθος πάντως ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστὶ;). The absoluteness of this truth is questioned in the popular view stated by Adeimantus in Bk ii., where it is urged that the gods may be bribed with offerings.

T. Go on till you are satisfied. I do not want to get myself disliked.

S. It is now clear that, if the unjust do transact anything jointly, it is in virtue of a tincture of justice. They are only ἣμμοῦχθηροι. [352 B—D]

42. Our next business is to find out whether the life of the just is the happier, or not.

The matter is of such importance that we cannot assume this, even now.

T. Proceed.

S. A horse has a function (ἐργον)?

A thing's function is that which can be done only, or best, with that thing?

For instance, the function of the eyes is seeing; of a pruning-hook, pruning.

T. So far, so good.

S. And everything which has a special function has a special excellence?

That excellence is essential to the proper performance of the function?

T. I am satisfied.

S. But the soul (ψυχή) has its special function, such as ruling, planning &c.?

a. If another had said this, Socrates would have asked for a more specific name for the function of the soul.

And is not life a function of the soul?

b. 'Life' is, however, either 'living' (which of course requires ψυχή, anima, in one sense) or 'the conduct of life' (which depends on ψυχή, "Living well" is living happily, and living well implies ἄρετή in the soul. But it is justice which is ἄρετή.
the mind, in another sense). The two meanings are confused in the argument which follows.

And will that function (living) be properly performed by the soul, if the soul lacks ἄρετή? But we granted that justice is ἄρετή?
T. We did.
S. Then the just soul and the just man will live ‘well’ (ἡ ὑστεραῖ), and the unjust not?
And he who lives ‘well’ (ἦν ξῖν) is happy (μακάριος καὶ εὐδαιμὼν)?

c. Early Greek logic was under the domination of ambiguous expressions like ἔδξήν, ἔδπάττειν. Reasoning was indeed λάγος in an unfortunate sense. Students trained in logic and alert to the various renderings which the same Greek expression requires in a modern tongue according to the context, readily detect the non sequitur in passages like the present. It would, however, be by no means obvious to those who themselves habitually used the one expression in several senses. ἔδπάττειν is ‘acting rightly’ (= ὀρθῶς πράττειν) and also ‘faring well’: ἔδξήν is ‘conducting life properly’ and also ‘living well’ (i.e. in comfort and happiness). The former depends on a condition of mind, the latter largely on external circumstances.

In Charm. 172Ἀ we have the same ambiguity utilised as here, ἀμαρτίας ἔξηρπεν, ὁρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης ἐν πάσῃ πράξει, ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ ἔδπάττειν τοὺς οὕσω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ ἔδπάττωντας εὐδαιμόνιοι εἶναι. So 173Β ἐπιστημόνως δὲ πράττοντες ἔδ οὐ πράττομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῦμεν. Cf. Alcib. 1. 116Β δόσεις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ ἔδπάττει; οἴ δὲ ἔδπάττοντες οὐκ εὐδαιμονίους; Gorg. 507C, Prot. 344Ε, 351Β (where ἔδξήν is treated as interchangeable with ἔδως ξῆν). The Platonists used ἔδπάττειν for χαίρειν in salutations by letter. Aristotle still tolerates the ambiguity Eth. 1. 4. 2, and vi. 2. 5 (ἔπραξεν).

Therefore the just man is happy and the unjust miserable? But to be miserable is not ‘profitable’?
Therefore injustice is in no case more ‘profitable’ than justice. [352D—354Α]

PL. REP.
43. **T.** I hope you have enjoyed your feast of Bendis.

*a.* It is probable that this should be read as a reproach. The occasion is festive. Socrates has turned it into a meeting for debate; and Thrasymachus, who is fond enough of ‘shewing off,’ now pretends to disapprove of this way of celebrating the feast of Bendis.

**S.** Yes, thanks to you.

We have, however, been merely tasting a number of dishes in passing.

We set out to discover the *nature* of justice: then I left that question to consider whether it is weakness and ignorance, or wisdom and excellence.

Next there came up the argument that injustice was more *profitable* than justice, and I attacked that.

The result is *nil*.

If I do not know what justice is, I cannot tell whether it is a virtue (excellence) or not, nor whether its possessor is happy or not. *[354 A—C]*

*b.* The dialogue which, in its original form, probably ended here, is one of the earlier Socratic tentative dialogues. (See below §§ 57 sqq.) The setting up and demolishing of definitions has proceeded as in the *Euthyphro, Lysis, Charmides* and *Laches.* Similarly to the present case the *Lysis* ends with the remark οὐπώ δὲ ὅ τι ἐστίν ὁ φίλος οἷοι τε ἐγενόμεθα ἔξεχρεῖν.

It might, perhaps, have seemed as if Socrates had actually demonstrated that justice is ἀδήλῳ and the source of happiness. But he himself regards the whole discussion as so much dialectics destructive of the definition and assertions of Thrasymachus. He has arrived at no definition for himself, and yet such a definition is essential. His conclusions have not come from a knowledge of the τι ἐστὶ of justice.
II. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROEM.

(Book II. to 369 B.)

44. Socrates thought discussion was over. It turned out to have been merely the prelude.

Glauccon was not satisfied. 'Socrates, you have not really convinced us that it is better to be just.' [357 A, B]

45. G. There are three species of good things (ἀγαθία), viz.:

(i) Things welcomed for themselves, without an eye to their consequences—harmless pleasures;

(ii) Things welcomed both for themselves and their consequences—e.g. health and sanity;

(iii) Things welcomed for their consequences, but irksome in themselves—e.g. money-making, practising or taking medicine &c.

In which class is justice?

S. I should think it is in the best class, the second.

G. Most people think otherwise. They place it in the third.

S. That is the position of Thrasymachus. But I must be a dunce. [357 B—358 A]

46. G. Thrasymachus gave in too soon. I want to hear what justice and injustice are in their essence, in the soul itself, apart from all question of rewards and results. [358 B]

Glauccon will therefore take up anew (ἐπανανεώσομαι) the argument of Thrasymachus.

He will maintain as uncompromisingly as possible

(1) the current allegation as to the nature and origin of justice:

(2) that it is practised unwillingly, as a necessity and not as a good:
(3) that such conduct is natural, since the life of the unjust is much to be preferred.

Not that Glaucn himself holds these views, but he wants to hear how Socrates will meet them. [358 C, D]

47. First, then, as to the nature and origin of justice.
To do injustice (ἀδικεῖν) is a good thing; to suffer it (ἀδικεῖσθαι), a bad thing.
But the harm in suffering it is greater in proportion than the advantage in committing it.

Hence, when committing injustice entails suffering it, men make covenants (ξυνθήκας) and laws (νόμον) to prevent both.

This preventing by law and covenant is called 'legality and justice' (νόμιμον τε καὶ δίκαιον).
Hence justice is a compromise between the best (doing injustice without impunity) and the worst (suffering injustice).

A man would be a madman to make such a compromise if he could do as he chose. [358 E—359 B]

48. Second, as to justice being practised from compulsion only.
If we gave a 'just' and an 'unjust' man a free hand, and then watched them, we should find that they would seek the same selfish objects.

Let us suppose each to have a 'ring of Gyges.' No one would be found to be above temptation. With full power to take, to slay, and so forth, there would be no 'just' man. For no one believes in justice as intrinsically preferable. The praise of justice is a piece of cant and mutual deception. [359 B—360 D]

49. Third, as to which is the preferable life of the two.
Let us assume the 'just' and the 'unjust' man to be perfect examples in their respective depart-ments (τέλεον ἐκάτερον ἔις τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἐπιτήθευμα), i.e. let the unjust man know how to work
his will, and never to be found out, but actually to secure the best possible reputation for justice;

and let the just man be absolutely immovable in his principles, but let him gain the worst possible reputation for injustice.

Our just man will be flogged, tortured and impaled, and will learn that it would be better to ‘seem’ than to ‘be’ (just).

Meanwhile the unjust man, who is wise after the Aeschylean standard in ‘being’ (unjust) without the ‘seeming,’ will do what he chooses and to whom he chooses. His ill-gotten gains will enable him to help friend and hurt foe, as well as to propitiate the gods with offerings. His life will therefore be the more prosperous and desirable. [360 E—362 C]

Socrates was preparing to reply, when Adeimantus joined in: ‘You surely don’t think the position has been adequately stated?’

S. Why not?

A. The most important point has not been made.

S. Then ‘A brother to the rescue!’—though I am overwhelmed already. [362 D]

50. A. Men praise justice and blame injustice. On what grounds? Parents and guardians preach justice, not for its own sake, but for its effects on the reputation. A good reputation brings the powers and advantages which Glaucon has described.

But these preachers of justice do not stop here with the effects of reputation (δοξα). They describe, after the manner of Homer and Hesiod, the blessings which heaven showers on the just. Musaeus and Eumolpus go further still; they reward the just with an afterlife of feasting and everlasting carouse. The unjust, on the contrary, in their afterlife, are buried in mud or made to carry water in a sieve; and, in the present world, fall into ill odour and meet with the penalties which Glaucon has imagined for his misjudged just man.
Such are the grounds on which justice is preached up and injustice preached down. [362 E—363 E]

51. Take another set of traditional statements. Whether in ordinary talk or in poetry, the chorus is that justice and temperance are fine things, but difficult and irksome, while injustice and intemperance are easy and pleasant, and only made disreputable by convention. Unjust deeds are admitted to be generally more profitable. Praise and compliments are given to the rich and powerful knave, while the honest man, if weak and poor, meets with contempt: laudatur et alget. [364 A]

Most astonishing are the views expressed about the gods and their relations to virtue. The gods, it is said, often reward men in life quite contrary to their deserts. Religious mendicants persuade rich men that, with a little expenditure of money, they can conjure the gods into granting indulgences and pardons for acts of injustice. [364 B, C]

For all these assertions the poets are quoted; Hesiod to shew that vice is easy and virtue hard, Homer to shew that the gods are bribeable, the Orphic bards to shew that expiatory rites will make the wrongdoer comfortable both in this life and in Hades. [364 C—E]

52. Here we have a number of statements which must affect the minds of intelligent youth. A young man asks 'Am I to entrench myself in justice or in deceit? Justice without its reputation is useless: injustice with a good reputation means a splendid life. All depends on appearance. I must therefore practise hypocrisy. It may be hard to escape detection, but faint heart never won anything great. I must make myself friends, and use persuasion where I can, and force where persuasion fails. Of course the gods are not amenable to deception or force. But how do we know if there are gods, and if they trouble about us? Only from the
same authorities who tell us they can be bribed. Let us, therefore, bribe them. True, there is the after-world; but it is admitted that certain rites and ceremonies will make us safe for that.' [365 A—366 B]

53. What argument is left to support a man of power and ability in choosing a life of justice? If the position we have represented is wrong, it is at least so natural that one may be forgiven for taking it up and acting upon it. Only a godlike nature or some deeper insight can save a man from such a view. [366 B—D]

54. The reason of this attitude lies in the fact which has prompted Glaucon and myself to press you in this way, Socrates. All of you who have preached justice, from the demigods down to our present prose and poetry, have praised it for its reputations, rewards and suchlike consequences. But what is it in itself, existing in the soul, unknown to gods and men? How is it essentially the greatest good, while injustice is the contrary?

If we had been enlightened as to that, we should have practised justice, and shrunk from injustice, spontaneously. [366 D—367 A]

55. I have represented the case as strongly as I could, not from my own convictions, but from the standpoint of Thrasy machus and others.

It remains for you, Socrates, to strip justice of all its accidentals and exterior consequences, and to shew us what it is and what it does, in and by itself, perceived or unperceived, in the soul of its possessor. How and why is it a good thing, when so considered? [367 A—E]

56. Socrates greatly admires the gifted brothers. They must have remarkable turns of mind if they can speak so forcibly against justice and yet think otherwise in their hearts. Socrates recognises the difficulty,
For his own part he hardly knows what to do, but he cannot stand by and see Justice maligned. [367 E—368 C]

One way out of the difficulty occurs to him. If we were bidden to read small writing at a distance and our sight was indifferent, we should welcome the hint that the same writing existed else-where in a larger form and on a larger ground, and that we could first read the latter and then compare it with the former.

So in a state (πόλις) justice exists on a larger scale and in a more distinguishable shape.

Suppose, therefore, that we try to see justice coming into existence while a state is coming into existence? [368 D—369 B]

This proceeding is agreed to, and from this point the construction of the ideal πόλις begins.

III. THE COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC.

RELATION OF THE FIRST BOOK AND OF THE WHOLE PROEM TO THE REMAINDER.

57. Probably every reader who has made himself conversant with both the matter and the style of the dialogues of Plato is struck with a peculiar phenomenon in the case of the Republic. It is that, while the work as a whole is made to rise out of matter discussed in the first book, and takes as a text the occurrence of a disputation on justice, the first book itself is separable from the rest as an entirely independent dialogue. In other words, if all the remaining books had been lost, the first book of the Republic would have been accepted as a complete and typical dialogue in Plato’s earlier or Socratic vein. No sequel would have been looked for, and, though it could not then have borne the name of the Republic, it might well have borne that of the Thrasymachus, with Justice as its subject-matter. The title ὘ρασύμαχος (ἡ περὶ
THE COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC. lxxiii

δικαίου) would have been as satisfactory a heading as Εὐθύφρων (ἡ περὶ ὀσίου) and the like.

58. That the dialogue would be occupied with purely destructive criticism and end with a confession of ignorance, would place it along with the Lysis, Charmides, Laches and other short pieces of Plato's Socratic period. The 'mimic' or dramatic setting, the reitered Socratic 'irony,' the malicious delineation of the sophist, the delight in dialectics for dialectics' sake, the logical fallacies and sophisms in which the Socratic dialectic itself indulges, together with the absence of any allusion to the characteristic elements of the later philosophy of Plato (such as the doctrine of 'ideas' and of anamnésis) and the complete absence of anything didactic or dogmatic, go to mark this book as composed at the same stage of development and in the same disposition as the earliest dialogues. In the later books the dramatic environment of the feast of Bendis and the 'going out to talk to the young men' are quite forgotten, the disputation becomes a discourse, and Socrates is metaphysical and expository in the most mature manner of the emancipated Plato.

59. With students of Plato these considerations of manner, method and result could not count for little even if they stood alone. They are too strongly in evidence, thrusting themselves upon the reader without the necessity of any of that detective work in which the critic sometimes unhappily confounds himself while testing dates and authenticities. But, as has been indicated, they do not stand alone. Even if we set aside these distinguishing marks of early views and early treatment in the first book, there remains the remarkable fact above-mentioned, that it is cleanly separable, as no portion of any other Platonic work is separable. It is true that other dialogues sometimes appear to blend the treatment of two different subjects, so that it becomes difficult to decide which is the real theme. But in no case can a portion be cut off at such and such a page and
left to exist as a complete dialogue in itself. Yet this can be done in the Republic.

60. The next observation which naturally occurs to the reader as he reviews the Republic is that later reference to the first book practically ceases with the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second. They think Thrasymachus 'gave in too soon,' and they re-state his position, though more strongly. This done, Socrates begins the construction of the ideal ποιμή, and the whole of the previous matter is so little involved in the eight-and-a-half books which are to come, that critics, endeavouring to establish a close organic unity in the whole work, have been at a loss to discover more than one or two places where there seems to be a faint reminiscence of something said in this earlier portion.

61. Arguments based upon linguistic data, though they can hardly be conclusive, are not without great value. Elaborate attempts have been made to determine the chronological order of the Platonic dialogues by criteria of language, in the departments of both words and their arrangements, in the avoidance of hiatus &c. Observations have been made upon changes which apparently came over the style of Plato in the course of years, and upon the relative frequency at different periods of one class of words and phrases as compared with another class, e.g. of τοίνυν as compared with μέντοι, καθάπερ as compared with ὁσπερ &c. For the application of these principles of 'stylometry' the student may be referred to Cap. III. (pp. 64—193) of the 'Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic' by W. Lutoslawski, where typical statistics are illustrated with a more scientific spirit and method than has usually been the case in this class of investigations. Of the Republic the writer says that 'the earlier part has always fewer peculiarities of later style,' and of the first book in particular that it is marked 'by a surprisingly early style, having less than half as many peculiarities of later style as the first sixteen pages of the fifth book, even fewer than the Laches,
which is inferior in size.' When, however, he proceeds to say that the first book of the Republic 'must have been revised, emended and corrected in order to be absorbed into the larger work' he is travelling beyond the record, inasmuch as there is absolutely nothing in the book as it stands to indicate that it need ever have had any other shape in any one expression. The later portions are linked to the first by the speeches of Glauccon and Adeimantus, but nothing whatever is done to adapt the first book to what is coming or to absorb it in any larger scope.

62. It thus appears that the first book, approached whether from the point of view of (a) the philosophy, (b) the handling, or (c) the language, implies a composition both early and independent. The internal evidence for this view is complete in every particular.

63. External evidence of a trustworthy character is lacking. Aulus Gellius, indeed (xiv. 3), gives the story that 'Xenophon indito illi operi Platonis, quod de optimo statu reipublicae civitatisque administranda scriptum est, lectis ex eo duobus fere libris, qui primi in vulgus exierant, opposuit contra conscriptuque diversum regiae administrationis genus, quod Παιδείας Κύρου inscriptum est.'

The story is not likely to be true in any case; but at least the 'two books' could not have been the same as our first two books, since they obviously included the treatment of education. Moreover our division of the books did not come from Plato, but from the Alexandrians. Even if we give the utmost credit to the story, it would prove no more than that the magnum opus peri πολιτείας came out in sections. It has no bearing upon the question whether the first book may not have had an independent existence and title before it was made introductory to the magnum opus.

More importance on the other side might be attached to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of the Cleitophon. This was
INTRODUCTION.

evidently written after the appearance of the first book of the Republic, and from a dissatisfaction with it. Thus (410 Α.-Β) καὶ εἶπές μοι δικαιοσύνης εἶναι τοῦς μὲν ἔχθρους βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν· ὑστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα κ.τ.λ., cf. 407 D, and the reference to Thrasymachus (410 C). In the same piece (409 D) the words ἀπεκρίνατο τις...τῶν σων ἑταίρων, ὅς δὲ κομψότατα ἐδοξέω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶ ὅ τις δικαιοσύνης ἰδιων ἔργον, ὅ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμᾶς, φιλίαν εὖ ταῖς πόλεσι ποιεῖν may allude to the Platonic notion, already developing, that justice might best be investigated in a state. But, if the portion of the Republic dealing with the question of justice and the state had been actually published, it is hard to believe that the Cleitophon, by whomsoever composed, would have passed it over so lightly, or have contained the same reproaches against Socratic results. One may hazard the conjecture that the Cleitophon was written by an inferior spirit, contemporary with Plato, who had read the Socratic dialogue (perhaps called Ἐρασύμαχος) which is now Book I. of the Republic, and who chooses Cleitophon, as the supporter of Thrasymachus, for his mouthpiece in expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome of the disputation. The general criticism of Athenians may have been similar, and Plato, who was elaborating and enunciating in lectures his notion of justice and the state (and who may be the very ἑταίρος referred to), thereupon completed the larger work as we have it.

64. It seems difficult, after pondering the whole work, to avoid the conclusions that—

(i) The first book was originally an independent Socratic dialogue of the exercitatory (γυμναστικός) division of the inquiring (ζητητικός) type upon an ethical subject (in this case, Justice), and ending in the usual deadlock.

(ii) At a later period Plato, having formulated more positive opinions, and having recognised how great and natural was the logical difficulty of preferring justice on
abstract grounds, was dissatisfied with the apparent futility of the discussion.

(iii) He thereupon took up the early dialogue, expressed through the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus both his own and the popular dissatisfaction, and set himself to arrive at something positive.

(iv) The speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus are a very dexterous and artistic device for re-opening the case and introducing his essay.

(v) Apart from his inquiries into justice pure and simple, Plato had also developed views as to an ideal commonwealth, and seizes the opportunity of 'watching justice growing in a growing state' to ventilate those views at great length.

(vi) Thus the consideration of the ideal state comes to preponderate in the work, and, whereas the first book was wholly concerned with τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν (354 B), and the later books nominally so, the dialogue as a whole comes to be concerned apparently with a 'commonwealth,' and so earns the name Πολιτεία.

(vii) The work, constructed into a unity long after the proem, was probably composed in different parts at different times, Books v.—vii. being chronologically the last.

IV. THE TEXT.

65. The mss of our portion of the Republic are numerous. Chief among them stands

A (or Par. Α), a ms of the 9th century now in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. The first hand is denoted by Α¹, that of the corrector (διορθωτής) by Α².

The representative of a second class is

Π (or Ven. Π), a ms of the 12th century in the library of St Mark at Venice. Π² denotes corrections by a somewhat later hand.
Typical of a third class is

M, a ms of the 12th or 13th century in the Malatestan library at Cesena.

Others of the mss more frequently quoted are K and q, 'edited' or 'learned' copies related to Π, and Ε, an 'edited' or 'learned' copy cognate to M.

Of these mss A is indisputably the best, but is far from invariably sound.

66. The present text follows A as closely as possible. Apart from one or two changes of accent in the case of pronouns which seem to demand emphasis (e.g. 329 E ἤγεισθαι σὲ for ἤγεισθαι σὲ of mss and 338 B οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ for οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ), one or two modifications of the punctuation (e.g. 329 c, 364 c, 368 d), which involve new views of the construction, and the substitution of true orthographies for those which are incorrect in mss, the new elements introduced for the first time here are in the following much-vexed passages—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSS.</th>
<th>THIS TEXT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>330 B</td>
<td>&quot;ἡ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποί᾽ ἐπεκτήσάμην, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις κ.τ.λ.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;ἡ ἐπεκτήσω; &lt;‘Ο&gt;ποί᾽ ἐπεκτήσαμην, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μέσος τις κ.τ.λ.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330 E</td>
<td>καὶ αὐτὸς ἦτοι ύπὸ τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείας ἦ καὶ ὡσπερ ἣδη ἐγγυτέρω ὄν τῶν ἐκεὶ μάλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ᾽ οὖν κ.τ.λ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>..........................................................καὶ ὡσπερ &lt;εἰ&gt; ἥδη ..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337 E</td>
<td>τῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἐφην ἐγὼ...τις ἀποκρίνατο πρωτὸν μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἐπείτα, εἰ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ ἐιν κ.τ.λ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.......................................................... .......................................................... ..........................................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE TEXT.

MSS.

351 E—352 A

οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινα φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἶον, ὃ ἄν ἐγγένηται, ...πρώτον μὲν ἄδυνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ (ποιεῖν Π) πράττειν κ.τ.λ.

358 E

περὶ τούτου ἄκονε, τί ὁν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη
[tί οἶον τε Π, τί οἶονται qβ1.]

365 D

οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσίν ἡ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λαθώνειν.
[tί καὶ ἡμῖν...; Σ, οὐδὲ ἡμῖν qβ1, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον D]

In 351 B—C [σοφία] is bracketed as the easiest means of restoring construction with sense. In 333 E ἄλθειν is obelised in order to indicate the probable seat of error.

Of emendations previously made it has seemed well to incorporate Stallbaum's bracketing of [ἐστι] in 329 D, Bekker's τοῦτοσι in 330 B, provisionally Bekker's οἶον γε σὺ in 336 E, Madvig's punctuation in 339 E, φαίμεν from Stephanus in 352 E, Hermann's bracketing of Γόγου in 359 C, and <μὲν> from Muretus in 366 A.

On the other hand τῷ δικαίῳ has been retained in 363 A.

One or two suggestions are offered for what they are worth in the footnotes to 328 C (οὗ δῆ), 336 E, 341 D, 346 B (<τοῦ> πλεῖν), 359 D—E (<περικείσθαι>), 366 E &c. In 333 E I find that ἄλθειν has been anticipated by Salvini,
INTRODUCTION.

CHIEF SIGNS OR ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES OR TEXT.

A¹, Π¹ &c. = the first hand of A, Π &c.
A², Π² &c. = the second hand of A, Π &c.
A corr., Π corr. = a correction in A, Π.
A +, Π +, &c. = A, Π &c. supported by other ms evidence.
mg. or marg. = a reading recorded in the margin.
om. = omitted by the ms in question.
ej. = ejected by the editor in question.
vulg. = the common reading in texts not further specified.
cett. = the reading in texts other than that specified.
[    ] enclosing words of the mss which were probably not written by Plato.
<    > enclosing words not in the mss which should probably be supplied.
* marking a new reading other than the above.
† marking a reading of the mss which probably still requires emendation.
L. and S. = Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

Α.

I. Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενος τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἀμα τῇν ἑορτήν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποίησον, ἀτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοιτες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπῆ ἐδοξεῖν εἰναι, οὐ μέν- τοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἂν οἱ Ὁράκες ἐπεμπων. προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῆμεν πρὸς τὸ Βάστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὑμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλον ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παίδα περιμεῖναι ἐκ κελεύσαι. καὶ μου ὀπίσθεν ὁ πᾶς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ἡμᾶς, ἐφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφη τε καὶ ἥρομην ὅποι τοῦτος εἶν. Οὕτως, ἐφη, ὀπίσθεν προσέρχεται ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦ- μεν, ἡ δ’ ὦς ὁ Γλαύκων. καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὑστερον ὦ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος Σ

327 Α. ποιήσον. For the orthography of ποιεῖν, ποιεῖν see Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 16 a). Since comedy says indifferently ποιεῖν, ποιεῖν, and since the omission of ι before η can hardly have been more than optional, we gain nothing by writing ποῃσούν.

PL. REP.
ἀδελφός καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικέιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς, ὃς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. οὐν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, "Ωσκρατεῖ, δοκεῖτε μοι πρὸς ἀστυ ὀρμήσαί ὀς ἀπιόντες. Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἡ τούηντοὺς, ἐφή, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ’ αὐτοῦ. Ὅκουν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλειπεται ὁ ἦν πείσωμεν ἡμᾶς, ὃς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφείναι; Ἡ καὶ δύνασθ’ ἄν, ἢ δ’ ὃς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκοουσμένων, οὔτω διανοεῖσθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ἄρα γε, ἢ δ’ ὃς, οὐδ’ ἵστε ὅτι λαμπτάς ἐσται πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀφ’ ἵππων τῇ θεῷ; Ἄφ’ ἵππων; ἢν δ’ ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπτάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἄλληλαις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ὦ πῶς λέγεις; Οὔτος, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος· καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἢν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι. ἔξε- αναστηρόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δείπνον καὶ τὴν παννυ- χίδα θεασόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσόμεθα τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων B αὐτόθι καὶ διάλεξόμεθα. ἄλλα μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις ποιεῖτε. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι. Ἁλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, οὔτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

Π. Ἡμεν οὖν οἶκαδε εῖς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Δυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθυδήμον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφοὺς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Καλχηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανία καὶ

327 C. ὃς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς A+M+. ὃς om. Π+. See note. The omission was probably quite accidental.

οὐκοῦν ms. oikôn (nonne) is preferable; ergo is out of place.

328 B. Καλχηδόνιον A correctly. See note. Χαλκηδόνιον Π+. The mistake Καρχηδόνιον M+ is not rare.
Κλειστοφώντα τὸν 'Αριστωνύμου· ἦν δὲ ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι ἐδοξεῖν εἶναι· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ξειράκη αὐτόν. καθήστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεξόμεθα οὖν παρ’ αὐτόν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ. εὐθὺς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἱστάζετό τε καὶ εἰπεῖν, 'Ο Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦ τοῦ ῥαδίου πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σὲ ἔδει δεύρο ἱέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ἴμεν· νῦν δὲ σε χρῆ πυκνὸτερον δεύρο ἱέναι· ὡς εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε, ὡς οἳ αὖ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δε τοῖς νεανίασι ἐξυνισθι καὶ δεύρο παρ’ ἡμᾶς.

Χαρματίδην Π+. The wrong omission and insertion of ν (represented by a stroke) are both common. In old Attic vase-inscriptions the nasal is sometimes not written at all before explosives (e.g. 'Αταλάτη, Τιμάδρα), v. Meisterhans § 31. 2.

Παιανία mss. I have replaced the proper form Παιανία. Cf. Meisterhans § 55 b) 9.


οὐδὲ θαμίζεις mss. οὐ δὲ J. and C. οὐτὶ Ast. If any change were required οὐ δὲ would be easiest: but see note.


οὐδὲν ἂν σὲ ἔδει mss. But the pronoun is opposed to ἐγὼ. The accents of mss carry little authority.

328 D. νεανίας Α+Μ+. νεανίσκοις Π+ and Stobaeus (Serm. cxii. p. 589) perhaps rightly.
φοίτα ὃς παρὰ φιλοὺς τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μήν, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος 
Ε τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι χρῆναι 
παρ' αὐτῶν πυθάνεσθαι, ὅστερ τινὰ ὀδὸν προελη-
νθότων, ἥν καὶ ἡμᾶς ίσως δεήσῃ πορεύεσθαι, ποία 
τίς ἔστιν, τραχεία καὶ χαλεπή, ἥ ράδια καὶ εὐπορος· 
καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, ὃ τί σοι φαίνεται 
τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἢδη εἰ τῆς ἥλικίας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ 
γῆρας οὐδόφο φασὶν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον 
χαλεπῶν τοῦ βίου, ἥ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἔξαγγέλλεις;

III. 'Εγώ σοι, ἔφη, νὴ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὃ Ὁσκρατεῖς,
329 οἶον γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθα 
tines εἰς ταύτο παραπλησίαν ἥλικίαν ἔχοντες, δια-
σφύζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ οὖν πλείστοι 
ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρωνται ἔννοιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι 
ἡδουδὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε 
tάφροδισία καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ ἐως ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλ' 
ἀττα ὃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς 
μεγάλων τυχῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὐ 
ζώντες,

χαίρω γε Π+ Stob. (l. c.). γε ομ. Α+Μ+. χαίρω τε some 
Florentine copies, by a common error (though τε might look 
forward to καὶ δὴ καὶ).

328 Β. πότερον before τραχεία interpol. qβ1. See note.
δ τί σοι mss. Qu. δ τί σοι?
αὐτὸς ἑξαγγέλλεις Α2.

329 Α. διασφύζοντες. The i-subscript is correct. Meisterhans 
§ 63. 26. Its omission in inscriptions is late.

ἔννοιόντες mss. ἔννοιόντες Ast, Stallbaum &c. But the 'birds of a 
feather flock together.'

πότους τε καὶ ἐως ἡλικίας Π+, perhaps not so well, inasmuch as 
there are three terms depending on the second περὶ. Yet τε may 
join πότους καὶ ἐως ἡλικίας into one compact notion to be set against the 
broader ἄλλ' ἀττα: i.e. περὶ τε τάφροδισία καὶ περὶ {πότους τε καὶ ἐως ἡλικίας 
καὶ ἄλλ' ἀττα.
νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ξώντες. ἐνιοῦ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκεῖων Β προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γῆρως ὁδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφῖσιν αἰτίων. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὕτωι οὐ τὸ αἰτίων αἰτιάσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τούτῳ αἰτίων, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη ἑνεκά γε γῆρως καὶ οἱ ἀλλοὶ πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἥλικιας. νῦν δὲ ἔγογξε ἦδη ἐντεύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινός, Πώς, ἔφη, ὡς Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς ζάφροδίσια; ἐτι οἶδος τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὦς, Ἐὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὥς ἀνθρωπε, ἀσμενεστάτα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυπτῶντα τῶν καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγόν. εὐ οὐν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκείνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἢττον. παντάπαισι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιοῦτων ἐν τῷ γῆρα πολλῆς εἰρήνης ἑγνυται καὶ ἐλευθερία. ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσιν, παντάπαισιν τὸ τού Σοφοκλέους ἑγνυται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν.
[ἔστι] καὶ μανομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἀν μὲν γὰρ κόσμοι καὶ εὐκολοὶ ὄσιν, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστίν ἐπίτονον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ γῆρας, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

IV. Καὶ ἐγώ ἀγαθεῖς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἰπον· Ὁ Κέφαλε, οἴμαι σου τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγης, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤγείσθαι σε ῥαδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτηθαί· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὡσον ούνονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεομοστοκλέους εύ ἔχει, ὅς τὸ Σεριφίω λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐν δ' 330 αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖν, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὔτ' ἄν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὁν ὅνομαστός ἐγένετο οὔτ' ἐκείνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὐ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ' ἄν ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάνυ τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι, οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκολός ποτ' ἄν εαυτῷ γένοιτο. Πότερον δὲ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Κέφαλε,
ον κέκτησαι τα πλειω παρελαβεσ η επεκτησω; "Ο ποι επεκτησάμην, έφη, ο Σωκρατες, μεσος της β γέγονα χρήματιστη σου τε πάππου και του πατρός. ο μεν γαρ πάππος τε και ομούνυμος εμοι σχεδον τι δοσιν εγω των ουσιαν κέκτημαι παραλαβων πολλακις τοσαυτην εποίησεν, Λυσανιας δε ο πατηρ ετι ελαττω αυτην εποίησε της των ουσισ εγω δε αγαπω, έδω μη ελαττω καταλιπων τουτοισι, αλλα βραχεϊ γε τιν πλειω η παρελαβον. Ου τοι ένεκα ηρομην, ήν δ' εγω, ητι μοι έδοξας ου σφοδρα αγαπαν τα χρηματα. ζ τουτο δε ποιουσιν ως το τολυ οι αν μη αυτοι κτη- σωνται οι δε κτησάμενοι διπλη ή οι αλλοι ασπα- ζονται αυτα. ωσπερ γαρ οι ποιηται τα αυτων ποιηματα και οι πατερες τους παιδας αγαπαοιν, ταυτη τε δη και οι χρηματισαμενοι περι τα χρηματα σπουδαζουσιν ως εργον έαυτων, και κατα την χρελαυ, ήπερ οι αλλοι. χαλεποι ουν και ευγγενεσθαι εισιν, ουδεν εθελοντες επαινειν αλλη η του πλουτον. 'Αλη- θη, έφη, λέγεις.

πλεω Α+. But ει is required before the long vowel. Meisterhans § 58. 17.

330 B. ποι" Π2+. ποι vulg. (with question at Σωκρατες). For the conjecture in the text see note.

Λυσανιας mss. Λυσιας van Prinsterer.
τουτωι Bekker. τουτωισιν mss.
ου τοι ένεκα κ.τ.λ. B. ουτοι Π (rec. Castellani). ουτοι Α+. The idiom was not understood.

330 C. τα αυτων ποιηματα Α, which often has the breathing wrong in the reflexive (Campbell).

ταυτη τε δη...καλ κατα την χρελαυ Α+ Π+, but for some reason the sense was missed at an early date. Hence καλ ου κατα την χρελαυ some inferior mss and Ficinus. These mss keep τε, however.

ήπερ Α+ for ηπερ.
D  V. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι
tοσόνυπε εἰπτε· τὶ μέγιστον οἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι
tοῦ πολλῆς οὐσίαν κεκτήσθαι; Ὁ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὅσως οὐκ
ἀν πολλοὺς πείσαμι λέγων. εὐ γὰρ ἱσθι, ἐφι, ὡ
Σῶκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τὸς ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι
tελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ
ἀν ἐμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήγη. οἰ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι
περὶ τῶν ἐν Ὄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ
ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ
Ε στρέψοσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὅσιν, καὶ
αὐτὸς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὡσπερ
<εἰ> ἡδὴ ἐγγυντέρω ὅν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθόρα
αὐτά, ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται
καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἡδὴ καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἰ τινὰ τι ἡδίκηκεν.
ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἐαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδική-
ματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν, ὡσπερ οἱ παϊδεῖς, θαμά
ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ξῆ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος.

331 τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἐαυτῷ ἀδικον ἐξυπερδότε ἡδεῖα ἐλπίς ἃεὶ
πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος
λέγει. χαριέντως γὰρ τοι, τοῦτοτέ ἐκεῖνος
ἐπεν, ὅτι δὲ ἄν δικαίως καὶ ὅσιως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ,
γλυκεῖα οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος
συνασμεί ἐλπίς, ᾧ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολυ-
στροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾶ. εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμα-
στῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἔγογγο τίθημι τὴν
tῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πλείστου ἄξιαν εἶναι, οὐ τι

330 Ε. ὡσπερ ἡδὴ mss. See note. Either ἐσπερ <εἰ> ἡδὴ
or ὡσπερ εἰ δὴ will restore grammar and sense; but ἡδὴ should be
retained.

ἡδίκηκεν A. ἡδίκηκεν Π+ and Justin Martyr (Cohort. ad Gr.
26). But the perfect better expresses the abiding guilt.
331 A. οὐτοί for οὔ τι appears in inferior copies. Cf. 330 Α.
Stobaeus (Serm. xcii. p. 512) has οὗτοι τοῦ.
παντὶ ἄνδρι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἀκοντᾶ ἐξαπατήσαι ἤ ψεύδοται, μηδὲ αὐ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἄνθρώπῳ χρῆματα ἐπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρη-μάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλας· ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἐγωγε θείνη ἢν εἰς τοῦτο ἄνδρι νοῦν ἔχουτι, ὁ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι. Παγκάλως, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὁ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ’ αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἢ τὸ τὰ παρὰ του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐστίν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄδικως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πάς ὁ που εἴποι, εἰ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλον ἄνδρος σωφρονοῦντος ὁπλα, εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαίτοι, ὅτι οὔτε χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἢν εἰή ὁ ἀποδιδός, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχουτα πάντα ἐθέλων τάληθη λέγειν. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ δ’ ἀρα οὕτως ὡς ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἢν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἰπέρ γε τις χρή Σιμωνίδη πείθεσθαι. Καὶ μεντοι, ἐφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ύμῖν τὸν λόγον· δει γὰρ με ἦδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθήναι. Οὐκόνυν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σὸν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ’ ὃς γελάσας· καὶ ἀμα ἤει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

331 B. ἀλλὰ γε ἐν μσς. ἀλλὰ ἐν γε Stob. (l. c.). See note.
331 C. ἀπαιτοῖ μς. v. sup. 330 a (note).
331 D. οὐκοῦν, ἐφην ἐγὼ Σ. ἐφη ἐγὼ Ἄ + Π + Μ+. The stroke — for ν must have been very early omitted by accident. Adam, however, reads οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, ἐγὼ ὁ Πολέμαρχος..., which may very well be right.
VI. Λέγει δὴ, εἶπον ἑγὼ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φης τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὅρθως λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; "Ὅτι, ἥ δ' ὦς, τὸ τὰ ὁφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δικαιὸν ἔστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἐμοίγε καλῶς λέγειν. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἥν δ' ἑγὼ, Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ βάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἄνηρ· τούτῳ μέντοι ὃ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὃ Πολέμαρχε, ἵσως γυνώσκεις, ἔγω δὲ ἄγνωσι. δῆλων γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὁτροῦν μὴ σωφρόνοις ἀπαίτούντι.

332 ἀποδίδοναι· καίτοι γε ὁφειλόμενον ποὺ ἐστὶν τοῦτο, ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἥ γὰρ; Ναι. 'Αποδοτέον δὲ γε οὐδ' ὀπωστειών τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαίτοη; 'Αληθῆ, ἥ δ' ὦς. 'Αλλο δὴ τι ἥ το τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐοικέν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὁφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδίδοναι. 'Αλλο μέντοι ἧν Δι', ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἶεται ὁφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δράν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. Μανθάνω, ἥν δ' ἑγὼ· ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὁφειλόμενα ἀποδίδοσιν, ὃς ἄν τῷ χρυσίον

Β ἀποδῷ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἥ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ οὕσω ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδοῦσι· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φης τὸν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέου, ὃ τι ἄν τύχῃ ὁφειλόμενον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὁφείλεται αὐτοῖς. ὁφείλεται δὲ γε, οἴμαι, παρὰ γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

VII. 'Ἡνίξατο ἀρα, ἥν δ' ἑγώ, ὡς ἐοικέν, ὁ

331 Ε. ἀνὴρ A+Π+. ὁ ἀνήρ the old texts (qu. with what authority?). ἀνὴρ Stallbaum. Cf. Phaedr. 266 c, where the answer βασιλεὺς μὲν ἄνδρες appears in mss as ἄνδρες. See note, however.

332 Α. ἀπαίτοι mss. See 330 A note.
Σιμωνίδης ποιητικός τὸ δίκαιον ὁ εἶη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ός φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ Σ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὄνομαςεν ὕφειλόμενον. Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. Ὡ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο. Ὡ Σιμωνίδη, ἥ τίσιν οὖν τὶ ἀποδιδοῦσα ὕφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἰατρικῆς καλεῖται; τί ἄν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀπο-κρίνασθαι; Δήλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σῶμαςιν φάρμακα τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσιν τὶ ἀποδιδοῦσα ὕφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικῆς καλεῖ-ται; Ἡ τοῖς ὤψιν τὰ ἵδύσματα. Εἶεν· ὡς οὖν δὴ τίσιν τὶ ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἤν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡς Σῶκρατες, τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἔχθροις ὕφελιας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα. Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἀρα εὗ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἔχθροις κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατῶτατος κάμνουτας φίλους εὗ ποιεῖν καὶ ἔχθροις κακῶς πρὸς νόσουν καὶ ὑγίειαν; Ἰατρός. Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς Εθαλάττης κίνδυνον; Κυβερνήτης. Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατῶτατος φίλους ὕφελεῖν καὶ ἔχθροις βλάπτειν; Ἐν τῷ προσπολε-
μείν καὶ [ἐν τῷ] ἐξωμαχεῖν, ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ. Εἶπεν· μὴ κάμνουντι γε μὴν, ὁ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρός ἄχρηστος. Ἀληθῆ. Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. Ναί. Ἀρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος; Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. Χρήσιμον ἀρὰ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνῃ; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Πρός γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική; Ναί. Πρός γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἶμαι, φαῖς κτῆσιν. Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαῖς ἄν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἐνυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνύματα, ἢ τι Β ἄλλο; Κοινωνύματα δὴτα. Ἀρ’ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεπτῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεπτευτικός; Ὁ πεπτευτικός. Ἀλλ’ εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ’ εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὦσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων; Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ. Πλὴν γ’ ἱσως, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δὲν ἀργυρίου

C κοινῆ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἢππον. τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἰστικός· ἢ γάρ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυτηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης. Ἐοικεν. Ὁταν οὖν τί δὲν ἀργυρίῳ ἡ χρυσίω κοινῆ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων; Ὁταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὁταν ἀρὰ ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον, τότε Δ χρῆσιμος ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνη; Κινδυνεύει. Καὶ

332 Ε. καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν Μ+. καὶ ἐν τῷ ξυμμαχεῖν Α+Π+. See note. καὶ ἐν should be κἂν in any case.
δή δρέπανον δεή φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἰδία. δότω ἐπὶ χρήσθαι, ἡ ἀμπελομενή; Φαίνεται. Φήσε τε καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν δότω δεή φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρήσθαι, χρήσιμον εἴναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, δότω δὲ χρήσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μονικὴν; 'Ανάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἄχρηστι χρήσιμος; Κιν- 

dυνεύει. 

VIII. Οὐκ ἄν οὖν, ὥ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον Ε ἐη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ἄν τυγχάνει. τὸ δὲ σκεψόμεθα. ἀρ' οὖν ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὕτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. ἹΑρ' οὖν καὶ νόσου ὁστὶς δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ ἡλαθεῖν, ὀὕτος δεινότατος ἐμποίησαι; "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ὄλλα μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φυλάξ ἀγαθός, ὀστερ καὶ τὰ 334

333 δ. καὶ δότω δὴ...δέων Ἄ + (shewing that the best may err). 
μηδέν χρήσθαι Ἄ + Ἄ2. μὴ χρήσθαι Ἄ1 + by a slight negligence. 
The former is more forcible. 

333 ε. ὁνκοῦν, ὥ φίλε, Ἄ + Ἄ + Ἡ +. ὥκ καὶ οὖν Ἴ, and an early hand in marg. Ἄ. The accidental omission of ἄν in connexion with οὖν, and its confusion with that word, are frequent. 
χρήσιμον ὄν mss. Baiter's χρήσιμον μόνον ὄν is bad, both for its cacophony and the misplacement of μόνον. See note. 
δωτις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν mss, except that Ὕβι have φ. καὶ μὴ παθεῖν (an evident correction). Schneider, Stallbaum &c. read φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν...ἐμποίησας. See note. The place has evidently suffered unusual tampering, probably through some rare word such as Plato affects (cf. next note and inf. 345 c, and the medical word ἔξαυτος Phaedr. 244 ε). ἄμμωθεῖν might be suggested, but καὶ ἀλθεῖν (a suggestion already made by Salvini) is preferable. ἀλθεῖν ('heal') is, in its cognates at least, a word of medical writers, and stands to ἀλθίσκω as ἑρεῖν, ὅφλεῖν to their presents.
τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. "Οτον τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τοῦτον καὶ φωρ δεινὸς. "Εοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινὸς. Ὡς γούν ὁ λόγος, ἐφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὃς ἐοικεν, ἀναπέφανται καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ἑκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον

B Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὀρκφ τε. ἐοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' ὁμήρου καὶ κατὰ Σμωνίδην κλεπτικὴ τις εἶναι, ἐπὶ ὁφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβη τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὗτος ἔλεγες; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἐφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἐγώγη ὁ τι ἔλεγον; τοῦτο μέντοι ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ἐτι, ὁφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ

c τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστῳ χρήστοις εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἀν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἐφη, οὐς ἄν τις ἡγήται χρήστοις, φίλειν, οὐς δ' ἂν ποιη- ροὺς, μισεῖν. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώ- ποι περὶ τούτῳ, ὡστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρήστοις εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον; Ἀμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτως ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλ' ὀμως δίκαιον

334 B. κεκράσθαι (Π cor. Θ) for κεκάσθαι is instructive as to the fate of rare words.

ωφελία: v. sup. 332 d.

ωφελεῖ...βλάπτει (a piece of editing) Π+

334 C. φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι Α+Π+Μ+. εἶναι om. Θ. Φ. τ. In view of the second εἶναι the sentence would be more elegant without it. There may, however, be emphasis, 'do you say they are...?'
πολιτείας A.

τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὥφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ δὸ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν. Φαίνεται. Ἦλλα μὴν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἱ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. Ἦλληθη. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἐοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἁρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὥφελεῖν. Οὕτως ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. Πολλοῖς ἁρα, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ξυμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν. Εἰ πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ εἰσίν· τοὺς δὲ ἔχθρους ὥφελεῖν· ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ· καὶ οὕτως ἔροιμεν αὐτὸ τοῦναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω ξυμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἔχθρον θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὁ Πολέμαρχε; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μεταθώμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον; τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ 335 εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἔχθρον δὲ ἢ αὐτή θέσις. Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς οἰκε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἔχθρος δὲ ὁ πονηρός. Ναὶ. Κελεύεις δὴ ἤμας προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εἰς ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἔχθρον κακῶς, νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὡς δέ λέγειν, ὅτι ἐστιν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εἰς ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἔχθρον κακῶν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

334 Ε. καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν μss. τὸν om. Ast, Bremini &c.
See note.

335 Α. ἀλλο interpol. before προσθείναι in one or two inferior copies. Cf. inf. 347 Β.
IX. ἔστιν ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, δικαίου ἀνδρός βλάπτειν καὶ ὄντων ἄνθρωπων; Καὶ πάνω γε, ἔφη, τούς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ὕπποι βελτίους ἄρεισος γίγνονται; Χείρος, ἂρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ὕπποι; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ὕπποι. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χεῖρος γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἄλλο γε, εἰς τὴν τῶν ὕπποι ἀρετὴν; Ἀνάγκη.

Γ' Ἀνθρώποις δε, ὁ ἐταίρε, μὴ οὐτω φῶμεν βλαπτομένοις εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν ἀρετὴν χείρος γίγνεσθαι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεῖα ἀρετὴ; Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὁ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικοτέρους γίγνεσθαι. Ἐοικεν. Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμοιόσους δύνανται ποιεῖν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοι ἀφίπποις; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην

Δ' ἀρετῆ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὶς; Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος, οἴμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίον. Ναι. Οὔδε ξηρότητος υγραίνει, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίον. Πάνω γε. Οὔδε δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίον. Φαίνεται. Ὅ δὲ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς; Πάνω γε. Οὔκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὁ Πολεμαρχε, οὔτε φιλον οὔτ' ἀλλον οὐδένα, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίον, τοῦ ἀδίκου. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ

Ε' λέγειν, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὁφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι φησίν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τούτῳ δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὁφείλεσθαι

335 D. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον Α+Π+. ἔργον βλάπτειν β. ἔργον om. M. But, after the break caused by the last question and in summing up, ἔργον is better expressed (in the absence of ἔστι).
παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλους ὁφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταύτα εἰπὼν: οὐ γὰρ ἄληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῖν γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἦμιν ἐφάνη ὅν βλάπτετοι. Συγχώρω, ἦ δὲ ὦς. Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρήκειν ἢ τιν' ἀλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν; 'Εγὼ γοῦν, ἐφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. 'Αλλ' οἰσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι 336 δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὁφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτετο; Τίνος; ἐφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἡ Περδίκκου ἡ Ξέρξου ἡ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἡ τινος ἀλλον μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός. 'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Εἰεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὅν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἄν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίνει εἶναι;

X. Καὶ ὁ Ὑθρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ δια-Β λεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ όρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἑπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύτετο βουλομένων διακούσαι τοῦ λόγου· ὅσ δὲ διεπανσά-

A. For fear τὸ φάναι should be regarded as adscript, see Alc. i. 110 d.

B. δὴ ἐπανσάμεθα Cobet for διεπανσάμεθα, to the deterioration of the sense. διαστασόμενος Cobet: but see note.

PL. REP.
ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδᾶν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥέων ἐρωτὰν ἡ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπέ, τι φής εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως

D μοι μὴ ἔρεις, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἔστιν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὄφελίμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ἐμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγης· ὅσ ἔγω οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, εὰν ὑθλον τοιούτοις λέγης. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκόουσα ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβοῦμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐωράκη αὐτὸν [ἡ ἐκείνος ἐμὲ], ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἰμίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἦρχετο

Ε ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὅστε αὐτῷ οἶος τ' ἐγενομήν ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ ἐλθὼν ὑποτρέμων, Ὄ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπῶς ἡμῖν ἵσθι· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὅδε, εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶον, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐξητούμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἤμας ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλῆλοις ἐν τῇ ἐξητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐξητούτας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἐπειδὴ οὕτως ἀνοητῶς ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανήναι αὐτό. οἶον γε

336 D. ὅπως μοι μὴ ἔρεις best mss. μοι om. Ἑβ. The pronunciation of μοι and μη had become practically identical.

τὸ δίκαιον II+ for τὸ δέον, by a slip.

ἐωράκη A. ἐωράκεν vulg. See 328 c note.

ἡ ἐκείνος ἐμὲ appears to be an interpolation.

336 E. εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν A+M+. εἰ γὰρ τι ἐξ. II+.

There is little to choose.

μὴ σπουδάζεων one or two edited mss. But the construction is μὴ οἶον ἦμας οὐ-σπουδάζεων.

οἶον τε σὺ A+Π+Μ+. μὴ οἶον σὺ Ἑ Stallbaum &c. καὶ οἶον σὺ β'. οἶον γε ἐστίν Ξ (i.e. after φανήναι), a manifest conjecture. Bekker's οἶον γε σὺ is provisionally accepted, though see note.
σὺ, ὁ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν ποὺ ὕπο ὕμων τῶν 337 δεινῶν ἡ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

XI. Καὶ ὃς ἁκούσας ἀνεκάγχασε τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν, ΤΩ Ἡράκλεις, ἐφή, αὐτη 'κεῖνη ἡ εἰσδημα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ᾑδη τε καὶ τοῦτο προβλεγόν, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσωσι, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἡ ἀποκρίνοιο, εἰ τίς τί σε ἔρωτά. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἰ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Ἐρασύμαχε· εὐ οὖν ᾑδησθὰ στὶ, εἰ τίνα ἔροι ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἔρομενος προείποις αὐτῷ, Β

Οπως μοι, ὁ ἁνθρωπε, μὴ ἔρεις, ὅτι ἐστίν τὰ δώδεκα δις ἐξ μητ' ὅτι τρίς τέτταρα μητ' ὅτι ἔξακις δύο μητ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὖν ἀποδέξοιμαι σου, ἐὰν τοιαύτα φλυαρῆς· δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρῖνοι τῷ σῶς πυθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι εἶπεν· ΜΩ Ἐρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρῖνομαι ὅν προείπες μηδὲν; πότερον, ὁ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τὶ τυγχάνει ὑν, ἀλλ' ἐτερον εἰπὼ τι τοῦ ἀληθοὺς; ἡ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἰπὲς πρὸς Κ ταῦτα; Εἰπεν, ἐφη· ὡς ἢ ὁμοιον τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἐστίν ὁμοιον,

The sense seems to be satisfied with e.g. <καὶ ταῦτ' ἐναντίον> οὖν γε σὺ (οὐ γε σοῦ).

337 A. ἀνεκάγχασε A. A recent hand has erased γ. See note. σαρδάνιον ΑΠ+. σαρδάνιον ΔΚq+. See comment. A frequent form is σαρδώνιον Ε.


εἰθέλησεις Θετ+, but these are not consistent in their treatment of the following future optatives.

337 B. τι om. Ε+ in ei τοῦτων τι τυγχάνει δν. The gen. of the class might stand, but the loss of τι was easy.
φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἑρωτηθέντι τοιούτῳ, ἦττὸν τι αὐτὸν οἷει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐαυτῷ, εάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν εάν τε μή; Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἑφη, καὶ σύ οὕτω ποιήσεις; ὥν ἐγὼ ἀπείπου, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ᾗ δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω

D δόξειν. Τι οὖν, ἑφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων; τι ἄξιοις παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δὲ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τού εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τούτο ἄξιον παθεῖν. Ἡδοὺς γὰρ εἰ, ἑφη. ἄλλα πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν μοι γένηται, εἰπον. 'Ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἑφη ὁ Γλαύκων. ἄλλ' ἐνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, λέγει πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς

Ε Ἐσκράτει εἰςοίσομεν. Πάνω γε, οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὦς, ἱνα Ἐσκράτης τὸ εἰσόθης διαπράξηται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἑφην ἐγώ, ὁ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίνατο πρὸς τὸν μὲν μὴ εἰδός μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα εἰ, <δ> τι καὶ οἶεται περὶ τούτων,
ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰ, ὅπως μηδὲν ἔρει ὃν ἡγεῖται, υπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν. σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ 338 οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Πλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. Εἰσόντος δὲ μοι ταῦτα ὑ τε Πλαύκων καὶ οἴ ἄλλου ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Ὁρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἢν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἢν εὐδοκιμήσειν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἰναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησεν, κάπειτα, Λύτη δὴ, ἔφη, ἢ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ Β ἔθελεν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. "Οτι μέν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἴπεσ, ὁ Ὁρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὐ μὲ φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ ἐπιλείφων μόνον χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω· ὡς δὲ προ- θύμωσ τοῦτο δρῶ, ἔαν τίς μοι δοκῇ εὐ λέγειν, εὐ εἰσεί αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνθη· οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ εὐ C ἐρείν. "Ἀκούε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅσ. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἰναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπανεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔθελήσεις. Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἐφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπώ οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φής ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἰναι. καὶ τούτο, ὁ Ὁρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ που τὸ

338 A. φιλονικεῖν mss. φιλονικεῖν Baiter. See the commentary and also Schanz Plat. Vol. vi. (proleg.).

338 B. οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ mss; but the pronoun is emphatic here, if anywhere.
πλατωνος

γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἶ Πονδινάμας ἦμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ ἔσμφερε τα βόεια κρέας

δ' πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τούτῳ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἦμῶν τοῖς ἦπτοσιν ἐκεῖνουν ἔσμφερον ἄμα καὶ δίκαιον. Βδελυγός γὰρ εἶ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἤ ἂν κακουργήσασις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὃ ἀριστε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις.

εἰτ' οὐκ οἰσθ', ἐφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννουῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεται δὲ γε

εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἡ ἄρχη πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ ἔσμφερον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικοὺς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικοὺς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπεφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένων εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ἔσμφερον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦστα τε καὶ ἄδικοντα. τούτ' οὖν ἑστίν, ὃ βέλτιστο, δ' ἢ

λέγω, ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταύτῶν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεσθηκυῖας ἄρχης ἔσμφερον· αὐτῇ δὲ ποιοῦ

κρατεῖ, ὅστε ἔσμφαινε τῷ ὅρθῳς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττους ἔσμφερον. Ἡν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐμαθον ὁ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἄλθες ἢ μῆ, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. ἐσμφερεν καὶ ὁ ἄπεκρινω δίκαιον εἶναι· καὶ ἔμοι ἀπηγόρευε ὡς μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινόμην.
ξεισως, ἐφη, προσθήκη. Οὔτω δὴλον οὐδ’ εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἰναι καὶ ἐγώ ὀμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σοῦ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἰναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνωστό, σκεπτέον δὴ. Σκόπει, ἐφη.

XIII. Ταῦτ’ ἐσται, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῆς εἰναι; Ἕγγογε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες εν ταῖς πόλεσιν έκάσταις ἡ οἶοι τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν; Πάντωσ που, ἐφη, οἰοὶ τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέσιν, τοὺς δὲ τιμᾶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι Ἕγγογε. Το δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀρα τὸ τὰ ξυμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι εὐαυτοὶς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς αξύμφορα; ἡ πῶς λέγεις; Οὔτως. “Α δ’ ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἄρχομένοις, καὶ τοὐτὸ ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐ μόνον ἀρα δίκαιον ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔνα δυναίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντιν, τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Τῇ λέγεις σύ; ἐφη. “Α σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπᾶ- μεν δὴ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὀμολογήται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἄρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιείν ἂττα ἐνίοτε δια- μαρτάνειν τοῦ εὐαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἀ δ’ ἂν προστάτ- τωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες δίκαιον εἰναι τοῖς ἄρχομένοις ποιείν; ταῦτ’ οὐχ ὀμολογήται; Οἶμαι Ἕγγογε, ἐφη. Οἴου τοῦνν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ αξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσι τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἰναι ὀμολογήθαι σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιοι εἰναι φῆς ταῦτα ποιεῖν

339 Β. δίκαιον φῆς Π + Μ+. καὶ δίκαιον φῆς Α.
339 Α. The second οἴοι τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν om. Ξ+. But the preceding question was a double one.
339 Ο. σκοπᾶμεν δὴ Α + ξ+. ἐδὲ Μ + ξ+. ‘Come, let us...’
ἤ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν· ἀρὰ τότε, ὃ σοφώτατε Ὄρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαινειν αὐτὸ οὕτως; δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοῦναντίον ἢ ὁ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον ἥππου προστάτηται τοῖς ἦττοσιν ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μᾶ Δί', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε. Ἔαν σὺ γ', ἔφη, αὐτὸ μαρτυρῆσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβῶν. Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὀμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἀρχοντας ἔνιστε ἕαυτος κακὰ προστάτευν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελεύόμενα ποιεῖν, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ὅπο τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, συμφέρον Β δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενοι ὀμολογήσειν αὐ ἔνιστε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἦττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὀμολογίων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. 'Ἀλλ' ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν δ ἡγοῦτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἦττον, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἔτιθετο. 'Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτοσ, ἢ ὃ δ' ὃς ὁ C Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο. Οὐδέν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

XIV. Καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἢν ὁ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττων, εὰν τῇ ξυμφέρῃ ἕαν τῇ μῇ; 339 Σ. Editors punctuate variously, (1) after οὕτως, (2) after ποιεῖν, (3) as in the text (after Madvig).
340 Α. αὐτὸς Θρασύμαχος (without γὰρ) Μ.
340 Β. δ ἡγοῦτο Α+Π¹. The vulgate ἡγεῖτο is a mistake. See note.
οὗτος σε φώμεν λέγειν; Ἡκιστά γ', ἐφη· ἄλλα κρείττῳ με οἱεί καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνη; Ἐγώγη, εἶπον, φίμην σε τούτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντάς ὁμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συκοφάντης γὰρ Ὁ ἐι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τούτο ὁ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὅπι ἄν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', ὁμιαί, λέγομεν τῷ ἰέματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς· τὸ δ', ὁμιαί, ἐκαστός τοῦτων, καθ' ὅσον τούτῃ ἑστὶν ὁ προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει· ὡστε κατὰ Ε' τοῦ ἀκριβῆ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιληπτούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ὧν οὐκ ἐστὶ δημιουργός; ὡστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ἢ, ἀλλὰ πάς ὃ ἀν εἶπο, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἡμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἡμαρτεν. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἑκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὑν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἑστὶ, μη ἀμαρτάνειν, μη ἀμαρτάνοντα 341 δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τούτῳ δὲ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὡστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἅρχης ἐλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

340 Ε. ἐπιληπτούσης Α¹ + Π⁺. ἐπιληπτούσης Α²Μ⁺. Either is possible. He fails when his knowledge has deserted him, or he begins to fail at the point where his knowledge begins to desert him.

καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἡμαρτεν om. Π through the homoeoteleuton.

νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι a few inferior mss. But ἀποκρίνεσθαι is imperfect.
XV. Εἶεν, ἥν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ Ἐρασύμαχος· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντείν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οἶει γὰρ μὲ ἐξ ἐπιβούλησ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντα σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἥρομυν; Ἕν μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἐφη· καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε ὧ καθών βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἥν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ μακάριε. ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ αὕτης ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρεῖττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπτείν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐ τὸ εὐμφέρον κρεῖττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἤττοι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἐφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα. πρὸς ταύτα κακοῦργε καὶ συκοφάντει, εἰ τι C δύνασαι· οὐδὲν σου παρίειμαι· ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μὴ οἶδος τ᾽ ἦσ. Οἶει γὰρ ἄν με, εἴπον, οὕτω μανήναι, ὡστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντείν Ἐρασύμαχον; Νῦν γοῦν, ἐφη, ἐπεχειρήσας, οὐδὲν ὁν καὶ ταύτα. Ἄδην, ἥν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν τοιοῦτων. ἀλλ᾽ εἰπτε μοι· ὃ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρη- ματιστής ἔστιν ἢ τῶν καμνῶν των θεραπευτῆς; καὶ λέγε τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ἰατροῦ ὄντα. Τῶν καμνῶν των, ἐφη, θεραπευτῆς. Τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὁρθῶς κυβερνήτης

341 A. ἐρέσθαι K. The common accentuation is ἐρέσθαι. See Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 8 and cf. ἐπεχεῖν 343 B. So ἐγερέσθαι, αἰσθένει are apt to be treated as presents by the later Greeks. A present ἐρωμαι is not provable for classical Greek, ἐρωτῶ being in regular use.

341 B. The trouble of Ast &c. with οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν is due to missing the sense. See note.

ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες mss, except that A shews ὅ over an erasure. ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες Benedictus, Hermann, J. and C. ὃν might, of course, lose its ν through the ν following, but the erasure in A is more probably due to ὅ acquiring a false ν from the same cause. See note.
ναυτῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ναῦτης; Ναυτῶν ἀρχῶν. D
Οὐδὲν, οὐκαί, τούτο υπολογιστέον, ὦτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νη',
οὐδ' ἐστιν κλητέος ναῦτης'. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν
κυβερνήτης καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν
τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν. 'Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ
τούτων ἐστιν τι ξυμφέρον; Πάννυ γε. Οὐ καὶ ἡ
τέχνη, ἦν ὃ ἔγω, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ
ξυμφέρον ἐκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; Ἐπὶ
tούτῳ, ἔφη. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐστιν
τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὁ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; Πῶς E
tούτῳ ἐρωτᾶς; "Ὡσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ μὲ ἔροιο, εἰ
ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι εἶναι σώματι ἡ προσδείται τινος,
ἐἰποὺμ' ἀν ὦτι Παντάπαισι μὲν οὐν προσδείται. διὰ
ταύτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἱατρικὴ νῦν ἡπρημένη, ὅτι
σῶμα ἐστὶ πόνηρον καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῇ τοιοῦτῳ
εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζη τὰ συμφέρουτα, ἐπὶ
tούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἡ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ,
ἔφην, ἀν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ; Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Τὴν
δὲ δὴ; αὐτὴ ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἐστὶν πονῆρα, ἡ ἄλλη τῆς
tέχνης ἐσθ' ὁ τι προσδεῖταί τινος ἄρετῆς, ὡσπερ
ὁφθαλμοὶ ὀψεως καὶ ὡτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταύτα ἐπ'
αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινὸς τέχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον εἰς ταύτα
σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκπορίζουσις; ἀρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ

341 D. οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων mss. Qu. οὐκοῦν <ἐδεῖ> ἐκάστῳ
τούτων or something similar?

ἐστιν τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο. How far interpolation may go in a
passage which an early reader felt to be too condensed is seen in q
and β' ἐστιν τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο οὕτω προσδεῖται, ἡ ἐξαρκεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῇ
ἀυτῇ, ὥστε ἰτι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι.

341 Ε. εὐρημένη mss. νύρημένη is the true form. Meisterhans
§ 62. 14. πόνηρον mss. πόνηρον is
the proper accentuation (in the physical sense) according to
grammarians. Hence πόνηρα is required immediately.

342 Α. ἐκπορίζουσις qβ' (edited mss).
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

tη τέχνη ἐν τις ποιησία, καὶ δεῖ ἄει ἐκάστη τέχνη ἀλλής τέχνης, ἢτις αὕτη τὸ Ἑυμφέρων σκέψεται, καὶ τὴ σκοπουμένη ἑτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν

Β ἀπέραντον; ἡ αὕτη αὐτῇ τὸ Ἑυμφέρων σκέψεται; ἡ οὕτε αὐτῆς οὕτε ἀλλής προσδείται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς ποιησίαν τὸ Ἑυμφέρων σκοπεῖν ἐστι, ἢ ἀμαρτία οὐλομέναι οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσή-κει τέχνη ἀλλω τὸ Ἑυμφέρων ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκεῖνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἄβλαβης καὶ ἀκέραιος ἐστιν ὁρθὴ οὖσα, ἐωσπερ ἃν ἢ ἐκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὁλη ἢ περ ἐστί; καὶ σκόπει ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεὶ λόγῳ οὕτως ἢ ἀλλως ἐχει; Οὔτως, ἐφι, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ,

C ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῆ τὸ Ἑυμφέρων σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σῶματι. Ναί, ἐφι. Οὐδὲ ἰππικὴ ἰππικὴ ἀλλ' ἰπποις οὐδὲ ἀλλή τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῆ, οὐδὲ γαρ προσδείται, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν. Φαίνεται, ἐφι, οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀρχοῦσι γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκεῖνον, οὕτε εἰσίν τεχναῖ. ξυνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόνις. Οὐκ ἀρα ἐπιστῆμη γε οὐδεμία τοῦ τού κρείττονος Ἑυμφέρου σκοπεῖ οὐδ'

D ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοῦ ἰπποίος τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς. ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελεύτων, ἐπεξερεύει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι ἕπειδη δὲ ὠμολο-γήσειν, "Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδείς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρὸς, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ Ἑυμφέρου σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κάμνοντι; ὠμολογήται γαρ ὁ

dei aieί A. aieί om. Π + Μ+ . On the principle of keeping to the best mss as far as possible we may retain aieί, and suppose it to have been lost from ΔΕΙΑΕΙ. Plato, like Thucydides, may have used the form aieί, which vacillates with δεί till 360 b.c. (Meisterhans § 14 a). The arguments of Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 7 are not conclusive for δεί.

342 B. αὐτὴ δὲ ἄβλαβῆς A, for aὐτῇ κ.τ.λ. Cf. sup. 330 c.
άκριβής ιατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρη-ματιστής. ἦ γὰρ ωμολόγηται; ξυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης; Ὑμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ γε τοιοῦτος Ε κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τὸ κυβερνήτης ἔξυμφέρων σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸ ναύτη τε καὶ ἄρχομένῳ. ξυνέφησε μόνισι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος ούδεις ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἄρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔξυμφέρων σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸ ἄρχομένῳ καὶ ὃ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνῳ βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἔξυμφέρων καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ὃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ ἄπαντα.

XVI. Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ 343 πάσι καταφανὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγου εἰς τοῦνατίον περιεστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Ἐιπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἠστίν; Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ: οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρήν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαύτα ἐρωτῶν; "Ὅτι τοῦ σε, ἐφη, κορύζωντα περιορά καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὡς ηὲ αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γυμνώσκεις. "Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. "Ὅτι οὔει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς θεοὺς θεούς τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν Β ἀγαθῶν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχιστας, οὐ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἀρχιστας, ἄλλως πως ἴηε διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἄν τις

342 Ε. πρὸς ἐκείνῳ βλέπων best mss. ἐκείνῳ r+; but τρὶς ἄρχομένων is neuter.

343 Δ. ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν Δ.χ. χρῆ Π+. The former is more idiomatic.

343 Β. διανοεῖσθαι mss, διακείσθαι Faesi; but see note.
πρός πρόβατα διατεθεῖτι, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτούς
dιὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἡ τούτο ὀθεὺν αὐτοὶ ἡφελήσουν.
C ταῦ. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περὶ τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
dικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀδικίας, ὡστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι
ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἁγαθὸν
tῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ἐξυμφέρον,
οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη,
ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοῦνατιον, καὶ ἀρχεῖ τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς
eὐθείκων τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχομενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ
ἐκεῖνον ἐξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαιμονα
D ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἔαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ'
ὁπωστιόν. σκοπεῖσθαι δὲ, ὡς ἐνθέστατε Σώκρατες,
οὕτως χρῆ, ὅτι δίκαιοι ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ
ἐλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ἐξυμβολαιός, ὅπως ἄν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινω-
νήσῃ, οὐδαμοὶ ἄν εὑροῖ ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας
πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἄλλο τὸν
ἐλαττον. ἐπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τε τίνες εἰσφοραί
ἀσίν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ὑσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὃ
Ε δ' ἐλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ τολλὰ
κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἄρχῃν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος,
tῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἀλλή ξημία,
tά γε οἰκεία δι' ἀμέλειαι μοχθηρότερος ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ
tοῦ δήμοσίου μηδὲν ὡφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι,
πρὸς δὲ τούτως ἀπεθέσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς
γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν θέλην αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ
tὸ δίκαιον. τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντια

游戏当中

The substitution of these analogical

forms is frequent.

343 C. ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας vulg. τε om. Α, Π. Cf. 329 Α.
See note.

343 B. ἀπεχθέσθαι mss (except for ἀπεχθάνεσθαι q +). For
the accentuation see comment. and cf. sup. 341 Α.
πάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὄντερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονέκτειν. τοῦτον ὅν ἔσκοπει, εἴπερ 344 βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσο μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδία αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ βάστα μαθήσει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἄδικιάν ἔλθης, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἄδικηθέντας καὶ ἄδικησαι οὐκ ἂν ἔθελοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστων δὲ τούτῳ τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν ταλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαίρεῖται, καὶ ἑρά καὶ ὁσία καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην, ἢν Β ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τῆς ἄδικησας μὴ λάθη, ξημιούτα τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἱερότυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστηρηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἄδικοις τῶν τοιούτων κακογρηγμάτων καλοῦνταί ἐπειδὰν δὲ τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὁνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν C ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτοῦ τὴν ὅλην ἄδικιάν ἡδικηκότα: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβοῦμεν ὑπειδίξουσιν οἱ ὑπειδίξοντες τὴν ἄδικιαν. οὕτως, ὃ ΣΩκρατες, καὶ ἱσχυρότερον καὶ ἑλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικότερον ἄδικια δικαιοσύνης ἔστων ἰκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει οὐ, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον ἐαυτῷ οὐσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

XVII. Ταῦτα εἶπὼν ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἴχεν D

344 Α. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον best mss, τὸ om. ΔΕτ.+. The whole expression might be bracketed by a certain school.

ἀπίεναι, ὡστερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὠτῶν ἄθρόνου καὶ πολὺν τῶν λόγων. οὐ μὴν εἰσασάν γε αὐτόν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλὰ ἡμᾶς καθάρισαν ὑπομείνα τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνω ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον, Ἡ δαμόνι Θρασύμαχε, οὗν ἐμβαλῶν λόγων ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπίεναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς ἡ μαθεῖν εἰτε οὔτως εἰτε ἄλλως ἐχει; ἦ σμικρὸν οὐεὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἔ πράγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὗ βίου διαγωγήν, ἤ ἂν διαγόμενον ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωῆς ζωή; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἐφῄ ο Ἐρασύμαχος, τούτῳ ἄλλῳς ἔχειν; Ἐοικας, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε οὔδεν κύδεσθαι, οὔδε τι φρουτίζειν εἰτε χείρον εἰτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες οὐ φῆς εἰδέναι. ἀλλ’, ὁ ἀγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεδιξασθαί. οὖτοι κακῶς

345 σοι κέισεται δ’ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσούδε οὕτας εὐρυγε- τῆσθι. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ σοι λέγω τό γ’ ἐμον, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὔδ’ οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεωτερον εἶναι, οὔδ’ ἔδω ἑα τις αὐτὴν καὶ μη διακωλύῃ πράττειν ὦ βούλεται. ἀλλ’, ὁ ’γαθέ, ἐστω μὲν ἀδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἥ τῷ λανθάνειν ἥ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι ὁμος ἔμε γε οὐ πείθει ὧς ἐστι τῆς

B δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεωτερον. ταῦτ’ οὖν καὶ ἔτερος ἵσως τις ἡμῶν πέποιθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγὼ. πείσον οὖν, ὁ μακάριε, ἰκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὁρθῶς βουλεύομεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ

344 D. ἄθρόνου is the regular form in A, and (according to Aristarchus) was more Attic than ἄθρόν. On irregularities of the spiritus asper in Attic see Meisterhans §§ 32 and 37.
344 E. ζῷω A¹ for ζῆν, by confusion of N and H.
oὗτοι qB¹ for ἦτοι. The point of ἦτοι was missed.
345 A. οὐ πείθει mss. οὐ πείθεις Ficinus. See comment.
πῶς, ἑφη, σε πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οίς νῦν δή ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἐτι ποιήσω; ἣ εἰς τὴν ψυχήν φέρων ἐνθῷ τῶν λόγων; Μὰ Δ', ἣν δ' ἔγω, μή σὺ γε· ἀλλα πρῶτον μέν, ἂ ἄν εἴπης, ἐμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῆ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὅρας, ὦ Ὁρασύμαχε, ἐτι γὰρ τὰ θέματα ἐμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψάμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὃς ἀληθῶς ἱστρόν τὸ πρῶτον ὄριζόμενον τοῦ ὃς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι φοῦ δεῖν ύστερον ἄκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἰεὶ αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμήν ἔστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὀσπερ δαιμονία τινά καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὀσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δὴ ποιμνίαν ὁ Ἰδήπο ἄλλου τοῦ μέλει ἡ, ἑφ' ὦ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκπορεῖ· ἐπει τὰ γε αὐτῆς, ἄστε εἰναι βελτίστῃ, ἱκανῶς δήπο ἐκπεπόρισται, ἐως γ' ἂν μηδὲν εὐδέη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἰναι· οὔτω δὲ ὀμην ἐγνωτε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαίων εἰναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πάσαν ἄρχην, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχη, μηδενὶ ἀλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ ἄρχωμεν τε καὶ θεραπευομενῷ, εὖ τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἄρχῃ. Ἐ σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἁρχοντας εὖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἁρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἰεὶ ἁρχεῖν; Μὰ Δ' οὐκ, ἑφη, ἀλλ' εὖ οἴδα.

ΧVIII. Τῇ δὲ; ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὦ Ὁρασύμαχε, τὰς ἀλλὰς ἁρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὔδεὶς ἐθέλει ἁρχεῖν ἐκὼν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῦσιν

345 Κ. πιαίνειν Α rightly. παχύνειν (a gloss) in a few inferior copies. ποιμαίνειν Π+Μ+Αα mg. See note and the remark sup. 333 Ε.

PL. REP.
өфелιαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχο-
μένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσοῦνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι
φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦτῳ ἔτεραν εἶναι, τῷ
ἔτεραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καὶ, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ
dόξαν ἀποκρινοῦ, ἵνα τι καὶ περαιώμεν. Ἀλλὰ
tοῦτῳ, ἔφη, ἔτερα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὥφελίαν ἐκάστη
idίαν τινὰ ἥμιν παρέχεται, ἀλλὰ οὐ κοινὴν, οἶον
ιατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ
πλείω, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
B μισθωτικὴ μισθὸν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις. ἡ
tὴν ιατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτήν
καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ
ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, εὰν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγίης
γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ,
ἐνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ιατρικὴν; Οὐ
dήτα, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ γ', οἷμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, εὰν
υγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρνῶν. Οὐ δήτα. Τί δὲ; τὴν
ιατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, εὰν ἱόμενος τις μισθαρνή;
C Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὥφελίαν ἐκάστης τῆς
tέχνης ἰδίαν ὀμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἑστω, ἔφη.
"Ἡντινα ἄρα ὥφελίαν κοινὴ ὥφελονται πάντες οἱ
δημιουργοί, δὴλον ὅτι κοινὴ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώ-
μενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὥφελονται. Ἑοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμὲν
dὲ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὥφελείσθαι τοὺς δη-

345 Β. ὥφελελας ἐσομένης xa. The accusative absolute was
less familiar.

346 Β. διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ πλείω A+Π+Μ+. ξυμφέρειν
Ξήq is an emendation. The participle is probably due to the
frequency of τὸ ξυμφέρον in the discussion. Otherwise we might
suggest διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ <τοῦ> πλείω.
μισθαρνηκήν Μ+. 

346 Α. τὸ μισθὸν A+. τὸν μισθὸν of many mss illustrates
the common error of false adaptation.
μιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρήσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γέγυνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ξυνέφη μόνης. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὐτῇ ἡ ωφελία ἔστιν, D ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ’, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ιατρικὴ ὕγιειαν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῆς ἐπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἳ ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι οὔτως· τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργων ἐργάζεται καὶ ωφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ’ οὖν τέτακτα. εἰάν δὲ μὴ μισθός αὐτῆς προσγιγνηται, ἐσθ’ ὦ τὶ ωφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἐφη. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐδ’ ωφελεὶ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν, E ὥ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἴδῃ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὔδε ἀρχή τὸ αὐτῆς ωφελίμων παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ’, ὅπερ πάλαι ἔλεγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ και παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἐμφέρον ἢττους ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὃ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθοῦ αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλὸς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε αὐτῷ τὸ 347 βέλτιστον πράττει οὖδ’ ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ’ ὡν δὴ ἐνεκα, ὡς

346 D. ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις om. M1. It adds clearness, however.

μισθαρνητικὴ M+. Reversely οἰκοδομικὴ in some inferior copies.


347 A. ὡν δὴ ἐνεκα om. some inferior copies (after πράττει) through homoeoteleuton.

ὡν δὴ ἐνεκα M. οὐ Π. ὡν οὐ (by conflation) E. ὡ A (which is probably due to -ω of the last word). It looks as if ὡν had been lost after -ω, and then the passage corrected variously.
ζοίκε, μισθόν δείν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ξημίαν, ἐάν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

XIX. Πώς τούτο λέγεις, ὡ Σώκρατε; ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γυγνώσκω τὴν δὲ ξημίαν ἕντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἰρήκας, οὐ ξυνήκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἀρα μισθόν,

B ἔφην, οὐ ξυνείς, δὴ ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλοις ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἴσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμον τὲ καὶ φιλάργυρυν εἶναι ὧνιδος λέγεται τὲ καὶ ἐστίν; Ἕγογε, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλοις ἄρχειν οἱ ἄγαθοι οὔτε τιμής. οὔτε γὰρ φαινέτως πραττόμενοι τῆς ἄρχης ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοι βούλονται κεκλήσαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄρχης λαμβάνοντες κλέπται οὐδ' αὐ τιμής ἕνεκα οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶ φιλότιμοι. δεὶ δὴ

C αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ξημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν. οἶθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἔναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νεομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ξημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, εάν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν. ἢν δείσαντες μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, οὗχ ὡς ἐπὶ ἰγαθόν τι ιόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ ἀνάγκαιον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες έαυτῶν

D βελτίστου ἐπιτρέψαι οὖδὲ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει,

dein yparchein ms. dein Euseb. (l. c.), Ast &c. See note.
où xynēka tò some edited copies. But the aorist here is independent of tò.

ξυνείς ΑΠ+. ξυνείς Ξ. ξυνής vulg. See note.

347 B. dein dein A. dein dh ΠΜ vulg., 'It is necessary, in fact,' makes the preferable sense.

347 D. epitrêpai tìn archèn Ξ+, objecting to the absolute verb. Cf. sup. 335 A.
πόλεις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὀσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἑνταῦθι ἂν καταφανεῖς γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὀντὶ ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αυτῷ ἕμφερον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ· ὡστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγαντίων πόλεις ἔλοιπο τι ἄλλου ἃ ἄλλου ἄρχον πράγματα ἔχειν. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἔγγιε οὐδαμῆς συγχωρῶ Ἐρασύμαχῳ, ὅσ τὸ δίκαιον ἐστίν Ἐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος εὐμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν ἀδικαίως καὶ εἰσαύθις σκεπόμεθα· πολὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ μειζόν εἶναι, ὁ νῦν λέγει Ἐρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττῳ ἡ τοῦ τοῦ δίκαιου. σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, αἱρεῖ καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δίκαιου ἐγώγε, ἐφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. Ἡκουσας, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὃσα ἄρτι Ἐρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθε τῇ 348 τοῦ ἄδικου; Ἡκουσα, ἐφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνόμεθα πή ἔξευρεῖν, ὡς οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἢ δ' ὃς. 'Ἀν μὲν τοιώνυ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγων παρὰ λόγων, ὃσα αὐν ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθίς οὖτος, καὶ ἄλλων ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δείξει τάγαθα καὶ μετρέιν ὃσα ἐκάτεροι ἐν ἐκατέρω λέγομεν, καὶ ἣδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν Β διακρινοῦντων δεσφόμεθα· ἄν δὲ ὀσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἀμα αὐτοῖς τε δικασταὶ καὶ ἱστορὲς ἐσφόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 'Οποτέρως οὐν σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει. Οὕτως, ἐφη. 347 Ε. ποτέρως...αἱρεῖ μss, followed by πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως (A + Π+) or πότερον ἀληθεστέρως (M+). Ast, Hermann &c. read πότερον...ποτέρως. See note. 348 Ε. ὑποτέρως mss, except for the intended correction ποτέρως Vind. Ρ.
XX. Ἡθὶ δὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχε, ἀποκριναὶ ἡμῖν εἴξ ἀρχῆς τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὐσίας δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἰναι; Πάνυ μὲν
C οὖν καὶ φημὶ, ἐφη, καὶ δὶ ἃ, εἴρηκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ἡν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν; Εἰκός γ', ἐφη, ὁ ἥδιστε, ἐπείδῃ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὖ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;
Τούναντίον, ἦ δ' ὦς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;
D Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν γενναῖαν εὐθείαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀρα κακοθείαν καλεῖς; Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἐφη. Ἡ καὶ φρόνιμοι σοι, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄγαθοι οἱ ἀδικοί; Ο'I γε τελέως, ἐφη, σοιτε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑπ' ἐαυτοῦς ποιεῖσθαι. συ δὲ οἴει με ἵσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὦς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐἀνπερ λαυθάνῃ· ἐστι δὲ οὐκ
E ἠξία λόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἐφη, οὐκ ἄγνοι ὅ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἑναντίοις. Ἀλλὰ πάνω οὖτω τίθημι. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὡδὴ στερεῶτερον, ὁ ἑταῖρε, καὶ οὐκἐπὶ ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὃ τὶ τίς

348 D. ύφ' ἐαυτοῖς some inferior copies. See note.

βαλλάντια Α + Π+. The variant βαλλάντια Ε+ was tolerably sure to appear, as in 575 Β. There is nothing in which ΜΣ are less to be trusted than in the double λ. Cf. inf. 358 c (θρυλεὶ) and 359 ε (ἐξαγγέλουεν). The Ravenna MS of Aristophanes has βαλλάντιον and in Ran. 772 the best reading points to βαλλαντιοτόμως as metrical. The quantity at least is long. Cf. Simon. Frag. 181 (Epig. 60) ἐμπροε καὶ φορτηγὲ τὸ ἀυβ βαλλάντιον αἴδεν.

348 E. βάδου (βάδον) ΜΣ, except for βάδιον Χ. The preceding comparative may have caused hallucination, but in any case
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α.

39
eίπη. Εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἑτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινὲς, εἰχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἰ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἵσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τάλλα αὐτῶ πάντα προσθήσεις, ἢ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, 349 ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτολμησάς θείναι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, μαντεύει. Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀποκινητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἐώς ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἀπέρ διανοεῖ. ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὥς Ὑρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνώς νῦν οὐ σκάπτεις, ἄλλα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Τί δὲ σοι, ἐφη, τούτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μη, ἄλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις; Οὐδέν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ. ἄλλα τάδε μοι πειρῶ ἐτί πρὸς Β τοῦτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν θέλειν πλέον ἐχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἢν ἀστείος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. Τί δὲ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἐφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἄξιοι ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοίτο δικαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοίτο δικαιον; 'Ἡγοῖτ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, καὶ ἄξιοι, ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο. Ἀλλ' οὐ τούτο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἑρωτῶ, ἄλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μη ζ ἄξιοι πλέον ἐχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; Ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἐφη, ἐχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀδικος; ἄρα ἄξιοι τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτέων καὶ τῆς δικαίας

PAIDION and PAION were liable to confusion. Cf. 370 λ, where ραδιον of Α is an error for ῥαδον of q.

349 Β. πλεον ἐχειν Α, but πλέον is the only form. Meisterhans § 58. 17.

οδὲ τῆς <πράξεως τῆς> δικαίας Adam. See note.

ἀξιοι ἂν πλεονεκτειν ΘΦ. ἄξιοι vulg. ν. sup. 330 λ. All give ἄξιοι in the next instance, but that might be indicative.
πράξεως; Πως γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὃς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιῶι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄδικον ἀνθρώποι τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστου αὐτὸς λάβῃ; "Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

XXI. "Οδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὦμοιον οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίον, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος
to τού τε ὦμοιοι καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. "Αριστα, ἔφη, εἰρηκας. "Εστίν δὲ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμος τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τούτ', ἔφη, εὐ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ έοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ έοικεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁν καὶ έοικέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ έοικέναι; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οὐσπερ έοικεν. "Ἀλλ' τι μέλλει; ἔφη. Εἶεν, ὁ Θρασύμαχος μουσικὸν δὲ

Ετινα λέγεις, έτερον δὲ ἅμουσου; 'Εγωγε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δῆτον φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἅμουσον ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν; Ναί. Τὶ δὲ ιατρικὸν; οὐχ οὔτως; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τὸς σοι, ὁ ἄριστος, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοττο-μενὸς λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικῷ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἣ ἀξιῶν πλέον ἐχειν; Οὐκ ἐμογε. Τὶ δὲ, ἅμουσον; 'Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 350 Τὶ δὲ ιατρικός; ἐν τῇ ἐδώδῃ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τὶ ιατρικὸν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος; Οὐ δῆτα. Μὴ ιατρικοῦ δὲ; Ναί. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὥρᾳ ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημωσύνης, εἰ τίς σοι δοκεῖ

349 C. ὅδε δὴ λέγομεν some inferior copies.

349 D. ὅδε μὴ A + P + M +. ὅδε, μὴ A². ὅδε μη, μη Xq +
Stallbaum, J. and C. The sentence is both more idiomatic and more euphonious without the second μη.
ἐπιστήμων ὀστίσον πλεώ ἃν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἡ ὅσα ἄλλας ἐπιστήμων ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξιν. ἉΛΛ ἵσως, ἐφή, ἀνάγκη τούτο γε οὕτως ἐχειν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονοι πλεονεκτήσειν ἂν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονοι; Ἦσως. Ὁ Β δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφὸς; Φημὶ. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθὸς; Φημὶ. Ὁ ἄρα ἄγαθὸς τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἠθέλησει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίον. Ἑοικεν, ἐφη. Ὁ δὲ κακὸς τε καὶ ἀμαθής τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαινεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Ὁρασύμαχος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἀδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἦν οὖν οὕτως ἐλεγες; Ἐγώγε, ἐφη. Ὁ δὲ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτήσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; Ναι. Ἑοικεν ἄρα, C ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεί. Κινδυνεύει. ἈΛΛΑ μὴν ὁμολογούμεν, ὃ γε ὁμοίος ἐκάτερος εἶναι, τοιούτην καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι. Ὡμολογούμεν γάρ. Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὁν ἄγαθος τε καὶ σοφὸς, ὁ δὲ ἀδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

XXII. Ὅ δὴ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταύτα, οὔχ ὡς ἐγώ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἄλλ' ἐλκόμενος D καὶ μόνη, μετὰ ἴδρωτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἀτε καὶ θέρους οὖντος. τότε καὶ εἴδον ἐγώ, πρώτερον δὲ οὕτω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθρίωντα. ἑπειδή δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετῆν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν,

350 C (fin.). ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος A+M+. Ὅ δὴ Π+ vulg. See note.
350 D. Punctuation is made after τότε in A+M+, followed by Bekker. But the story is of what happened yesterday. Π+ give the right division.
τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἰεν, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὔτω κείσθω· ἐφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὃ Θρασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἐφη· ἀλλὰ ἐμοιγε οὔδὲ ἦ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν Ἐ λέγομι, εὐ οἴδ᾽ ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἂν με φαίης· ἢ οὖν ἢ ἐμε με εἰπεῖν ὦσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἑρωτάν, ἑρώτα· ἐγὼ δὲ σοι, ὅσπερ ταῖς γραυσίν ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγοῦσαι, εἰεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, παρὰ γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. "Ὡςτε σοι, ἐφή, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔάς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδεν μά Δία, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπερ τοῦτο ποιῆσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἑρωτησώ. Ἐερώτα δὴ. Τούτο τοῖνυν ἑρωτῶ, ὅπερ

351 ἀρτι, ἰνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὅποιον τι τυγχάνει ὅν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχηθη γάρ ποὺ, ὅτι καὶ δυνατότερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δὲ γ᾽, ἐφην, εἰπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἁρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οὐμαί, φανῆσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία· οὔδεις ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοῆσειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὃ Ἐθρασύμαχε, ἐγώγη ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδε πτη σκέψασθαι πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ

Β ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ψφ᾽ ἐαυτῇ ἑχειν δουλωσαμένῃν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη· καὶ τοῦτο γε ἦ ἀρίστῃ μάλιστα ποιῆσει καὶ τελεωτατα οὕσα ἀδίκους. Μανθάνω, ἐφην· ὅτι σὸς οὕτος ἢν ὁ λόγος. ἄλλα

351 A. ἐφη, εἰπερ Α+Π+Μ+. ἐφην, εἰπερ ὑ. "In A the breathing of εἰπερ has absorbed the sign — for ν' (Campbell).
οὔδεὶς γὰρ ἂν qB1, objecting to the asyndeton. Cf. sup. 329 c. τῆδ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι Π+ for τῆδε πτη σκέψασθαι, by itacism.
τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἡ κρεῖττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἐφι, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἐλεγες ἔχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη [σοφία], μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας. Πάνω ἄγαμαι, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεφεὶς μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνω καλῶς. Σοὶ γάρ, ἐφι, χαρίζομαι.

XXIII. Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἡ πόλιν ἡ στρατόπεδον ἡ ληστάς ἡ κλέπττας ἡ ἀλλο τὶ ἐθνος, ὁσα κοινῇ ἐπὶ τὶ ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πράξαι ἂν τὶ δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοίειν ἄλληλους; Ὅν δῆτα, ἡ δ' ὦς. Τί δ' εἰ μη ἀδικοίειν; D οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνω γε. Στάσεις γάρ ποι, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχε, ἢ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἄλληλους παρέχει, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἡ γάρ; 'Εστω, ἡ δ' ὦς, ἢν σοι μη διαφέρωμαι. 'Ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὁ ἀριστε. τόδε δὲ μοι λέγε· ἂρα εἰ τούτῳ ἐργον ἄδικιας, μίσοσ εμποιεῖν ὅποι ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δουλοῖς ἐγγυγμομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἄλληλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἄλληλων πράττειν; Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ; ἂν ἐν Δ δυοῖν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσοντι καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἐσονται ἄλληλοι τε καὶ τοῖς δικαῖοις; 'Εσονται, ἐφη. 'Εὰν δὲ δὴ, ὁ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐν ἐγγένηται ἄδικια, μῶν μη ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἡ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐξει; Μηδὲν ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε

351 B. ei μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἐλεγες ἔχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία best ms. εὑς for ἔχει of Ξ is an obvious correction. ἔχει, <ei> Baiter, Stallbaum. See note. Ι bracket σοφία as adscript.

351 D. διαφέρωμαι Π+Ξ, διαφέρωμεν ΑΜ. The middle is proper in this sense. Cf. 352 Α (διαφέρεσθαι).
τινά φαίνεται ἐξουσα τήν δύναμιν; [οἶαν] ὁ ἄν ἐγγένηται, εἶτε πόλει τινὶ εἶτε γένει εἶτε στρατοπέδῳ
352 εἶτε ἄλλῳ ὅτῳν, πρώτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ
πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέ-
ρεσθαι, ἐτι δ' ἔχθρον εἶναι ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἑναντίῳ
παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ
ἐν ἐνὶ δῇ, οἶμαι, ἑνόοσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσει, ἀπερ
πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρώτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν
πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμοούντα
αὐτὸν ἐαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἔχθρον καὶ ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς
dικαίοις· ἡ γὰρ; Ναὶ. Δίκαιοι δὲ γ' εἰσίν, ὃ φίλε,
Β καὶ οἱ θεοὶ; Ὅντων, ἐφη. Καὶ θεοίς ἄρα ἔχθρὸς
ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος.
Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἐφη, θαρρῶν· οὗ γὰρ ἐγωγεί σοι
ἑναντίωσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοίσδε ἀπέχωσαι. Ἡθὶ δῇ,
ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποτιθήμω-
σου ἀποκρινόμενος ὅσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὃτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ
σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ
dίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδέν πράττειν μετ'
C ἀλλήλων οἶοι τε, ἀλλὰ δῇ καὶ οὺς φαμέν ἐρρωμένως
πόστη τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πράξαι ἄδικους ὄντας,
tοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθεῖς λέγομεν· οὗ γὰρ ἄν
ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον
ὅτι ἐνή τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἡ αὐτοῖς ἐποίει μῆτοι

351 Β—352 Α. οἶαν...ποιεῖ Α+Μ+. ποιεῖν Π+. I
bracket ὁἶαν, and make the sentence with asyndeton explanatory
of τοιώδε, after the manner of Plato. ΟΙΑΝ arose from ΩΙΑΝ.
See note.

352 Α. ἔστωσαν mss. ἔστων Schanz (on ms evidence. Plat.
Vol. xii. Proleg. § 17). For ὁντων (on epigraphic evidence)
see note.

352 Β. δικαίος Α¹ for δῇ καὶ οὖς, partly by itacism, partly by
association of ideas.
καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἦσαν ἀμα ἄδικεῖν, δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀδικα ἄδικα ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἱ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶν καὶ πράττειν ἄδινατοι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θείοι ἔχει, μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁμείνουν ἦσσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἄδικων καὶ εὐδαιμονεστέροι εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὑστερον προοθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν ὁμώς δὲ ἐτὶ βελτιών σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ξην. Σκόπει δή, ἐφη. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι λέγει δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ὑπον έργον; "Εμουγε.Ε 'Αρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θείης καὶ ὑπον καὶ ἄλλου ὀτούν ἐργον, ὦ ἄν ἡ μόνω ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἡ ἀρίστα; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη. 'Αλλ' ὁδὲ ἐσθ' ὅτω ἀν ἄλλῳ ἰδοὺς ἡ ὕφθαλμοις; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δε; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἡ ὅσιν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικάιως ἀν ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν ἐργα εἶναι; Πάνυ γε. Τί δε; μαχαῖρα ἀν 353 ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλως πολλοῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; 'Αλλ' οὐδει τ' ἂν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο έργασθεῖντι. 'Αληθῆ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἐργον θήσομεν; Ἐν σομεν μέν οὖν.

**XXIV.** Νῦν δή, οἶμαι, ἁμείνον ἀν μάθοις ὁ ἁρτι

352 D. ὡς γε μοι Π+Μ+. ἐσθεμοὶ Α1. ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ Α2. The point is 'It seems so to me, but let us all be quite satisfied.'

ὁμώς δὲ τι vulg. δ' ετι Ε+. 'Somewhat better' is a possible rendering, but this would usually be βελτιών τι.

352 E. ἀκούσας <ἀν> ἀλλῳ Ast.

φαίμεν mss. φαίμεν Stephanus. In 357 c φαίμεν of Α has been made from a previous φαίμεν.

353 A. μαχαίρα ἀμπέλου mss, except for μαχαίρα ἄν ἀμπέλου of Χ.
πλατωνός

... πυθανόμενος εἰ οὐ τούτο ἐκάστου εἰτὸ ἔργον, ὃ ἄν ἦ μονον τὸ ἡ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. 'Ἀλλ', ἑφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τούτο ἐκάστου

Β πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. Εἰεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἰναι ἐκάστῳ, ὃπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; ἐῳμεν δὲ ἐτί τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν. ὅφθαλμοιν, φαμέν, ἐστίν ἔργον; 'Εστίν. 'Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὁφθαλμῶν ἐστίν. Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ; ὡτων ἦν τι ἔργον; Ναὶ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; Οὔτω. 'Εχε δὴ ἅρ' ἄν ποτε ὀμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς

C ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαιν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἑφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἵσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. 'Ἡτις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἢ ἀρετῆς; οὐ γὰρ πῶ τούτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς. 'Ἀληθές, ἑφη, τούτῳ γε λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὕτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; Πάνω γε. Τίθεμεν οὐν καὶ τάλλα πάντα εἰς

D τῶν αὐτῶν λόγου; 'Εμοιογε δοκεῖ. 'Ιθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἐστίν τι ἔργον, δ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν εὖ πράξαις; οἶνον τὸ τοῦνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἐσθ' ὅτι ἄλλο ἢ ψυχῆ δικαῖος ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοίμην καὶ φαῖμεν ἑδ' οὔκ ἐκείνης εἶναι; Οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. Τί δ' αὐ τὸ ξῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

353 C. ἀπεργάσαιντο mss (except for ἀπεργάσονται Θ, -ωνται ρ). No correction to the singular is required. See note.

353 D. ἢδια ἐκείνου ᾽Ελ by editing. See note. ψυχῆς φήσομεν best mss. οὐ ψυχῆς φ. three Florentine copies (by editing) and Stobaeus.
Μάλιστα γ’, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχής εἶναι; Φαμέν. 'Αρ’ οὖν ποτε, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὑ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένῃ τῆς οἰκείας ἄρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; 'Αδύνατον. Ἄναγκη ἀρα κακῆ ψυχῆ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὑ πράττειν. Ἄναγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἄρετὴν γε συνεχωρῆσαμεν ψυχής εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἄδικιάν; Συνεχωρῆσαμεν γάρ. Ἡ μὲν ἀρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὑ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. Φαίνεται, ἐφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε εὑ ξὸν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαιμον, δὲ μὴ τάναντία. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὅ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαιμον, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Ὅντων, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεί, εὐδαίμονα δὲ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ὅνδεποτ’ ἄρα, ὁ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἄδικα δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Ὑσκρατες, εἰστιάσθω εὖ τοῖς Βενδίδιοις. Ὅπως οὖν γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πράος ἐγένοι καὶ χαλεπάων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι, δ’ ἐμαυτὸν, ἀλλ’ οὐ Β διὰ σε’ ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἄει παραφερομένον ἀπογένονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι, καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ οὖτω, πρὶν δ’ τὸ πρῶτον

354 A. ἔστωσαν mss. v. sup. 352 A.

Bvendidios AΠ+. Bvendidelois vulg. Names of festivals are more regularly formed in -ia attached to the stem (Διονύσια, Δίαςia, Ποσειδώνia &c.). mss of Proclus and Origen (see note on 327 A concerning Bendis) have Bvendideia, but mss are not to be trusted in i and ei. The name of the temple, on the other hand, is naturally Bvendideion (Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11).

354 B. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ A+Π+Μ+. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ Ρ+. The error was probably caused by the general sense of the clause obstructing on the copyist’s mind, viz. ‘so I think...’
πλατώνος

ἐσχοπούμεν εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέ-μενος ἐκείνου ὀρμήσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἶτε κακία ἐστίν καὶ ἀμαθία εἶτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὧτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἄδικα τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὖκ

C ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὁ ἐστίν, σχολὴ εἶσομαι εἶτε ἀρετή τις οὗσα τυγχάνει εἶτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὖκ εὐδαιμῶν ἐστίν ἡ εὐδαιμῶν.

B.

357 Ι. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἕμην λόγου ἀπηλ-λάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἤν ἁρα, ὡς ἐοικε, προοίμων. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεὶ τε ἀνδρειότατος ὃν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἀπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Ῥασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἄλλ' ἔφη, Ἡ Ω Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι, ἦ ὡς ἀληθῶς

B πεῖσα διτ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμεινόν ἐστίν δίκαιον εἶναι ἡ ἅδικον; Ἡς ἀληθῶς, εἰπὼν, ἔγωγ' ἀν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἰ. Ὡν τολύνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς δ' βούλει. Λέγε
gάρ μοι. ἀρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόῦτο τί εἶναι ἀγαθόν, δ' 

dεξαίμεθ' ἄν ἔχειν οὐ τὸν ἀποβαίνοντον ἐφιέμενοι, ἄλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα ἀσταζόμενοι; οἶνον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἱδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἐπειτὰ χρόνον διὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται ἀλλο ἡ χαίρειν ἔχουτα.

357 Α. τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι K, which makes a different sense. See note.

357 Β. καὶ μηδὲν...γίγνεται all best mss. ei καὶ...X+ (by editing). καὶ...γίγνεται Stallbaum and old texts.
'Εμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δὲ; ὁ C αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπώμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γυνομένων; οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ὑγιανεῖν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ποὺ δι' ἀμφότερα ἀσταξόμεθα. Ναὶ, εἶπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὅρας τι, ἐφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ὃ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνουτα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμὸς; τάντα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἃν, ὥφελεῖν δὲ ἦμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἐνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα D ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁσα γίγνεται ἃπ' αὐτῶν. 'Εστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ τούτῳ τρίτον. ἄλλα τί δή; Ἑν ποίω, ἐφη, τούτων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τίθης; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἴμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ 358 καλλίστῳ, δ καὶ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γυνόμενα ἃπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἰδοὺς, δ' μισθῶν θ' ἐνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δ' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὁν χαλεπῶν.

Π. Οἴδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Ὀρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὑπὶ ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται· ἄλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἐοίκε, δυσμαθῆς. Ἡθι δή, ἐφη, ἀκουσοῦν καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐὰν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ. Β Ὀρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶαῖτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡσπερ ὁφίς κηληθήναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἐκατέρου.

357 C. φαίμεν made from φαίμεν A. Cf. sup. 352 ε.
358 A. ἐγώ μὲν, οἴμαι, ὅ τι ἐγώ μὲν οἴμαι? See note.
δικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται om. A+ through homoeoteleuton. The words are not strictly necessary.
358 B. ταῦτα δοκῆ ΠΞ̄Ē for ταῦτα δοκῆ. But τάδε would be required.

PL. REP.
πληθυνμό γαρ ἀκούσαι τί τ’ ἔστων ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐνοῦ ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν. οὗτοσὶ οὖν ποιήσω, ἡν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι
C τὸν Ὀρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιο-
σύνην οἶνον εἰναί φασίν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον
de ὃτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀκούται εἰπτη-
δεύσομαι ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν· τρίτον
de ὃτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρᾶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἁρὰ ὁ
tοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ
ἐμοιγε, οὐ Σώκρατες, οὔτι δοκεὶ οὔτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι
diastebhulmenos tа ὁτα ἀκούν Θρασυμάχου καὶ
μυρὼν ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον,
D ὡς ἀμείνων ἀδίκιας, οὔδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι.
βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐγκομιαζόμενον ἀκούσαι.
μάλιστα δ’ οἶμαι ἃν σοῦ πυθέσατί· διὸ κατατείνας
ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδίκον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ εὐδείξομαι
σοι, ὅτι τρόπον αὐτὸ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδίκιαν
μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦτος. ἀλλ’
ὁρα, εἰ σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἀ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα,
Ε ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἃν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις
νοῦν ἐχὼν χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Καλλιστα,
ἐφι, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἐφ’ ἐρεῖν, περὶ τοῦτον
ἀκοῦει, τί <τῷ> ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσῦνη.

358 C. οὗτοι δοκεῖ οὗτως q81. v. sup. 330 a.
diastebhulmenos best mss. The false -λα- is apt to make its
Cf. sup. 348 D. Eustath. (Π. xiii. 396) ἡ πλείων χρήσει δι’ ἐνὸς λ.
θρύλλω might exist beside θρύλεω, but hardly θρύλλω.
358 E. τί δ’ νε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονεν Α + Μ + . τί οἶνον τε Π + .
οἶνον τε Χ + . τί οἶνον τε q81 (followed by γεγονέναι δικαιοσύνην), an
obvious correction. See commentary for the suggestion in the
text τὶ τῷ ὄντι (sc. ἐστὶ) κ.τ.λ. οἶνον τε τί Adam.
Πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέον δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικώσι τε καὶ ἀδικώντα καὶ ἀμφότερων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ 359 αἰρέειν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλους μὴν ἀδικεῖν μὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἀρξάσθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅμοιος τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὐσιῶν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικοῦμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατός ἢ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀμφότερων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, Β ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ός ἄληθώς ἄνδρα οὗτο ἄν ἐνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μῆτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μάνεσθαι γὰρ ἂν· ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὁ Σῶκρατες, αὐτὴ τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ εὖ ὃν πέφυκε, τοιαύτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

III. Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύοντο, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιὸνδε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες C ἔξονσιαν ἐκατέρω ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε

πλέον Α+· πλέον ΠΙΜ1.

γένωνται τ for γεύωνται illustrates errors 'of general resemblance.'

359 A. αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ mss. δοκεῖν Ast, but see note.

ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν Α. αὐτῶν vulg. αὐτὸς ἦ (edited). See comment.

ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν DK, an easy and frequent mistake, spoiling the sense.
δικαίω καὶ τῷ ἄδικῳ, εἰτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαμεν θεώμενοι, τοῦ ἦ-ἐπιθυμία ἐκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβομεν ἃν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἄδικῳ εἰς ταύτων ἴσονα διὰ τὴν πλεονέξιαν, ὅ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσον τιμήν. εἰτ’ δ’ ἂν ἢ ἐξουσία ἢν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἶαι ποτὲ φασίν δύναμιν τῷ [Γύγου]

D τοῦ Λυδίου προγόηρ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὁμβρού δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σείσομοι ραγίνα τι της γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ ἐνεμεν· ἱόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβήναι· καὶ ἰδεὼν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογούσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππου χαλκοῦν κοιλου, θυρίδας ἐχοντα, καθ’ ὁς ἐγκυψαντα ἰδεὼν ἑνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μελῶν ἢ κατ’ Ε ἀνδρωπον’. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἐχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ της χειρι χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὅν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰςθότος, ἠ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μήνα τῷ βασιλεὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκείνου ἐχοντα τῶν δακτύλιον. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφευδόνυν

359 C. τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἄδικῳ might be bracketed by the school of Cobet.

νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ Α. ν. δ. καὶ βίᾳ Π+Μ+, a mistaken emendation.

τῷ Γύγου best ms. τῷ Γύγη Χ Ficinus, without grammar. Hermann ejects the word. τῷ <Γύγη τῷ> Γύγου Adam.

359 D. μυθολογοῦσιν Α+. ἄ μυθολογοῦσι Π+Μ+, a mistaken correction.

359 D—Ε. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἐχεῖν οὐδέν Π+Μ+. ἐχεῖν om. Α+. Its place is taken in Ζ by φέρεω (=φορεῖν) after δακτύλιον, an evident attempt to make grammar in the absence of ἐχεῖν. The archetype almost certainly had no ἐχεῖν. Perhaps e.g. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν <περικείσθαι>, περὶ δὲ... ὅν om. Jackson (without ἐχεῖν), but the case of δακτύλιον is questionable.
τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἰσω τῆς χειρός. τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοις παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφώντα τὸν δακτυλίον στρέψας ἐξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτῳ ἐνυόσαντα ἀποπειράσθαι τὸν δακτυλίον, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντε μὲν εἰσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἁδήλω γίγνεσθαι, ἐξω δὲ δήλω. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασίλεα· ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναίκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύοντα, μετ’ Β ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεί ἀποκτείναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ γενούσθην, καῖ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἀδικος, ούδεις ἃν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμαντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἄλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἀπτεσθαί, ἐξον αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἰδεῶς ὅ τι βούλοιτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰσιόντει εἰς τὰς οἶκιας συγγιγνεσθαι ότως βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτινώναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὔστινας βούλοιτο, καὶ τάλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς

360 Α. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲλ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν ἡβ. ‘Always’ is sufficiently implied.

τῶν παρὰ τῶν βασιλέα om. Α¹, supplied by Α² marg. The words are not indispensable, but Α¹ is guilty of omissions.

360 Β. ὡς δόξειεν mss. ἃν add. Ast, without reason. See comment.

360 C. ἀποκτινώναι mss, the usual form of the present in the Platonic mss, though ἀποκτείνωναι is sufficiently warranted. Schanz Plat. Vol. viii. Proleg. § 3. In 517 a we have εἰ πῶς ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναυτο λαβέων καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτινώναι ἃν; (though not without variation).
Ανθρώποι ισόθεν ούτα. ούτω δε δρόν ουδέν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιή, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ταύτων ἵοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τούτῳ τεκμήριον ἂν φαίνει, ὅτι οὔτε ἐκών δίκαιος ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἔδιδα οὐτος, ἐπει ὑπὸν γ’ ἂν οἴηται ἐκαστος οἴος τε ἐσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. Λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ

Δ’ ἰσται πάς ἄνηρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδία τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθὴ οἴομενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον λόγου λέγων’ ἐπει εἰ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἑπιλαβόμενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικήσαι μηδὲ ἀφαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτόιων, ἀθλιῶτατοι μὲν ἂν δάξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατοι, ἑσταῦον ἡ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβου. ταύτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὔτω.

IV. Τὴν δὲ κρῖσιν αὐτήν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὁν Ε’ λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησόμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οὐδ’ τ’ ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὅρθως· εἰ δἐ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε’ μηδὲν ἀφαιρέμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπ’ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπό τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἐπιτιθήμεν μιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν

diaφέρον π.+

ποιεί μεσ. v. sup. 330 λ.

ἐπὶ τοῦτ’ ἂν ἵοιεν π.+. ἂν was suggested by the following optative.

ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν ΑΠ. ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖ vulg. See note.

360 D. ὡς φήσει Α+Π+. ὡς φήσειν Μ.

ἀνοιγτότατος Α corri., by a hasty adaptation to the other dative. αὐ τὴν Adam for αὐτήν.

360 Ε. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις ἦδε; some texts. See note.

τί οὖν of Α+ is possible but not probable.

to ἑαυτῷ ἐπιτήδευμα Α (proving that the best may err).
ὁ ἀδίκος ὀσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτω· οἴον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τὰ τὸ ἄδινατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διασκόρπίζεται, καὶ τοὺς μὲν 361 ἐπιχειρεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἐὰν· ἐτὶ δὲ ἐὰν ἂρα πη σφαλῇ, ἰκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀδίκος ἐπιχειρῶν ὅρθως τοὺς ἀδικήμασιν λαυθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφῶρα ἀδίκος εἶναι· τὸν ἀλησκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἄδικα δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ δύνατα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελεως ἀδίκω τῇ τελεωτάτῃ ἄδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐστέον τὰ μέγιστα ἄδικοντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακένει εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἂρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατὸ ἐμα, λέγειν τε ἰκανῷ οὕτω πρὸς τὸ πεῖθειν, εὰν τι μηνύθηται τῶν ἀδικήματος, καὶ βιάσασθαι, ὅσα ἂν βίως δέχεται, διὰ τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ρώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευήν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τούτων δὲ τοιούτων θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀνδρα ὀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὕ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐσονται αὐτῷ τιμαί καὶ δωρεῖ δοκοῦντι τοιοῦτῳ εἰναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιούτος εἰη. γνωμωτέος δὴ πάντων πλήν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἄδικια, ἵνα ἦ βεβασανασμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι
υπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων· ἀλλὰ
D ἵτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι
ἀδικος διὰ βίου, ὃν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ
ἐσχατον ἔληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας,
κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῦ εὑραμονέστερος.

V. Βαβαί, ἢν ὑ’ ἔγω, ὥς φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρω-
μένως ἐκάτερον ὅστερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν
ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖς ἀνδρῶιν. Ὡς μάλιστ’, ἐφη, δύναμαι.
ὄντων δὲ τοιούτων, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγκριν, χαλεπὸν
ἐπέξελθεν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει.

Εἰκελτέον οὖν καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικότερος λέγηται, μὴ
ἐμὲ οἶκον λέγειν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας
πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικιᾶν. ἑροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὐτω
διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλόσεται,

362 δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τῶφθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα
κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτι
οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἄλλα δοκεῖν δὲι ἐθέλειν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ
Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἢν ἁρὰ ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ
ἀδικοῦ. τῷ ὑπὶ γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἀδικοῦ, ἀτε ἐπιτη-

10 p. 538 and Theodoret (fl. a.d. 420), Therap. xii. p. 667.

The confusion of the prepositions is common.
Cf. inf. 363 λ.

ἀλλ’ ἵτω Neukirch. ἵτω Α (with η from i) M+. ἵτω Π (which
might suggest ηθεω). ἵτω Euseb., Theod. and γ. All the
readings derive most naturally from ἵτω, an early error by itacism.

361 Ε. ἐκκαυθήσεται A+ Π+. ἐκκοφθήσεται M+ (partly, at
least, through confusion of pronunciation, when ὑ had become
Eng. f). ἐκκοφθήσεται qβ Euseb., Theod. (a frequent substitution
of 2nd fut. form. See comment.).

362 Α. ἀνασκινδυλευθήσεται κ+, Clem. Alex., Euseb. -dαλ-
a few inferior copies. The form is discussed in the notes. ἀνα-
σκολοπισθήσεται of Κ is a gloss.
πολυπαύς ἁληθείας ἔχομενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς
dόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἄλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

βαθείαν ἄλκα διὰ φρενὸς καρποῦμενον,
εἴ ἦς τὰ κεδυνα βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, Ὁ

πρῶτον μὲν άρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ
εἶναι, ἐπειτά γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἄν βούληται, ἐκδίδοναι
εἰς οὕς ἄν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἄν
ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὁφελεῖσθαι κερδαί-
νοντα τῷ μη δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἁδίκειν: εἰς ἁγὸνας
τοῖνοι ἱόντα καὶ ἵδια καὶ δημοσία περιγύγνεσθαι καὶ
πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλούτειν
καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς
βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοίς θυσίας καὶ ἁναθήματα ἴκανοὺς
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ
θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεούς καὶ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὕς ἄν βούληται, ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλέ-
στερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων
ἡ τοῦ δικαίου. οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατε, παρὰ θεῶν
καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἁδίκῳ παρεσκευάζθαι τὸν
βίον ἄμεινον ἡ τῷ δικαίῳ.

VI. Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν

νῦ εἰχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ
'Αδείμαντος, Οὐ τί ποιεῖν, ἐφή, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἴκανος
eιρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἁλλὰ τί μή; εἴπον.
Αὐτό, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἰρηται ὁ μάλιστα ἐδει ρηθήναι.
Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ
pαρείπ. ὡστε καὶ σὺ, εἰ τί ὀδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμενε.
καίτοι ἐμὲ γε ἴκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ρηθέντα
καταπαλαίσαι καὶ ἁδύνατον ποιήσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιο-

362 D. ἐφη after οὖ τί ποιεῖν om. A + M. The cause of loss
was perhaps the general pronunciation of the sentence.
Εσύνη. καί ὃς, ὸυδέν, ἐφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐτι καὶ τάδε ἀκούε. δεὶ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίονς λόγους ὃν ὦδε εἴπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵνα ἥ σαφέστερον ὦ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δὲ ποι καὶ παρακέλευσεν ταῖς νείσιν καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὦς χρὴ δικαίων εἶναι, οὐκ ἀυτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ίνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνεται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαῖ τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσα περ Γλαύκων διήλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν όντα τῷ δικαίῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἁγαθὰ τοῖς ὁσίοις, ἀς φασὶ θεοὺς διδόναι, ὡσπερ ὁ γεωναῖος Β' Ἡσίόδος τε καὶ Ὄμηρος φασὶν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν

ἀκρας μὲν τέ φέρειν βαλανοῦς, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας·
eiropόκοι δὲ οἶες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβε- βρίθαισιν,
καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά ἁγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα· παρα-
pλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος· ὡστε τευ γάρ φησιν

362 Ε. νείσι editors. Schanz (Plat. Vol. xii. Proleg. § 5) concludes from msx that *ὑός, not ὦός, was the form in the archetyp. But Meisterhans (§ 17. 4) shows that ὦός is good for Plato's date. The remark of Theognostus (Bek. Anecd. 1426 b) ὦός καὶ γνώς· ταῦτα δὲ ὢτικοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἄ γράφουσι refers to a more modern Attic.

363 A. αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην +, the facile change of misconception.

tοῦ δικαιο B+Π+Μ+. om. DK Ficinus. τοῦ ἀδίκῳ ΧЮ, followed by most editors. But see comment.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

ἡ βασιλῆς ἄμυμονος, ὡστε θεοῦ ἡ εὐδικίας ἀνέχθη, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα πυρὸς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθησι δὲ δευδρεαὶς καρπῶν, τίκτη δὲ ἐμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἵχθυς.

Μουσαίος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τὰ γαθᾶ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αυτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόσων τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς "Αἰδοῦ γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἑστεφανωμένους ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἀπαντα χρόνον ἢ διάγειν μεθύοντας, ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον· οἱ δὲ ἐτὶ τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοῦς παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παῖδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀλλὰ τοιαύτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην· τός δὲ ἀνοσίως αὐτὶ καὶ ἄδικους εἰς πῆλον τίνα κατορύπτουσιν ἐν "Αἰδον καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὑδῷ αναγκάζουσιν φέρειν, ἐτὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἀπερὶ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἄδικων διήλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄδικων λέγοντων, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐχοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐπαινοῖ καὶ οὗ τοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκατέρων.

VII. Πρὸς δὲ τούτων σκέψασθαι, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς τοῦ δὸς λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικαις ἱδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ υπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ 364

363 d. ἀποτίνουσιν q, followed by Adam: but μακροτέρους is not melōs.

κατόπισθε II, but copyists had a notion that ν ἐφελκυστικῶν preceded vowels only. Meisterhans (§ 42) shows that it was almost as common before consonants. Cf. Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 17.
Δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ δικαίωσιν, ὡς καλῶν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη
te καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπῶν μὲντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον·
ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδίκια ἤδυ μὲν καὶ εὐπετεῖς κτή-
sασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. Λυσιτε-
λέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος
λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις
ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμῶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν
dημοσία τε καὶ ἱδία, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν,
Β οἱ ἂν πη ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πέντες ὥσιν, ὀμολογοῦντες
αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάν-
tων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγου καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιῶ-
tατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἀρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ἀγαθοὶς
dυστυχίας τε καὶ βίων κακῶν ἑνεμαν, τοὺς δ' ἐναν-
tίους ἑναντίαν μοίραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ
πλουσίων θύρας ἱόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἐστὶ παρὰ
σφία σύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ
C ἐπροδαῖς, εἰτε τι ἀδίκημα τοῦ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ
προγόνων, ἀκείσθαι μεθ' ἤδονον τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, εάν
τε τίνα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλη μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπα-
νῶν, ὀμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκω βλάψειν ἐπαγωγάς τισῶν
καὶ καταδέσμων, τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς φασίν, πείθουτές
σφίων ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτως δὲ πάσιν τοῖς λόγοις
μάρτυρας ποιητάς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι
εὐπετείαις διδόντες, ὡς

364 A. τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη om. A+ through homoeoteleuton.
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον (a gloss) x+.
364 C. The present text removes a comma after πημῆναι
ἔθελη.
βλάψει q. βλάψει c ett. βλάψει Muretus. The accidental
loss of the v-sign, or a misconception, may be responsible for the
error.
(LL) οἱ... for διδόντες Muretus and Cobet, unnecessarily. More-
over it is the charlatans, and not the poets, who are the subject.
τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὄδὸς, μάλα δ’ ἐγγύθι ναίει. Ὁ τῆς ὧ’ ἀρετῆς ἱδρώτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἐθηκαν
καὶ τινα ὄδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγὴς τῶν "Ομηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἑκείνος ἔτευν
λιστοὶ δὲ [στρεπτοὶ] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοῖ, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισαι καὶ εὐχωλαίς ἀγαναίσιν
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῷ ἀνθρωποὶ ἔλισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.
βίβλων δὲ ὁμαδὸν παρέχονται Μουσαίον καὶ Ὄρφεως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασί, καθ’ ἃς θυηπολούσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιάς ἕδονὼν εἰσὶ μὲν ἐτὶ ξώσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς ἕτη τελετᾶς 365 καλούσιν, αἱ τῶν ἑκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.
VIII. Ταύτα πάντα, ἐφη, ὦ φίλε Σῶκρατες, τοιαύτα καὶ τοσαύτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ

λείη mss. ὄλγη mss of Hesiod. Qu. λυτή as the original in Hesiod, though not in Plato? See note.

364 D. καὶ τραχεῶν add. A² mg. after ἀνάντη, a note to complete the Hesiodic description.

στρεπτὸς δὲ τε Π + M⁺, λιστοὶ στρεπτὸς τε Π², λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτὸς τε Α, λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτὸς δὲ τε Α². See note.

eὐχωλὴς ἀγανησί Χ, restoring the exact Homeric form. Cf. inf. 365 ε.

364 E. ἐγγόνων Λst: but see note.
κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οίμεθα ἀκουόντας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὥσοι εὐθυεῖς καὶ ἴκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογισμοῦ τιμῶν, ποῖος ὢς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἄν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ Πότερον δίκα τείχος ὑψιοῦ ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβᾶς καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲν φασιν εἰναί, πόνους δὲ καὶ ξημίας φανερᾶς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασμένως θεσπέσιος.

C βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιαται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἄρετής περιγραπτέου, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἐλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀλλο οὐδὲν εὑπετές, Φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων: ἀλλ' ὀμοί, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονίσεϊν, ταὐτὴ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων

365 A. ἐφιπτάμενοι a recent corrector in A. Schanz Plat. Vol. xii. Proleg. § 17 agrees with Cobet as to the prose forms. See note. ἐπιστάμενοι ΔΚ, a misreading.

365 B. τοῖς ἡθοῖσιν for πῆ.

δικαίον (for δικαίον) most mss. δικαίον would have been written δική at once, but δικαίον suggests the plural. δικαίον X+. The δικαίον of θ is simply a misreading δικαίον' (where ἴν representatives οὐ).

καὶ before ἐμαυτὸν om. ΔΚ. It can be spared, and there was a tendency to insert καὶ between participles, one dependent on the other.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ Α+Π+Μ+. ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ Χ+, a mistaken conjecture. See comment.
φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνειν ἔνωμοςιάς τε καὶ ἐπαιρέας συνάξωμεν, εἰσὶν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λαυθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατὸν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν µή εἰσὶν ἡ µηδὲν αὐτοίς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων µέλει, <οὐδὲν> καὶ ἡµῖν µελητέον τοῦ λαυθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ Ἐ ἐπιµελεύονται, οὐκ ἀλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσµεν ἢ ἀκηκόαµεν, ἡ ἕκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάµτων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσίν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανήσιων καὶ ἀναθήµασιν παράγοντες ἀναπειθόµενοι· οἶς ἡ ἀµφότερα ἡ οὐδέτερα πειστέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικηµάτων. δικαίου µὲν γὰρ οὖντες 366 ἀξίµιοι µὲν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσώµεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόµεθα· ἀδικοὶ δὲ κερδανοῦµεν τε καὶ λισσόµενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀµαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀξίµιοι ἀπαλλάξοµεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἀιδοὶ δικὴν δώσοµεν ὅν ἀν ἐνθάδε ἀδικῆσωµεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἡ παῖδες παῖδων. ἄλλ', ὡ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόµενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὐτὸ µέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοὶ, ὡς αἱ µέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν Β παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφητηται τῶν θεῶν γενόµενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὖτως ἔχειν µηνύουσιν.

365 δ. καὶ ἡµῖν µελητέον Α+Π+Μ+ τι καὶ ἡµῖν µ. Χ++. ροθ' ἡµῖν µ. 9β1. καὶ ἡµῖν οὐ µελ. δ. καὶ ἡµῖν ἀµελητέον Baiter. For the suggestion in the text see note.

365 ε. ἀγαναίοι Χ++. Cf. sup. 364 δ.

366 α. ἀξίµιοι µὲν Muretus. ἀξ. µόνον Π+Μ++. ἀξίµιοι Α++. Probably µὲν was mistaken for µὸν, or µ' so misread.

αθ µέγα δύνανται om. Α+Μ+Π1 through homoeoteleuton. Cf. sup. 364 Α. Hermann's ἀλλ' ῥφελήσουσιν ἀγνώσµενος is reckless.
IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐτὶ λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἄν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροὶμεθ’ ἃν; ἂν ἐὰν μετ’ εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλων κτησάμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοὶς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπωις πράξεμεν κατὰ νοῦν ξοντεῖς τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἱρημένων τίς

C μιχανῆ, ὁ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ὃ τις δύναμις ὑπάρξει ψυχῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ σώματος ἡ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελάν ἐπαινομένης ἀκοῦοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἰ τις ἐχει ψευδή μὲν ἀποφήναι ἢ εἰρήκαμεν, ἰκανὸς δὲ ἐγγωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλὴν που συγγνώμην ἐχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλ’ οίδεν ὅτι, πλὴν εἰ τις θέη φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἑπιστήμην λαβῶν ἀπέχεται

D αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπὲρ ἀλλῶν οὐδείς ἐκῶν δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἡ γῆρως ἡ τυφεσ ἀλλῆς ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δράν. ὡς δὲ, δὴλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἠλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεὶ, καθ’ ὅσον ἄν οἶδος τ’ ἃ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἀλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, θευρπεὶ ἄπας ὁ λόγος οὔτος ὁρμησεν καὶ ἑδε καὶ ἔμοι πρὸς σὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ὡ θαυμάσιε, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι

Ε ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἰναι, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς ἀρχῆς

366 C. ψυχῆς Α+Π¹+. τίχης Α mg. Π²Μ+. The confusion of ψ and τ is common.

366 D. ὃς δὲ, δὴλον ΠΙ+Μ+Α². ὅδε (or ὅ δὲ) Α. ὅδε δὲ Χ+. εἰπείν Α (corrected to εἰπείν), through the frequency of ἐφη or ἐπε after a quotation has begun.

366 D—Ε. ὑμῶν ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης Α+Μ (omitting εἰναι). εἰναι add. vulg. ἡμῶν ὅσοι ἐπ. φαμεν τῇ (sic) δ. εἰναι Π. The omission of εἰναι is remarkable, as is also the error in Π. φατὲ might be adscript, but is an unlikely one. Qu. e.g. ὅσοι ἐπαινέται τέφανθε δικαιοσύνης (though τέφανθε is not actually found).
367 Α. ἀριστος is interpolated by some copies before or after ἐκαστος.

ξύνοικος θ Α + Μ+. ξυνοικοις Π+. See note.

ὦς γ" ἐμοὶ Π.X. ὦς γέ μοι Α + Μ+. 

367 C. ἀλλα τὸ δοκεῖν after ψέγειν om. A, suppl. A² mg. The
άδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκον αὐτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἢπτουν ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁμολογησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἢ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἑνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, ὅσ' ὥραν, D ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ψυχαίνειν δὴ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἁγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἄλλ' οὐ δόξῃ εὔστιν,— τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει· μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρει ἄλλοις ἐπαίνειν. ὡς ἔγω τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχολημένοι ἀν σύνως ἐπαίνοντος δικαιοσύνης καὶ ψευδότων ἁδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδοροῦντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις, διότι Επάντα τὸν βίον οὐδέν ἄλλο σκόπων διελήλυθας ἤ τούτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἁδικίας κρείττον, ἄλλα τι ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἐχοντα αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν, ἐὰν τε λαυθάνῃ ἐὰν τε μὴ θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἤ μὲν ἁγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακὸν ἑστι.

Χ. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἂεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτἀρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἡσθην καὶ εἶπον. Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ύμᾶς, ὃ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρος, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν words might be understood, but they suit the conversational emphasis.

367 D. ἀνασχολημένοι ΕΠ and apparently Ficinus (sustinerem). ἀποδεχολήμην Π + A² mg. ἀποσχολημένοι Α+. See note. κελεύοις Α + Μ+. κελεύεις vulg.

367 Σ. κρείττων ΕΠ. αὐτὴν δι' αὐτὴν Α + Π+. αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν Μ+.
ελεγείον εποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμή-σαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην, εἴπον
παίδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλείνον θείον γένος ἀνδρός.
tούτῳ μοι, ὥς φίλοι, εὖ δοκεί ἔχειν. πάνυ γὰρ θείον
πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδίκιαν δικαιοσύνης ἀμεινὸν εἶναι, οὔτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.
δοκείτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεισθαί. τεκμαίρομαι B
de ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ
gε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἢπίστων ἂν ὑμῖν. ὡς ἄν
dὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὧ τι
χρήσωμαι. οὐτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθόν ἔχω. δοκῶ γὰρ
μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι. σημείον δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἡ πρὸς
Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὅμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἀμεινὸν
dικαιοσύνη ἀδίκιας, οὐκ ἀπεδεξασθέ μου. οὔτ' αὐτ
ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω. δέδοικα γὰρ, μὴ οὔδ' ὅσιον ἦ
παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορομεμέγη ἀπαγο-
ρεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἐτι ἐμπνεόντα καὶ δυνάμενον
φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὔτως ὅπως δύναμαι
ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. ὧ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖνα τῶν
λόγων, ἄλλα διερεύνησασθαι τὰ τε ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον
καὶ περὶ τῆς ὀφελίας αὐτοῖν τάληθες ποτέρως ἔχει.
εἰπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἐδοξέων, ὅτι Τὸ δίκημα ὧ ὑπερ-ρούμεν οὖν ὁμοῦ ἂλλ' ὧδ' βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ
φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἥμεις οὐ δεινοὶ, δοκεῖ μοι, ἢν ὦ D

368 A. τῆν ἐν Μεγαρῷ τ+. See note. The same copies have ἐκεῖνον for κλείνοι, partly from the preceding ἐκεῖνον and partly from misreading.
368 B. ὃ τι χρήσωμαι ΑΠ, ὃ τι χρήσωμαι Α²ΞηΒ. Both are possible. See comment.
68 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

ἐγὼ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἴανπερ ἂν
ἐι προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ τὸρρωθεν ἀνα-
γρώναι μὴ πάνυ ὄξυ βλέπονσιν, ἐπειτα τις ἑνενόησεν,
ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε
καὶ ἐν μείζου. ἔρμαιον ἂν ἑφάνη, οἷμαι, ἕκεινα
πρῶτον ἀναγνώντας οὔτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἑλάττω, εἰ
tὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ
Ἐ' Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ᾧ Ὁσκρατεῖ, ἐν τῇ
περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσει καθορᾶσ; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφην,
ἔρω. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἐστὶ μὲν ἄνδρὸς ἐνός, ἐστι
δὲ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν
μείζων πόλει ἐνός ἄνδρός; Μείζων, ἐφη. Ἰσως τοῖνυν
πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζων ἐνεῖθ καὶ ῥάων
369 καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
ζητήσωμεν πολύν τι ἔστιν' ἐπείτα οὔτως ἐπισκεψώ-
μεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ, τῇ τοῦ μείζωνος ὁμοίωτητα
ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἑλάττωνος ἴδεα ἐπισκοποῦντες. Ἀλλὰ μοι
dοκεῖς, ἐφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ
γυνομένην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τῇ δικαιο-
σύνῃ αὐτῆς ἴδομεν ἂν γυνομένην καὶ τῇ ἄδικίᾳ;
Τάχ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπὶς
Β εὑπετέστερον ἴδεῖν ὁ ζητοῦμεν; Πολὺ γε. Δοκεῖ οὖν
χρήναι ἐπιχειρήσαι περαίνειν; οἷμαι μὲν γὰρ οὖν
ἄλλον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἐσκέπται,
ἐφη ὁ' Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μη ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

368 D. A comma only is usually read after μείζων.
368 Ε. μείζων A²+. But μείζων is manifestly better here.
369 Α. ζητήσωμεν some Florentine copies.
NOTES.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ. The Republic was regularly known in antiquity under the name of Πολιτεία. Whether Plato himself gave it that title cannot be determined, but he must at least have recognised that such a name would befit the dialogue, since in Tim. 17 b he uses the expression τῶν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ῥηθέντων λόγων περὶ πολιτείας. From Aristotle downwards it is so referred to, and Cicero, when he does not translate by Respublica, retains either the Greek Πολιτεία or transcribes as Politia. Cf. Epist. ad Att. iv. 16 feci idem quod in Πολιτεία deus ille noster Plato and de Div. ii. 27 Platonis Politiam nuper apud me mures corroserunt.

Later the plural Πολιτείαι appears, and the chief ms of the Republic (Par. A) bears the inscription Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαι, ἦ περὶ δικαίου. This illogical plural refers (like the expression ‘the Aenecids of Vergil’) to the several books. Thus Πολιτείων πρώτη of the Aldine edition stands for Πολιτείων πρώτη πολιτεία (or βιβλιοσ).

Diogenes Laertius (iii. 60) has Πολιτεία, ἦ περὶ δικαίου πολιτικὸς (sc. διάλογος or λόγος), quoting the secondary title and classification of Thrasyllus (or Thrasylus), a rhetorician of the age of Augustus and Tiberius, who gave similar designations to all the dialogues, e.g. Παρμενίδης, ἦ περὶ ιδεών, λογικὸς and Εὔθοφρων, ἦ περὶ όσίων, πειραστικὸς (v. Grote Plato Vol. i. c. iv. pp. 158 sqq.). The same Thrasyllus also divided the dialogues into rather fanciful tetralogies based on the alleged share of each set in a common theme (κοινὴ ὑπόθεσις). In this, however, he had been preceded by an arrangement in trilogies (after the dramatic example) made by Aristophanes of Byzantium.

The term πολιτικὸς refers to the place of the dialogue in the following scheme of distribution made (or adopted) by Thrasylus—
It has been pointed out (Introd. §§ 57 sqq.) that the first book of the Republic is separable as a dialogue 'of search,' and that the expository character belongs to the later portion.

BOOK I.

327 A. κατέβην χθές κ.τ.λ. There is a familiar story that a few of the opening words of the Republic were found written upon Plato's tablets in various arrangements. Dionysius Halicar. De Comp. Verb. v. p. 209 (Reiske) says that there was discovered a tablet containing ποικλος μετακειμένην τήν ἀρχήν τῆς Πολιτειας τήνες Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαυκώνος τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. Quintilian Inst. Or. viii. 6. 64 says it was the first four words (inventa sunt quattuor illa verba), and rightly remarks that the various arrangements aimed at making the language rhythmical (numerosum). Diog. Laert. iii. 25. 37 does not mention the number of words, but only that it was 'the beginning of the Republic.'

It is impossible to decide whether there is any truth in the story or not. What it points to is the recognition of the fact that Greek writers spared no pains in the elaboration of their style and its rhythm. For the care spent upon the latter see Aristotle Rhet. iii. c. 8. Blass and others have done much for the appreciation of the style of Demosthenes by investigating its principles of rhythm and euphony.

eἰς Πειραιᾶ. Equally allowable is εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ.

Originally ὁ Πειραιῶν was adjective, with λιμήν expressed or understood. As a town grew and came to be thought of more than the harbour the article was dropped, although the older expression was too inveterate for the article to be omitted consistently. The same phenomenon of language is familiar in new countries. A river is called 'the Werribee' or 'the Thames'; a town grows beside it and is first called 'the Werribee' or 'Werribee,' 'the Thames' or 'Thames' indiscriminately; later the article gradually disappears.

From the middle of Athens to the middle of the Peiraeus was about five miles.

Πειραιᾶ. In Attic Greek of the 5th and early 4th century, in the declension of adjectives or nouns in -εὸς following iota, contraction always took place, where it was possible, in the last syllable, e.g. Πειραιᾶ, Πειραιῶν, &c. So Δωριᾶ, Δωριᾶς, Δωριῶν,
as against Φωκέα, Φωκέας, Φωκέων. See Meisterhans Gramm. Att. Insch. § 55 b) 9, who quotes θεσπιάς, Παιανίων, Αλγιλίως. Thomas Mag. 287 says Πειραιῶς Ἀττικῶν; Πειραιῶν κοινών. The uncontracted forms came in with other innovations (e.g. -εῖς in nom. and acc.) later in the 4th cent. Hence inf. 328 b we must write Παιανία and not -έα with most editors.

Γλαύκωνος. For the persona of the dialogue see Introduction § 3 c.

τῇ θεό. That the goddess was Bendis seems clear from 354 ά, ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδίδιοις. Bendis was a Thracian goddess, often identified by the Greeks with Artemis.

Hesychius has Βένδις (Βενδίς is a variant accentuation) ἦ Ἀρτεμις. Origen (adv. Cels. 631 ε), with this passage in mind, writes προσευξόμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι. Proclus (Tim. p. 9, Polit. p. 358) makes Bendis the Thracian name for Artemis and Selene, and places the Bendidia on the 19th of Thargelion (April—May). In Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11 τὸ Βενδίδειον is near the temple of the Greek Artemis on the promontory of Munychia at Peiraeus. The Peiraeus, being the port, and therefore full of Athenian sailors who had made acquaintance with foreign customs, as well as of foreign sailors and merchants who paid frequent visits or actually resided on business, was a natural place for the first establishment of foreign divinities.

Socrates, here as elsewhere, poses as ready to offer the same pious worship as any other average respectable Athenian.

θεό. ή θεός, not ή θεό, is the proper expression in Attic prose and comedy, except where an express opposition is desired between the masculine and feminine, e.g. in μᾶ θεόν, μᾶ θεός (Symp. 219 c). [Cf. the necessity of forming the Latin deabus in distinction from deis.]

Inscriptions carry out this rule till after b.c. 300. Thus τῶ θεό (=Demeter and Persephone), but τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς. See Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 47 a) 4.

It is probable, however, that in certain expressions, e.g. αἱ σεμναὶ θεαῖ, the feminine form alone was used, the instinct of analogy calling for a full correspondence when article is combined with adjective, while it might not do so with article alone. (So it is allowable to join δῶ with either dual or plural, but δῶν regularly demands an accompanying dual because of its own pronounced dual shape.)

τὴν ἐορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσωμι. The order shows that the construction is not θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσωμι τὴν ἐορτήν, but the more idiomatic θεάσασθαι τὴν ἐορτήν,
(i.e.) τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν (αὐτήν). Cf. inf. c ὅρᾳς ὅυν ἡμᾶς, δοῦ ἐσμέν; 332 β ἤμιξατο τὸ δίκαιον, δ ἐν. Soph. Aj. 118 ὅρας, Ἦδοςε, τὴν θεών λαχύν, δοῖ:

Both forms of expression are good Greek in themselves, and in e.g. Eur. Med. 451 μὴ παύσῃ ποτὲ | λέγωσι 'Ἰάσων ὡς κάκιστος ἢςτ' ἀνήρ, the only inducement to read 'Ἰάσων' lies in overpartiality for an idiom.

ποιήσουσιν. A difference deserves noting. ἐορτὴν ποιεῖσθαι=a resolved verb, viz. ἐορτάζειν, while ἐορτὴν ποιεῖν='conduct, or perform, a festival,' the action not being regarded in its reflexive bearing, but as done for the god or goddess (cf. ἔρκεθν ὄσιαν &c.). ἀτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες—sc. αὐτὴν. The date of the first introduction of Bendis-worship is unknown, and, in any case, need not be the same as the date of the first public recognition of a festival in her honour.

καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπῆ. The function of καὶ would be expressed in English by emphasizing 'local.' In the ultimate analysis the sense is 'now the procession of the local people also (i.e. as well as that of the Thracians about to be mentioned) appeared to me to be a fine one.'

οὐ μέντοι... μέντοι answers to μὲν in a somewhat stronger way than δὲ. Cf. 329 Ε λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε δοὺν οἶνται. 364 Α καλῶν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ, χαλεπὰν μέντοι καὶ ἐπιπον. Apol. 38 Α ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωσα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.

It was natural to avoid οὐ δὲ, but that difficulty might have been got over by writing οὐχ ἤττον δὲ.

Riddell (Plato Apology, Digest of Idioms p. 188) sums up his collections with the conclusion that μέντοι is preferred to δὲ (1) when particular emphasis is to be given to the opposition, (2) where δὲ could not be conveniently used, (3) in opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δὲ.

327 B. ὃμημένους—a frequent perfect-present. 'When we had started' = 'when we were on our way.'

μου...λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου—'taking hold of me by the cloak.' The partitive genitive is used of that part by which a man seizes, drags, holds or hangs a person or thing; e.g. ἐλκεῖν τινὰ τοῦ ποδός, κρεμάσαι τινὰ τῶν σκελῶν, σπάν τινα τῆς κόμης. Any such verb may take this construction, whether, like λαμβάνοιν, ἄπτεσθαι &c., it takes in its own right a genitive of the whole person or thing (here μου) as well as the genitive of the part, or whether its own regimen is an accusative.
For the situation Stallbaum quotes Terence Phorm. v. 6. 23 puer ad me accurrir; pone adprendit pallio.

ὁποὺ αὐτὸς εἶη. Besides the sense *(Polemarchus) himself,* aὐτὸς conveys, relatively to the slave, the implication *his master.* Cf. the aὐτὸς ἐφα *ipse dixit* of the disciples of Pythagoras. Ar. Nub. 218

ΣΤ. φέρε τίς γὰρ οὗτος οὐπὶ τῆς κρεμάθρας ἀνήρ;
MAΘ. aὐτὸς.

ΣΤ. τίς αὐτὸς; MAΘ. Σωκράτης.

Ar. Frag. 261 ἀνοιγέτω τίς δώματι. aὐτὸς ἐρχεται. Catullus iii. 7 suamque norat | ipsam tam bene quam puella matrem. The same implication exists in Prot. 314 δ ἔα, Ἕφη, σοφισταὶ ῥίνες ὄν σχολή aὐτῶ (‘my master’). Bosanquet (‘Companion to Plato’s Republic’) compares a Scotch usage of *himself* to indicate an important personage.

οὗτος προσέρχεται—*yonder he comes.* The deictic οὗτος and ὅδε are often thus used with verbs where we should employ an adverb. Cf. Hom. Il. x. 82 τίς δ’ οὗτος κατά νῆα...ἐρχεσί; Eur. Phoen. 443, καὶ μὴν Ἐτεοκλῆς...όδε χωρεῖ.


For a different repetition of ἀλλὰ v. inf. 337 ν.

ἡ δ’ δς ὁ Γλαύκων. The whole expression ἡ δ’ δς is archaic. The verb ἡμι is found in Attic Greek only in the survivals ἡν and ἤ, and then only in conjunction with δ’ ἐγώ and δ’ δς (δ’ ἤ) respectively.

δς is the old demonstrative pronoun (Hom. Od. i. 286 δς γὰρ δεύτατος ἡλευ), which survived in this particular combination as in the expression καὶ δς ‘and he.’ The δ’ is due to places in which the particle once actually connected sentences (‘and I said’). The necessarily very frequent combination of ἡ δ’ δς, in which the particle was connective, led, when ἡ and δς had both become archaic, to a fusion of the whole expression practically into one word (‘quotha’), and the particle was incorporated even where it was meaningless. In conversation ‘said he, ‘said I,’ are used so perpetually by all classes that the old expression for these senses withstood the changes which time brought to less every-day parts of ἡμι and of the demonstrative.
ó Γλαύκων might appear to be grammatically exegetical of ὅς, but, as a fact, its addition shows that ἤ-ὅ-ὅς has come to be simply the equivalent of ἐφι, as ἤν-ὅ-ἕω of ἐφιν.

327 C. ὅς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς—either (1) ‘to all appearance, from the procession,’ i.e. one might conclude that they were coming from the ceremony; or (2) ὅς gives a reason for their being together for this lucky meeting, ‘as was natural with people making a move after the procession.’ The latter rendering has more point, and is properly given in Stallbaum’s ‘quippe qui pompe interfuissent.’

πρὸς ἀστυ. Above (b) we have πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ.

As with τείχος, πύλης, ἀγρός, &c., the article may be present or absent, though not indifferently. It is incorrect to say that the article is ‘omitted.’ Such combinations as ἐν ἀγορᾷ, ἐξω τείχους, ἐς ἀγρόν, πρὸς ἀστυ belong to a period before the article came into regular use, and, being familiar expressions of everyday occurrence, they were retained in a shape which was not only permissible but normal. When the article is added there is an appreciable difference in suggestion. Thus ἐξω τείχους (Phaedr. init.) is simply an adverb, ‘out of walls,’ the opposite of ἐνδοῦ; ἐς ἀγρόν is ‘up country,’ the opposite of ‘in town’; πρὸς ἀστυ is ‘cityward,’ i.e. ‘inwards’ as opposed to ‘outwards.’ The particular τείχος, ἀγρός, ἀστυ are not contemplated; the expression is generic. Cf. ‘up stairs,’ ‘at home,’ ‘to market’ &c. On the other hand ἐξω τοῦ τείχους = ‘outside the wall (well-known)’ or ‘its wall’; πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ = ‘towards the city (which lay near)’: the wall or city being specific and individual to the consciousness of the speaker. The difference may be realised by comparing the delicate ways in which we use ‘go to market’ and ‘go to the market,’ ‘go to town’ and ‘go to the town.’

οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις: ‘yes, your surmise is not amiss’: literally (‘we are going townwards,) for your surmise’ &c. Cf. Phaedr. 228 c ὃς μοι δοκεῖς σὺν σκάμμα ως με ἀφήσειν πρὶν ἀν εἰπω. ΣΩ. πάνυ γὰρ σοι ἀλήθη δοκῶ. Sometimes γὰρ in assent is combined with other particles, e.g. Theaet. 170 ΣΩ. τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἰναι φησί ποι τὸ δοκεῖ; ΘΕ. φησι γὰρ ὁδ. The ellipse is sometimes actually supplied, e.g. inf. 329 ε ἀλήθη, ἐφι, λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται.

For the playful threat of force cf. Philob. 16 λ ἄρ', οὐ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλήθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; Phaedr. 236 ο εἰσέν ἐς μὴν μὲν ἐν ἔρμην, ὑψυχρότερον δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος.

οὖκον...ἐτὶ ἐλλειπτεῖαι τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ψιφάς κ.τ.λ. The evidence of mss is in favour of ἐλλειπτεῖαι, though the margin of A has
ἐν λείπεται. ἐτί ἐλλείπεται = 'there is still left unstated.' ἐλλείπειν τι = 'to leave unpaid': cf. Dem. Timoc. 753 ἐλλειποῦτες εἰςφοράν (al. τὰς ἐςφοράς). Aristot. Ath. Pol. 48. 1 καὶ τις ἐλλεύη καταβολήν. Lucian Icarom. 24 διὰ τίνα αλλαν ἐλλείποιεν τὰ Διάσia. Hence in the passive, as here, Phileb. 18 ν. Thus the meaning is that there is still a deficiency in the account. The pleonasm in ἐτι ἐλλείπεται is too slight and natural to cause offence.

With τὸ the place of a noun is taken by the following notion in the group of words ἣν πείσωμεν κ.τ.λ.; 'the alternative that we should persuade you': literally 'the (proposition), if we persuade you.' Cf. inf. 332 α. Xen. Cyr. ν. 1. 21 τὸ ἐὰν μένητε παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀποδώσω. Demosth. Aristocr. 693 ὑπερβάς τὸ καὶ ἀλῷ φῶν' καὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἀπεκτονεῖαι κ.τ.λ.

Whether we should read ὀὐκοῦν, ὀὐκοῦν, or ὦκ ὦν, is dubious, and cannot be settled positively by a priori arguments. The question here, however, appears naturally to involve the stress on the negative element ὀὐκ, which regularly corresponds to the sense nonne, whereas in e.g. inf. 338 δ, 348 ε, &c., Xen. Cyr. π. 4. 15 ὀὐκοῦν σοι δοκεῖ σύμφορον εἶναι τὸ λεηθέναι ἡμᾶς ταῦτα βουλεύοντας; the word ὀὐκοῦν is simply = ἀρα, ergo, the sentence being really an inference put in the form of a question. ὀὐκοῦν should mean 'then there is left...is there not?' which is obviously away from the mark in our passage.

ὡς τοῖνυν μὴ ἀκούσομένων, ὀὐτω διανοεῖτο—literally 'on the understanding that we shall not listen, so make up your minds.' For this form of expression (which is common enough) see Goodwin Moods and Tenses § 917 sq. Cf. Phaedr. 244 c ὦς καλὸν ὄντος...οὕτω νομίσαντες ἔθεντο, Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 6 ὦς ἐμοὶ ὅντος ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἐχέτε, Cyr. π. 3. 15 ὦς ἐμοὶ ἄγνωσιομένου, οὕτως γλυκωσκε. With accus. absol. of the neuter impersonal Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 30 ὦς τἀν μοι δοκοῦν...οὕτως ὑσθι. Without οὕτω Soph. Aj. 281 ὦς ὁδ' ἔχοντων τῶν' ἐπισταται δε σχρῆ, Eur. Med. 1311 ὦς οὐκέτι' ὄντων αὖν τέκνων φροντίζε δή. The redundant οὕτω sums up or emphasizes the ὦς-clause; conversely the ὦς-clause might be regarded as explanatory anticipation of οὕτω. So, in Latin, sic is frequently redundant with indicio, sentio &c.

μἡ with the participle is probably rather due to the imperative context than to any hypothetical tone in the ὦς-clause itself. The statement is of a fact, 'we will not listen,' not 'as if then you have to deal with people who will not listen...' So Thucyd. vii.
NOTES.

15 ὡς τῶν στρατιωτῶν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε.

328 A. οὐδ' ἵστε—‘do you not so much as know?’ = ‘are you actually ignorant?’

οὐδὲ gives in negative statements and questions the same tone of surprised emphasis which belongs to καί in the positive. Thus οὐδ' ἵστε; καί ἀγνοεῖτε: δέδοικα μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ, ‘I am afraid it is actually wicked.’

λαμπάς, i.e. λαμπάδηδρομία or λαμπάδηφορία. Cf. λαμπάδα δραμείν, νικάρ, &c.

The usual method of procedure was with competing chains of runners, each chain forming a ‘side’ in the game. For every chain there was a torch, which must be carried to the goal alight. Each runner handed on the torch to the next man in his line (Lucr. p. 79 et quasi cursores vitali lampada tradunt after Plato’s καβάτερ λαμπάδα τῶν βίων παραδιδόμασ αἵλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων (Legg. 776 b)), and the winners are thus the whole winning chain and not the individuals. Hence the expression in Aesch. Ag. 314 νικᾶ δ’ ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμῶν. The same fact is pointed to by the existence of rival λαμπαδάρχαι (like the rival χορηγοί), who would hardly be required unless each provided a set of runners and not merely an individual.

There seems also to have been a simpler form of the race, between single competitors (Pausan. i. 30. 2).

dιαδώσουσιν ἄλληλοις here shews that the chain-match is meant. The diminutive λαμπάδια implies that the torches were small, and proportionately hard to keep alight.


Bendis (=Artemis, the moon-goddess) might be appropriately honoured with a λαμπάδηφορία, and, in a mystic Chthonian character (=Hecate-Artemis), with a πανυχίς.

καινόν: a ‘novelty’ or ‘invention,’ differing from νέων in implying ‘new-fangled.’ Xen. Mem. i. 1. 3 οὐδέν καινότερον ἐσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων.

ἐξανασπηρόμεθα: ‘will rise and go out.’

μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον. The article implies ‘the dinner of which you will, of course, first partake.’

ξυνεσώμεθα πολλοῖς τῶν νέων—a great temptation to Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 33, where the tyrants Critias and Charicles forbid him τοὺς νέους διαλέγεσθαι. Ibid. 35 μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεω-
τέροις τριάκοντα ἕτων. It was the peculiar intellectual effect of his intercourse upon the youth of Athens that led to the specific charge ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

328 B. μὴ ἄλλως πολεῖτε—‘don’t refuse.’ Probably, however, apart from its obvious meaning ‘otherwise (than we ask),’ ἄλλως is here, as so frequently, a υποκορισμός for a blunter word. There is an implication that to act ἄλλως is to act otherwise than kindly or civilly. So ἀγαθά ἡ θάτερα and the Latin sequius.

The expression used here is common. Cf. Ar. Av. 133 μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιήσεις.

CHAPTER II.

328 B. εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου—‘to Polemarchus’s.’ Cf. elis ‘Αιδού, εἰς διδασκάλου φοιτάν, εν διδασκάλων (Αλε. i. 110 a), ἢ ἐν Διονύσου ἐκκλησία, ‘to St Paul’s,’ ‘go to the schoolmaster’s,’ ad Vestae &c.

No specific noun should be supplied (e.g. elis <τῶν> τοῦ Πολεμάρχου <οἴκου>) any more than in τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, where it is unintelligent to say that ‘πράγματα is understood,’ inasmuch as the neuter plural article is in itself a complete object. When the same comprehensive τὰ is used in phrases like Arist. Vesp. 1440 οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεξ’ ἐς τὰ Πιττάλου i.e. ‘to the doctor’s,’ or Iys. c. Eratosth. 121 καὶ ἐρωτῶσιν ὅτι βαδίζομεν· ο δὲ ἐφασκεν εἰς τὰ τοῦ ἄδελφου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, or Theoc. π. 76 ἂ τὰ Δύκωνος, it is wrong to search for a particular neuter plural noun to fit the sense of ‘the doctor’s house, place, surgery, &c.’ So, though elis τοῦ Πολεμάρχου is, of course, practically ‘Polemarchus’ house,’ the actual noun which elis would grammatically govern is any word which would suit the notion. But the Greek speaker was no more conscious of any definite omission than we are when we say ‘run down to the grocer’s.’

In the opposite expression Ar. Δαιτ. 48 οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου; Prot. 326 c ἐκ διδασκάλων, &c., ἐκ does not logically govern the following genitive any more than elis in the one before us.

[For Polemarchus and the persons about to be mentioned see Introduction § 3 c.]

καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον. ‘And, in particular, Th.’ This combination of particles often directs attention to a specially important case. The presence of the great Thrasymachus adds much to the interest of the gathering. Cf. inf. 329 ηδὲ ἐντεῦχε σῶ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλῆ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενώμην. Properly the first καὶ connects, δὴ is expletive, and the second καὶ
emphasizes the particular word ‘and, we must not forget, also... Thrasymachus.’

tὸν Καλχηδῶνον. It is impossible to say decisively in what way Plato chose to spell this word. The proper name of the town, as given on its coins, was Καλχηδῶν, but Meisterhans (Att. Inscr. § 38. 1) shows that, as early as the middle of the 5th century B.C., such spellings as Χαλχηδῶνοι (sic) existed in Attica side by side with Καλχηδῶνοι. This was partly due to the ‘cockneyism’ of Athenian speech, which tended to aspirate illegitimately (e.g. ἄμιχλην, ἀθρόος &c.), and partly to the natural association of the word with χαλκός. From the latter cause (probably) the pronunciation Χαλκηδῶν became prevalent in later Greece and is almost the rule in mss, even when the author may not himself be responsible for it. There is moreover in all languages a danger of metathesis of similar vowels or consonants in adjoining syllables, and for this reason Μιτυλήνη came to be written for Μυτιλήνη, like Χαλκηδῶν for Καλχηδῶν. Plato may or may not have fallen in with the popular error.

Παιανα — not Παιανέα. See note on Πειραιά, 327 init. Paiania is an Attic deme, to which the orator Demosthenes gave renown later.

328 C. διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη αὐτόν. ‘For it was some time since I had so much as seen him’: lit. ‘for after an interval of time had I even seen him.’ The καὶ implies that it is possible to see a man without holding conversation with him, but that Socrates had not even done the former. γὰρ explains why Cephalus seemed so much older than Socrates had pictured him.


The sense implied, though not expressed, is that the time has been a long one. Frequently the full διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου is found, e.g. Ar. Plut. 1045 ἐκεῖ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου σ’ ἐωρακέως. This implication is not confined to the combination with διὰ, for the same notion of protracted time is often involved in the use of χρόνως, ‘at last,’ χρόνου ἐποιεῖν &c. So in colloquial English, ‘it is quite a time since I saw you.’

ἐωράκη. The proper termination of the pluperfect persons in classical Attic is discussed by Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. cxxvi. That -η, -εις, -ει(ν) were the true endings of the singular is shown by metrical evidence, as well as by that of the best mss and of grammarians (Eustath. 1946. 22 &c.). The tendency of copyists to substitute a first person ending -ειν for -η is proved by Dawes from the mss of Ar. Av. 511 τοῦτο τοῖνυν οὐκ ἠδη 'γώ, where mss
(except Vat. and Rav.) actually have ἱδεῖν ἵ'γ'ώ. It may be added that the 3rd person plural in -εσαι, not -εσαν, is further demonstrated by Attic Inscriptions (v. Meisterhans § 61 a) 3). Originally the pluperfects were aorist formations and the endings were -ε(σ)α, -ε(σ)ας, -ε(σ)ε(ν), which were duly contracted -η, -ης, -ει(ν).

That ἔφακα and ἔφακα were both in use in the best Attic times is highly probable. Comedy no doubt often requires, and always allows, a scansion equal to ἔφακα (see the passage quoted in last note from Ar. Plut. 1045). Sometimes the scansion actually proves ἐ-, as in the second foot of Ar. Nub. 768 ταῦτην ἔφακας. But in other places it has not been shewn (1) that ἔφακα cannot be scanned ἔφακα, (2) that, if ἔφακα is a correct form, it is the only one which is correct. Whenever the method of augmenting was away from the usual pattern there was a tendency to diversity (e.g. ἀνεσχόμην, ἀνεσχόμην: ἐνεγύησα, ἐγγύησα; and see Rutherford N. P. Art. xx.). So, in the next sentence, καθήστο, (καθήτο) or ἐκάθητο would be equally authenticated forms.

ἔστεφανωμένος. A wreath was regularly worn by the person sacrificing. Cf. Ar. Plut. 819

καὶ νῦν ὁ δεσπότης μὲν ἐνδον βουθυτεῖ
ἐν καὶ τράγου καὶ κριῶν ἔστεφανωμένοις.

Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 40 τὰ μὲν ἱερεῖα εὐτθῆκε παρὰ τὸν βωμὸν καὶ Κοιματάδης ἔστεφανωμένοις ὤς θύσων. Similarly a στεφάνος was worn by many magistrates as a mark of office, investing them with respect. Dem. 802. Δεῦτε αἰροντες καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους περιήρηται. Cf. the judge's wig and gown.

ἐπὶ τίνος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου. The point of τίνος is a little obscure. Viewed along with the τε καὶ following it may be taken to imply that, for this very aged man, and as a mark of honour, a special kind of cushioned chair had to be provided. 'On a sort of combination of cushion and chair' = 'a sort of easy chair.' In Prot. 315 Πρόδικος ἐτὶ κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κρύσοις τισιν καὶ στρώμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς there is a similar suggestion that Prodicus had made himself unusually snug.

It may be assumed that the use of cushions in household chairs was not frequent with Athenians of the time, and would be considered effeminate for younger men. Cf. Xen. Hell. iv. 1. 30 ῥαπτὰ ('cushions') ἐφ' ὄν καθίζουσιν οἱ Πέρσαι μαλακῶς, a remark which would otherwise have been pointless. That προσκεφάλαια were used in boats or in theatres, where the seats were hard and often wet or cold, is no argument for their domestic use.

In keeping with ἔστεφανωμένος is also the implication that (like Latin pulvinus and pulvinar) the seat was a seat of honour. Cf. Cic.
ad Fam. ix. 18 *sella tibi erit in ludo: eam pulvinus sequetur*; i.e. ‘you shall be promoted later.’

τεθυκὼς...ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ—i.e. at the altar of Zeus Ἐρκεῖος (who corresponded in a measure to the Latin Penates).

The altar stood in the middle of the open court which occupied the central part of the ἀνδρωμῆτις. A colonnade ran round it, out of which the men’s rooms opened. This was the αὐλή. Another in the γυναικωνίτις would want special definition, and had nothing to do with the present visitors. Domestic sacrifices were the mark of a religious man. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 2 θύων τε γαρ φανερὸν ἡν πολλάκις μὲν οίκοι πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν.

ΠΟΡ’ ΑΥΤΩΝ. The accusative implies ‘we went and sat beside him,’ ἔκειτο = ἔτεθειτο, ‘had been placed.’ So ἀνάκειται, περίκειται &c. are the recognised passive perfects of ἀνατίθημι, περιτίθημι &c. τιθέναι νόμον has for its counterpart κεῖται ὁ νόμος.

Where τεθείμαι is found in the best period of Attic Greek it is middle. In later Greek however (after Macedonian times) such expressions as προτεθείμαι ὁ νεκρός, εὖ διατεθείμαι &c., were gradually accepted into literary language. See Cobet Var. Lect. p. 311.

ΑΥΤΟΘΙ—i.e. there was no need to move to another room. The chairs were ready ‘on the spot.’ With κόκλῳ cf. the social sense of *circulus*.

οὐδὲ θαμίζεις. The expression is difficult, whether we read οὐδὲ or οὔ δέ. An exact parallel does not appear to exist. Jowett and Campbell (with οὐ δέ) say that δέ is adversative to the idea contained in ἴσσαρχος, i.e. ‘you are welcome, but you do not come often enough.’ For this we have to assume that Cephalus thinks (though he does not utter) words like ἀσπάζομαι μὲν σε before οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις. This seems somewhat far-fetched, and one instinctively expects the order οὐ θαμίζεις δὲ, or else the words ἀλλ’ οὐ θαμίζεις. οὐδὲ, if correct, must be regarded as one of those colloquial idioms which, logical enough in their origin, imperceptibly shift their application till they defy strict analysis. Thus it is possible to meet with the expression ‘Socrates, you are not very frequent *either* in your visits,’ and to feel that, while the idiomatic ‘either’ is explainable, more or less subtly, in some settings, its precise application eludes the grasp in this particular case. Nevertheless both such an English and such a Greek phrase are conceivable.
Some editors (after Ast) would read οὖτι from II. xviii. 385

— τίπτε, Θέτι πανύπεπλε, ικάνεις ημέτερον δῶ, αἰδοίοι τε φιλὸν τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὐ τι θαμίζεις—

and Od. v. 87

τίπτε μοι, Ἐρμεία χρυσόρραπι, εἰλῆλουβας 
aιδοίοι τε φιλὸς τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὐ τι θαμίζεις.

It is quite possible, and not wholly improbable, that the similarity of circumstances may have led Plato's Cephalus to quote Homer, or at least hint at him in a way which would be readily understood by Socrates without further elaboration. On the other hand there is nothing specially Homeric about the word θαμίζειν itself, and we are not, by the mere guess that a quotation is intended, justified in altering a reading which may be quite sound, however curiously idiomatic.

If any alteration were necessary, one might suggest οὐ δὴ; but probably οὐδὲ was really written by Plato.


χρὴν μὲντοι—lit. 'yet it was your duty (to do so)' = 'yet you ought to have done so.' As ἐδει follows, and χρὴ shortly after, it may be well to emphasize the doctrine that properly χρὴ is used of moral obligation ('I ought') and ἐδεί of physical or logical compulsion ('I must'). So inf. εἰ χρὴναι...ἐδήσει, where the same distinction exists.

The distinction is something (though not wholly) like that of je devrais from je dois. No doubt some Greek writers and speakers occasionally confuse the uses of the two words, especially where the meanings are apt to overlap each other. Language cannot be precise and clear-cut without the thought being precise and clear-cut. Nevertheless the distinction was, in the best prose authors, a real one.

'You should (morally, χρὴν) have been coming to see us. For, if I had still been capable of making the journey to the city, there would have been no compulsion (ἐδεϊ) for you to come to us....But, as it is, you should (χρῆ) come here more frequently.'

ἐν δυνάμει ἦ. The correct form for the first person in the best period of Attic is ἦ, not ἦν. The derivation is from η(σ)α contracted. [The form ἦν is probably due to the analogy of other past tenses e.g. ἔφην, ἐτίθην, &c.] See Rutherford New Phrynichus, Art. cxxx., where the grammarian Porphyrius is quoted for this very passage, after saying τὸ ἦν ἐπιπολάζει νῦν, τῶν δὲ Ἀττικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι 

μονογράμματον αὐτὸ προεφέροντο. Hence it seems best to restore ἦ here, although it cannot be denied that ἦν had begun to appear in Euripides and Aristophanes, at least where it was metrically convenient. mss are inconsistent, but they not in-
frequently shew an earlier \( \ddot{\eta} \) turned into a later \( \dot{\eta} \nu \). Dr Rutherford says 'this is simply an indication of what has happened in every case.' 'Every' is no doubt too strong, but the evidence for Plato is all in favour of \( \ddot{\eta} \), \( \pi\alpha\rho\dot{\eta} \&c. \)

\( \eta\mu\epsilon\iota\iota \). There is no necessity to take this as plural for singular with Jowett and Campbell, though such a use is frequent enough in some cases, e.g. that of writers speaking of themselves, or of persons professing modesty. The word includes both Cephalus and his family (the \( \nu\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\lambda\alpha\iota \) mentioned below). Cephalus is particularly desirous for the young men's sake that Socrates should come. Cf. 368 d.

328 D. \( \alpha i \ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \ \tau\omicron \ \sigma\omicron\alpha\mu\alpha \ \dot{\eta}\delta\omicron\alpha\iota \). For the thought cf. Aristot. Eth. N. vii. 11. 4 \( \epsilon\mu\pi\delta\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron \ \phi\rho\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota \ \alpha i \ \dot{\eta}\delta\omicron\alpha\iota \).

\( \nu\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\lambda\alpha\iota\iota \). As a matter of fact Polemarchus, Lysias and Euthydemus are middle-aged men, but it is quite in character for the aged father to style them 'these young fellows.' Even the reading of some inferior mss \( \nu\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\sigma\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron \) is sufficiently natural, and perhaps carries more point. Cephalus would be speaking humorously: 'these boys.'

\( \kappa\alpha l \ \mu\eta\iota \ldots \chi\alpha\rho\omega \ \gamma\epsilon \). It is well to take the particles as an intimate group, although of course the word coming between them is strongly emphasized. So Aesch. P. V. 984

ER. \( \dot{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota \ \dot{\epsilon}o\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma \ \sigma\omicron\delta\epsilon\nu \ \dot{\omega} \ \chi\rho\dot{\eta}\iota\epsilon i \ \pi\alpha\dot{\eta}\iota \).

II.P. \( \kappa\alpha l \ \mu\eta\iota \ \delta\phi\epsilon\iota\lambda\omega\nu \ \gamma^\prime \ \dot{\alpha}v \ \tau\iota\nu\omicron\mu\iota \ \dot{\alpha}v\iota\nu \ \chi\alpha\rho\nu \).

The force of \( \kappa\alpha l \ \mu\eta\iota \) is ultimately '(aye) indeed' or 'and, more by token,' while that of \( \gamma\epsilon \) is to add a tone of emphasis, serious or ironical. Here the sense is ' (I recognise the force of what you say) and, indeed, it is my pleasure to....' This may all be expressed in English by 'Nay, Cephalus, it is a positive pleasure to me....'

328 E. \( \chi\rho\eta\iota\nu\iota \ldots \delta\epsilon\eta\iota\sigma\epsilon i \) — v. sup. c on \( \chi\rho\eta \ \mu\epsilon\nu\tau\iota \).

\( \omega\sigma\pi\epsilon r \ \tau\iota\nu\alpha \ \omicron\delta\omicron\nu \ — \tau\iota\nu\alpha \) qualifies the simile: 'because, as it were, they have preceded us over what one may call a road.' So \( \dot{q}\iota\delta\iota \iota \) in Latin.

\( \iota\omicron\sigma\omega s \) — either (1) 'equally' (=\( \delta\omicron\omega\iota\lambda\omega s \)), or, better, (2) 'probably.' There is no certainty that we shall all grow old, and the latter rendering is therefore demanded.

\( \tau\rho\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\alpha \ldots \dot{\eta} \rho\alpha\delta\iota \a — \) Plato not seldom omits \( \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \) in the first member of dependent questions, e.g. Theaet. 161 \( \alpha v \ \tau\omicron \ \dot{\omicron}\nu \ \dot{\alpha}v\omicron\nu \ \kappa\nu\rho\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \ \dot{\omicron}\tau\iota\alpha \ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\kappa\epsilon\phi\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron \ \dot{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu, \ \dot{\omicron}\rho\theta\eta \ \dot{\omicron} \ \psi\epsilon\nu\delta\iota\iota \).

Legg. 670 b &c.
There is a slight chiasmus, a figure of which Plato is fond, in the order of the epithets; τραχεῖα rather answers to εὐτορος, χαλεπῇ to ῥαδία. Cf. inf. 348 ε κακίαν...ἡ ἀλοχρόν is answered by καλὸν καὶ θειρών. 350 c ἐςικεῦ...ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σωφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἀδίκος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεί. For a doubly chiasitic arrangement cf. Crit. 47 c περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ ἀλοχρῶν καὶ καλῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The fact that so many instances can be collected shews that Plato was deliberate in avoiding an obtrusively obvious antithesis.

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ κ.τ.λ.—'and particularly from you I should like to hear....' For καὶ δὴ καὶ, v. sup. b.

ὁ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο...ὁ δὴ ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῷ φασὶν εἶναι. Grammatically these words might be rendered either (1) 'what you think of that which the poets say lies on old age's threshold,' or (2) 'what you think of that condition which the poets call being upon the threshold of old age.' The latter is the more natural in point of meaning. τί ἐστι (τὸ) 'εἰναι ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῷ'; τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὁ φασὶν 'ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῷ εἶναι'; where φασὶν practically = καλῶν. Lit. 'what is that with regard to which they use the expression 'to be upon the threshold of old?''

The phrase ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῷ occurs Π. xxii. 60, xxiv. 487, Od. xv. 348, while in Od. xv. 246 and xxii. 212 we have γῆραος οὐδόν ἰκέσθαι. 'The poets' are not merely Homer, but his imitators also, e.g. Hymn. Aphrod. 106 (γῆρ. οὐδόν ἰκέσθαι). Hes. op. 331 κακῷ ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῶν and, as often, Herodotus borrows the poetical expression (πι. 14) ἐπὶ πτωχῆναι ἐπὶκταὶ ἐπὶ γῆραος οὐδῶν. The interpretation 'upon the threshold of old age,' in the sense of the 'entrance to old age,' does not suit the passages in the Iliad, nor would it suit the present place, if Plato had so interpreted it. Dr Leaf is for taking οὐδῷ as = οὖδὲ 'upon the path of old age' (see his note Iliad xxii. 60). It is, however, quite simple to understand it of the threshold over which the aged man passes out, and on which he stands ready to depart. This is the explanation of the scholiast on Π. xxii. 60. Nevertheless I would suggest that γῆραος is a defining genitive and οὐδῶν the threshold of death: lit. 'upon the threshold (which consists) of old age.' Cf. Verg. Aen. iv. 480 Oceani jinem iuxta ("the end of the world which consists in Ocean").

The words ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἡδὴ εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας are thus parenthetical.

The view of the Jowett-Campbell edition, however, is that τοῦτο refers to what has preceded, and that ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὁ δὲ...φασὶν εἰναι οἱ ποιηταὶ should be taken together, ὁ apparently following ἐνταῦθα for its antecedent, just as it might have followed the equivalent ἐν τοῦτῳ. This makes ὁ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο weak,
is rather strained in regard to the relative ὁ, and does not, perhaps, give any particular sense to δή. Moreover it leaves πότερον χαλεπὸν ...εξαγγέλλεις awkwardly attached. With τοῦτο ὁ δή...φασίν... the sense is ‘that which, whatever they mean by it, they call....’ No difficulty is then offered by πότερον χαλεπὸν, with which φαίνεται is naturally supplied. ‘How that appears to you...which they call &c....(viz.) whether it (appears to you) disagreeable...or how....’

χαλεπὸν τοῦ βλου. It is not easy to understand how Jowett and Campbell write that “τοῦ βλου is a partitive genitive depending on χαλεπὸν, ‘a harsh part of life.’” Indeed (pace tantorum virorum) the expression is a confusion. If the genitive ‘depends’ on χαλεπὸν it cannot be partitive; it would require rather to depend on τοῦτο, or on an indispensable τι in χαλεπὸν τι τοῦ βλου. Rather render ‘disagreeable in respect of the sort of life,’ the genitive being the ‘genitive of relation,’ of which one large department is conveniently labelled ‘causal.’ Cf. Phaedo 58 ε ἐβδαίμων ἐφαίνετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων; Theaet. 175 λ ἄροτα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας; Apol. 41 c οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι ἄμήχανον ἃν εἴῃ ἐβδαίμωνας. A gen., familiar with μακάριος, is no less natural with its opposite χαλεπὸς, σχέτως &c.

For χαλεπὸν applied to old age cf. Hom. II. viii. 103 χαλεπὸν δὲ σε γῆνας ὀπάζει.

ἡ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις; Though these words may depend on πυθόμην ἃν (indirect question), it is equally in keeping with Plato’s style, and is much more vivacious, to treat them as reverting to the direct. ‘I should like to know how it strikes you...whether as disagreeable...or how do you report of it?’ εξαγγέλλεις is properly used of one who is in the secret reporting to one who is not.

CHAPTER III.

οἴνον γέ μοι φαίνεται—‘what it does seem like to me.’ The γε with οἴνον gives something of the sense ‘just what.’ The same colloquial effect is obtained in English by ‘I’ll tell you what it seems like.’

329 Α. πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. γάρ regularly introduces a promised account or narrative. ‘You must know.’

διασφηντες τὴν παλαιὰν παρομιλῶν—cf. Arist. Rhet. i. 11 § 25 πάντα τὰ συγγεγυκαὶ ἐν μοι ἦδεα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἰνὸν ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵπποιν ἵππῳ καὶ νύσιν νύσι. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παρομίλαι εἴρηται ὡς ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὄμοιον, καὶ ἐγνω δὲ θηρ
Such kindred proverbs about 'birds of a feather' were very numerous. The particular byword thought of here is ἰλίξ ἴλικα τέρπει, as we may gather from Phaedr. 240 c ἴλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπει τὸν ἴλικα, and the scholiast at that place completes the line in a manner very apposite to the present passage, viz. ἰλίξ ἴλικα τέρπε, γέρων δὲ τε τέρπε γέροντα. Cf. Gorg. 510 B φίλος...ἡ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. The whole of the context here is practically quoted by Cicero de Senect. 3 without acknowledgment. See Introd. § 5 a.

ἀναμμυνησκόμενοι—reciprocal-reflexive: 'reminding one another.'

ἐς τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται—'which belong to that class.' Cf. 362 A ἑπιτηδεύοντα πράγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον, 363 B καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἄγαθα τούτων ἐχόμενα, Meno 93 D, 94 B (ὡς τέχνης ἔχεται).

The sense of ἐχεθαί is 'to be closely attached to,' and this may mean 'to cling to,' 'pertain to the same class,' 'follow,' or 'adjoin,' according to the precise nature of the context. In Herodotus the present use of ἐχεθαί is particularly frequent, e.g. ι. 120 τὰ τῶν ὀνειράτων ἐχόμενα ἐς ἀσθενεῖς ἔρχεται, 'everything in the shape of dreams': Stein there quotes Hippocrates (περὶ παθῶν p. 185) ὡς ἐς καίτιον ἡ ποτῶν ἐχόμενα ἐστι.

καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ᾧντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ᾧντες—i.e. καὶ ὡς τότε κ.τ.λ.

The first ᾧντες is imperfect in tense: 'As if at that time they used to live well, while now they do not even live.' For the antithesis cf. Arist. Pol. 1. 2 πόλει...γυνομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζην ἔνεκα, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζην.

329 B. τὰς τῶν ολκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως—a double genitive—subjective and objective. 'The insults to old age on the part of one's own people.' Cf. Thuc. vii. 34 δὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἀπωσίων τῶν ναυαγίων. Phaedr. 244 c τὴν γε τῶν ἔμφρόνων ζητησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος. Hdt. vi. 2 Ἰστιαῖος ὑπέδυε τῶν Ἰᾶων τὴν ἠγεμονίνη τοῦ πρὸς Δαρείον πολέμου.

προπηλακισμός is defined by Aristot. (Top. vi. 6) as ὑβρις μετὰ χλυναδίας, i.e. 'insult combined with mockery.'

καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ—'and on this alleged ground.' δὴ contains some irony. 'They give that as a sufficient reason for bewailing old age.' Caecilius ap. Cic. de Senect. 8 Tum etiam in senecta hoc deputo miserrimum | sentire ea aetate esse se odium alteri.

ὑμνεῖν—'to harp upon,' the suggestion being that the complaints are unthinking 'cant' (cantare) to the same old tune. Cf. 549 ν καὶ ἄλλα δὴ δόσα καὶ δόσα φιλούσιν αἱ γυναικεῖς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.
NOTES.


καὶ ἑγὼ τα αὐτὰ ταυτά ἐπετόνθη—'I myself should have been in the same state (of mind). The perfect πέπονθά τι is often a present in meaning, i.e. 'I have been affected into (=am in) a certain state of mind.'

Cf. 345 β ταύτι' οὖν καὶ ἔτερον ἵσως τις ἠμών πέπονθεν. 368 θαύ ὁρὸν θείου πέπονθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε. 488 A. Apol. (init.) ο τι μὲν ὑμεῖς...πέπονθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα (=in what temper you are, thanks to my accusers'). Meno, 95 ε καὶ γὰρ αὐτός ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθατο τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ. So τι πέπονθας; = 'what is the matter with you?'

This differs from τα αὐτὰ ἄν ἐπαρχεῖν, which would mean 'I should have been undergoing the same treatment.'

For the form ἐπετόνθη (which a corrector would here make into ἐπεπόνθην) v. sup. on ἐωράκη 328 c.

ἐνεκά γε γῆρως—i.e. if old age had been responsible for such troubles, whereas it is really a man's disposition (τρόποις inf. δι). ὅσοι...ἡλθον. The idiom of the tense should be observed. It is not ἐλθοῦσαν nor ἐρχονταί, either of which would have been simple enough. The relative clause ὅσοι ἡλθον is contained in a conditional sentence, concerning which it is implied that the condition is not or has not been fulfilled, the apodosis being a past tense with ἄν. In such a setting the relative clause has its verb in a past tense of the indicative (Goodwin, M. and T. § 528). Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. i. 16 εἰ δὲ οἰκοι εἶχον ἐκαστὸν τὰς ὀικᾶς, τούτως ἄν ἀπώλλυσαν φίλους μάλατα ἄραν Ἀθηναίων τῷ δήμῳ.

The instance in our passage differs slightly from most of those quoted by Goodwin, since the thing 'would have happened' in the case of men who do come to old age. Nevertheless the conception is of circumstances wholly imaginary—'if this case had been the true one (which it is not) I should have been in the same state, and so would every one else who (in the supposed unfulfilled case) had come to old age'; i.e. ἐγὼ ταύτα ἐπετόνθη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ τινὲς ἡλθον... ἐπεπόνθησαν ἄν.

We may if we choose call this a use of moods and tenses by assimilation or association. This use of the aorist must be distinguished from that which would have been the case if δοκοῦντε...
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, I. [329 B—

ηλθον or ὅσοι ἡδὴ ηλθων had been written. (Goodwin M. and T. § 156.)

καὶ ἀλλοι καὶ δῆ καὶ Ἐφοκλεῖ...παρεγενόμην—v. sup. 328 B. Sophocles (ob. 406 B.C.) was noted for his amiable character. Ar. Ran. 82 ὁ δ' εὐκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὐκολος δ' ἐκεῖ. For the following story cf. Athen. xpi. 510 and Cicero De Senect. c. 14. It is told also by Valerius Maximus (iv. 3. 2), and three times by Plutarch.

πῶς, ἐφη...ἐχεις;—ἐφη is of course redundant after ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινος, but its insertion is very common, even when ἐπεὶ or its equivalent has preceded. The effect is to give naturalness to the conversational style (cf. ὁδὲ θαυμάζεις 328 c). In origin it springs from the almost universal colloquial habit of repeating and insisting upon the verb of saying, 'said I,' 'says he.'

The usage is particularly common in Xenophon, e.g. Anab. vii. 6. 41

Πολυκράτης ἐδὲ ἐστε ἀναστάς ὕπερ Ξενοφώντος' ὅρω γε μὴν, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνδρες κ.τ.λ., and for the same in Plato, v. inf. 337 A.

With πῶς ἐχεις πρὸς τάφροντια; cf. Prot. 352 B πῶς ἐχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; Symp. 174 B Ἀριστόδημε, πῶς ἐχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλεω ἀν ἑναι ἀκλητος ἐπὶ δειπνον;

329 C. Εὐφήμει—'Hush'; bona verba quaeso, cf. Prot. 330 B εὐφήμει ὁ ἀνθρωπε, where ὁ ἀνθρωπε adds the same touch of reproach. Sophocles treats the suggestion as a thing to shrink from, as from an evil omen. Hence εὐφήμει, as in Euthyd. 301 λ ἐὰν σῶν παραγενήτατο σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἰ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρεμι, Διὸνυσό-δωρος εἰ; Εὐφήμει τοῦτο γε, ὃν δ' ἐγώ. Meno 91 B, Gorg. 469 A.

μέντοι—here not adversative but asseverating (μὲν τοι), 'I assure you.' [V. Liddell and Scott, μὲν B. π. 4 b.]

In this sense it is used freely in either affirmative or negative sentences. We may compare to some extent the protesting use of English 'nay.' So in answers in the affirmative, as inf. 332 A ἀλλο μέντοι νη Δίᾳ.


παντάπασι γνρ...γλυνεται..., ἐπειδα...χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι...γλυνεται. If this (without γνρ after ἐπειδα) is the true reading, we must take the clause παντάπασι το τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γλυνεται as a repetition in another form of the opening words παντάπασι...ἐλευθερα. 'For most certainly there is great peace and freedom from such things in old age, when the desires have ceased from racking us and have relaxed their strain,—(yes) it most certainly
becomes as Sophocles said,—it is riddance from a multitude of mad masters.'

It cannot be said that there is anything impossible about the two asyndeta παντάπασι...γίγνεται, and δεσποτῶν...ἀπηλλάχθαι. They may even have been adopted with some deliberation by Plato for the sake of arresting attention. Nevertheless with the same words it is doubtful whether we should not rather punctuate—παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τιμίων ἐλλήμερη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι...χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. The asyndeton is then in the clause with ἐπειδὰν, and this appears on the whole less abrupt.

For the rest, the clause δεσποτῶν...ἀπηλλάχθαι, apart from its asyndeton, contains a rare use of ἐστὶ and a form of expression which comes in rather awkwardly after γίγνεται. One of the features of Plato's style is its fluent ease, and there appears in all this passage to be a lack of that quality. The omission of ἐστὶ (proposed by Stallbaum and accepted by some editors) makes a perfectly natural and neat idiomatic sentence, viz. παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνω πολλῶν καὶ μανιμένων ἀπηλλάχθαι, where the infinitive clause is exegetical of τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους.

mss other than the best (Par. A) and the first hand in two of less weight add γὰρ after ἐπειδὰν. This of course clears away the difficulty of the first asyndeton, but looks too much like a piece of early 'editing,' inasmuch as the loss of γὰρ is somewhat improbable.

tῶν...τοιούτων...ειρήνη κ.τ.λ. The genitive is that of emptiness=‘absence of,’ as with ἐνδεία, ἀπορία, ἐρημία τυφός. Cf. inf. 370 c σχολὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων (and with a verb 371 c ἄργησε τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας): Ηδ. vi. 135 ἵσυκη τῆς πολιορκίης, Eur. Iph. Aul. 547 γαλανεία χρησάμενοι μανιμένων οἴστρων.

κατατείνουσαί. The metaphor, as in χαλάσωσι, is from the rack. Cf. Dem. Olympiod. 1172. 14 κατατεινόμενος ὦτὸ τῆς βασάνου, and for mental torture Soph. O. T. 153 ἐκτέταμαι φοβερὰν φρένα δείματι πάλλων, Plato Lys. 204 c παραταθήσεται ὦτὸ σοῦ ἀκοῦσιν βαμά λέγοντος.

χαλάσωσι may be equally transitive or intransitive here, as in many other places.

329 D. δεσποτῶν...ἐστὶ...ἀπηλλάχθαι. If ἐστὶ is correct the rendering is 'it (the state of things) is (means) being rid of.' There is, of course, no relevance here in the usual sense of ἐστὶ with infin. 'it is possible.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Arist. Ath. Pol. c. 55 ἐστὶ δὲ ψηφὶ-ξεσθαι, 'the case is one of voting.' It is probable, however, as
stated above, that ἔστι is an interpolation, due to some Greek editor before the date of our mss, who failed to catch the exegetical construction of ἀπηλλάχθαι after τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, for which cf. inf. 332 C διενεῖθη...ὁτι τοῦτ' εἶν ἐδικαίον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, Hom. Od. 1. 82 εἰ μὲν δὴ νῦν τοῦτο φίλου μακάρεσσι θεοί, νοστήσαι Ὀδυσσᾶ.

Stallbaum notes that the position of ἔστι varies in the mss, a fact which makes its claims suspicions, but does not by any means dispose of them, since transpositions of words are not rare in mss even where all the words are certain.

tοῦτων πέρι...μία τις αἰτία ἔστιν—cf. Phaed. 97 C εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, and 98 D καὶ αὐ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγοντας ὑμᾶν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, &c.

It must not however be supposed that αἰτία περὶ τινὸς can be simply the equivalent of αἰτία τινὸς. The words do not occur in immediate juxtaposition, and the analysis of the present sentence for example is 'in regard to these things' (περὶ=quod attinet ad)...there 'is one and only one cause.'

[περὶ and ἐνεκα are the only prepositions which good Attic prose allows to follow their cases.]

ὁ τρόπος—'the disposition,' 'temper.' Cf. Aeschin. in Ctes. 65. 1 μεταλλάττει οὐ τὸν τρόπον ἄλλα τὸν τόπον=caelum non animum mutat.

καὶ τὸ γῆρας—'then old age too (for its part).'

καὶ γῆρας...καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ—'not only age, but youth also is unpleasant.' νεότης thus becomes the more emphatic subject, or practically the subject; hence the singular ἐμμεθαλνει and the position and gender of the adjective. V. inf. 332 B ἐδάνπερ ἣ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις βλαβερὰ γίγνεται.

τῷ τοιοῦτῳ—sc. τῷ μὴ κοσμίῳ καὶ εὐκόλῳ.

CHAPTER IV.

ἀγασθεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐπόντος ταῦτα. Besides the common constructions corresponding to those of θαυμάζω, viz. ἀγαμαὶ τινὰ τινὸς and ἀγαμαὶ τινὸς τι, the verb ἀγασθαι may (probably from the influence of the latter) take a genitive of the person alone, as here. Cf. Xen. Oec. iv. 21 ἀγαμαὶ τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σου, Herod. vi. 76 ἀγασθαὶ μὲν ἐφί τοῦ Ἐρασίνου οὐ προδιδόντος τοὺς πολείτας. The position of αὐτοῦ would itself shew that the genitive is not 'absolute.'
For the more familiar construction, cf. Rep. 426 D τοὺς ἔθελοντας θεραπεύειν οὐκ ἀγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας; Plato might here have written ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, but ταῦτα here, of course, depends on εἰπόντως.

βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκλίνον. The expressed αὐτὸν belongs by position to λέγειν, with which it is absolutely required by the sense; but another αὐτὸν remains to be supplied with ἐκλίνον. It is usual to express this by saying that αὐτὸν is constructed ἀπὸ κοινῶν with both words. Stallbaum's note αὐτὸν ἐκλίνον, 'eum commovebam,' is misleading. It is not of course Socrates who 'wishes still to speak,' and 'to carry on the conversation' would require διαλέγεσθαι.


The procedure implied in κινεῖν is eminently Socratic (see Introduction § 7 c).

329 E. τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις...φασιν ἐιναι—φασιν (on dit) suggests that there was a well-known proverb to this effect. It has for its subject, not οἱ πολλοί of the previous sentence, but 'they' = people at large, mankind.

There is little use in reconstructing with Muretus any hypothetical verse-proverb (γνώμη) out of these words.

λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται—'There is something in what they say, but by no means so much as they think.' λέγειν τι is opposed to οὗδεν λέγειν (nugiari or mentiri), cf. Crat. 404 a κινδυνεύεις τι λέγειν, with which contrast Symp. 205 D κινδυνεύεις ἄληθῆ λέγειν. Euthyd. 305 E δοκοῦσι σοι τι, ὃ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; Lach. 195 c καὶ γὰρ λέγει γε τι, οὐ μέντοι ἄληθές γε. Soph. O. T. 1475 O1. λέγω τι; KP. λέγεις.

[As there is a distinct stress on τι in the present passage, some editors write λέγουσι μὲν τι. There appears to be no certainty as to a Greek rule on the subject.]

For οὐ μέντοι in answer to μὲν v. sup. 327 A. γε serves to throw further emphasis, 'but not, be sure,...'

τῷ Σεριφίῳ. The article implies that the story was well known: 'the Seriphian' (who has become historical).

Seriphos is an inconsiderable island in the Cyclades between Attica and Paros. Like Bébina, Cythnos and other out-of-the-way islands (v. Stob. Flor. xi. 8), it became proverbial as a 'Little Peddlington'
or 'Hole-and-Corner,' in which no one would be condemned to live. Cf. Seneca Consol. ad Helviam 6 § 4 deserta loca asperrimas insulas Scythum et Seriphum. Juv. 6. 564.

...Cui vix in Cyclada mitti
Contigit et parva tandem caruissa Seripho

(referring to a time when banishment took the shape in which it was experienced by Napoleon I. at St Helena). A similar story appears in Herod. viii. 125 of a certain Timodemus of Aphidnae, to whom Themistocles said οὐτῶ ς ἔχει τοι' οὐτ' ἄν ἐγὼ, ἐὼν Βελβινίτης, ἐτῷφιν οὐτὸ πρῶν Σπαρτιτέων, οὔτ' ἄν σὺ, ὁνδρωπε, ἐὼν 'Ἀθηναῖος, where the commentators seem to think the retort is the same as here. Examination however will shew that, while the repartee here is sharp and double-barrelled, in Herodotus its force is much weaker, inasmuch as Timodemus was an Athenian and was not a Belbinate (ἐὼν 'Ἀθηναῖος = 'though you are an Athenian'). The story had improved with use. It is told again by Plutarch (Themist. 121 Α).

330 Α. εὐδοκίμοιη. That this, and not εὐδοκιμοῖ, is the classical Attic prose form of optatives of -έω and -ώ verbs (όω verbs in φη) is acknowledged by grammarians. Cf. Meisterhans § 61. 8, and a full discussion in Rutherford New Phryn. pp. 442 sqq. The mss of Plato naturally exhibit the proper forms in the 1st person singular, where the step from -οίης, -φην to -οίη, -φη μι is palaeographically considerable (e.g. δμολογοῖν Αpol. 17 β, καλοίην ibid. 40 Α, συνδία-
σκοτοίην Prot. 361 Β, ἀγαπήφην Meno 75 Β and c), but in -οίης -οίη the corruption was easier and is frequently made.

καὶ τοῖς δή μη πλουσίοις—'so, in the case of the said (supposed) class who are not rich and....' καὶ (as more frequently after a comparison introduced by ως &c.) gives the application. δή throws into the sentence a tone very much like that imparted in English by the use of the ironical 'your'—'so with your poor people who....'

πάνυ τι—to be connected with the negative, without which it does not occur. Cf. 419 Α ἐάν τίς σε φη μή πάνυ τι εὐδαλιμονας ποτεύν τοῦτος τοῦς ἄνδρας. Dem. in Neer. 14 ἡ οὐλα οὐδὲ τρίῳν ταλάντων πάνυ τι ἴν. Whereas οὐ πάνυ may also = 'not at all' (omnia non), οὐ πάνυ τι has only the meaning non omni, ‘not altogether,’ lit. 'not wholly, so to speak.' τι is frequent with adverbs, e.g. σχεδόν τι, κάλλικον τι, &c.

γῆρας μετά πενής. These words should be closely joined (cf. 'peace with honour'). So 372 δ διάγοντες εν εἰρήνη μετὰ υγείας, 591 β ψυχη σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη ) (σώμα ἴσχυν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ υγείας λαμβάνον.
330 B. ποι' ἐπεκτησάμην; mss vary between ποι' and ποι. Palaeographically the two readings may be put on an equality, but neither affords an altogether satisfactory sense.

(1) ποι' ἐπεκτησάμην; The regular implication of ποιος in retorting upon the last speaker is one of surprised expostulation or even ridicule. Cf. Ar. Nub. 366

ΣΤ. ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ἡμῖν, φέρε, πρὸς τῆς γῆς, Οὐλύμπιος οὐ θεός ἐστιν; ΣΩ. ποιος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις; οὐδ' ἐστι Ζεὺς.

Plat. Euthyd. 291 A ΣΩ. μη ὁ Κτήσιππος ἢν ὁ τοιαύτ' εἰπὼν; ΚΡ. ποιος Κτήσιππος; 'You and your Zeus!' 'You and your Ktesippus!' Charmid. 174 β ποιον, ἢ δ' ὅσ, πεπτευτικόν; Theaet. 180 β ποιοις μαθηταῖς, ὡ δαιμόνιε; Euthyd. 304 Ε &C. The use is very common (see Blaydes' note on Aristoph. loc. cit.), but only so in connexion with nouns and adjectives, whereas here it attaches to a verb. Nevertheless, so far as the construction is concerned, there seems to be no a priori objection to the present combination. There is, however, nothing in Socrates' question to call forth a contemptuous "acquired! You and your 'acquired'!" In fact Cephalus, as he proceeds to state, actually had acquired in some degree. If we could find authority for ποιος without derision, the expostulatory force might perhaps be weakened into "'Acquired'! Don't talk of 'acquired'! It has been so little"; and, though this is rather strained, it might pass. Jowett and Campbell indeed go so far as to observe that the use of ποιος "is not necessarily derisive or ironical, but implies a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact," but they do not support this obiter dictum by examples.

(2) ποι ἐπεκτησάμην; There are uses of ποι (γινόμαι), as of ποθευν and πῶς, which correspond to the above ironical use of ποιος. Thus Ar. Lys. 192

ΚΑ. εἶ λευκὸν ποθευν

ΠΠΟΥΝ λαβοῦσαι τόμουν ἐντεμοίμεθα.

ΛΥ. ποὶ λευκὸν ἠππον;

ibid. 383

ΧΟ. Α. μῶν θερμοὺ ἢν; ΧΟ. Β. ποὶ θερμὸν;

and in Eur. Phoen. 712 ἐξοιστεόν τὰρ' ὁπλα is answered by ποι; μῶν νεαζὼν οὐχ ὄρας ἐ χρυ' ὦ ὄραν;

But here again we find no use of a verb with this ποι, and even if we write δείκσιμ ποῖ; ἐπεκτησάμην; the irony is as misplaced as in the previous reading.

We may, perhaps, venture to suggest the emendation ὁποι' ἐπεκτησάμην and unite with these words the following clause,
which is at present left with asyndeton; i.e. ὄποι ἐπεκτησάμην, μέσος τις-γέγονα χρηματιστῆς, 'in regard to any little I may have acquired, I have stood about midway...' Cephalus would thus not deny having made some acquisition, while he would speak of it modestly in the word ὅποια (quantumcumque, quanta quanta). The initial Ο might easily be lost after Ω.

μέσος...τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. μέσος with genitive is frequent enough. Cf. Polit. 303 Α ἐνὸς καὶ πλῆθους τὸ ὀλίγον μέσον, and in Latin, Hor. Od. ii. 19. 27 pacis eras mediusque belli (though not in the same sense). More deserving of remark, however, is the use of τε...καὶ in such contrasts (= 'on the one side...on the other'). Cf. 360 ε ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαίωτατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικωτατον. Aesch. P. V. 927 ὅσον τὸ τ' ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ δουλεύειν δίξα. There is something of the sort, but otherwise expressed, in Latin in e.g. Hor. Sat. i. 7. 11 inter...Priamiden animosum atque inter Achilles | Ira fuit.

πάππος τε καὶ ὀμώνυμος ἐμοί. That it was almost the rule for Greek names to alternate thus in a family is well known. Among familiar instances are Niceratus—Nicias—Niceratus, Nicomachus—Aristotle—Nicomachus, Sophocles—Iophon—Sophocles, Xanthippus—Pericles—Xanthippus. Cf. Lach. 179 Α ἡμῶν εἰσὶν νεῖσοι οὕτωι, διε μὲν τούτε, πάππον ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὐτὸ δὲν παππῶν δὲ καὶ οὕτος ὄνομα καλούμεν (i.e. Thucydides—Melesias—Thucydides, and Aristides—Lysimachus—Aristides). The same custom is more than hinted at in Aesch. Eum. 8, where it is said of Phoebe, grandmother of Phoebus,

δίδωσι δ' ἡ γενέθλιον δόσιν
Φοίβῳ τὸ Φοίβης δ' ὄνομα ἔχει παρώνυμον.

There is consequently much in Van Prinsterer's suggestion that the name Λυσιάδας immediately following ought to be Δυσιάς. This would give the alternation Cephalus—Lysias—Cephalus—Lysias.

ἐλάττω...πλεῖῳ—neuter plural. If τὴν οὕσιαν were understood, αὐτὴν would be almost indispensable, and πλεῖῳ would rather be μειῶς.

οὗ τοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην...οτί. A frequent idiom. 'Why I asked you (was this, τούτο ᾴ)...because.' Cf. 491 Β δ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστῶτατον ἀκούσα, ὅτι ἐν ἔκαστον...ἀπόλλυς, Phaedr. 248 Β οὗ δὲ ἔνεκα ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ,...ἡ τε ἡ...νομὴ κ.τ.λ. Lach. 184 Β, &c.

330 C. διπλὴ ἡ οἱ ἄλλοι—'in a twofold way as compared with other people,' διπλὴ being explained later by (1) ταύτῃ τε.
NOTES.

(330 ὅν) as creators love their own creations, summing up ὅσπερ... ἀγαπῶσι) (2) καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν (for their practical utility). η follows ἀναλυς or ἀναλάσιος &c. as it follows comparatives, πλέον, μᾶλλον &c.

For the thought cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 1. 20 ἔλευθεροτεροὶ δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἡμῖν κτησάμενοι ἄλλα παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀπειροὶ τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα ὅσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ παῖδες, and ibid ix. 3 ὑπεραγαπᾶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα στέργοντες ὅσπερ τέκνα.

CHAPTER V.

330 D. ἐν γὰρ ἵσθι. γὰρ is introductory. 'You must know...'

ἐπειδὰν τις ἐγγὺς ἦ τοῦ οἶλεσθαι τελευτῆσει—'when a man gets near thinking he is going to die.' Apparently there is some confusion between the thoughts ἐγγὺς ἦ τοῦ τελευτᾶν and οἶηται ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ τελευτᾶν.

δέος καὶ φροντὶς—the two words form one notion: 'fear and anxiety'='anxious fear'; hence the sing. εἰσφρέχεται.

περὶ ὄν=περὶ τοῦτων περὶ ὄν. Note imperf. εἰσήγει, 'concerning which it used not to occur to him.'

ἐνθάδε...ἐκεῖ: The euphemism ἐκεῖ, 'in the other world,' answered by ἐνθάδε, 'in this world,' is almost too common to require remark. Yet cf. Eur. Med. 1073 εὐδαίμωνοι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ, Soph. Ant. 75 πλείων χρόνοι | δὲ δεὶ μ' ἄρέσκειν τοῖς κατῶ τῶν ἐνθάδε, Aj. 855, Ar. Ran. 82 (where, the scene being in Hades, the two worlds are reversed) ὃ δ' εὐκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὐκολος δ' ἐκεῖ. Inf. 365 λ αἰ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἦμᾶς.

καταγιλάμενοι τέως =οι πρότερον κατεγελώντο. Besides possessing the meaning 'for a time' τέως is demonstrative, 'up to that time,' 'formerly.' Cf. Aesch. Cho. 993 τέως φίλον, νῦν δ' ἔχθρον. Lysias in Epier. 16 ὅσπερ ἐν τῷ τέως χρόνῳ εἰθισμένοι ἐστέ (=αἰθου). τότε δὴ—'then, if not before.'

στρέφουσιν—'Make him uneasy.' Cf. versare, and the use of στρόφος and the impersonal στρέφει of the colic.

μὴ ἄληθεσι ὅσι—'For fear they may prove true.' The words στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν imply fear; indeed the line which separates implication from actual expression is perhaps passed. Hence the construction is as if δέδοκε had preceded. See Godwin M. and T. § 365 (and also § 92). Cf. Soph. O. T. 747
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The same construction occurs in Latin in e.g. Hor. Od. i. 2. 5 Terruit gentes, grave ne rediret saeculum Pyrrhae (i.e. ita ut timente ne...).

330 E. καὶ αὐτὸς—(1) with colon at ὁσι ‘and instinctively (of his own accord)’ i.e. apart from the extraneous influence of μῦθοι; or (2) with comma at ὁσι, the ‘legends commonly told torment him...and, on his own part (i.e. applying the reflection to himself), he...’ The latter seems the more compact and natural in sense, and, if the other rendering appears to give the clearer force to ὅτι...μῆν...καὶ αὐτὸς..., it may be pointed out that proper values of τε...καὶ are sufficiently represented in the rendering ‘for not only do the legends...make him uneasy... but he personally applies them.’

καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι...καθορᾷ αὐτὰ, ὑποψίας δὲ οὖν...

The passage as usually read and punctuated is lax and difficult. If we write καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι...καθορᾷ αὐτὰ as an independent sentence ending with a full stop or colon (and with δὲ οὖν following in the sense ‘however that may be’), we shall be obliged to render ‘he gets a better view of things in Hades either through the weakness of old age or else because he has got, so to speak, nearer to them.’ But though the weakness of old age may be conducive to alarm, it can hardly be conducive to clearer sight.

If, on the other hand, we place a comma after αὐτὰ, the passage becomes harshly anacoluthic, καθορᾷ being an error for καθορῶν of a sort which it would be hard to parallel in Plato, ‘And, either through the weakness of old age, or else being, as it were (ὡςπερ, not ὁς or ᾧτε), nearer to things in Hades and so getting a better sight of them (καθορῶν), he (whatever the real case may be, δὲ οὖν) becomes full of suspicion.’ Stallbaum, followed by Jowett and Campbell, accepts this confusion and quotes for δὲ οὖν Tim. 28 b ὁ δὴ πᾶς ὦμανός ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ποτὲ ὑμομαξόμενος... σκεπτέον δ᾽ οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον. That nominativus pendens, however, is common enough in Greek, and there cannot arise in regard to the meaning any such ambiguity as is entailed in the present passage. Nevertheless, whether a particular anacoluthon (resulting in or produced by a confusion of thought) is probable or improbable, is one of those matters about which opinions of competent scholars will differ without hope of definite settlement.

The whole passage is rendered both grammatical and logical if we insert εἰ after ὡςπερ and before ἡδη (εἰ after επ and before η, with which its pronunciation became almost identical). Thus ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἄσθενελας ἢ καὶ ὡςπερ <εἰ> ἡδη ἑγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεὶ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾷ αὐτὰ, ὑποψίας δὲ οὖν...‘either through the weak-
ness of old age, or else as if, being nearer..., he catches a better glimpse..., no matter how it is, he...’ Indeed it is a question whether for ἶδη itself we should not read εὶ δὴ (ὡς περ εἰ δὴ). The δὴ would qualify the rather quaint notion. But ἶδη has a point worth retaining.

For σ’ οὖν resumptive (sed), after the quasi-parenthesis ήτο...αὐτά, cf. Apol. 34 D εἰ δὴ τις υμῶν οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγνως, εἰ σ’ οὖν..., and frequently.

δείματος—a word used by Thucydides, but otherwise in Attic mainly confined to poetry. So Plato uses δύμα for ὀφθαλμός, with other old-fashioned terms and phrases.

μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος—ἐλπίς originally signifies ‘expectation,’ whether good or bad. (Cf. δόξα, fama, dolus with meanings ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα.) Plato himself writes, Legg. 644 C, πρὸς δὲ τούτου ἀμφοῦν αὐ δόξας μελλόντων, οὐ κοινῶν μὲν δυομα ἐλπίς, ιδον δὲ φόδος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίον. Hence, though ψευδέων τωσ ἐλπίδος is usually ‘to cheat one of his hope,’ in Soph. Aj. 1382 καὶ μ’ ἐφευρᾶς ἐλπίδος πολὺ = ’you have (agreeably) disappointed me.’ Spes and sperare are similarly used in Latin, e.g. Livy ii. 3. 1 id (bellum) scep omnium serius fuit. The opposite μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος occurs in 496 e.

331 A. ἴδεια ἐλπίς αἰὲ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος—’Hope is always with him to gladden him (ἵδεια) and to be a kindly nurse of his old age.’ [The order is altogether against construing as if it were ἴδεια καὶ ἀγαθὴ ἐλπίς αἰὲ πάρεστι γηροτρόφος.] Ἐλπίς is personified. The γηροτρόφοι (or γηροβόσκοι) were usually the sons or daughters.

ὡς καὶ Πινδάρος λέγει—’as Pindar says.’ Closely pressed, καὶ has the sense ‘(I am not the first to say it, but in particular) Pindar as well.’

δικαίως καὶ σωσ. The usual order, at least in the formula τὰ σοι καὶ δίκαια, is the reverse. The present order occurs in Gorg. 507 b &c., and in a negative sentence Legg. 86. 1 D οὐ γὰρ αὖ νόμιμον οἶδε σοιν αὖ εἶν. τὸ δοσιν=fas, τὸ δίκαιον (or νόμιμον) =ius. Antiphan (114. 9) has the full expression πρὸς θεῶν δοσιν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δίκαιον. Similarly Polyb. xxiii. 10. 8. See also Cobet Var. Lect. p. 359. Cf. Gorg. 507 b περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσ- ήκοντα πρᾶττων δίκαι ἀν πρᾶττοι, περὶ δὲ θεῶν δοσιν. Ibid. 523 λ, B δικαίως καὶ σωσι is answered by ἄδικως καὶ ἄθεως.


συναορεῖ. Cf. Pind. N. iv. 5 εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάορος.

PL. REP.

NOTES. 97
The human κατανεμομένη is regarded as a ship, whose head is kept right whenever it would swerve aside. ζωή means 'thought' or 'mood,' which is variable and erratic (πολυστροφος) unless there is some steadying influence at the helm. εὖ οὖν κ.τ.λ. οὖν resumes after the quotation.

πρὸς...τοῦτο...πλείοντον ἄξιαν—'most valuable to this end.' Cf. χρήσιμος, ἱκανός, &c., πρὸς τι.

331 B. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ...ἀπίεναι δεινότα. A nominativus pendens. The sentence begins as if it would run somewhat thus, τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ...δεινότα, (τοῦτο) οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐκ τῆς τῶν χρησμῶν κτήσεως συμβαίνει. It actually ends as if it had begun εἰς γὰρ τὸ μηδὲ...δεινότα. 'For that one should not even unintentionally cheat or deceive anybody, nor yet, through owing either sacrifices to a god or money to a man, therefore (consequently, ἐπειτὰ) depart to Hades in fear—to this end the possession of money greatly contributes.' The force of ἐπειτὰ is simply 'thereafter,' and this may mean, according to context, (1) 'consequently,' (2) 'nevertheless.' With its value here cf. Iach. 192. 1τειχὸς δὴ εἰπεῖν, τὰς οὐσία δύναμις...ἐπειτὰ...ἀνδρέα κέκληται.

ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνθρώπων...θείην ἄν...πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον ἐπίλαι. The simple combination ἀλλὰ γε without either a separating word or another particle following is very dubious, and editors mostly follow Stobaeus (Serm. 92, p. 512), who quotes the passage with ἀλλὰ ἐν γε ἀνθρώπων.

The combination ἀλλὰ γε δὴ (Phaedr. 262 Α.), as Stallbaum argues, cannot warrant ἀλλὰ γε alone, inasmuch as in γε δὴ, γε τοι, γε μηδὲ κ.τ.λ., the particles are in such frequent association that they may almost be regarded as compounded (cf. Liddell and Scott Lex. γε I. 5). No sure example of the unqualified ἀλλὰ γε seems to be forthcoming.

ἐν ἀνθρώπων—adverbially. So ἐποὺ πρὸς ἔπος, γῆν πρὸ γῆς &c. Cf. Legg. 647. 1τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὖν ὁμοίως σφόδρα ἡμῶν ἀπεργάζεται.

Primarily, however, the grammar grew out of an appositional construction: θείην ἄν, (τιθέλει) ἐν ἀνθρώπων i.e. 'I should put down (putting it, that is to say, as) one thing against any other one thing.' In Legg. 705 the order ἀνθρώπων ἐν occurs.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον. It is usual to take οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρησιμώτατον together, and to assume a confusion of the thought οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρησιμωτάτον ( = μάλιστα χρησιμωτάτον) with the simple χρησιμωτάτον.

But ἐλάχιστον is not ἐλάχιστα, nor is ἐλάχιστα the equivalent of ἥκιστα. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον might = μέγιστον, but μέγιστον χρησι-
μῶτατον is not the Greek of prose, and obtains little support from double superlatives like τῶν μάλιστα ἀνθρωτάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων (Tim. 92a). The singulants πλείστου and μέγιστον are indeed found with superlatives a few times in tragedy, e.g. Eur. Med. 1323 ὁ μέγιστον ἐχθρίστη. Soph. Phil. 631 τῆς πλείστου ἐχθρίστης, O. C. 743 πλείστου ἀνθρωπῶν ἐφὼν κάκιστος. Yet Plato would almost certainly not have written the singular either in οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρήσιμον or in οὐκ ἐλάχιστον χρησιμώτατον, even if he might have written the plural οὐκ ἐλάχιστα. He would not, therefore, in either case have got so far as writing οὐκ ἐλάχιστον at all.

It is rather to be presumed, either (1) that when writing οὐκ ἐλάχιστον he intended to continue in some such way as οὐκ ἐλάχιστον...θείν ἂν...εἰς τούτο...πλοῦτον συμβάλλεσθαι, or (2) that in the grammatical construction οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is attributive to ἐν. ‘I should set down,—setting down, that is to say, one thing against one thing as not least important—that wealth is most helpful for this purpose.’ There seems to be no real objection to dispensing by this rendering with the hypothesis of a confusion of thought.

331 c. τούτο δ’ αὐτό, τήν δικαιοσύνην. See Introd. on this place.

πότερα φήσομεν. Cf. 397 D τι οὖν ποιήσομεν;

The tone and implication of the future and those of the deliberative subjunctive are different. τί φῶμεν = ‘what ought we to say?’ τι φήσομεν = ‘what are we going to say?’ The distinction should be apprehended even in places where the two uses occur together and are often spoken of as identical, e.g. Eur. Ion 758 εἴπωμεν; ἡ συγώμεν; ἡ τι δράσομεν;

ἀπλῶς οὖτωs. These words, as in 386 b, Meno 73 εστρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴπουμ’ ἄν ἐγγογ, δι’ σχήμα τι ἔστω, οὐχ οὔτωs ἀπλῶς δι’ σχήμα, and Prot. 351 c οὐκ ὁδό...ἀπλῶς οὖτωs, ὡς σο ἐρωτᾶs, may be translated in two ways, according as the stress is laid on one or on the other.

(1) With the stress rather on οὖτωs (i.e. with οὔτωs qualified by ἀπλῶς), ‘simply so’ i.e. ‘so, without qualification,’ in which case οὔτωs would be explained by τήν ἀλήθειαν καὶ το ἀποδῶναι κ.τ.λ. ‘Shall we say that it is truth—speaking just in that way, without qualification—and the restitution of something received?’

The position of the words, however, in the middle of the explanatory terms makes against this interpretation.
(2) With the stress rather on ἀπλῶς (i.e. with οὕτως qualifying ἀπλῶς) 'just absolutely' (= 'neither more nor less').

Both position and usage are in favour of this rendering of οὕτως. Cf. Gorg. 464 ν ἐν ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι ὦκ ἔχω, ibid. 494 ε ἀνέδυν οὕτω, 503 δ οὕτωσι ἀτέρβα, Phaedr. 235 c νῦν μὲν οὕτως ὦκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, Symp. 176 ε οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἑσυχίαν, Soph. Aj. 1206 κεῖμαι δ’ ἀμέριμνος οὕτως, the sic temere iacentes of Horace, and such phrases as οὕτωσι μὲν ἀκόουσι. Compare also inf. 340 δ ἀλλ’, οἰμαί, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως.

αὐτ姮 ταῦτα ποιεῖν—sc. ἀληθεύει καὶ ἀποδίδοει. The point of αὐτ姮 is 'even these things,' i.e. unlikely as it may appear that truth and restitution could ever be unjust.

ε’ τις λάβει...ε’ μανεῖς ἀπαντητη. For a similar (somewhat awkward) combination of clauses with ε’ cf. Meno 74 ν (where there are three), Theaet. 147 λ. Cicero borrows the illustration in De Offic. ππ. 25.

οὕτε δικαίου άν εἶ...τάληθη λέγει—i.e. 'nor would the man who did so restore it (ὁ ἀποδίδονος) be just, nor yet (would he be so) if he consented (ἔθελων without article) to tell the man who was in such a state the whole truth and nothing but the truth' (πάντα τάληθη) has either or both these meanings).

331 D. ὀρος—a definition.' Cf. Aristot. Met. xii. 1078 b δόν γὰρ ἐστιν ἀ τις άν ἀποδίδη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοῦς τ’ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζοαι καθάλον ('inductive reasoning and the definition of general terms').

Of the cardinal virtues, as the Republic is concerned with justice, so the Laches turns upon the definition of courage, and the Char- mides upon that of temperance. See more on the subject in Introduction § 7.

Σμονιδη—i.e. the lyric poet Simonides of Ceos (not of Amorgos), who lived b.c. 556—467.

Other allusions (apparently) to the same gnomic sage occur in 365 c, and 489 b, and in the Protagoras 339 λ he again supplies a text in the well-known lines ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποιλ καὶ νόμω τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγον τετυγμένον.

καὶ μέντοι...καὶ παραδίδωμι ύμιν. The first καὶ implies the thought ('well, you have joined in') and... The second is attached to παραδίδωμι in the sense 'I do (indeed, as a matter of fact) hand over the discussion to you (ὑμῖν, the rest of the company).'

μέντοι as in 329 c. The whole thus='nay (it is well you speak as if the discussion were in your hands), and I do resign it to you.' For the graceful retirement of Cephalus see Introduction § 8 c.
τῶν γε σών κληρονόμος. The words contain a double meaning: (1) ‘P. is heir to your share in the discussion,’ (2) playfully—‘then you give us to understand that P. is to be your heir (at your death).’ Socrates pretends that in his remark to Polemarchus Cephalus has shown how he has made his will, since he has thus formally recognised him. Hence γελάσας in the next sentence, ‘‘Oh, of course,’ said he, with a laugh.” In τῶν γε σών the particle supplies the same force as the tone in, ‘then we know who your heir is.’

γελάσας. Though this aorist participle literally = ‘having broken into a laugh,’ it is best rendered in English by ‘with a laugh.’

Certain aorists, e.g. ἐπήνεσα, ἀπέπτυσα, ἐνυψά, ἔδεξάμεν τὸ ρηθὲν, ἐγέλασα, ἠςθην, are used idiomatically in positions where English requires the present. Cf. Ar. Eq. 696 ἠςθην ἀπειλαίει. ἐγέλασα ψολοκομπίας. Inf. 339 τὸ νῦν...ἐμαθὼν ὁ λέγεις. 348 ἐθαύμασα. Goodwin M. and T. § 60 says that ‘a sudden action, which is just taking place, is spoken of as if it had already happened.’ It is, however, difficult to feel satisfied with that account of the matter. Rather the sense was originally explainable on strict principle. ‘I approved (as soon as you spoke),’ ‘I understood you (before you had finished),’ ‘I was delighted (when I heard you)’ &c. That the feeling or demonstration continues into the present, and that, therefore, ἐπαινῶ, ἐνυψῶ, δέχομαι, γελῶ, ἠδομαι, might stand where the aorists stand, is no proof that the tense-suggestion did not exist in the aorist.

CHAPTER VI.

331 E. ἀλλὰ μέντοι—‘nay but (indeed)…’ Cf. Xen. Anab. iv. 6. 16.

σοφὸς γάρ καὶ θείος ἀνήρ. σοφὸς (doctus) was a standing epithet of poets, but the term is used with a special significance in speaking of Simonides. Cf. Cic. Nat. Deor. i. 22 Simonides non solum poeta suavis, sed etiam ceteroquin doctus sapiensque traditur. For the combination of adjectives cf. Protag. 315 επάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνήρ εἶναι καὶ θείος (of Prodicus), and very similarly, after mention of the same person, Theaet. 151 διὰ λοις σοφῶς τε καὶ θεσπεσίους ἀνδράς.

The reading ὃ ἀνήρ is apparently given by mss of less authority, ἀνήρ by those of greater. The common source is almost certainly ἀνήρ. Where metre absolutely requires ἀνήρ mss often have ἀνήρ. ἀνήρ itself is of course translatable enough: ‘for he is a wise and extraordinary man’; but, since palaeographically ἀνήρ and ἀνήρ are
equally probable, it is usage and environment which must decide when the mss differ. Usage is rather in favour of 'the man is wise and admirable.' See however Ar. Ran. 968 Θηραμένης; σοφός γ' ἀνήρ καὶ δεινὸς ἐς τὰ πάντα.

θεῖος—'extraordinary,' often with an implication of inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμὸς).

Cf. Meno 81 b Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοι ἦσι. Phaedr. 234 ν συνεβάκχευσα μετ' σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς. Meno 99 c οὐκοῦν...ἀξίων τούτων θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἀνδρας, οὕτως νοῦν μη ἐξοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν τῶν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι; and ibid. ν καὶ οί Δάκωνες ὡταν τιν' ἐγκυμιάξωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα 'θείος (really σείος) ἀνήρ,' φασίν, ὀντος.' Cf. inf. 335 ε τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν.

gυγνώσκεις—not ἐγγοκας, but 'you can make out,' 'you perceive.'

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνω. For the Socratic irony see Introduction § 22 a.

παρακαταθεμένου. In the comparative rarity of large and trustworthy banks, strong-rooms, or opportunities for profitable and safe investments, it was not uncommon with Greeks and Romans (when about to travel &c.) to entrust money or articles of value to the safe keeping of friends or persons of known probity. Such παρακαταθήκαι (fideicommissa) were evidently often very much at the mercy of their temporary holder, and a special bona fides was expected of him. For an instance of such depositing in its crudest form see the story in Hdt. vi. 86, and the allusions to it in Juv. xiii. 174 sqq.

ὀτροφοῦν—after παρακαταθεμένου. The word is more emphatic than if it had been (τινος παρακ. τι) τινι, and = 'where a man has deposited a thing with anyone whatever,' i.e. 'in any case wherever where a man receives a deposit.'

μη σωφρόνως ἁπαιτοῦντι—i.e. εἰ ἁπατεῖ αὐτὸ μὴ σωφρονῶν.

The use of the adverb is exceptional in reference to 'the condition of the agent and not to the mode of action' (Jowett and Campbell). μη σωφρονοῦντι ἁπαιτοῦντι would be an intolerable cacophony. We may compare Shakspeare Henry V. iv. 1 'If a son do sinfully miscarry upon the sea' (i.e. in his sins).

332 A. ἀποθετεύον δὲ...ὀπτὲ τις...ἀπαιτοῖ. It is an error to call this the optative of 'indefinite frequency,' inasmuch as in the technical accception of the term that optative is only used in past connexions. On the other hand it is in no way necessary, but shews a want of appreciation of Greek idiom, to alter with Madvig into the obvious ἁπατεῖ. Cf. inf. 361 c ἄνθηλον ὄν (sc. ἄτιν) εἴτε τοῦ δικαλοῦ εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν ἑνεκα τοιοῦτος εἶτ, Gorg. 482 c ἔγωγε
Such sentences belong to the class of 'mixed conditionals,' which become exceedingly frequent in late Greek writers, e.g. Lucian. It would, for instance, be possible to write here with formal correctness (1) ἀποδοτέον (ἐστιν)... ὀπότε (= ἐν ποτε) ἀπαίτει, (2) ἀποδοτέον (ἐστιν)... ὀπόταν (= ἐὰν ποτε) ἀπαίτη, (3) ἀποδοτέον ἄν εἰνι... ὀπότε (= ἐν ποτε) ἀπαίτοιη. In the present example, as in the others quoted, it is a matter of indifference whether we speak of the apodosis or the protasis as the 'irregular clause.' Each is formally 'irregular' relatively to the other. It is worth noting, with Goodwin, that this construction occurs almost only when the apodosis states an 'obligation, propriety, possibility &c.'

λέγει τὸ τὰ ὅφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδίδοναι—"means by his saying (τὸ) that 'it is just to make restitution of what is due.'" τὸ belongs to all that follows, as if the words τὰ... ἀποδίδοναι were beneath quotation marks. Cf. 338 ε τοὺτ' ὄν ἐστιν... δ λέγω... ταύτων εἶναι δίκαιον for the use of λέγω= 'I mean by saying...'

ἄλλο μέντοι—'nay, something else certainly': v. sup. 329 c. μέντοι. The combination μέντοι νὴ Δὰ occurs 469 ε. Cf. Phaedo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d &c.

μανθάνω ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τι... It is best to make τι independent of μανθάνω and = διότι, 'because.'

332 B. βλαβερά γίγνεται. The singular not so much because ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις form one notion (each action necessarily implying the other), as because the real subject is felt to be ἡ λήψις. Cf. sup. 329 D καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ ἐξαμβαλεῖ.

ὀπερ καὶ προσῆκε—as an impersonal verb προσῆκε differs from δεὶ and χρῆ in expressing that which befits, or is called for by, a particular set of relations. Here, of course, it is not impersonal, but the connotation remains the same. 'What, you know, suits their relationship.' It is this expression which prompts the correction made below (c) by Socrates (προσήκον).

The γε after παρά and the explanatory καὶ indicate a certain amount of scruple in pleading for the doing of injury to anyone. For the scruple and the half-excusing tone contained in γε cf.
CHAPTER VII.

ἡμίξατο...ποιητικῶς—‘spoke darkly (in riddles) as poets do.’ Cf. Theaet. 152 C τούτῳ ἡµῖν µέν ἡμίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφητῷ, τοῖς δὲ µαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἄλληθειαν ἔλεγεν;

The construction is ἡμίξατο τὸ δίκαιον, δ ἐίη. See on 327 A τὴν ἐορτὴν βουλόµενος θεάσασθαι κ.τ.λ.

dievoeitо—‘meant,’ not ‘thought.’

332 C. τούτ’...ἀποδεδόναι. The infinitive is exegetical of τούτο. (The article τὸ of course belongs to προσήκον.) See on 329 D (init.) and cf. Gorg. 491 D καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων.

τούτῳ δὲ ὀνόµασεν ὄφειλόµενον—not = τὸ ὀφειλόµενον, but = ‘and for this he used the word ὀφειλόµενον.’

ἄλλα τι οἷς; ἐφη—“‘Well, and what have you to say of it?’ said Polemarchus.”

It is hard to understand what the difficulty is which editors have found in these words, and which has caused some (after Madvig) to treat ἄλλα τι οἷς; as part of Socrates’ speech, and then to continue with Ἐφη (= ἤνεφη sc. Polemarchus), while others have boldly omitted ἐφη and run on ἄλλα τι οἷς, ὁ πρὸς Δίως, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, thus creating a sentence in which ἦν δ’ ἐγώ is both superfluous and badly placed.

It is usual to say with Stallbaum that ἄλλα τι οἷς; = ἄλλα τι (ἄλλο) οἷς; and to compare e.g. Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δὴ φῶµεν; (= τί γὰρ δὴ ἄλλο φῶµεν). But as a matter of fact the words convey no implication that Polemarchus confirms Socrates’ statement of the case. He simply asks, ‘Well, what then is your opinion?’

ὅ πρὸς Δίως. These words belong to the question which continues with ὁ Συμωνίδη. They are supposed to be uttered by the person (τις) who interroga tes, not by Socrates. “I replied, ‘If any one had asked him, ‘In the name of Zeus, Simonides...’”’
ὁ πρὸς Διὸς is a common expletive in appeals of remonstrance. Cf. Apol. 25 c ἐτι δὲ ἣμιν εἰπέ, ὁ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, κ.τ.λ. Meno 71 d ὡθὲ αὐτὸς, ὁ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φις ἀρετῆν εἶναι;
That ὁ does not belong to the vocative, but forms an integral part of the expletive, is clear from e.g. Soph. Aj. 371 ὁ πρὸς θεῶν ὑπεικε καὶ φρόνησον εὖ. Inf. 459 λ ἀρι ὅνω, ὁ πρὸς Διὸς, προσέχῃκας τι τοῖς τούτων γάμως; &c. In Protag. 309 τὶ, τι λέγεις; simply.
The accentuation, ὁ or ὁ, is doubtful.]

ἀποδιδόμενα. Though the sense in which the word is here applied is very common, it has somewhat shifted from the meaning of ἀποδίδοναι just above. It is no longer a case of ‘restoring’ what has been lent or entrusted, but of giving what is due—what one ought to give—in a certain relation.

Cf. reddere, and the opposite ἀποστερεῖν (‘withhold’). Cope on Aristot. Rhet. i. 1. 17 amply illustrates various uses of the verb arising out of the general sense of ‘assigning something due.’ Similar to the present case is 456 β ὡθὲ εὔπτηδεύματα ὡθὲ αὐτὰ ἀποδώτεα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεωι;

ἀφελόμενον καὶ προσήκον—the καὶ is corrective: ‘due, that is to say, fitting.’

332 D. ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς ἐμπροσθὲν ἐλημένοις. Cf. 365 δ ταύτῃ ητέον, ὡς τὰ ἱχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει, 394 δ ὅπη ἄν ὁ λόγος ὀστερ πνεύμα φέρη, ταύτῃ ητέον.

τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς. The addition of τοῖς before ἐχθροῖς would be impossible with the words which follow, since it would then be stated that each class should receive both benefits and injuries. τίσι is answered by τοῖς φίλοις-τε-καὶ-ἐχθροῖς, i.e. the recipients are persons who are comprehended in the term ‘friends and enemies.’

One article is used by Plato when two substantives or adjectives denoting contrasted things are used together in such a way as to form a unity for purposes of discussion; the connecting καὶ or τε καὶ may in such cases often be rendered ‘as the case may be,’ or ‘and...respectively.’ Cf. Euthyph. 7 c τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος. Symp. 186 c ὁ διαγιγνώσκων...τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ αἰσχροῦ ἐρωτα. Prot. 355 ε τοῦ ἡδο τε καὶ αἰναροῦ. Euthyph. 15 ε τοῦ ὑσον καὶ μῆ. Apol. 23 δ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξέων. Crito 48 λ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων. Prot. 313 δ ὁ ἐμπορός τε καὶ κάτηλος, &c.

πλέοντας—sc. φίλοις; ‘when they are on a voyage’; not = τοὺσ πλέοντας.

332 E. τὶ δὲ ὁ δικαῖος; No special verb is to be supplied, though the sense implies an ellipse of e.g. ποιήσει or ὁ ὅν ποιήσει.
Similarly in the English, 'And what about the just man?' The speaker has no fuller formula present to his mind.

For the Greek idiom cf. 341 ο τι δε κυβερνήτης; ναυτών ἄρχων ἐστίν ἢ ναύτης; Gorg. 502 ο τι δε ο πατήρ αυτοῦ Μέλις; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βελτιών βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; The last instance helps to show that the proper punctuation here is τι δε ο δίκαιος; εν τινι πράξει... and not τι δε; ο δίκαιος εν τινι πράξει κ.τ.λ.

πράξει—not 'action,' but 'state of his affairs,' 'plight' (cf. πράπτειν εν or κακώς), circumstances such as are specified in κάμωντας and πλέοντας above. Cf. Soph. Aj. 790 ἤκει φέρον | Αλεπτὸς ἧμιν πράξειν ἢν ἡλγήσε τ' ἐγὼ, Aesch. P. V. 695 πέφρικ᾿ εἰσδοῦτα πράξειν 'Ιδω. v. note on τῆς δικαίας πράξεως, 349 B.

πρὸς τι ἔργον; 'in regard to what object (to be achieved):black

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμένῳ καὶ ἐνμαχεῖν. 'In making war against or for' ('as the case may be' or 'respectively'). Literally 'in the department of making war for and against.' Cf. sup. δ τοῖς φιλοῖς τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς, 'friends or enemies respectively.'

The addition of ἐν τῷ before ἐνμαχεῖν in good mss is due to some early reader who, failing to grasp this sense, was naturally puzzled at the notion 'making war against and with' the same persons.

希腊 A. καὶ γὰρ γεωργίᾳ—sc. χρῆσιν ἐστι, 'and so is agriculture for example.' Lit. 'Yes, for agriculture also...'

χρεάν ἢ κτήσιν. Cf. 451 ο παῖδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτήσις τε καὶ χρέα.

Sometimes the antithesis is emphasized by a jingle, e.g. Menex. 238 Φιλόντων κτήσιν τε καὶ χρήσιν διδαξάμενοι.

ἐνμβόλαια—in the wide sense of 'bargains,' 'contracts,' or 'engagements.' Cf. Dem. de Cor. 3 τα του καθ' ημέραιν βιον ἐμβόλαια. Legg. 738 Α εἰς τε πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ' εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀπαντα τὰ ἐμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα. ἐμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα. The grammar is not the same as if τὰ κοινωνήματα had been written. 'In saying ἐμβόλαια you say κοινωνήματα,' or 'you use ἐμβόλαια in the sense κοινωνήματα.' This might have been more fully expressed 'ἐμβόλαια δὲ λέγων, λέγεις 'κοινωνήματα' (i.e. 'joint enterprises').

333 B. πεττῶν θέσιν. There are constant references in Greek literature to the game (or games) of πεττόλ from Homer downwards, e.g. Od. i. 107, Pind. Fr. 95. 4, Hdt. i. 94, Eur. Med. 68 and Suppl. 409, Aristot. Pol. i. 2. 10 &c. Nevertheless it is not satisfactorily known how many varieties of the game there
were, or in what precise manner any one of them was played. The feature apparently common to all games of πεττολ was a board marked with lines and occupied by pieces to be moved, as in chess or draughts, or else as in backgammon.

From Aristot. Pol. i. 2. 10 ἄτε περ ἀξοξ ὁν ὁσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς, and an epigram by Agathias (Anth. Pal. ix. 482) it appears that one well-known form of πεττολ was almost the same as the Roman ludus duodecim scriptorum, and very much like backgammon. To this game may very well refer the words inf. 487 β ὁσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεων δεινων οἱ μυ τελευτάντες ἦποκλήνται καὶ οὐκ ἤχοιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν (cf. Polyb. i. 84), though these are usually taken as applying to another familiar form of πεττεία closely resembling draughts. The latter is described by Pollux (ix. 97) as a game in which πέντε (sc. πεσσόντων) ἕκτερος εἴχε τῶν παιζόντων ἐπὶ πέντε γραμμῶν, but as to exactly how it was played, we have no information.

For the present passage it would be obviously quite irrelevant to inquire further into details. In πεττὸν Plato is thinking of any and every kind of chess, draughts or backgammon playing.

θεσὶς is the technical name for a move (θεσθαι τὴν ψήφον). Thus in the epigram of Agathias (Ζήνωνα) τοῦ ποικιλοτευκτος ἔλευθεσ. That the πεττεινικὸς might have almost a professional character appears from inf. 374 c πεττεινικὸς δὲ ἡ κυβευτικὸς ἱκάνως οὐδ’ ἐν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδός ἐπιτηδεύσων ἄλλα παρέργῳ χρώμενος. εἰς κρομάτων—sc. κοινωνιαν.

333 C. ὅταν παρακαταθέσαι καὶ σῶν ἐιναι. The implied subject of εἰναι (viz. αὐτὸ) is the object of παρακαταθέσαι. The next sentence contains a similar change of subject, viz. ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ (ἡμᾶς) αὐτῶρ χρῆσαί ἄλλα (δέῃ αὐτὸ) κεῖσαί. Cf. 343 ε and 360 α (φασὶν) ἀφανὶ αὐτῶν γενέσαί τοῖς παρακαθημένοις καὶ διαλέγοσαί (sc. αὐτῶν) ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου.

σῶν is a word frequently used of money, e.g. Ar. Lys. 488 τάργα-ρον σῶν παρέχειν. Cf. Plaut. Pers. ii. 5. 23 argentum hoc actutum incolume redigere. κεῖσαί—‘be idle.’ Cf. Hom. II. ii. 688 κεῖτο γὰρ ἐν νήσσι (sc. Achilles).

ἐπ’ αὐτῷ—‘in dealing with it,’ or ‘in charge of it.’

333 D. καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἱδίᾳ—i.e. whether it be kept jointly (as belonging to partners), or where an individual only is concerned.

Jowett’s ‘to the individual and to the state’ makes κοινῇ = δημο-σία. But what has the state to do with a pruning-hook?
CHAPTER VIII.

333 E. εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὃν τυγχάνει. The participle is assimilated to the gender of χρήσιμον.

The neuter adjective with masculine or feminine noun is common as a predicate, and a feminine participle following immediately would naturally sound awkward. Cf. 420 c οἱ γάρ ὄφθαλμοι, κάλλιστον τόν, κ.τ.λ. In 336 λ ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκέ τούτο ἐφάνη ή δικαιοσύνη δὲ the attraction is less called for, and is due to a confusion of subject with predicate. So 351 λ ὡσπον τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη. The reverse assimilation, from neuter to feminine, appears in 354 c ὁπότε τὸ δίκαιον μη οἶδα δ ἐστι, σχολή ἐκσομαι, εἰτε ἀρετὴ τις τυγχάνει οὕσα. For attraction of participles generally see Jell (§ 389), who quotes, among other passages, Legg. 735 ε τοὺς μέγιστα ἐξημαρτηκότας ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὗσαν βλάβην πόλεως κ.τ.λ.

The sense ‘only’ is obtained by emphasis on ἄχρηστα. See note on ἄδικα ἴμμοχθηροι 352 c.

That μόνον can be dispensed with is clear also from e.g. 357 λ τὸ δ’ ἢν ἄρα, ὡς ἐνίκε, προοίμιον (sc. μόνον). Cf. Herod. p. 123 τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπ’ ἐκάστων ἀκόη (sc. μόνον) γράφω. Moreover the emphatic juxtaposition of ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον is sufficient for the point; ‘if it comes to being useful for the useless.’

ἐλτε τιν καὶ ἄλλη. The proper Attic order (not ἐλτε καὶ τινι ἄλλη). Lit. ‘and (it holds good) in one of another kind as well.’

ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσον ὡστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν οὔτος δεινώτατος ἐμποίησαι; The best mss give this unsatisfactory reading; two inferior copies substitute καὶ μη παθεῖν for καὶ λαθεῖν; some have καὶ before ἐμποίησαι.

(1) Taking the reading which is best authenticated, we have first to consider the punctuation, determining to which clause καὶ λαθεῖν belongs. (a) ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσον ὡστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὔτος δεινώτατος ἐμποίησαι; is favoured by some editors. Yet καὶ λαθεῖν is surely meaningless, nor can λαθεῖν be joined with an accusative of the thing. If, on the other hand, we were to personify νόσον (with Jowett), it would be necessary to keep up the personification in the following clause, and that device is impossible with ἐμποίησαι. If, again, φυλάξασθαι-καὶ-λαθεῖν be taken as = φυλάξ.
In the text provided, the author discusses several points:

1. The expression "secret in avoiding disease" is considered absurd. There can be no point about secrecy in avoiding disease.

2. It is obvious to conjecture that the verb in antithesis to φυλάξαθαι should be the prominent verb, perhaps in the form of καὶ λαθείν, which would lend itself readily, under a misapprehension, to a corruption into φ. καὶ λαθείν. If we allow either of these changes, the point of λαθείν must be an anticipation of the notion expressed by κλέψαι in the following sentence, i.e., 'as he can watch against disease, so he can escape a watch and implant it.' This is forced, however, and ἀλλὰ μὴ rather shows that the point contained in κλέψαι of the next question is a new one.

3. Regarding the variants, the καὶ μὴ παθέω of the inferior MSS is very feeble, and reads like a gloss from e.g. Meno 71 ε καὶ αὐτῶν εὐλαβεσθαι μὴν τοιοῦτον παθείν (where the sense of the context is similar to this). φυλάξαθαι μὴ παθέω (sc. τήν νόσον) might have been written by Plato, but we should have expected better warrant in the MSS.

4. Before ἐμποιησαί is good in itself, if no καὶ has already occurred in the clause. Whatever may be the real state of the case, enough suspicion attaches to both the purpose and the construction of καὶ λαθείν to justify us in obelising it.

5. The text being regarded as unsound, we may advance various theories as to its original and correct shape. Unfortunately they can only be guesses. A new guess, which may be hazarded as such, is that λαθείν should be μαθείν (i.e. καὶ μαθείν ὀὕτω δεινότατος ἐμποιησαί, 'clever at learning how to implant'); yet another possible suggestion is that φυλάξαθαι is itself a gloss on e.g. ἀμυναθείν, a form supported by διωκαθείν Euthyph. 15 δ., ὑπεικαθείν Apol. 32 λ. But see crit. note.]

334 A. δοσπερ...κλέψαι—sc. ἀγαθός ἐστι. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 6 τῶν στρατηγῶν εἶναι χρῆ...ἐπίβουλον καὶ φυλακτικὸν τε καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προσεκτικὸν καὶ ἀρπαγα. Hippiarch. v. 2 χρὴ δὴ μηχανητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ μὴ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων μόνον κλέπτεων ἐπιστασθαί. The notion here is of 'getting secret possession' combined with that of 'forestalling.'

κλέπτεων is often difficult to render in English, but can mostly be resolved into a verb supplemented by the adverb 'by stealth.' Xen. Anab. v. 6. 9 κλέπτεων τὰ ὀργ = 'occupy by stealth' (= λαθρα καταλαμβάνειν); κλέπτεων φυγὴν = 'flee by stealth' (λαθρα φεύγειν). Frequently, however (as is seen in the examples given), the notion of forestalling is also present, the sense being that of snatching...
what another was on the point of obtaining. Cf. ‘to steal a
march.’

οτοῦ τὶς ἄρα κ.τ.λ. This generalization from a few dubious
instances is obviously quite unjustifiable. For the argument
altogether, see Introd. § 14 a, b, c.

σημαίνει—not ‘proves,’ but ‘indicates.’ Cf. the use of σημεῖον in
logic. Polemarchus is obviously not satisfied, though he cannot
detect the quibble.

κινδυνεύεις παρ’ Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. With his usual
ironical humour Socrates would make out that the idea was not
put into Polemarchus’ head by the Socratic dialectic, but that he
was always familiar with it from his Homer.

334 B. Αὐτολύκον. Ἑμ. Ὀδ. xix. 395

µητρὸς ἐνὶ πατέρι ἐσθλῶν, διὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο
κλεπτοσύνη θ’ ὅρκῳ τε.

The title ἐσθλῶν justifies the word ἀγαπᾷ used by Socrates, but
it does not justify him in quoting Autolycus as a type of the
δίκαιος, even in what Mr Merry calls ‘the society of low morality’
represented in the Odyssey. The ὅρκος was a cunning use of
oaths to cover his thefts while sailing short of absolute perjury,
or an equally cunning evasion of oaths when made. The character
of Autolycus is given in Ovid Met. xi. 312

alipedes de stirpe dei versuta propago
nascitur Autolycus, furtum ingeniosus ad omne:
qui facere adserat, patriae non degener artis,
candida de nigris et de candentibus atra.

ἀγαπᾷ—‘is fond of,’ ‘makes much of.’ Cf. Phaedo 110 ὅ τὰ
ἐθάδε λιθίδια...ταῦτα ὅ ἀγαπῶμενα.
καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ’ Ὀμηροῦ κ.τ.λ. With ironical politeness
Socrates puts the reluctant admission which he has drawn from
Polemarchus on a level with the deliberate opinion of a Homer or
a Simonides.

The trick is frequent with the Platonic Socrates. Jowett and
Campbell quote Gorg. 470 b, 503 c, &c.

ἄλλ' ὑκέτι οἶδα ἔγνως ὅ τι ἔλεγον. So Alcib. i. 127 ὅ ἄλλα µὰ τοὺς
θεοὺς, ὃ Σῶκρατες, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς οἶδα ὅ τι λέγω, κινδυνεύων δὲ καὶ πάλαι
λεπτέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἰσχίστα ἔχων.

τοῦτο µέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἑτε, ὑφελεῖν µὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη
κ.τ.λ. The familiar construction with δοκεῖ being personal rather
than impersonal, the Greek, which might have been expected
to proceed grammatically with τοῦτο ἐμοιγε δοκεί, ωφελείν μὲν...τὴν δικαιοσύνην, substitutes for the accusative of the infinitive clause (exegetical of τοῦτο) another nominative to the verb δοκεί, i.e. τοῦτο ἐμοιγε δοκεί, (viz.) ωφελείν μὲν (δοκεί)...ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

The same construction is found in Theaet. 189 ἐ τοῦτο γάρ μοι λογίας επημεν (ἡ ψυχή) οὐκ ἄλλο τι η γιελέγεσθαι, and (without τοῦτο, but with its equivalent) Apol. 25 ἑ καὶ περὶ ἵππων ὦτω σοι δοκεί ἐχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίως ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρον; Μενο 72 ὁ πότερον δὲ περὶ ἅρετῆς μούνον σοι ὦτω δοκεί...ἄλλη μὲν ἀνθρός εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γνωσικῶς;

334 C. καὶ ἑχθροῖς ωσαιτως;—i.e. καὶ ἑχθροῖς (λέγεις εἶναι τινα) ωσαιτως, “and do you term men ‘enemies’ on the same principle?”

ἐλκός μὲν, ἐφή κ.τ.λ.—μὲν does not, of course, answer to δ’ in οὐδ’ αὐ τονορόης. For this the order οὐδ’ μὲν ἄν τις κ.τ.λ. would be required. The answering δ’ really belongs to a suppressed clause, e.g. ‘it is natural (but I will not speak positively).’

Cf. Eur. Or. 8 ᾧς μὲν λέγουσι... Apol. 21 δ τοῦτο μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφωτερός εἰμι (‘whatever may be the case with others’). Meno 82 b Ἡ Ἐλλην μὲν ἐστε; So frequently in the combinations ἐγὼ μὲν (inf. 358 A), οὐτωσι μὲν ἀκούσα &c. In these settings the force of μὲν comes to be not materially different from that of γε. Cf. 339 b.

334 D. οὐδ’ μη ἀδικεῖν—lit. ‘of a character to do no wrong,’ i.e. τοῦτοι οὐδ’... (a full expression regularly found at the beginning of a ‘character’ of Theophrastus). Cf. 365 ε λέγουσιν ὡς εἰςιν οὐδ’ θυσίας παράγεσθαι, Xen. Anab. II. 3. 13 οὐ γὰρ ἤν ὦρα ολὰ τὸ πεθόν ἀρδεῖν.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον—δὴ brings us again to the vital point, here a conclusion.

μηδαμῶς—deprecatory; sc. γένοιτο, or τοῦτο λέγε (λέγωμεν). This usage is common. Cf. Gorg. 497 b, where, in answer to οὐκ οἶδ’ ὃ τι λέγεις, Socrates answers μηδαμῶς, ὃ καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου. ξυμβησταῖ—i.e. as a logical consequence. So ξυμβαλεῖν inf. ε (where the sense ‘happen’ would have required the future).


334 E. πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσί—‘For they have bad ones.’

Stallbaum and others, attending too much to the words and too little to the thought, make the easy slip of rendering ‘for in their opinion they are bad,’ a use of the dative familiar enough (e.g.
Soph. Ant. 904 καίτωι σ’ ἐγὼ τίμησα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν εὖ. O. C. 1446 &c.), but quite away from the sense required here. The position is no longer that it is just to injure those who seem πονηροὶ, but those who are so. A man may make a mistake and accept as his friends persons who are ἀδικοὶ (=πονηροὶ). Yet, though his friends, he is bound to injure them, πονηροὶ γὰρ εἶσιν, not indeed in his opinion, but in reality.

οὐκ ὀφθαλῶς—the two words must be closely joined. οὐκ negatives the one word = (‘improperly’), not the sentence; otherwise μὴ would be needed.

tὸν φίλον καὶ ἔχθρον. For the one article see 332 δ and ε; ‘our friend and enemy (as the case may be).’

tὸν δοκοῦντα τε...καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον—sc. εἰναι μεταθώμεθα. ‘The man who both seems and is good let us put down as our friend.’

The position of τε, combined with the fact that the participles refer to the same person, would make it natural to expect no article with ὄντα. Its repetition is difficult to explain. Possibly, as the words form part of a definition, we may understand inverted commas, so to speak, i.e. ‘let us change the words, and not be satisfied with ‘τὸν δοκοῦντα,’ but rather demand ‘τὸν ὄντα,’ “not merely him ‘who seems’ but him ‘who is.’”

335 A. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἔχθροῦ δὲ—δὲ is connective of the sentences, while καὶ = etiam and belongs to περὶ τοῦ ἔχθροῦ, ‘And concerning the enemy also...’

In καὶ...δὲ the particles are separated by such words as καὶ is intended to emphasize: usually there is but one; here περὶ τοῦ ἔχθροῦ is of course incapable of division.

προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἦ ὡς κ.τ.λ. “To qualify our previous statement as to what is ‘just.’” Literally ‘to add to our (explanation of) δικαίον (and make it otherwise, ampler,) than the way in which we gave it at first.’ The ἦ follows the sense ὡστε μακρότερον (or ἄλλο) εἰναι implied in προσθείναι. Cf. αἱρεῖσθαι and even βοῶμαι ἦ..., διάφορος ἦ, and Gorg. 481 c ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν ἰδίων τι ἐπασχε πάθος ἦ οἱ ἄλλοι.

For προσθείναι used absolutely cf. Aristot. Eth. π. 6. 9 τοῖς εὖ ἐχουσίν ἐργοῖν οὗτ’ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὗτε προσθείναι and inf. 339 β ἓν δὲ προστίθης.

νῦν πρὸς τοὺς δὲ λέγειν—sc. κελεύεις, ‘to this, I say, do you bid us now add...? ’ λέγειν κ.τ.λ. is resumptive, and exegetical of προσθείναι κ.τ.λ.
CHAPTER IX.

335 B. τούς γε πονηρούς. The γε is apologetic (cf. 332 b); also note that δέ and not χρη is used (v. note on 328 c).

εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν. The ἀρετή of a thing is the peculiar excellence by virtue of which it fulfils its special function (ἐργον), or is most perfectly what it claims to be.

V. inf. 353 B. Cf. Aristot. Eth. ii. 6. 2 ῥητέον οὐν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, oὐ δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσι.

335 C. ἀνθρώπους δὲ...μη οὔτω φῶμεν βλαπτομένους...χειρὸς γλύνεσθαι; For μη φῶμεν 'are we not to say?' cf. 337 b μη ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν προείπα μηδὲν; 'am I to make none of the answers you warned me against?'

With the deliberative subjunctive οὖ has no place, and μη, which with the indicative expects 'no' for an answer, is used with the subjunctive when the answer, as here, is 'yes.' So Xen. Mem. i. 2. 36 μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, οὖ τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐὰν εἴδω; See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 287 and 293.

Of the construction of the sentence as a whole it is possible to take two views: (1) that οὔτω = 'in the same (above) way,' and that the order is μη φῶμεν ἀνθρώπους βλαπτομένους χειρὸς γλύνεσθαι: or (2), less probably, that οὔτω = 'thus' (viz. 'as follows'), the words βλαπτομένους...γλύνεσθα 'depending on φῶμεν) being exegetic of οὔτω, while the sentence which began with ἀνθρώπους is grammatically incomplete, the accusative being left suspended, i.e. 'of mankind are we not to speak thus...that they are made worse by injury?'

φημι does not take as a legitimate construction this, which would be familiar to λέγειν. Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 12 has Κορυθίους δὲ καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαιόν τί φῶμεν; but the τί makes a difference, and the sentence is elliptical (an infinitive being understood).

For the notion that men grow worse (μοιχθηρόι morally) when they are hurt or made miserable (μοιχθηρόi physically or in circumstances) cf. Simonid. Frag. 5. 10—13 ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι χρη οὐ κακῶν ἐμμεναι, δν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

ἀλλ' ἡ δικαίωσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεῖα ἀρετή; The somewhat unusual position of the interrogative οὐκ is due to a desire to emphasize ἡ δικαίωσύνη. 'But, justice—is it not a human excellence?'

ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γλύνεσθαι. For the logical veracity of the argument see Introd. at this place.
Δικωτέρους = 'less just.' It is frequently necessary to render Greek comparatives in this negative manner.

Διλα η δικαιοσύνη δη—δη intimates that the speaker has now come to the point or application. 'Well then, to come to the case of justice.' So ὅδε δη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (inf. d).

335 D. Θερμότητος... ἔργον. For the meaning of ἔργον cf. 352 ε ἀρ ὁδ τοῦτο ἄν θείας καὶ ἑπτού καὶ ἄλλου ὅτου οὖν ἔργον, δ ἄν η μόνῳ ἐκεῖνῳ ποιῇ τις ἡ ἄριστα;

335 E. τοῦτο διδη νοεῖ αὐτῷ—either (1) τοῦτο is subject to νοεῖ and αὐτῷ is 'ethical': 'and this means, to his mind...'= 'and by this he means';

Cf. Euthyd. 287 ε τι σοῦ ἄρτι ἱπρον, ὅ τι μοι νοεῖ τῷ ῥήμα; Cratyl. 407 ε πεφομένα τὸν Ἐρμήν σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τῷ ὄνομα. Ar. Plut. 55 πυθομεθ' ἄν τὸν χρησμὸν ἠμῶν ὧ τι νοεῖ. Similarly Lucian Necyon. 1 τι σοῦ αὐτῷ βούλεται τὸ ἀλλόκοτον τοῦ σχῆματος;

or (2) τοῦτο is object to νοεῖ 'and he means this by it.'

The latter might seem at first sight too much like the English idiom to be unquestionable Greek, but the instrumental dative may stand very well in the sense 'and he intends to convey by it (viz. τῷ φάναι αὐτῷ) this, viz...'. There is nothing to shew that Greek could not say τι νοεῖς τῷ ὄνοματι; as readily as τι σοῦ νοεῖ τῷ ὄνομα;

δη perhaps gets a better force with this rendering, 'and if what he means by it is this.' With the other view δη belongs to the whole clause, 'and if this, as we are to think, means &c.'

οὐκ ἦν σοφός ὁ ταύτα εἰπών—i.e. The man who so spoke (and still speaks in our current proverbial philosophy, φησίν,) was no true sage. The saying lives, though its author is long dead. Hence the imperfect ἦν, despite φησί preceding.

Otherwise, though much less naturally, it is possible to regard ἦν as the idiomatic imperfect (habitually combined, however, with ἄρα) of 'a fact which is just recognised...having previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood' (Goodwin M. and T. § 39). The usual ἄρα may then be in a measure understood from εἰ ἄρα at the opening of the sentence.

ἐὰν τις...φη...Σιμωνίδην. It is not likely that Socrates doubted the authenticity of the proverb. Ironically championing the reputation of Simonides, he covertly hints at the imperfections of the sages and the shallowness of gnomic ethics. Homer,
Hesiod and Simonides are spoken of by Protagoras as Sophists under the disguise of poets, Prot. 316 ν.

**Hesiod** and Simonides are spoken of by Protagoras as Sophists under the disguise of poets, Prot. 316 ν.

**Biànta** ἡ Πιττακόν. Bias of Priene and Pittacus of Mitylene are two of those four sages (the others being Thales and Solon) whose names are invariably included in the various lists of Seven. In Prot. 343 λ they are given as Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πρηνεύς καὶ Σίδων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λύδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηρεύς, καὶ...Δακεδαμόνιος Χίλων. Plutarch (de EI apud Delph. 385 ε') gives a tradition that there were five sages, Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias and Pittacus, and that Cleobulus and Periander forced their way into the list.

The date of **Bias** is approximately 570 B.C. For his sayings see Diog. Laert. i. 82—88. The date of **Pittacus** is 562—569 B.C. For his character and wisdom see Diog. Laert. i. 74—81. Though he was αἰσθανόμενος of Mitylene, that position was αἰρετὴ τυραννίς (Aristot. Pol. III. 14. 8), and his behaviour in it places him in a different list altogether from the τύραννοι mentioned in 336 λ.

There was, of course, a tendency to fasten old and anonymous sentences of gnomic wisdom upon some particular authority, and Bias and Pittacus were especially favoured in this way. The ascription of such γνώμαι was naturally inconsistent, and the discrepancy mentioned by Herodotus (i. 27 οἱ μὲν Βιάντα λέγουσι τὸν Πρηνέα...οἱ δὲ Πιττακόν τὸν Μυτιληναῖον) must have been frequent.

**τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων άνδρῶν.** Cf. 331 ε σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θείος ἀνήρ. μακαρίων = 'wonderfully gifted.' Cf. ὁ μακάριος (inf. 432 δ) = ὁ θαυμάσιος. Menex. 249 ν ὁ Διὰ, ...μακαρίαν γε λέγεις τὴν Ἀστασίαν, εἰ γινὴ οὕσα τοιούτους λόγους οὰ τε ἐστὶ συντιθέναι. Meno 71 λ κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριος τις εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γονὸν εἶτε διδακτὸν εἴθ οὕτω τρόπῳ παραγγελνεῖται εἰλάδει.

Though μακάριος and its cognates are often used in reference to the 'blessed' dead, that implication need not be assumed here.

**336 A.** τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δικαίον εἶναι. τὸ φάναι, which is grammatically not required, is exegetical and in apposition. 'Do you know from whom I think came the maxim—I mean the assertion that.' Cf. Legg. 838 οὐκοῦν σμικρόν ῥῆμα κατασβένναι πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς; ΜΕ. τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις; ΑΘ. τὸ ταῦτα εἶναι φάναι μηδαμὸς δοξα.

**A ῥῆμα is a compact saying, a maxim or mot.**

Cf. Prot. 343 ν καὶ δή καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἤδη περιεφέρετο τούτο τὸ ῥῆμα...τὸ χιλεστὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμενει—a passage which might eu-
courage a certain school of critics in declaring \( \phi\alpha\nu\alpha\iota \) to be an adscript.

Περιάνδρος. The tyrant of Corinth (circ. 625 B.C.).

He is mentioned first as being himself commonly included in the list of Seven Sages, and as the author of gnomic verse (\( \upsilon\pi\omicron\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\iota \)). Despite these claims to sageship, however, he is regarded as the very type of \( \tau\omicron\varpi\alpha\nu\nu\sigma\varsigma \), practising the Machiavellian cunning and cruelty associated with Greek despotism.

Περδίκκος—i.e. (presumably) Perdiccas II., King of Macedonia, who was frequently at war with Athens, particularly B.C. 432—431, and who died B.C. 413.

Beyond the fact that he was a \( \tau\omicron\varpi\alpha\nu\nu\sigma\varsigma \) and availed himself of any form of diplomacy to increase his power, there seems to be no special appositeness in quoting him. Perdiccas is mentioned again in Gorg. 470 as the father of Archelaus, and there, after asking if Archelaus is to be considered \( \epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\imath\mu\omicron\nu \), Polus proceeds to ask if the ‘Great King’ (cf. Xerxes here) is to be so considered.

Ἰσμηνίος. A Theban who (in 393 B.C.) accepted bribes in the interests of Persia against the Lacedaemonians. Paus. iii. 9. 4, Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 1.

He was put to death by the Spartans B.C. 382 (ibid. v. 2. 36). Plato mentions Ismenias as a \( \pi\lambda\omicron\omicron\upsilon\iota\sigma\iota \) again in Meno 90 A ὃσπερ ὃ νῦν νεωτί \\ \( \epsilon\lambda\lambda\nu\phi\omicron\upsilon \) τὰ \( \Pi\omicron\upsilon\kappa\omicron\rho\acute{a} \tau\omicron\varsigma \chi\rho\omicron\mu\acute{a} \tau\omicron \) Ἱσμηνίας ὁ ᪟ββαῖος.

\( \pi\lambda\omicron\omicron\iota\sigma\iota \)—implying, as often, not merely ‘rich’ but ‘prosperous,’ strong in both wealth and position. Cf. Soph. O. T. 1070 \( \pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\omicron\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma \) \( \chi\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\rho\upsilon \) γενεί (=‘of wealth and power’). Hor. Od. iv. 7. 15 nos ubi decidimus...quo Tullus dives et Ancus.

οὐδὲ τούτο—‘not this either,’ any more than the previous definition.

ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὃν. For the attraction of the participle to gender of \( \tau\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron \) v. sup. 333 e. ἡ δικαιοσύνη is the abstract quality, the virtue in theory: τὸ δικαίον is the concrete embodiment in practice.

CHAPTER X.

336 B. Ὑπασύμαχος—upon his standing and personality see Introd. § 3 c and § 21 a.

καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα κ.τ.λ. Though μεταξὺ (preceding) is frequently joined with participles, the position here
(especially with ἠμῶν intervening) is in favour of relating it quite as much to ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

Perhaps it would be best to say that it belongs to the general sense (ἀπὸ κοινοῦ). In Apol. 40 Β καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχῶν δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ the force of the adverb is probably not precisely the same as if μεταξὺ λέγοντα had been written. The latter = 'it checked me in the middle of my speech'; the former = 'it checked me when I was speaking, right in the middle.' In other words, μεταξὺ is made more prominent and emphatic. But, if so, it belongs to the whole act and mainly to the verb.

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. The meaning of this word depends upon the context: (1) 'take a hand in' or 'get a hold upon'; (2) 'take objection to.' The former is obviously in point here. Cf. inf. 534 ὁ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς παιδελας (= 'take in hand'), Thuc. ii. 8 ἀρχύμενον γὰρ πάντες διότερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται (sc. πολέμου).

ἔπειτα—for ἔπειτα δὲ or καὶ ἔπειτα, is common enough, but the present use as almost = ἀλλὰ is rare. Cf. Prot. 310 ο καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εἰθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἦναι, ἔπειτα μοι λιαν πόρρω ἐδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν. There is an antithesis between what was first intended, and the subsequent fact. Lit. 'he shewed eagerness to join in; afterwards (= but thereupon) was in each case prevented.'

διεπανωσάμεθα—'had made a pause for a while.' δια- expresses the 'break' in the conversation. Cf. διαλείπειν ὡμέραν, διασείν τοῦ τέλους, &c. So διαναπαύεσθαι.

συστρέψας ἐαυτόν—'gathering himself together (for the spring).' Cf. Hom. Π. ΧΧ. 168 (of the lion) ἐάλη τε χανών, where the Schol. Ven. 2 has the explanation συνεστράφη πρὸς τὸ πνῆμα. Arist. Hist. An. ΙΧ. 48. 631a 27 συστρέψαντες ἐαυτοὺς φέρονται ὡσπερ τόξευμα.

Some commentators render 'se colligens,' but it does not appear that se colligere is used in such a sense.

Ast quotes Cicero in Vatim. § 4 repente enim te, tamquam serpens e latibulis, oculis eminentibus, inflato collo, tumidis cervicibus, intulisti.

Ἱκεν ἐφ' ἠμᾶς—'was upon us.'

Jowett and Campbell prefer to take ἵκεν as the aorist of ἰμι. This seems needless far-fetched, especially as the intransitive ἵκεν should mean 'let fly at us,' and would result in mixed metaphor. Nevertheless, see the quotation from Aristotle (ὁσπερ τόξευμα) in the last note.

The middle future of ἀρπάξω is better Attic than the active, eis τὸ μέσον—'For the benefit of the company.' Cf. Legg. 664 c τὰ τοιαῦτα eis τὸ μέσον ἀσήμενος. Hdt. vi. 129 ἔρων ἐξον ἀμφὶ τὲ μνουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸ τὸ μέσον. Add the Homeric ἐς μέσον τιθέναι (of a prize) and the Latin in medium. φθεγάμενος should not be translated by 'roaring,' nor by in- crepans. There is no need to make Thrasymachus out worse than he is. He simply φθεγγέται 'gives voice.'

336 C. εὐθυδίεσθε—'play the (good-natured) fool.' Cf. the senses of 'silly.'

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς—a metaphor from wrestling. The notion is of shirking, refusing to stand up and try honest conclusions. The word is also used of taking a lower seat at table.

Plutarch (π. 58 ρ) is quoted for the application of the word to a wrestler who permits himself to be thrown. Cf. Dion. Hal. vi. 24. 71 ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι τινι τῆς γνώμης.


336 D. τὸ δέον κ.τ.λ.—apparently a series of definitions attempted in some quarters. The several terms are practically synonymous. τὸ δέον implies no moral obligation, but only a practical one.

σαφῶς...καὶ ἀκριβῶς—'clearly (i.e. intelligibly) and with precision.' The two words are opposed to obscurity and vagueness respectively. Cf. Arist. Eth. N. π. 2. 3 πᾶς ὁ ἐπί τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τοῦ πω καὶ ὁ ἀκριβῶς ὄφελει λέγεσθαι.

 yalou. Cf. the proverbial γραών οἴθος (Theaet. 176 β).

εἰ μὴ πρῶτος ἐωράκῃ αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. The allusion is to the common superstition that, when man and wolf met, the man was struck temporarily dumb if, of the two, the wolf was the first to see the other, Plin. H. N. viii. 34 Sed in Italia quoque creditur luporum visus esse noxius, vocemque homini, quem priores contemplentur, adimere ad prae sens. Cf. Verg. Ecl. ix. 53 Vox quoque Moerim | Iam fugit ipsa: lupi Moerim videre priores. Theoc. xiv. 22 ὃς φθεγξή; λύκων εἶδες;

[The words ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ are unnecessary, and perhaps a gloss. The grammar itself (for πρῶτος...ἡ) is not above suspicion. Gorg. 528 η ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταύτα ἐγνωκὼς πρῶτος ἢ ύμεῖς is obviously different.]
νῦν δὲ—'but as things were.' In this combination νῦν loses the temporal sense 'now,' and becomes almost = τὸ ὄντι: hence its use with a past verb.

336 E. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου κ.τ.λ. The ἄν with ὑποκατακλινεῖαι is not to be repeated with ὑπείκειαι. Lit. 'Pray do not think that whereas, if we had been searching for a piece of money, we should not, at least knowingly, have been shewing complaisance to each other in the search and thereby spoiling the discovery of it, yet, now that we are searching for justice,...we are yielding in that senseless way...'; i.e. briefly 'that whereas we should not shew such foolishness in searching for money, we are shewing it in the search for justice.'

dιαφθείρειν—combines the notion of corrupting the method of search (i.e. carrying it on disingenuously) with that of spoiling the result of it (i.e. ruining the chances of discovering the truth). 'Spoil by improper practices.'

ἐπειθ'—'Nevertheless' (i.e. despite its superior value). See 331 π. Cf. Prot. 319 ὅδειμθεν μαθῶν ὀδὴν ὄντος διδασκάλου ὀφέλον αὐτῷ ἐπείτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν. Phaedo 70 e, Aesch. Eum. 653 sqq. ὄντως—viz. as you accuse us of doing.

αὐτὸ—referring to δικαιοσύνην.

Cf. 338 c καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρώ δικαιοσύνην οἶου εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἑπιτηδεύοντες ἀκοντες ἑπιτηδεύουσιν. Μένο 86 ὃ ὦκ ἄν ἐσκεφάλεθα εἰτε διδακτὸν εἰτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἣ ἄρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἐξητήσαμεν αὐτῷ. Phaedo 88 λ (αὐτὸ in reference to ψυχῆ).

οἶου γε σὺ—Bekker's reading for οἶου τε σὺ of most mss. It cannot however be called quite satisfactory. With it we must supply σπουδάζεως ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα φανὴναι αὐτό from the preceding negative, which he is not to think. 'Do think so, my friend.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Phaedo 68 π ὦκ ἄσμενοι εἰσίν αὐτὸσε; οἰεσθαί γε χρῆ, and Crito 53 π ὦκ ὦκ ὦκ ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Ἀκράτους πράγμα; οἰεσθαί γε χρῆ. Cf. Crito 54 λ, Prot. 325 c. These passages, however, are manifestly easier, being questions to which the answer 'yes' is expected. In other words, the negative there is not a real negative, but the sign of an interrogation (=no one, not non). So here a question οὖ σπουδάζομεν φανήναι αὐτό; might have been followed naturally enough by οἶου γε σὺ.

οὐ δυνάμεθα—i.e. 'we are incapable,' 'we lack the power.' There is no need to supply e.g. εἰρεῖν αὐτό.
337 A. ὑπὸ ύμῶν τῶν δεινῶν. Thrasymachus is a recognised sophist, one of the professors of instruction, and both δεινῶς and σοφὸς are specially used of sophists, in Plato, of course, ironically. Cf. Theaet. 178 Β δεινὸ τε καὶ σοφὸς γεγονότες, ώς οἶνον ταίρι. Protag. 341 Α ἄλλῳ ἄσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὔτοι νοοθετεὶ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἔγω ἢ σὲ ἢ ἅλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἔστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθα δεινὰ καλῶν.

In Phaedr. 245 c δεινῶς is opposed to σοφὸς as shrewdness or practical ability is opposed to wisdom (ὅ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἐστι δεινὸς μὲν ἀπίστος, σοφὸς δὲ πιστή). Arist. Eth. vi. 13. 2 opposes δεινότης to φρόνησις, the δεινὸς being a person of natural ability who may become φρόνιμος by good training and πανούργος by bad.

The sense of δεινῶς here is that of ‘expert,’ ‘past-master.’

χαλεπατάνεοθαί—this peculiar passive of the intransitive verb is adopted in order to balance the sentence.

Nevertheless there are abundant instances of verbs which ‘govern’ the dative in their active form turning that dative into the subject of a passive form. Cf. Thuc. iv. 61 ξύμπαντες ἐπιβουλεύομεθα. Xen. Symp. iv. 29 κραῖττον ἐστὶ πιατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ ἀποτειςθαί. A curious example of the freedom of Greek passives is to be found in Legg. 877 ε ὅταν τις ἀμα δυστυχῇ καὶ ἄσβηθῃ τῶν οἶκων ‘when calamity and sin have been wrought upon it.’ For more see Jowett and Campbell Republic Vol. ii. p. 180.

CHAPTER XI.

ἀνεκάγχασε—‘burst into a guffaw.’ Cf. Euthyd. 300 ν μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας. Hesychius explains by ἀτάκτως or ἀπαγεῖτως γελῶν. Cf. cachinnari and ‘cackle’ (an onomatopoetic word and therefore no violation of Grimm’s law).

The verb is variously given in mss as καχάζω or καγχάζω, and it is usual to speak of the nasalised form as belonging to the later Greek. It is in keeping with this statement, that in Ar. Eccl. 849 ἑκνω, καχάζων μεθ' ἐτέρου νεανίου the short syllable is required, while in Babrius xci. 8 λύκος ὑ' ἐπ' αὐτῶ καγχάσας it is the long. Where metre offers no assistance the evidence of mss is too inconsistent to be trusted. Since, however, Homer always uses καγχαλάω, and since the word is onomatopoetic, it is possible that both forms existed together, καχάζω prevailing in earlier times and καγχάζω in later. The reading and metre in Soph. Aj. 198 are both doubtful.

The forms σαρδόνιον, Σαρδόνιον are due to the notion that the word was derived from the effects of the acrid ranunculus Sardous on the faces of those who ate that plant. Cf. Verg. Ecl. vii. 41

Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amator herbis. Paus. x. 17. 13 ἦ πῶς δὲ ἦ ὀλέθριοι σελίνῳ μὲν ἑστιν ἐμφερέως, τοὺς φαγοῦσι δὲ γελώσιν ἐπηγίνεσθαι τῖν τελευτήν λέγοντι· ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ 'Ομήρος το καὶ οἱ ἐπειτὰ ἀνθρωποί τού ἐπὶ οὖν ὕπολεγει Σαρδάνιον γέλωτα ὄνομαξιοι. This explanation represents a 'popular etymology.' The true derivation is doubtful, the connexion with σαίρω, σεσηρώς being hardly convincing.

καὶ ἐπεν...ἐφη: cf. 329 Β ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινὸς Πώς, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ. and note.


dιρωνεῖ—'mock-modesty.' Cf. Aristot. Eth. iv. 7. 2 δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαξίων προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ υπαρχόντων καὶ μειώνων ἢ υπάρχει, ὃ δὲ οἱ ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνείσθαι τὰ υπό-ἀρχοντα ἢ ἑλαττῶ ποιεῖν... § 14 οἱ δ' ἐρωνεῖς ἐπὶ τὸ εὐαττόν λέγοντες χαριστέροι μὲν τὰ ἢ ἔρχεται. οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἐνεκα δοκοῦσε λέγειν, ἄλλα φεύγοντες τὸ ὑγκηρὸν...οἶνον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐπολει. Cf. ibid. ii. 7. 12.

Theophrastus has a 'character' of the εἶρων (Char. 1) in which he defines εἰρωνεῖα 'roughly' as προσποιήσεις ἐπὶ χείρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων. His εἰρων, however, proves to be a very different person from Socrates, although pretended ignorance is a point in common (cf. Symp. 216 Ο sqq.). See also Cic. Brut. § 292 Ego, inquit, ironiam illum quam in Socrate dieunt fuisse, qua ille in Platonis et Xenophonis et Aeschinidis libris utilitur, facetiam et elegantiam puto. Est enim et minime inepti hominis et eiusdem etiam faceti, cum de sapientia discipulatur, hanc sibi ipsum detrahere, eis tribuere illuminetem, qui eam sibi arrogant, ut apud Platonem Socrates in caelo effert laudibus Protagoram Hippiam Prodicum Gorgiam ceteros, se autem omnium rerum insecum fingit et rudem. See Introduction § 22 a.

ἀποκρίνασθαι...οὐκ ἔθελησοι—a common accusation against Socrates.

Cf. Theact. 150 Κ ἄγονος εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡδὴ πολλοί μοι ὁμοίωσαν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῖκας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὖν ἀποκρίνομαι
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, I.

[337 A—

peri oudevos dia to muoiv exheiv sofoiv, alhesis ouneidikousin. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 9 aerkei gar, oti tow allon katagelais erwtoiv men kai elegyxou pavtas, autovs 8 oudevi ethelov upheixin lhyon oude gnwmen apofainestei peri oudevos.

ouk evelholeus k.t.l.—the 'indirect' equivalent, after a past tense, of the fut. indic. Thrasymachus would say ouk evelholei: 'he will refuse': v. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 669. 2, and 670 (b).
el ti ti se erwata—not 'if anyone were to ask you a question (el...erwph), but 'whenever anybody asks you.' Thus it is not the oblique for ean tl ti auton erwata, but for el ti...erwata (=ste ti...erwata).

sofos gar el—i.e. 'No, (you knew I couldn't answer) because you are a man of understanding (and can see the difficulty you place me in).'

€€ ouv ydhsa sti...deiouv, oima, soi ntv sti... The sentence is in danger of becoming entangled through the length of the protasis and its attachments (el...phvarh). The opening words are therefore resumed under another form in a manner which is entirely natural to conversation. oima becomes practically equivalent to 8 ouv. 'You knew well that...it was clear to you, I take it, that...'

337 B. apokrmnoito—the fut. opt. as above (§ A), ouk evelholeus.
It follows, not the literal deiouv ntv, but its sense, as=ydhsa, the verb sentiendi.
el soi elpve—not elpo. 'If (in the supposed case which did not occur) he had said...'

mu apokrinwmai. For mu v. sup. 335 C mu ovto wphmen;

mu's' el touton ti tychanei ovn—(1) with touton ti in predicate, 'not even if it (sc. the thing in question) happens to be one of these,' or (2) with ti as subject, 'not even if one of these things happens to be the fact.' The latter plainly makes too great a demand upon the participle ovn.

337 C. €s di' omoion touto ekelw—ironically. Lit. 'because, of course, this is like that!' i.e. 'as if the two cases were alike!'

Grammatically €s=etei and a previous clause is understood, e.g. 'your illustration is excellent,' seeimg that the cases are so very similar!' This appears also from Charmid. 170 A 8 ti, 8 Swkrates, tauton esti touto ekelw. Cf. Gorg. 408 E e ovs di' ov, 8 Swkrates, ouk av dekato exeivai soi pioi oti otei soi. Aesch. Ag. 1633 wks di' ou moi tpranns 'Argeinov exei. Eur. Andr. 235 (without verb, as here) ovs di' ou swfrwv, tame 8 oucswfrwv. The ironical

οὐδέν γε κωλύει. Jowett and Campbell render 'there is nothing to prevent it,' and compare the remark (inf.) οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι κ.τ.λ. But that answer here is more peremptory and lacks the snarliness of Socrates. The passage cited from Charm. 164 λ καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἵσως κωλύει ἀληθή λέγειν is evidently quite different, being concessive. Rather οὐδέν γε κωλύει is a formula of polite concession, or waiving the point: 'be it so, if you like.' Cf. Euthyd. 272 δ ἄλλοι οὐδέν κωλύει, ὥς Σωκρατες, ἔαν γε σοι δοκῇ. Ar. Eq. 972 &c. So τὸ γε ἐμὸν οὐδέν κωλύει (per me licet), Gorg. 468 ν, Lach. 188 c, and τῇ γὰρ κωλύει; Euthyph. 9 ν, &c. It is doubtful whether οὐδέν is the subject of κωλύει or adverb with the verb impersonal.

ei δ' οὖν καὶ μη—'be that as it may (δ' οὖν), if it is not (καὶ emphasizes μη) similar.'

φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον—'if to the person asked, it (viz. the thing in question) appears to be some such thing (as you have forbidden, viz. δις ἔξ &c.).' τοιοῦτον is predicate, like τοιτων τι (sup. b).

τὸ φαῖνόμενον—perhaps—'the best so far as he can see,' and so slightly different from τὸ δοκοῦν.

In the unemphatic senses of 'seems' or 'is thought' the regular participle is τὸ δοκοῦν, even when the verb is φαίνεσθαι. Cf. 487 δ ἄλλα τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδεὶς ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Σ. ἀκούοις ἂν ὁτι ἐμοιγε φαίνονται τάληθη λέγειν. φαῖνόμενον is rather used in special oppositions, e.g. (τὸ δὲ τῇ ἀληθεία (596 ε.) Here, however, it is enough to suppose that, the verb φαίνεται having preceded, the participle is used deliberately to recall it. 'If it so appears—don't you think he will give the answer which does so appear?'

ἡμεῖς—ironically inculpating himself with Thrasymachus. Cf. inf. 350 δ ἔφαμεν.

ἀλλὰ τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις—'you mean, of course, that you are going to do so?'

Though it may pass to say that either ἀλλὰ τι or ἀλλὰ τι ἦ can be used in sentences expecting an affirmative answer, it can hardly be correct to say that with ἀλλὰ τι there is an understood omission of ἦ. For ἀλλὰ τι itself cf. inf. 369 δ, Gorg. 495 c, Symp. 201 a and, combined with οὖν, inf. 342 δ, Euthyd. 276 a, Gorg. 467 ν. The two expressions correspond to οὐκ and οὐκοῦν in the sense nonne.
From positions in which the ἄλλο τι possessed a strict grammatical regimen in the sentence (e.g. ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ ὅτι... or τί λέγεις; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι...; or finally the simple ἄλλο τι λέγεις; = 'surely it is so') the combinations ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι each came, by an irrational brachylogy, to be regarded as introducing a question, while intimating an assurance that the thing is so.

οὐκ ἃν θαυμάσαμι...εἰ μοι...δόξειν—either (1) 'I should not be surprised if I were to see fit to do so,' or (2) 'I should not be surprised (to give such an answer), if on consideration I thought it so.'

The latter appears to be chosen by Jowett, and by Davies and Vaughan, and grammatically might be supported by Euthyph. 6 c EY. δηνήγησομαι ἢ σὺ ἀκούων εῦ oieu ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἃν θαυμάζομι, ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ., but is much less natural. Its adoption seems to be due in the first instance to a misapprehension of the sense of εἰ μοι οὕτω δόξειν, which does not mean 'if it seemed to me to be so,' but 'if I thought well to do so.'

337 D. τί ἄξιοις παθεῖν—'what do you think you deserve to have done to you?' This is the first part of a judicial formula, the completion of which is hinted at in ἀπότεισον immediately below.

In full it is found in Apol. 36 Β τιμᾶται δὲ οὖν μοι ὣ ἀνήρ θανάτου· εἰεν' ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὡμίν ἀντιτιμήσομαι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τίς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτείσαι; Cf. Polit. 299 Α τιμᾶν δὲ τι χρή παθεῖν αὐτῶν τινάς ἢ ἀποτίνειν. Xen. Mem. π. 9. 5, Leg. ap. Dem. (Mead.) 529.

The two words embraced punishment of the person (death, imprisonment, ἀτύμλα &c.), and pecuniary penalty.

ἡδὸς γὰρ εἰ—'yes! you are a sweet innocent!' Cf. inf. 527 Β, Gorg. 491 Ε ὡς ἡδὸς εἰ, inf. 348 Κ ὡ ἡδοτε. Similarly Hipp. Mai. 288 β ὡς γλυκὸς εἰ. Or 'you are pleased to be facetious.'

For γὰρ—v. on 338 Β βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἰ.

ἀπότεισον.

That this was the correct spelling in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. is certain from Meisterhans, §§ 15. 28 and 64. 6. The present is τίνω, but the forms τεῖσο, ἐτείσαι, ἐτείσθην alone are warranted.

Socrates and Plato cherished a genuine and vehement repugnance to receiving pay for teaching. Cf. Apol. 19 Β, 31 c, Xen. Mem. r. 2. 60, 6. 11, 6. 13 (τὴν σοφιαν...τοῦ μὲν ἀργυρῷ τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὀστερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦν). Jowett and Campbell fully illustrate from Plato Socrates' habit of bantering the sophists on their money-making. See also Introduction § 23.
NOTES.

ούκουν ἐπειδᾶν μοι γῆνται. οὐκοῦν—'yes,' is conversational. Cf. Ar. Pax 364 ΕΡ. ἀπόλλωνας, ὃ κακόδαιμον. ΤΡ. οὐκοῦν, ἢν λάχω, and somewhat similarly Polit. 289 ΣΕ. ἕτε ὑπὲρκυψεμαθα. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν χρῆ. Perhaps originally 'will it not, then, be when...?'

For the poverty of Socrates cf. Apol. 23 Ε ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμὶ, 37 c, 38 B ἔσως δ' ἀν δυναίμην ἐκτείσαι ύμιν μνὰν ἀργυρίου. In Xen. Oec. p. 3 he assesses his total property at 5 minae.

ἄλλα ἐστιν...ἄλλα ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου κ.τ.λ.—for reiterated ἄλλα cf. 327 β. Here, however, each—'nay,' and one repeats the other.

eἰσολογομεν—'we will club together.' The word is especially common as applied to ἐρανοί (friendly loans by contribution). Cf. Symp. 177 ο ἐπιθυμῷ τοῦτῳ ἐρανον εἰσενεγκείν.

The locus for ἐρανοί is Dem. Meid. 547 (101) where both εἰσφέρεων and φέρεων are used. The latter occurs again ibid. 573 (184), followed by εἰσενήνοχε.

337 Ε. λαμβάνῃ λόγον—not = λ. τῶν λόγων, but a current phrase 'begin to argue' ('against' being implied). Cf. Meno 75 δ ελ δε μη δρθως λέγω, σον ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. Compare 'to take objection.'

πώς γαρ ἄν...ἀπειρημένον εἴη. The sense itself is clear: 'how could a man answer if, in the first place, he had no knowledge and did not pretend to any, and (if), in the second, it had been forbidden him to say anything he thought?' The first 'if,' however, according to the mss, is only expressed in the participle, while the second (with the reading ἀπειρημένον εἴη) is not expressed at all.

The sentence being thus ungrammatical, it is possible to take divers views of its evolution.

(A) If the reading of mss is as Plato left it, he may have written ἀπειρημένον εἴη either (1) under the impression that he had said ελ πρῶτον μὲν μη ελείνει μηθε φάσκοι, the sense 'if' being present to his mind, though not the actual manner in which he had expressed it. We may compare Prot. 327 δ ελ δεον αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς αὐθρώπους, οἶν μητε παιδεία ἐστιν μητε δικαστηρία...ἄλλα εἰν ἀγριοί τινες. Or (2) in consequence of a confusion, the use of ελ in the subordinate clause ελ τι καὶ οἰεταί leaving the impression that the 'if' of the main clause had actually been expressed (in other words, ελ is made to do double duty).

(B) If the reading is incorrect we may emend (1) by omitting εἴη with Stallmann. ἀπειρημένον then stands absolutely (like ἦς φώς, παρέχων, ἀνίσαν, προσταχθέν, ἐρημένου &c., Goodwin M. and T. 851)
and = ei ἀπείρηται, the participle containing the same hypothetical force as eiδως and φάσκων just above. We should then have to assume that an early copyist or editor missed the construction and inserted eiν, though this would involve the further assumption that a person so solicitous about making Plato grammatical himself failed to see that his own eiη had no regimen. A reader who missed the grammar of the ‘absolute’ participle would perhaps be quite capable of the other blunder; (2) as in the present text, ἔτηται eiν, <δ> τι καὶ οἶδαι περὶ τοῦτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ eiν, κ.τ.λ.: ‘and in the second place if, in regard to whatever he thinks about them, it were forbidden...’

φάσκων—with the frequent implication of pretence. Cf. inf. 538 λ ὀν τοῦτων ἔστι τῶν φασκοτων γονέων.

<δ> τι καὶ οἶδαι. καὶ emphasizes the contrast of thinking with knowing (δῆξα with ἐπιστήμη). ‘If he goes so far as to think...’ ὡπως μηδὲν ἔρει. Properly ὡπως and ὡπως μη with fut. indic. are used only after verbs of planning or considering (φροντίζω, ἐπιμελοῦμαι, σκοπεῖν, βουλεύομαι &c.). Thence by brachylogy came an imperative use (σκόπει) ὡπως μη ἔρεις &c. This was taken as a normal way of expressing a direct command without the association of any verb of preceation. Thence, as a command in indirect discourse, it becomes naturally attached to verbs like παραγγέλλειν, ἀπαγορεύω &c. Cf. inf. 415 Β παραγγέλλει δῶψ μη ἔρονται, 549 Ε διακελεύονται δῶψ τιμωρῆσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους.

338 Α. χαρίζον—not merely ‘do me the favour,’ but = ‘be liberal.’ Cf. the Homeric χαρίζοσθαι παρεόντων &c. Reference has already been made to the commercial spirit of the sophists. Note also μη ψευδήσης following, and cf. Protag. 327 λ ei καὶ ἰδια καὶ δημοσία πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μη καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μη ἐφθάνει τοῦτον κ.τ.λ.

Γλαύκωνα τόνδε—though ὠντοσί, and not ὠντος, is necessary with proper names when the article is absent, ὥδε (deictic) is used freely without article. Cf. Prot. 316 Β, 318 Α, 329 Β, 340 Α, 341 Α, Lach. 178 Α, 180 Α, 187 Α (bis), Ap. 33 Β, Ε, 38 Β, Meno 89 Ε &c.

CHAPTER XII.

παγκάλην. Of three terminations in Plato (Phaedr. 276 Ε, Legg. 722 Β), but in Ar. Plut. 1018 (χειρας παγκάλους) of two. Cf. Ar. Lys. 969 sq. ἡ παμβδελυρά καὶ παμμυσαρά...καὶ παγγλυκερά. So παναγάθη, πανημερία, πανυστάτη were in use.
φιλονικεῖν. It seems probable that in later Greek the spelling (and implication) φιλονικεῖν prevailed over an earlier φιλονικεῖν. Both words can be accounted for in point of sense, and naturally overlap each other in that respect. ‘To be contentious’ and ‘to be eager for victory’ amount to much the same thing.

Though the mss of Plato shew -ei- everywhere except in Legg. 935 b (Par. A there has φιλονικίσῃ), other mss often vary in the form given, and the decision must rest with such other evidence as is obtainable. Inf. 581 b φιλόνικον καὶ φιλότιμον answer to νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν in the previous sentence; 582 ε φιλότιμος τε καὶ φιλόνικος correspond to τιμῆ τε καὶ νίκη; 586 c φιλοτιμίων ἡ φιλονικία is followed by τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης. In none of these cases, it is true, is it explicitly stated that the relevant parts of the words are etymologically identical, but it is clear that Plato did so associate them. It is moreover to be remembered that, whereas in later Greek the pronunciation of ei and i became identical, and in mss one is indiscriminately substituted for the other, no such confusion existed in Plato’s time. Arist. (Rhet. π. 12. 6) has more unmistakably καὶ φιλότιμοι μὲν εἰςι, μάλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι. ύπεροχὸς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἢ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχὴ τίνι, and ibid. 1. 10. ἀ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμῆ, ὥ δὲ ὑπεροχὴς δι’ ὀργῆν, ὥ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην. These passages prove φιλόνικος, though they do not disprove a φιλονικοῖς beside it. Cobet (Nov. Lect. p. 692) points out, indeed, that an adjective compounded with νείκος would result in a form in -νείκης (cf. ἀκλείς, ἀδείς, Πολυνείκης). He overlooks, however, the fact that a νείκη=νείκος has good authority. All that can be said is that the forms φιλόνικος, -υκεῖν, -νικία are the more probable for Plato.

φιλονικεῖν πρός το ἐμε εἶναι κ.τ.λ. πρός, as after σπουδάζειν, ἀμυλάνθαι &c., of the object aimed at.

[In Protag. 360 ε φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἐφη, δοκεῖς, ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ ἐμῆ εἶναι τῶν ἀποκρινόμενων, there is no need to suspect a loss of πρός. V. Goodwin M. and T. § 791.]

338 Β. αὕτη δη...η Σωκράτους σοφία: ‘here is the wisdom of Socrates, with a vengeance’: i.e. it consists in being shrewd enough to get what he can for nothing.

παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ. The whole tone of the passage shews that Thrasymachus, regarding Socrates as a sophist, though a peculiar one, means ‘Socrates, for all his reputed wisdom, is one who won’t himself teach, but goes the round (sc. of the schools of the sophists, the στοά &c.) and learns from the rest (sc. τῶν ἄλλων διδασκάλων =σοφιστῶν) without even so much as paying them a thank-you, much less a fee.’
This is more pointed than to take τῶν ἀλλῶν as simply = ‘other people’ and περιούντα as simply = ‘going about.’ In the latter case there would be no occasion for money-payment, nor (in most cases) even for ἐπαυως. These things belong rather to the formal instructors, e.g. Prodicus.

The expression χάριν ἀποδίδοναι also should be noted. The ordinary terms are χάριν ἔχειν, εἰδέναι, and ἀποδίδοναι is only combined with χάριν in order to allude pointedly to the propriety of a ‘payment.’

ἐκτίνειν . . ἐκτίνω. Thrasymachus had said ἀποδίδοναι. Socrates uses another and stronger word: ‘I do pay a full return, of as great a sort as I can.’

ψεύδει—‘you are in error.’

οἴμαι γάρ σὲ εὖ ἐρείν. Editors regularly print γάρ σε. Yet the emphatic pronoun seems demanded. The sense is ‘I praise zealously when I think a man speaks well. You will find that out at once when you answer. For I think you will speak well.’ The compliment is in the style of Socrates.

338 C. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. See Introd. at this place. τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖσι;—quin laudas? = ‘come now, praise me!’ The expression is quasi-imperative, and hence there is no difficulty in the following future. ‘Praise me! Nay, (I know) you will not.’

Cf. Protag. 310 ε ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ’ αὐτόν; καὶ τοῦτο... τί ποτε λέγεις; καὶ looks forward to τί, with the same implication of surprise, or slowness to understand, as in a closely combined καὶ τί.

Πολυδάμας. Of Scotoussa (Scotoessa) in Thessaly, victor in the pancratium at the Olympic games B.C. 408.

Pausanias vii. 27. 6 speaks of his statue standing at Olympia in his own day (circ. 180 A.D.). He remains the traditional type of invincible athlete as late as the literature of Lucian (Quom. Hist. Con. 35). The scholiast on the present passage tells of his great stature and of his killing lions &c. while on a visit to Dareius Oechus. The name is variously quoted as Πολυδάμας or Πολυδάμας. The latter is plainly only the atticised pronunciation of the former, which is genuine Thessalian.

ὁ παγκρατιαστής. The παγκράτιον was a combination of wrestling and boxing. Plut. Symp. ii. 4 διὶ γὰρ μέμικται τὸ παγκράτιον έκ τε πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης δῆλον. Aristot. Rhet. i. 5. 14 ὃ δὲ θλίβειν (δυνάμενος) καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὃ δὲ ὡσα τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὃ δὲ ἀμφοτέρους τούτους παγκρατιαστικός.
τά βόεα κρέα. ‘His beef diet’ or ‘the regulation beef diet’ (of an athlete).

338 D. ξυμφέρον ἁμα καὶ δίκαιον. This is misrepresenting Thrasymachus. See Introduction.

βδέλυρός γὰρ εἰ. ‘That's just like your gross behaviour.’ Lit. ‘Of course you must garble things) because you are shameless.’

Cf. 340 D συκοφάντης γὰρ εἰ. Sup. 337 D ἡδος γὰρ εἰ.

Theophrastus has a character (No. 11) of the βδέλυρός, in which the prevailing feature is παιδιά ἐπιφάνης καὶ ἐπουειδιστος (‘obtrusive and objectionable pleasantry’ Jebb). This is the charge intended here. Apposite also is Ar. Ach. 289 τούτ’ ἑρωτᾶς; ἀναι-σχυντος εἰ καὶ βδέλυρός.

ταύτη ύπολαμβάνεις:—either (1) ‘you understand (take) things in such a way,’ or (2) ‘you catch one up in such a way.’ See lexicons for both meanings. The former appears the better: ‘you put such a construction on (things).’ It is possible, but not necessary, to understand τὸν λόγον also with ύπολαμβάνεις (i.e. ἀπὸ κοινοῦ).

ἄν κακουργήσαις.

[Above (4) we have the form ἐφοδικιμήσειεν. The metrical evidence of Aristophanes and the other comedians is all in favour of making -ειείς, -εί the proper terminations of the first aor. opt. 2nd and 3rd persons in Attic conversation. They use -αις, -αι only in poetic quotation or paratragedy. These forms were therefore literary. As, however, they existed, and as mss shew no variation here, it appears safest to retain κακουργήσαις in the text, with a hint that Plato probably wrote κακουργήσειας. For a full discussion see Rutherford New Phryn. pp. 433 sqq.; where it appears that the 2nd person in -αις must have been more familiar to the Athenians than the 3rd person in -αι, but that it was hardly conversational.]

For κακουργεῖν in reference to argument cf. Gorg. 483 λ ὀ δη καὶ σὺ τούτῳ τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγη, κατὰ φόσιν ὑπερφώτων, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. Aristot. Rhet. πί. 2. 7 τῶν ὀ ονομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμονυ-μίαι χρῆσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ). Cope on Aristot. Rhet. 1. 1. 10 (ἥττον κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία) explains that the word is used ‘of the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectic reasoning.’ So Dem. Lept. 491 ἐπειδὰν τις κακουργῶν ἐπὶ μὴ προσήκουτα πράγματα τοὺς λόγους μεταφέρη. ἐτ’—expressing impatience, as often. Eur. Andr. 666 &c.

tοῦτο κρατεῖ...τὸ ἄρχον. κρατεῖ here, as in 339 λ, is correctly treated as the verb corresponding to the adjective κρείττων in the

PL. REP.
definition of 'Justice.' Thrasydamus is pointing out what the κρείττον in each case is. "This then is the 'stronger' in each state."

τούτο is not = τόδε, nor used in anticipation of το ἀρχον. Grammatically το ἀρχον is an afterthought, exegetic of τούτο, which itself refers to something implied in a previous expression. The speaker is not satisfied, after saying τούτο, that the hearer will grasp exactly what it imports, and therefore adds an explanation. Thus "some states are under despotisms, some democratic, some under aristocracies:...Well then, that is the 'stronger' in each state—, I mean the governing power." In the same way inf. 583 τούτο γάρ, ἐφι, τότε ἡδον ἤ λογον καὶ ἀγαπητόν γίνεται, ἡσυχία (the previous sentence having said τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκυμοναύσων ὥς ἡδίστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν). Cf. Gorg. 478 c.

[For different forms of government and the ἀρχον (or κύριον) in each case, cf. Aristot. Pol. iii. 6. 1, 7. 2. In the latter place he remarks ἑτεῖ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολιτεῖμα σημαίνει ταύτων, πολιτεῖμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἐνα ἡ ὀλίγοις ἢ τοὺς πολλούς. ὡταυ μὲν ὁ εἰς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοί πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἀρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθά ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνός ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πληθοῦς παρεκβάσεισ.]

τίθεται. A distinction frequently imagined between θείαι νόμους (of an autocrat) and θέσθαι νόμους (of a republican legislator) is not sound. A republican legislator may τίθεναι νόμους when regarded simply as framer of laws for a community which has appointed him to the task. On the other hand an autocrat may τίθεσθαι νόμους when the notion of self-interest is emphasized. The middle here and in 339 c differs from the active (339 c) only in the greater prominence of that notion.

It would be better to say that (1) θείαι νόμους has reference to the mere act of legislating for a state (whether, as with a republican like Draco, the legislator must obey the laws himself, or, as with a despot, he need not), (2) θέσθαι νόμους has reference to the effect upon oneself of the legislation (whether, as with republican states, it be for their own obedience as well as interest, or, as with a despot, for his own interest only). The natural result is of course that θείαι νόμου is the usual expression of either a despot or a constitutionally appointed framer of laws, while θέσθαι νόμου is the usual expression of a people legislating for itself. In other words, the middle does not imply the binding of the legislator but the serving of his interests.
338 E. ἐκάστη—
Par. A has ἐκάστη, of which Jowett and Campbell remark that it is 'a manifest error.' But it is hard to see why νόμος ἐκάστη (πόλει) could not be right, if the middle τίθεται be explained as in the last note. On general principles it is more likely that ἐκάστη should be altered to ἐκάστη than vice versa. In point of sense, however, ἐκάστη is more natural, and the dative may be due to the dative in the previous line.

ἀπέφηνεν...εἶναι—'declare it to be,' 'make it into.' The aorist is gnomic. Goodwin M. and T. § 155. Joined with present in Symp. 188 a ὅταν ὃ Ἑρως ἐγκρατέστερος γέννηται, διαφθείρει τε πολλὰ καὶ ἥδικησεν, and with perfect Prot. 328 b, c.

τοῦτον ἐκβαίνοντα. One ms only has τοῦτο. Both cases are allowable, according to the shade of meaning attaching to the verb.

In ἐκβαίνειν τοῦτον the thought is literally 'depart from,' cf. Prot. 326 δ ὅ ἐκτὸς βαίνη τοῦτων κολάξει, while in ἐκβαίνειν τοῦτο the verb has come to be treated as if it were like e.g. παραβαίνειν ('transgress'). Contrast 330 δ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἱδεας ἐκβαίνειν, 404 λ ἐκβαίνας τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης with Symp. 183 β ἐκβαίνειν τὸν ὄρκου, and also compare the uses of ἔξισταμαι τι = 'avoid,' 'shirk' (κινδυνον, Dem. Lept. 460), and ἔξισταμαι τινος 'depart from,' inf. 380 δ (ἔξιστατο τῆς ἱδεας).

Often of course it is equally possible to use either, as in the present instance.

tοῦτ' οὖν ἐστὶν...δ λέγω...ταῦτον εἶναι δίκαιον. "It is in this sense, then, that I use the expression that 'the same thing is just.'" = 'This, then, is what I mean by the same thing being just.' Cf. 332 λ. Davies and Vaughan mistranslate 'therefore my meaning is that in all cities &c.'

339 A. κρατεῖ=κρειττόν ἐστι, v. sup. 338 d (ad fin.).

ξυμβαίνει—i.e. logically. Cf. sup. 334 d.

νῦν...ἐμαθον. The aorist for English present, as in ἡκουσα, εἰνήκα, ἐδεξάμην τὸ ῥηθέν &c. V. note on γελάσας sup. 331 d.

tὸ ξυμφέρον...ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—which, plainly, is not the same as saying that τὸ δίκαιον is τὸ ξυμφέρον. See Introduction. A strictly logical antagonist would have reversed the subject and predicate of εἶναι and said e.g. ξυμφέρον μὲν τι καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι...πρόσετι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Plato, however, is far from logical (see Introduction §§ 9 a, 14, 15 b and c).

ἀποκρινομήν—future. V. sup. 337 ε.

πρόσετι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι κ.τ.λ. "It is true that in this case (i.e. in
your definition) there is added the phrase ‘of the stronger.’” Cf. Meno 73 d οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτότε τὸ δικαίως;
Since τὸ ξυμφέρον has preceded, it is better not to supply ξυμφέρον with τὸ, which simply introduces the quotation. In other words the substantive belonging to τὸ is the expression τοῦ κρείττονος.
339 B. ἵσως—sarcastically: ‘I daresay.’
oὔτω δήλον οὐδ’ ἐι μεγάλη. ‘It is not yet shewn, on the other hand, whether it is a great one,’ or ‘whether it is a great one, either.’
οτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον κ.τ.λ. No δὲ-clause follows. μὲν almost = γε. See note on 334 c.
προστίθησ—used absolutely, ‘make an addition.’ V. sup. 335 a.
sκεπτέον δή. Σκότει—cf. inf. 342 a σκέψεται…σκοπούμενη, 369 a οὔτως ἐπισκέψωμεθα…ἐπισκοποῦντες, ibid. b σκοπεῖτε οὖν.
"Εσκεπται.

[The Attic paradigm is σκοπεῖν (σκοποῦμαι), ἐσκότων (ἐσκοπούμην), σκέψομαι, ἐσκεψάμην, ἐσκεμμαι, σκεπτέον. The ‘regular’ forms σκοπήσω, ἐσκόπησα &c. begin from Aristotle. In Lach. 185 b περὶ οὖ βουλεύομεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα the form is probably deliberately chosen for the sound with βουλεύομεθα, while known to be unusual. That σκοποῦμαι and σκοπῶ are absolutely indistinguishable may be seen from Lach. 185 d, where σκοπήται, σκοπή, ἐσκότει, σκοπούμενοι, σκοποῦμεν follow each other without any shade of difference in the meaning. Rhythm may have had something to do with the choice.]

CHAPTER XIII.

οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι κ.τ.λ.—καλ belongs principally to πείθεσθαι, while οὐ…μέντοι introduces a question, to which the anticipated answer is ‘yes’ (in virtue of οὐ), and which suggests a new point likely to have some qualifying effect (in virtue of μέντοι). Lit. ‘don’t you, however, say that it is just, further, to obey the rulers?’ Cf. inf. 346 a ἐπει τοσόνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαίνε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτω ἐτέραν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.; 521 d, 602 c &c. Theaeet. 163 e, and elsewhere, very frequently. In Prot. 309 a ἐίτα τι τοῦτο; οὐ σο μέντοι "Ομήρου ἐπανέτητα εἰ; the qualifying force of μέντοι is that of exculpation.

339 C. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις—‘In the several (or respective) states.’ ἐκάσταις is less emphatic in this position than in ἐν ἐκάσταις ταῖς πόλεσιν—‘in each and all the states.’ So
Phaedr. 248 ε εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄγδον ἤκει ἢ ψιχὴ ἔκαστη ('the several souls') ὦκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων.

οἷοι τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν—For οἷοι with inf. v. sup. 334 δ. ἑαλ throws a stress upon ἀμαρτεῖν: 'they are capable of a mistake occasionally.'

τοὺς δὲ τινας—the addition of τινας is not without point. 'Some rightly, and some (i.e. perhaps only few, but still some) wrongly.' The force of τι in οἷοι τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν is similar.

[There are, of course, other uses of οἷ δέ τινας, where τινας has no such implication as here.]

τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς—sc. τιθεναι. That this is the grammar, and not τὸ "ὀρθῶς" ("the term 'rightly'"), is shewn by the following μὴ ὀρθῶς. "The term 'wrongly'" would have required τὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. V. sup. 334 ε.

ἑαυτοῖς—with ἐμφθέρωντα. The self-regarding middle τιθεοῦσα could not properly be used with a reflexive pronoun.

339 D. τι λέγεις σὺ;—σὺ, though in the best, is not in all, mss, but it (1) is more characteristic of Thrasymachus, as it adds a tone of impatience or asperity, (2) lends additional point to the σὺ in Socrates' answer. For the tone 'acriter contradicentium' of τι λέγεις σὺ; see Blaydes on Ar. Nub. 1172 sqq.

νῦν μὲν γ' ἵδειν εἰ πρῶτον ἐξαιρητικὸς κάντλολογικός, καὶ τοῦτο τοῦπικηρίου ἀπεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τι λέγεις σὺ;

οἷοι ἐγγένε, ἐφη. Οἷον τοῦνν...καλ....: 'I believe so.... Then believe also....' Jowett and Campbell compare 430 c, where ἀποδέχομαι is followed by the reply καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχον κ.τ.λ. Thrasymachus' answer is a grudging one, and Socrates, ironically taking up his word οἷοι, instead of replying with e.g. 'then it must be clear to you,' says 'if you believe so (go a step further with your believing and) believe....'

Plato enters into the feelings of his refuted sophists, and graduates their terms of assent from the ready and cheerful to the impatient and sullen. Cf. Prot. 360 c sqq. πάνω γε...συνεφη,...ἐπένευσεν... πάνω μόνε ἐνταῦθι...ἐπένευσεν...ἀυτός, ἐφη, πέρανον.

339 E. τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον ἐλναι φής—a condensation for τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον ὥς σὺ φής: 'and when (nevertheless) it is, according to your account, just....'

οὐκ ἀναγκαίον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ ὀπτωσὶ δίκαιον ἐλναι ποιεῖν τοῦναντίον ἢ δ σὺ λέγεις;—(1) 'must it not of necessity follow that, in
such case, it is just to do exactly the opposite of what you contend for?"

This punctuation was first given by Madvig, the earlier editors being misled by the unusually wide separation of αὐτό from τούναυτον. The position of αὐτό is due to strong emphasis. The sense of συμβαίνειν is as in 339 Α.

Otherwise (2) it is possible to place a comma after οὕτωσι, and to render 'must it (αὐτό) not turn out thus, (viz.) that it is just to do the opposite of what you contend for?' αὐτό then = 'the case' (with which we are dealing).

340 A. Κλειτοφῶν—v. 328 Β and Introd. § 3 c. He supports his master Thrasydamus, and his observation is not particularly polite.

deίται—sc. Σωκράτης, to be supplied from αὐτῷ preceding.

The rendering 'what need is there of a witness?' answers rather to a τί δεί..., but is not out of the question. Cf. Meno 79 c δεί οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχής τῆς αὐτῆς ἑρωτήσεως... ηὗ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεί σαθί σαθί τῆς αὐτῆς ἑρωτήσεως; Soph. O. C. 570 ὥστε βραχέ' ἐμοί δείσθαι φράσσαι.

'There is need' = δεί. 'It (the thing in question) needs' = deitai.

But the latter is very rare and not entirely above suspicion.

to...tά κελευόμενα ποιεῖν κ. τ. λ.—Thrasymachus admitted this 339 Β (fin.).

to γάρ...καὶ γάρ το τοῦ κρείττωνος κ. τ. λ.—Both instances of γάρ, belonging as they do to the vivacity of conversational retort, are somewhat elusive of precise interpretation. The ellipses however can be roughly supplied as follows. 'Yes,' says Cleitophon, ' (but there is no overthrow of Thrasydamus in that) for what he laid down as just was the doing what was hidden by the rulers.' 'Nay,' replies Polemarchus, ' (that is not all) for he also laid it down &c.' In English we say 'yes, but,' followed by 'nay, but he also....'

The unusual separation of κελευόμενα from ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων—a hyperbaton certain to be felt by a Greek reader—throws an emphasis upon κελευόμενα. Cleitophon wishes to shift the definition from a doing of τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ ἀρχόντος to a doing of his commands.

340 B. δ ἥγεται—some mss have ἥγετο. The imperfect indicative is out of place, and what is required is the oblique of either δ ἥγεται or δ ἰν ἥγεται after the past tense. δ ἥγετο would
represent either, or the present δ ἡγεῖται must remain for the former. Goodwin M. and T. § 669. 2.

τούτο ποιητέων ἐλαί—sc. Ἔλεγεν (from the previous sentence).

CHAPTER XIV.

340 D. συκοφάντης γαρ εἰ—for γαρ cf. 338 D.

For συκοφάντια ἐν λόγοις in the sense of sophistical quibbling or logical cheating cf. Arist. Rhet. π. 24 § 10 ὡσπέρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πὴ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφάντιαν, and Soph. Elench. 15. 5 σοφιστικῶν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἑρωτώνων.

αὐτικα—'for instance' (i.e. not to linger over the matter, but take the first example to hand). The use is very frequent, e.g. Protag. 359 ε, Phaedr. 235 ε. In Gorg. 472 c more fully αὐτικὰ πρῶτον. Similarly εὐθὺς in Aristot. Pol. π. 4 § 6 ὡσπέρ ἔριψαν εὐθὺς.

καλεῖς σὺ—the σὺ of impatience, which we rather express in the verb, 'now, do you call...?' Cf. 339 D τί λέγεις σὺ; 'what are you saying?'

λογιστικῶν—'accountant' or 'arithmetician' (not 'reasoner,' since Plato is speaking of professional occupations). Cf. λογιστής (inf.) = 'auditor' and 'teacher of arithmetic.' Gorg. 451 c τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητική, ἡ λογιστική ἔχει (and context).

λέγομεν τῷ ρήματι οὕτως—For two manners of rendering οὕτως v. 331 c (ἀπλῶς οὕτως). The better here, as there, is 'just,' 'offhand,' i.e. 'we do say loosely in so many words.' Cf. Gorg. 450 ε οὐχ ὁτι τῷ ρήματι οὕτως ἐπέσε, ὁτι... 'not but what you did, so far as that goes, make use of the form of words, that....' There is an emphasis on τῷ ρήματι, 'so far as the form of words goes.' Cf. Theaeet. 166 δ τὸν δὲ λόγον μὴ τῷ ρήματι μον δώκε.

ὁ γραμματιστής—'the writing-master' (Prot. 326 δ) or 'teacher of reading and writing.'

He is to be distinguished from the γραμματικὸς, who was a critic and man of letters. Cf. litterator )( litteratus.

τὸ δ’ = 'whereas in point of fact.' Cf. inf. 357 λ ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἠγαν λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι: τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προολιον, 443 c, Prot. 344 ε, σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὡς Πιταλε, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμενεῖ: τὸ δὲ ἔστι γενέθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν, δυνατὸν δὲ ἐσθλὸν, ἐμμενεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. Apol. 23 a τὸ δὲ κινδυνεῦει τῷ δυτι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς ἐλναι, &c. So later, in e.g. Lucian Alex. 17 τὸ δ’ οὖν πάντως ἐστι.

The use originated in an antithesis of τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ (like τούτο μὲν ...τούτο δὲ Hdt. i. 161 &c.) = 'on the one hand...on the other....'
The τὸ μὲν of the first member is then omitted, or rather τὸ δὲ comes to have the meaning 'on the other hand' without the assistance of a preceding τὸ μὲν. Grammatically τὸ δὲ is in apposition to its sentence.

340 E. δημιουργῶν. The width of application of the word δημιουργὸς is perhaps best illustrated by Hom. Od. xvii. 383

tis γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν δὲ δημιουργοί ἔσαι,
μάντων ᾧ ἰητὴρα κακῶν ᾧ τέκτωνα δοῦρων ᾧ καὶ θέστων οὐδόν, δ' κεν τέρπησον ἄείδων;

It includes all those who practise a skilled calling which brings them into service to the public, e.g. sculptors (inf. 529 ε), physicians (Syrp. 186 ν), confectioners (Hdt. vii. 31); and therefore embraces both trades and professions. Its use as = χειροτέχναι alone is narrower.

For the iατρός as δημιουργός cf. Aristot. Pol. iii. 11 § 11 iατρός δὲ δὲ τε δημιουργός καὶ ὁ ἄρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην.

η σοφός—in the mouth of Thrasydamus, and in the context, σοφός, used as a noun, implies that there is such a thing as a professional σοφός with a recognised standing as an expert in wisdom. The σοφός (among whom, as a sophist, Thrasydamus would include himself) would be authoritative guides to right views in general. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 20 Προδίκος ὁ σοφός, Euthyph. 2 c καὶ ἐνεμείθη σοφός τις εἶναι, Mem. 75 c, &c.

ὁταν ἄρχων ᾧ—put loosely for ὅταν δημιουργός ᾧ σοφός ᾧ ἄρχων ᾧ.
τοιοῦτον οὖν...νῦν ᾧ ἀποκρίνεσθαι—'well then, take it that I also just now answered you to the same purpose,' or, in other words, 'take it that the answer which I just now gave was meant in the same way.'

νῦν δη (with a past tense) in Plato and the dramatists regularly = 'just now,' while in most writers it = nunc cum maxime ('at this very moment'). Its force is sometimes brought out strongly by an antithesis to νῦν, e.g. Legg. 683 ε ᾧ νῦν δὴ μὲν ὅλιγον ἐμπροσθεν τούτων περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δὲ ἐπελείσμεθα, and a line quoted from the comic poet Magnes νῦν δὴ μὲν ᾧς μη γεγονέναι, νῦν δὲ φῆς.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι is imperfect, corresponding to the direct τοιοῦτον νῦν δὴ ἀπεκρινώμην. Cf. inf. 341 B δ νῦν δῃ ἔλεγες.

tὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει δὺ—'but the strictly accurate
(way of speaking) is this’ (ἐκεῖνος = illud, of what follows). The infinitive clause following is exegetic of ἐκεῖνο (v. 329 d).

CHAPTER XV.

341 A. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντα—Cf. Gorg. 483 ι and v. sup. 338 δ. σε belongs to ἐρέσθαι. ‘Nay, do you think it was maliciously and with knavery that I put you the question in the way I did?’

341 B. οὔτε μή λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναι—Lit. ‘nor could you, when you failed to remain undetected, force me by sheer argument.’

The tense of λαθὼν is important; it differs from λανθάνων by assuming that the attempt has first been made. ‘I should detect you if you tried trickery; also, when you were detected (and had to come into the open), you could not overpower me by strict argument.’

For the form of sentence cf. Apol. 32 Α οὐδ’ ἄν ἐνὶ ύπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεικάσει βάναυν, μή ύπείκων δὲ ἁμα καὶ ἁμα δὲν ἀποδολεμένη.

The word βιάσασθαι is in keeping with the eristic attitude of the sophist. Socrates would rather say πέτοιαι. At the same time, the antithesis of λανθάνεω and βιάζεσθαι was not rare (cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 21).

tοιοῦτον—‘such a misunderstanding.’

τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν κ. τ. λ.—‘The ruler in the loose sense, or the ruler in the strict signification, of whom you just now spoke.’

The phrase ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν is restrictive or qualifying, and is so used in two connexions (1) when the speaker owns that he is not aiming at strict exactness in the particular language he chooses, but qualifies it with ‘to speak approximately’ or ‘not to be too particular.’ This is the sense here (cf. 340 δ τῷ ῥήματι οὖτως), Legg. 639 δ, &c.: (2) when he qualifies a word, which may be too strong or comprehensive, by adding ‘I might almost say’ (prope dixerim). Cf. Apol. 17 Α καίτω διηθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ δὲν εἰρήκασι (where οὐδὲν is too strong). So πᾶς αν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν in Gorg. 450 Β, Aesch. Pers. 714 διακεφόρκησε τα Περσῶν πράγματι, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος. Phaedr. 258 ε τίνος ἀνέκα κἀν τις, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ξωφή; These two uses of ‘so to speak’ are closely related, and in e.g. Legg. 656 ε νύχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστόν, ἄλλο δυντῶς they practically coincide.

[A sense given in some lexicons, but which the phrase never has, is that of ‘as the saying goes.’]
δ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγε—If we read δὲ it of course refers to τὸν ἄρχοντα (viz. 340 e), not to λόγῳ. Cf. inf. 343 ε λέγω γὰρ δὲν περ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. But the reading δ of mss is quite satisfactory 'as you were just now saying': lit. 'to take the expression which you just now used.' Thrasy-machus had said κατὰ τὸν ἄκριβῆ λόγον (340 e).

οὗδὲν σοι παρέμαι—'I ask no quarter (or concession) from you.' The genitive may be explained (1) ad sensum, as if παρέμαι = αἰτοῦμαι παρά; (2) on the same principle as τοῦτο σοι θαυμάζω and its like, i.e. 'I try to win over nothing (in you =) on your part.'

The latter is on all accounts the better. Cf. Apol. 17 c τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέσμαι καὶ παρέμαι. This, which is the only one quoted, is no instance of παρεσθαί with genitive of person directly dependent upon it. We cannot therefore render 'in no way (adv.) do I beg off your opposition.' In that sense the verb would take an accus. of the person (as with παρατείσθαι). Cf. Legg. 742 β παρέμενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδημεῖτω. The same accus. is understood in Soph. O. C. 1666 οὐκ ἄν παρείμην (sc. τούτους) οἴσι μὴ δοκῶ φρονεῖν.


ἔφρειν...λέοντα—a proverb more quoted in late Greek than in the classical period. Cf. Lucian Cynic. 14 οὐκ ἄν ὑπέμεναν οὐδὲ εἰς αὐτῶν οὗδὲν μάλλον ἥ τῶν λέβων τις ἐφράμενος.

νῦν—not = νῦν δὴ, but 'in the present case' (cf. nunc vero and νῦν δὲ with past tenses).

οὗδὲν ἄν καὶ ταῦτα—The translation of these words depends upon the tone and inflection with which they are spoken: (1) with καὶ ταῦτα run practically into one word (i.e. with καὶ lightly and rapidly pronounced) the sense is 'moreover' or 'too,' i.e. 'and proved a failure, too'; (2) with more stress on both καὶ and ταῦτα it = 'being a failure at that also (as well as at other attempts).'</p>

The sense could in any case hardly be the same as with the order καὶ ταῦτα οὗδὲν ἄν, since there is no point in saying 'and that too though you are a man of no account,' even if we allow that Thrasy-machus is capable of such extreme rudeness. καὶ ταῦτα, when it = præsertim cum, regularly precedes its participle, though it is possible to quote from Diodorus Comicus τὴν ἐσομένην καὶ ταῦτα μέτοχον τοῦ βίου and still better Aristid. pro Quat. p. 504 Περικλέους δὲ οὐκ ἐφείσω τεθυκότος καὶ ταῦτα. Editors who are alive to this fact (Stallbaum, Jowett and Campbell, &c.) give the explanation (2) above, i.e. rendering καὶ as = quoque and ταῦτα as an accus. respect, 'being a nobody in regard to this also.' They do not appear to have thought of the other, (1), which is here.
offered as most easy and natural. kai ταύτα is an afterthought, insisting on the preceding statement: grammatically it is a separate clause as in Charmid. 154 Ε πάνω καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἦστι καὶ ταύτα (‘he is a thorough gentleman, too’). Here, literally, ‘being a failure,—being that also,’ and there ‘he is a thorough gentleman, that also (sc. he is).’ So I should explain Lucian Alex. 13 διὰ ώμα περὶ τὸ αἰδώς ἔχων κατάχρουσον καὶ τούτο (where commentators are at a loss).

341 D. οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἦστιν τι ἔμφερον;—‘I suppose in the case of each of these there is something which is his interest?’

οὐ καὶ η ὁχνη...ἐκπορίζεν; ‘and is it not also the case that the art (in each instance) is essentially directed to this, viz. the discovery and provision of what is for the (said) interest of each?’

These questions are sufficiently obscure to deserve more comment than they usually receive. What is meant by ἐκάστῳ? It is difficult to believe that it can refer to the practitioner of the art, since Socrates is bent on shewing that an art is not directed to the interest of the practitioner, but to that of the ‘subjects’ on whom it is exercised. On the other hand, to take ἐκάστῳ τούτων and ἐκάστῳ as referring to the ‘subjects’ upon whom the art is practised, seems to put a rather unnatural strain upon the language. Yet this is apparently the only rendering which is in keeping with (ἐ inf.) τούτῳ ὅν ὅπως ἐκπορίζης κ.τ.λ., and (342 β) οὐδὲ προσικεῖ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμφερον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἦστιν. We shall then be obliged to consider that ἐκάστῳ τούτων is made to refer to the ‘subjects’ the more easily because τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἄρχην has just preceded and so drawn attention to the ‘subjects’ as opposed to the practitioners. Either, therefore, Plato has expressed himself awkwardly, or something which imparted more precision has been lost from the ms.

[We may suggest οὐκοῦν <εἰδεί> ἐκάστῳ τούτων =‘in each department of the operations named is involved a certain interest somewhere, (which is to be provided for).’ For εἰδεί cf. inf. 389 β ὡς ἐν φαρμάκον εἰδεί (‘in the department of medicine’). ἐν εἰδεί τινὸς subsequently became common. Cf. τιθέναι τι ἐν τινὸς μέρει. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. ι. 15. 2 τὸ μὲν ὅν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖ νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἰδος ἢ πολιτείας (‘belongs to the department of...’), Rhet. ι. 22 § 1 περὶ δ’ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἰπωμεν, τίνα τρόπου δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα τοὺς τόπους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰδος ἐκατέρω τούτων ἦστιν (‘belong to different departments’). ἐκάστῳ <τῶν εἰδῶν> τούτων is of course equally possible, ‘each of the sets of circumstances specified introduces a certain ἔμφερον.’ With ἐκάστῳ of the following sentence εἰδεί is then again understood.]

ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη κ.τ.λ.—There being some form of ἔμφερον
involved in each set of relations (viz. of physician to the sick, navigator to sailors), Socrates proceeds to shew that there is no ἐγκέφαλος of the art itself and its practitioner to be sought, but only a ἐγκέφαλος of the ‘subjects’ of its exercise. The καὶ either (1) emphasizes ἐκάστῃ τῶν ἐπεξών, 'Well, but then, as regards each art (itself), has it any other interest (i.e. qua that art and nothing else) than that it should be as perfect as possible?'; or (2), belonging to the whole question, = 'going a step further.'

341 E. νῦν—'In actual experience.'

πόνηρον—πονηρός, like μοιχηρός, is used of both the physically and the morally unsound and defective. Cf. Tim. 86 ν πονηρὰ ξὺς σώματος. Thuc. viii. 97 πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων.

[The old grammarians laid it down that in Attic the accent was oxytone only in the moral sense. It seems safest to follow their rule. Cf. (though with reservations) English 'human' and 'human'.] τοιούτῳ εἶναι—'to remain in that state.'

342 A. ἡ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὅ τι προσδείται τινος ἀρετῆς—'or does any other art in any way stand in need of some further excellence?' ἔσθ' ὅ τι = τι, except that it is brought into greater prominence. Cf. inf. 346 δ. So ἔστω ὅτε = ἐνλοτε, ἔστω ὅπως = πως. Cf. Protag. 331 ν ὅ τι γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὁ πῦρ προσέθηκε. ἀρετῆς = excellence enabling it to perform its special function (ἔργον), v. on 335 β.

ὁπερ ὥθημαλμός κ.τ.λ.—"'For example eyes stand in need (of the ἀρετῆς of) of seeing, and ears (of the ἀρετῆς of) of hearing, and therefore there is need in connexion with them (ἐπ' αὐτοῖς = 'in charge of them,' or, 'engaged upon them') of some art to consider and provide what is ἐγκέφαλος to these ends (viz. seeing and hearing) [such a 'providing' art is that of the oculist or aurist]. Is it also the case that in art itself there is a certain defectiveness, and that —[inasmuch as it therefore stands in need of a completing ἀρετῆς to enable it to perform its function]—each art requires the help of another art to provide it with what is ἐγκέφαλος (to that end, viz. the obtaining of the ἀρετῆς in question), and so ad infinitum?"'

Socrates does not conceive of the interdependence of arts and sciences. 'The art of healing' is complete in itself; it implies the fullest and most ideal command of healing, and what further can it require to enable it to perform its function? So far as it is the art of healing it can proceed at once to heal. Cf. inf. β οὔτε γὰρ ποιηρία οὔτε ἀμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν κ.τ.λ.
σκεφομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριοῦσθης. ἐκποριοῦσθης (a form liable to corruption) is given in two ‘edited’ mss, but is perhaps unnecessary. In 604 λ μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν should, however, almost certainly be corrected ἀντιτείνειν.

σκέφτηκα...σκοπούμενη—v. sup. 330 B.

342 B. ἐπί τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρλαν—'to remedy its own defectiveness.'


αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιος κ.τ.λ.: 'but in itself it is without flaw or blemish while it possesses its true nature—that is to say, so long as each art, bearing its strict meaning, is nothing but the art it is.' ἐωσπερ ἄν ἦ κ.τ.λ. is explanatory of ὀρθῇ οὖσα. It is to be noted (1) that the Greek is not ἀκριβῆς καὶ ὁλη, (2) that we have ἦπερ and not διερ.

It is therefore no literal rendering to translate, 'while in all strictness and entirety it is what it is.' Grammatically ἀκριβῆς=ἀκριβῆς οὖσα, and its meaning is that which attaches to τὸν ἀκριβεὶ λόγῳ sup. 341 B. So inf. ὃ ἀκριβῆς ἱατρός=ὁ ἀκριβεὶ λόγῳ ἱατρός. By ὅλη, which belongs to the predicate with ἦ (i.e. ἐωσπερ ἄν ἐκάστῃ ἀκριβῆς (οὖσα) ἦ ὅλη ἦπερ ἐστί), is meant 'nothing but' the art which it calls itself (i.e. ἱατρική, for instance, without involving χρηματιστική &c.). This use of ὅλος or πᾶς is frequent enough, e.g. δλον ἁμαρτημα ('nothing but a mistake'), πλάσμα ὅλον ('a cheat and nothing else').

The balance of the whole passage is thus οὔτε γὰρ πονηρλα...πάρεστι corresponding to αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς οὖσα καὶ ἀκέραιος, and οὔτε προστήκει ἄλλω τὸ ξυμφέρον κ.τ.λ. corresponding to ἐωσπερ ἄν ἦ ἀκριβῆς ὅλη ἦπερ ἐστί: and the meaning in brief is, 'art has no defects and no flaw; and, in so far as it is simply what it professes to be, it only seeks the advantage of its subject. [It is only when it becomes confused with money-making &c. that it either (a) requires a supplementary art, or (b) aims at some other interest than that of the subject.]'

342 C. ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. In these words Socrates brings the remarks upon τέχνη round to their application. For the reasoning and its fallacy see Introd. § 31 a.

342 E. τῷ ἄρχομένῳ—neuter; hence ἐκείνο below.

δημιουργῆ—v. sup. 340 E.
CHAPTER XVI.

343 A. ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος—′the account (to be given) of justice.' Cf. Phaedr. 245 ε ψυχής οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον. The sense is often indistinguishable from that of ὅρος ′definition.' See Legg. 895 ε.

[τὴ δὲ;—Stallbaum's τὴ δαί; is not in the mss.

Both expressions were in use in conversation, and, in the later entire confusion of pronunciation of ε and αι, one was often substituted for the other in the copies. Sometimes the corruption can be detected from the metre, as in the mss of Aristophanes (e.g. Ach. 912, where however it is δαί which has replaced δὲ). τὴ δὲ; was more widely recognised in literature than τὴ δαί; and there can be no reason whatever for altering it here.]

κορυφώντα—′drivelling.' Literally κορυφά=πιτουίτα, ′a running at the nose.' Hence it is used of idiocy or childish helplessness. Cf. Lucian Alex. 20 κορυφάς μεστός τὴν μίνα, and κορυφᾶς (Menander). Hor. Sat. i. 4. 8, speaking of Lucilius, employs the contrary expression emunctae naris.

αὐτή—′ethical′ dative: ′to her shame;' lit. ′so far as she is concerned.' Cf. Lys. 208 ὡς ἐκείνη σε ἐὰν ποιεῖν έ τὶ ἄν βούλῃ ἡνα αὐτή μακάριος ὑς. Soph. Aj. 1128 θεὸς γὰρ ἐκσύζει με, τῶδε ὰν οἴχομαι.

οὔδε πρόβατα οὔδε ποιμένα γεγυνώσκεις—not=οὔτε...οὔτε; but the first οὔδε =ne...quidem (with the verb or general sense), while the second =neque; cf. Apol. 26 οὔδε ἡλιον οὔδε σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεῶς ἐλνα. Lit. ′Inasmuch as you cannot so much as tell sheep or shepherd.' English prefers the form of expression ′sheep and shepherd′ or ′sheep from shepherd,' but with the present ′disjunctive′ form Jowett and Campbell compare 605 οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι.

ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα;—Lit. ′because why, exactly?′

Both the English and Greek belong to the ungrammatical vivacities of conversation; but while the English is colloquial, the Greek is countenanced in literary use. The sentence begins ὅτι δὴ 'because, of course...' and then the speaker, finding himself unable to assign the reason readily, asks for it instead: ′because, of course...why, exactly?′ The idiom ἡνα τὶ; is somewhat similar: ′in order that—what?′

With the present passage cf. 449 c ὅτι, ἐγὼ ἐξον, τί μάλιστα; For μάλιστα cf. Crito (ad init.) πηνικα μάλιστα; ′what o′clock, exactly?′
343 B. τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν...καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν—The shepherds &c. are in the first instance naturally thought of as slaves, since they were commonly such. καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν might either refer to the advantage which even slaves may get from success with their masters’ flocks and herds, or (= ἂ τὸ αὐτῶν) to freemen who act as their own shepherds and herdsmen.

καὶ δὴ καὶ—‘and so, of course, also....’

ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοῦσιν—i.e. are really and truly lords and masters (and do not qualify that attitude by seeking any other object, e.g. social good or beneficent organisation &c.).

diavoeiσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. It is natural (especially with διατίθημι following) to suggest διακείσθαι, with Faesi, Cobet, and others. Yet cf. inf. 414 ΄ υπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν δυνῶν καὶ γαγγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι (‘be minded’), and with πρὸς Legg. 628 δ ὠσάντως πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν διανοεῖσθαι, &c. ‘To be minded’ being thus an established sense of διανοεῖσθαι, there is nothing gained by altering to its synonym διακείσθαι ‘to be disposed.’

ωφελήσονται. For the middle form with passive sense, cf. inf. 361 ε μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, 426 σ τιμήσεται. In 376 σ θρέψωσον is middle ‘will grow up.’

[Ὑπηρέστομαι, ἀδικήσομαι, ἀξομαι, λέξομαι, ἀπανθόσομαι, φυλάξομαι, στυγήσομαι, μυσίσσομαι, ὀλίγοσομαι, ἀξιώσομαι, ἀσόμαι, διδάξομαι and others are similarly used.]

343 C. οὔτω πόρρω εἰ—‘you are so far (out),’ sc. τοῦ ἀλήθους, or τοῦ ὅρθως γνώναι.

The expression πόρρω εἰναι περὶ, ‘to be far off in the matter of,’ is here treated as sufficiently explicit to dispense with the usual genitive, for which cf. Theaet. 151 σ πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι, ὅτι...

περὶ τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαίωσύνης κ.τ.λ. For the distinction of τὸ δικαίον and δικαισύνη v. sup. 336 λ. The ‘hyperbatie’ position of τε immediately after the preposition is the regular Greek. Cf. Prot. 316 δ τοῦ ἅμφι τε ὁρφέα καὶ Μουσαίων. Thuc. viii. 78 υπὸ τε Ἀστυάθου καὶ Τισσαφέρους (for υπὸ Ἀστυάθου τε καὶ Τ.) and inf. 345 ε ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἄρχῃ.

A omits τε after ἀδίκου, nor is it requisite. The sense is περὶ τοῦ δικαίου—καὶ—δικαισύνης καὶ ἀδίκου—καὶ—ἀδίκιας, ‘concerning on the one hand justice and on the other injustice.’ If, however, τε is right, we must suppose it to have been deliberately inserted in order to shew more definitely that the words ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδίκιας form a single notion opposed to the other single notion τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
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ἀδικασώνη. For the one article before ἅδικαν, which runs on with its opposite ἅδικος, cf. 332 D τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς.

ἀλλότριον ἁγαθόν—cf. Aristot. Eth. v. 1. 17 καὶ ἄλλοτριον ἁγαθόν δοκεῖ ἐναὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη μονὴ τῶν ἁρετῶν, ὡς πρὸς ἑτερόν ἑστιν, and ibid. 6. 6 ἄλλοτριον ἐναὶ φασιν ἁγαθόν τήν δικαιοσύνην. The phrase was evidently in vogue.

tοῦ πειθομένου κ.τ.λ.—there is a slight chiasmus (cf. 328 e). πειθομένου answers more particularly to ἀρχόντος, ὑπηρετούντος to κρέστονος.

οἱ δ’ ἀρχόμενοι—as Jowett and Campbell point out, this admits of being taken either as (1) οἱ δὲ ‘while they’ (sc. the εὐθήκοι καὶ δικαίοι) ἀρχόμενοι ‘being ruled,’ or (2) ‘and the subjects’: i.e. in the one case we have demonstrative pronoun and true participle, and in the other article and substantive.

The former rendering, however, is obviously less natural when οἱ δὲ stands immediately before a word which looks like its noun, than when it stands without such ambiguity before the verb, as in the instances quoted by them, viz. 380 B οἱ δὲ ὑψίναντο κολαξόμενοι. Prot. 315 A οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἑπονται κεκηλημένοι.

343 D. οἱ εὐθέστατοι Σώκρατες. Though we need not press the intellectual meaning of εὐθής too far, this is a rude enough return for the οἱ σοφῶτατε Ὀρασύμαχε of Socrates (339 e).

ἐξυμβολαίοις...κοινωνήσῃ—v. sup. 333 A ἐν τῇ διαλύσει κ.τ.λ. ‘at the settlement of the joint venture.’ The modern ‘dissolution of partnership’ conveys a more specific technical notion.

ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πάλιν—ἐξυμβολαίοις should be repeated from ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἄλλους ἐξυμβολαίοις, the distribution of taxes and receipts among the partners in the political κοινωνία being regarded as a ‘joint engagement.’

Otherwise τοῖς may be taken more comprehensively—‘in matters referring to the state.’

tινες εἰσφοράλ. εἰσφοράλ were not the regular taxes, but (after 428 B.C.) calls upon the citizens and metics to supply funds for various emergencies (hence τινες), especially wars.

Such contributions were levied by decree of the people, which fixed the amount required, and payments were in proportion to property, the Θητεῖς alone being untaxed. Practically the εἰσφοράλ was an income-tax, since the taxable property was assessed at 12 times the net income. As the amount of that income was returned by the citizen himself, there were at least the same opportunities for evasion as with the modern income-tax. The ἅδικος, though possessed of as
much property (ἀπὸ τῶν ἵσων) as the δίκαιος, might deceive the symmories or collectors.

οὕτων τε λήψεις. These would include (a) the ordinary payments e.g. the μουσαδ κασατικός, βουλευτικός, ἐκκλησιαστικός, magistrates’ fees, officers’ fees (e.g. of πρέσβεις and ϑεωρολ) and payments for government jobs and contracts (e.g. in buildings, religious processes &c.); (b) state doles e.g. the ϑεωρικῶν, σιτοδοσίαι, gratuities to orphans &c.; (c) the handling of public money by paymasters, στρατηγῶν, &c. The ἄδικος would thus receive more than he had earned, or secure more than his share of largess, or let public money stick to his fingers in passing.

343 E. ύπάρχει—not simply = ἐστι, but implies a first condition to be reckoned with (‘to start with’). That condition may be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Cf. Xen. Ages. 8. 1 ύπαρξομαι μὲν τιμὴς, παροῦσης δὲ δυνάμεως, inf. 366 c ως τις δύναμις ύπάρχει ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.

tά γε οἰκεία. It is obviously more natural to take these words as the subject of ἔχειν (and not as accus. respect). The fact that the subject of ἀφελείσθαι changes to ‘the just man’ counts for nothing in the Greek. Cf. sup. 333 c, where the instances are much more abrupt.

ἀπέχθεσθαι or ἀπεχθεσθαι?—The latter appears to be the correct form for Plato.

The proparoxytone accent of mss,—an accent which can only date from times when a later verb ἀπέχθομαι was actually in current use—manifestly proves nothing. The older verb was ἀπεχθάνομαι, of which various parts occur in the classical period. If ἀπέχθομαι had existed as well, we should have looked for corresponding parts from that present, and it is at least highly suspicious that the only part which claims to represent it is identical in form with the aorist of ἀπεχθάνομαι, viz. ἀπεχθεσθαι. The first appearance of ἄπεχθ-θεται is in Theocritus (7. 45), but that writer can hardly be quoted to validate a form in Attic Greek (cf. his ἰὸς). Later, however, ἀπέχθομαι came into general use, and it is to that fact that the error in ἀπέχθεσθαι is due. [ἀπέχθομαι, the old reading in Eur. Hipp. 1260, has now been long corrected (from mss) to ἐπάχθομαι.]

δύναι νῦν δι' ἐλεγον—sc. in the general sense of 343 νοῦς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντίαν. For the expression cf. 341 n. Here also some inferior mss have ὁπερ.

μεγάλα—with πλεονεκτεῖν (otherwise μέγα would be required) ‘the man who has the power to grasp on a large scale.’
344 A. ὃσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἵδια αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον—αὐτῷ, from its position with ἵδια, is rather ἵππι than ἐκ.
'To his own personal advantage.'
τὸ before δίκαιον creates a certain difficulty, and it is probably for this reason that some MSS omit it. Retaining it, with the best MSS, we may render (1) 'How much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,' i.e. μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ξυμφέρει. (Both constructions of ξυμφέρει are of course allowable. For the personal use cf. Hdt. ix. 37 οὖ...οι συνήθεια τὸ ἔχθος.) (2) 'How much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by being just,' i.e. μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

[That in this case it would have been usual to express τὸ either twice or not at all does not prove the unusual expression to be wrong. Critics are too apt to abridge the conversational liberties of language. For a variation of expression with and without article cf. 347 δ πᾶς ἂν τὸ ὑφελείδθαι μᾶλλον ἑλοῖτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλου ὑφελέλων πράγματα ἐχειν.]

The former rendering is probably correct, though editors appear to have overlooked it.

τὴν τελεωτάτην—i.e. most ideal in both character and opportunity.

τοὺς...οὐκ ἂν ἑθέλοντας—οὐκ rather than μὴ because it coalesces into one word with ἑθέλοντας, 'those who would refuse.' Cf. Gorg. 457 C τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον (τῇ ἀρτορίκῃ), inf. 427 ἐν οὐκοῖν ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὑρομένεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐσται τὸ οὐχ ἵππομένον; ('the not-found'). Soph. Aj. 1131 εἴ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ ἄς θάπτειν (= καλεῖς). Similarly τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἑκοντάς (= ἄφρονας).

ἡ οὖ κατὰ σμικρὸν...ξυλλήβδην—'which, in its secret or forceful plundering of alien property, whether sacred or profane, public or private, proceeds not by littles but comprehensively.' There is no method and no object of depredation which the complete ἄδικος avoids. The smaller ἄδικος does a little here and there, sometimes λάθρᾳ, as in thieving and cheating, sometimes βίᾳ, as in kidnapping and open robbery: he sometimes despoils ἵππα (as ἵππον ὀυλοῦ), sometimes δοσια (as τοιχωρόκος), sometimes ιδια, sometimes δημόσια. The τελεωτάτη ἄδικια proceeds ξυλλήβδην to do each and all of these without reserve. That λάθρᾳ is not unsuited to the actions of the ideal ἄδικος is shewn by 345 A δινάσθω δὲ ἄδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λαυθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι.

ἵππα καὶ δοσια—cf. Dem. Timoc. 702 (fin.) τῶν λεπίν μὲν χρήματων
344 B. ὁν ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ μέρει—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these (aforesaid) crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'

ἀνδραποδισταὶ—'kidnappers,' 'man-stealers.' The crime was common in Greece, where slavery made it profitable. With the present passage cf. 575 B οία κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιστομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ιερουλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται. Gorg. 508 ε, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.

ἀποστερηταὶ—'cheats,' differing from κλέπται, inasmuch as it implies 'keeping back what is due' (the opposite of ἀποδίδοναι) rather than the positive act of stealing. One who fraudulently retained a παρακαταθήκη would come under this description.

τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων—The genitive follows κατὰ μέρη: 'those who are wrong-doers in regard to separate items of such knaveries,' τοιούτων: viz. either (1) those referred to above (λ) in τάλλότρια...δημοσία, or (2) = 'those implied in the said names respectively': 'the corresponding knaveries.' [There is nothing to decide the question.]

πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοῦς κ.τ.λ.—a brachylogy, or azeugma, for πρὸς τῷ τά τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ αὐτοῦς κ.τ.λ.

ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώστηται—ἀνδραποδισάμενος takes up the preceding ἀνδραποδισταὶ and conveys primarily the notion of 'seizing the person,' to which δουλώστηται adds the sense 'and turns them into his slaves.' [For the original distinction of ἀνδράποδων and δοῦλος v. L. and S.]

eὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληται. For the plural after a clause with ἐπειδὰν τις, ὅταν τις, εἰ τις, δοτὶς &c. by a common construction ad sensum see Madvig Gk Syntax § 99 d. Cf. Xen. Cyr. vii. 4. 5 ἣν παρὰ ταῦτα ἄδικειν τις ἐπιχειρήσει, τούτους Κύρος τε καὶ ἡμεῖς πολέμου έσόμεθα; and for the reverse order, inf. 426 c αἱ πόλεις προαγορεύουσι τοὺς πολίτας τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανοῦμεν τὸν τούτο δεῦ. See also Protag. 319 d, Gorg. 478 c. Here the singular is resumed in αὐτῶν...ἡδικηκότα. Inf. 347 A ἐὰν μὴ ἐρχῃ (sc. τις) follows the plural τοῖς μέλλονσιν ἐθελήσειν ἀρχεῖν.

[Whatever distinction may once have existed between εὐδαίμονες and
μακάριος, it is impossible to show that any was consistently maintained, and in the frequent combination εὐδαιμὼν καὶ μακάριος (cf. 354 A) the effect is simply comprehensive or cumulative, as in the English ‘sin and wickedness’ and as in so many of Cicero’s pairs of epithets. Cf. Theognis 1013 ὁ μάκαρ εὐδαιμὼν τε καὶ ὁλίβιος, Phaedr. 250 B. In Arist. Eth. i. 10. 14 εἰ δ’ οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιται ἐν ὁ εὐδαιμών (happy by ἔξις), οὗ μὴν μακάριος γε (happy in external circumstances), ἀν Πρωμηχεὺς τύχαις περιπέσῃ merely shows that a difference could be extracted between the words when pressed.]

344 C. φοβούμενοι—belongs to the first member of the clause only by a slight zeugma: ‘not because they dislike (e.g. ὁκνοῦντες) doing injustice, but because they fear to suffer it.’ The antithesis of τὸ ποιεῖν and τὸ πάσχειν is, however, better brought out by putting both under the government of one word, which, after all, is but slightly strained.

ικανῶς γιγνομένη—i.e. εἰ ικανῶς γίγνεται, ‘if it comes off adequately.’ Cf. εὖ, καλῶς, κακῶς γίγνεσθαι τιν. γίγνεσθαι often has the sense of ‘amounting,’ ‘accruing.’ Cf. inf. 346 c. That sense may be present here, i.e. ‘if there is a sufficient amount of it.’

τὸ δ’ ἄδικον ἐαυτῷ λυστείνον—‘whereas to oneself injustice is profitable.’ The common rendering, ‘injustice is that which is of advantage to oneself,’ is neither so apt, nor is it grammatical, in view of the absence of τὸ before ἐαυτῷ.

CHAPTER XVII.

344 D. ἡμῶν καταντλήσασ— the genitive ἡμῶν depends directly upon the participle, while κατὰ τῶν ὄτων is added for further definition. Cf. 536 ἐν φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλεῖον γέλωτα καταντλήσαμεν.

For καταντλεῖν of a deluge of words, cf. Lys. 204 ὐ, Ar. Vesp. 483 ἄλλ’ ὄταν ξυνήγορος | ταῦτα ταῦτα σου καταντλῇ καὶ ξυνειμότας καλῇ. Athen. v. 221 Λ δοκεῖτε μοι σφυροῖς καταντλήσθαι λόγοις. Similarly καταξεῖν (Legg. 800 ὐ) and ἐπαντλεῖν (Eur. Frag. 891). The whole passage is imitated by Lucian Dem. Enc. 16.

ἀθρόων καὶ πολύν τὸν λόγον—‘emptied his speech plump over us in a torrent.’ The adjectives keep up the metaphor of καταντλεῖν. Cf. the familiar πολὺς ἰδι, Dem. de Cor. 272 θρασυνομένῳ καὶ πολλῷ ἰδέωτι (of language), Hor. Sat. i. 7. 28 salso multoque fluenti. Their ‘predicative’ position is part of the idiom, i.e. as ὁ λόγος πολὺς ἰδι 80 ὁ λόγος πολὺς καταντλεῖται.
ütomeinai te kal parașxein...lōgon—either (1) 'to stay and render an account;' or (2) taking ütomεinai also with lōgon, 'to submit to argument and render it' = 'to give and take argument' like δοῦναι kal δέξασθαι lōgon. Cf. Hipp. Mai. 208 D ἄλλα ὑπομείνωμεν τούτων τῶν lōgon, Isoc. 171 C ὅμως δὲ ἐπειθῆπεν ὑπεμείνατε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους lōγους...καὶ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἀνασχέσθαι δέομαι. Perhaps these instances rather favour the latter rendering, which seems to have been generally overlooked. With the former might be compared Prot. 329 B περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

οἶον ἐμβαλὼν lōgon. The metaphor is most probably taken from hurling missiles. Cf. Prot. 342 E ἐνέβαλε ῥήμα διον lōgon βραχὺ καὶ διφθεραμένου ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοινοτήτης. Theaet. 165 D ἐλλοχῶν ἀν πελταστικός ἀνήρ μισθοφόρος lόγους ἐρµένου...ἐμβαλῶν ἂν ἐσ τὸ ἀκούειν...ἥλεγχεν ἂν, ibid. 180 A, Philoeb. 23 B &c. 'Having hurled into our midst.' There is a reference to the proverb βαλὼν φεῦγειν. Cf. Symp. 189 B βαλῶν γε..., ὁ Ἀριστόφανες, oiei ἐκφεύξεσθαι.

344 E. ἄλλα' οὐ βιὸν διαγωγῆν, ἢ ἂν διαγόµενος...ζωὴ—'and not the leading of a life—(I mean) by what manner of conduct one would live the most profitable existence.' It is better to treat ἢ not as ἢ διαγωγῆ, but as the adverb (=qua ratione).

ἄλλα' οὐ is regular for English 'and not' in such emphatic oppositions. Cf. 379 D, 492 A, 532 C (ὡσπερ χρηµατιστήν, ἄλλα' οὐ τοιµένα), Lach. 185 A &c. καὶ οὐ is, however, no less permissible. Cf. inf. 350 Α δοκεῖ πελεῖν ἂν ἐθέλειν αλέθιθαι...καὶ οὐ ταχτά.

διαγόµενος—much rarer than the active διάγων. With διάγεων it is possible to understand (1) χρόνον or βιον, (2) ἐαυτόν, 'to keep oneself (occupied).' But διάγεων ἐαυτόν may be expressed by διάγεσθαι, while the meaning is practically identical with διάγεων (βιον).

ζωὴ—properly differs from βιον as the physical existence differs from the course of life and its activities. Here also a 'rational way of leading a life' (βιον διαγωγὴ) is answered by 'getting the most profit out of existence' (ζωὴ λυσιτελεστάτη).

ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι κ.τ.λ.—'pray, do I think otherwise?' or 'do you mean to say that I think otherwise?' To which Socrates replies 'You seem to, or else to care nothing about us.'

This rendering is so simple that it is hard to understand why οὐτοι has been suggested for ἦτοι, and why the mark of interrogation has not been universally accepted after ἐξειν.
345 A. οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσται...ἐυφρενίτησι—‘any benefit you may confer upon so great a number of us will be no bad investment for you.’ The sense of κείσθαι, as applied to money or other treasure stored or invested, may be gathered from e.g. Soph. O. C. 1518 ἐγὼ διδάξω, τέκνον Ἀιγέως, α σοὶ | γῆρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσται πόλει, Hdt. vi. 86 εὖ ἐξεπισταμένῳ ὃς μοι κείμενα ἔσται παρὰ σοι σφα.

In connexion with ἐυφρενίτησι there is an allusion to the custom of the Persian kings, who recorded the names of their ἐυφρενίται for future recompense. Cf. Gorg. 506 c καὶ μὲ ἐὰν ἐξελέγξης...μέγιστος ἐυφρενίτης παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφει, Thuc. i. 129 κείσται σοι εὐφρενίσια ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ εἰσαι ἀνάγραπτος.

τὸ γ’ ἐμὸν—either (1) ‘I tell you my own feeling (or case), viz., that...’ cf. Sophist. 237 β τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν διὶ βούλει τίθεο, τὸν δὲ λόγον, κ.τ.λ., or (2) τὸ γ’ ἐμὸν is purely adverbial: ‘so far as I am concerned.’ Cf. Prot. 338 c ἐπεὶ τὸ γ’ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει, Hdt. i. 108 ἄλλ’ εἰ τοι φίλον τοῦτο οὕτω γλύνεσθαι, χρῆ δὴ τὸ γε ἐμὸν ὑπηρετέσσαται ἐπιτιθέοις (though this also is capable of being rendered as if τὸ ἐμὸν were the subject to ὑπηρετέσσαται).

ἐστώ μὲν ἄδικος κ.τ.λ.—‘let there be an unjust man, and let him...’

οὐ πείθει—sc. ‘he’ (the aforesaid successful ἄδικος), ‘such a man.’ This is more natural than to supply ‘it,’ ‘such a case.’

ταῦτ’...πέπονθεν—[or ταῦτ’?]—‘is in this state of mind’; v. note on 329 Α.

345 B. πείσω...ποιήσω;—since ἐνθά follows, these verbs are probably subjunctive.

ἐνθά—apparently a metaphor from putting food into another’s mouth. Cf. Ar. Eq. 716 sqq. κᾶθ’ ὁσπερ αἱ τιθαὶ γε στίξεις κακῶς | μασόμενος γὰρ τῷ μὲν ὀλίγον ἐντλῆσ | αὖτος δ’ ἐκεῖνο τριπλάσιον κατέσπακας. So ἐνθάσεις=‘mouthful.’

This form of ‘teaching’ is the last of which Socrates would approve.

πρῶτον μὲν—it is not necessary to look for a δε-clause to balance
the stereotyped πρῶτον μὲν, which here simply = ‘above all things.’
For the absence of the δὲ-clause cf. Aesch. Ag. 810, Supp. 410.

[Otherwise it would perhaps be permissible to take πρῶτον μὲν
as = μᾶλλον μὲν (‘if possible’), and to suppose that the regular
εἰ δὲ μὴ is here replaced by a clause with ἢ, i.e. ‘if possible, abide
by your assertions, or else... change your ground openly.’]

345 C. ὀριζόμενος κ.τ.λ. Jowett and Campbell say ‘having
at first defined the physician as the true physician you did not
think fit afterwards &c.’ But ὀριζόμενος is not ὀρισόμενος, and
must be synchronous with φου. Rather render ‘that, while
providing at the outset for the genuine physician, you did not,
consistently therewith (ὁκέτι), realise that you were bound sub-
sequently to keep to the genuine shepherd’; i.e. ‘while making
the proviso in the one case, you did not see that you would have
to make it in the other.’

οὐκέτι does not mean later in time, but following in logic: ‘you
did not carry on the principle.’ Cf. Prot. 321 ν τῷ δὲ Προμηθείει εἰς
μὲν τῷ ἄκροτολῷ...οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν (i.e. he could not carry
his boldness further and enter &c).

πιαίνειν.

So λ. A few inferior mss have the gloss παχύνειν, while the
common reading is ποιμαίνειν. πιαίνειν, being a rare word in
prose, was likely to be glossed, and no less likely to be corrupted (in
this particular context) to the similar looking ποιμαίνειν. On the
other hand it is not so easy to believe that a genuine ποιμαίνειν
could first be corrupted to the rarer πιαίνειν and then further
glossed into παχύνειν.

Here, as in 343 β, the main business or ‘art’ of the herdsman is ‘to
fatten’ his herds. The art of the ποιμῶν, which might be expressed
by ποιμαίνειν, is at least equally expressed by πιαίνειν τὰ πρόβατα.
In keeping with πιαίνειν also we have immediately μέλλοντα
ἐστιάσεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

ἰστιάσεσθαι. Davies and Vaughan inadvertently say ‘to give an
entertainment.’ This, of course, requires the active.
πρὸς τὴν εὔωχιαν — σε. βλέποντα.

345 D. τῇ δὲ ποιμενίκῃ... ἱκτορεῖ — see 342 β.

ἐκπεπόρισται — middle, otherwise the nominative βελτίστῃ could
not stand.

ὡς γ’ ἂν μὴδὲν ἐνδέχῃ τοῦ ποιμενικῆς εἶναι—‘that is to say, so long
as it lacks nothing of being (what it calls itself, viz.) ποιμενικῆ’
οὔτω δὲ ὡμὴν νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.—εἶναι is imperfect.
καὶ θεραπευόμενο—it is exactly in this addition that Socrates begs the question, implying that the subjects have to be brought into good condition. See note on 342 c. To him the king is ποιμήν λαῶν (Π. π. 85) in the Homeric sense.

345 E. ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἱδωτικῇ ἀρχῇ—For the position of τε in 343 c. ἱδωτική ἀρχή is any form of control (e.g. of the κυβερνήτης, λατρός, ἱππικός, ποιμήν) which has no reference to the body politic. 'And it is the same whether the position of governing be political or non-political.'

CHAPTER XVIII.

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς—i.e. τὰς ἱδωτικὰς (sup. d), as opposed to τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεωι immediately above. Socrates means such forms of control as λατρική (=ἀρχή σωμάτων), κυβερνητική (=ἀρχή ναυτῶν) &c. Cf. 342 c ἀρχοντὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς λαοῦ.

[The translation of Jowett and of D. and V., 'the common state offices,' cannot be got from the words.]

οὐδὲς ἐθελεῖ ἁρχεῖν ἕκών. ἕκών involves no tautology with ἐθελεῖ, which simply expresses consent, not desire. A man may 'consent' to hold office ἕκών (against his wishes).

ὦ σὺχλ ἄντοίσιν ὥβελαν ἐσομένην—the accus. abs. as in 426 c, Phaedo 109 b, Soph. O. T. 101 &c. It is combined with gen. abs. in 604 b ὦ σύ ὡς ὃ ἦλθεν ὁ ντός τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ...οὕτε ὁ ὀδην προβαϊνον κ.τ.λ., and similarly in Xen. Mem. π. 2. 13, Thuc. vii. 25 (fin.). Attempts to draw any real distinction between the two cases in a clause with ὦς are futile.

ἀντοίσιν. The 'longer' form, which in Attic literature mostly belongs to verse, is apparently chosen for emphasis (ipseis), though euphony may have had something to do with the matter.

The same explanation can be given of the other instances in the Republic collected by Jowett and, Campbell, viz. ξῦν ἄντοισι τοῖς κηρίοις (564 c), ἐμικροῖσι παθήματι (388 b) and θεοίσι μὲν (389 b). In μεγάλοισι τέλεσι (560 b) rhythm seems to be the chief consideration. In the treatise on the Laws they are frequent. That such forms were conversational is shewn by their free use in Aristophanes. In inscriptions they are rare after 444 B.C., though before that date they occur almost as frequently as the shorter forms. Meisterhans § 47. 7.

346 A. σὺχλ...μέντοι—v. on 339 b.

ἐτέραν—'different (from others)' = 'distinct.'

τὴν δύναμιν—'its faculty'; i.e. its special power towards a certain end. Cf. 532 λ ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις.
346 B. ή την ιατρικήν σύ... ή ἐάνπερ κ.τ.λ.—'or do you (σύ, cf. 339 ὅ) call the art of healing and the art of navigating the same? (Can it possibly be so?) or (is it not rather the case that), if you desire to draw strict distinctions according to the principle you laid down (viz. 340 ὅ), the fact of a navigator becoming well through the benefit of a sea-voyage will none the more make you call it (viz. the art of the navigator) an art of healing?'

διά τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν—the best mss give διά τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν, of which it is possible to take several views: viz. (1) (most probable) that the frequent recurrence of the phrase τὸ ξυμφέρον in the previous argument caused it to be inadvertently substituted here, (2) that ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ forms an adjectival qualification to the noun πλεῖν (=διὰ τὸ πλεῖν τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ), 'through the beneficial voyaging,' (3) that ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ is a phrase of the accus. absolute participle, i.e. the whole=διὰ τὸ πλεῖν, ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ, 'through his voyaging, it being beneficial to him,' (4) that διά τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ='through the fact of it benefiting him,' the participle being used as equivalent to the infinitive itself.

Of these (2) and (3) are exceedingly harsh, and will hardly be considered tenable in the absence of parallels. The last explanation...
might perhaps be maintained by those who are satisfied to quote e.g. Thuc. v. 9 τοῦ ἑρπαίματι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένουσι τιν διάνοιαν ἐξουσίων, vi. 24 τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τὸν πλοῦ ὧν ἑξηρέθησαν (where, however, it is easy to render ‘the part of them (the feeling in them) which desired the expedition’). Soph. O. C. 1220 ὅταν τις ἐς πλοῦ πέση τοῦ θάλαντος, Trach. 196 τὸ γὰρ ποθοῦν ἐκαστὸς ἐκμαθεὶν τέλων. The Thucydidean usage, however, is by no means to be regarded as a substitution of participle for infinitive. His τὸ δεδίκα, τὸ θαρσοῦν, τὸ βουλόμενον, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν are never the same thing as τὸ δεδιέναι &c. Usually they are accompanied by a genitive (e.g. αὐτοῦ, τῆς γνώμης) and are literally ‘the fearing part (of him, his mind),’ ‘the desiring part (of him, his mind)’ &c. In the strongest case i. 142 ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντες ἐξυνετάτεροι ἐσονται it is an error to say that ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶν could be substituted in exactly the same sense. Literally the words mean ‘in the non-practising quality (part of them).’ The passages quoted from Sophocles are very dubious (v. Jebb’s notes on each). A careful examination of each instance will shew that there is none analogous to the supposed use of τὸ ἔμμφερον here.

The second καλεῖς is probably future, which would be the regular tense in apodosis to ἔαν ψύχῃ γλίγγηται.

αὐτήν, sc. τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, to be supplied from the context in general.

καλεῖς μᾶλλον—οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον has been separated from its verb by the conditional clause, and it is forgotten that μᾶλλον has been already expressed.

346 C. οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὄφελλαν κ.τ.λ.—‘we accordingly granted (viz. sup. a) this much, that the benefit of each art is peculiar to itself.’

κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.—‘through their common use of some one and the same thing in addition (to their own art) they derive benefit from the said thing.’ ἀπ’ ἐκέλνου, sc. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τινὸς (which is μαθητική).

γλυκεσθαι—the regular word of ‘accruing.’ Cf. Xen. An. v. 3. 4 τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώστων γενύμενον ἄργυρον, Cyg. i. 1. 2 καρπὸν οἱ ἐξ ἄγελων γεγρώμενοι, Aesch. S. c. T. 20 ὅπως γένοιτο πρὸς χρέος τὸ δέ (which should be rendered ‘accrue to meet this debt’). The subject of γλυκεσθαι is τὸ ὄφελεσθαι τοῖς δημοφυργοῖς: ‘the benefit received by the craftsmen in the shape of wages which they earn accrues to them from &c.’

346 D. αὐτῇ ἐπομένῃ—‘naturally associated with it.’ Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 2. 7 τῇ ἄχαριστῇ ἥ ἀνασχυντία ἐπέτα. 
λῶν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς κ.τ.λ.—To make the position sound we must include in μισθὸς all such rewards and considerations as honour, position, self-approbation, &c. Τιμή, indeed, is specifically named later (347 b), and cf. τοῦ διὸ μισθὸς (347 a).

346 Ε. οἶμαι ἔγωγε—sc. αὐτὸν ὣφελεν τότε.
οὐδὲ ἄρχη.—For the fallacy involved in the addition of these words v. sup. 342 c (note).
In ἄρτι Ἑλεγον Socrates is referring to the arts, the idiosyncratic ἄρχαι of 345 ε. The application to τοιτικὸν ἄρχη is to follow.
Ἑλεγον μηδένα ἡθελεν κ.τ.λ.—The regular negative is οὐδένα, but Plato not uncommonly uses μὴ with verbs sentiendi et declarandi, e.g. ζηγοῦμαι, φημί, ὁμολογῶ. Cf. Phaedr. 242 b οἴμαι...μηδένα πλείους ἂ σε πεποιηκέναι, Euthyphr. 6 b ὁ μολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδέν εἰδόταν. Protag. 319 b ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ζηγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτῶν (i.e. οὐ-διδακτῶν) εἰλαι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστόν. Theaet. 155 λ φήσομεν...μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἄν μείζον μηδὲ ἐλαττον γενέσθαι. So in other writers, e.g. Xen. Mem. τ. 2. 39 φαίνην ἄν μηδὲν μηδὲμαλλ' εἰλαι παλάθων παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἄρεσκοντος. Soph. Ph. 1058 οἴμαι σοῦ κάκιων οὐδέν ἂν | τοῦτον κρατῶνεν μηδ' ἐπιθύνεις χερί. Soph. Ο. Τ. 1455 (after οἶδα), &c.

It would seem that the μὴ which is regular with ἄρνουμαι, ὁμολογεῖ &c. could hardly be kept from appearing in conversation after any other verbs of thinking or asserting, and already in classical Attic there are signs of the confusion which had become hopeless in the time of Lucian. The greater number of instances perhaps occur with φημί, but in any case the line between verbs with μὴ and verbs of cognate meaning with οὐ was too fine to be maintained consistently.

τὰ ἀλλότρια κακά μεταχειρίζομαι ἄνορθούντα—′and takes in hand the troubles of others as their corrector.'

Some critics might regard ἄνορθούντα as a gloss to explain μεταχειρίζομαι. It is redundant, since μεταχειρίζομαι itself = ′treat as healer.' Cf. 408 c λατρεῖ...τοιοῦτοι δοσὶ πλεῖστον μὲν ὑγιεινοῦ πλεῖστον δὲ νοσῶδεις μεταχειρίσαντο. But Plato is often even more redundant.

The word κακά is strictly suitable only to such arts as λατρεία, while for ὀλεθρομοίχα or κυβερνητικά some cognate word, e.g. πράγματα, must be supplied. As applied to the πολιτικὴ ἄρχη, κακά is appropriate enough, since Socrates is thinking of the ἄρχων κακά ἄρχων, as an organiser,remedying the evils of a social system.
347 A. κατά τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων—i.e. so long as he prescribes only what the principles of his art demand, with no eye to anything extraneous, e.g. money-making.  
δεῖν—like the infinitives just above, is in the oratio obliqua after ἔλεγον. That grammar is, however, probably confused with a false notion that δεῖν is dependent on ἕοικε.

Such a confusion is very common. Cf. Sophist. 263 D παντάπασιν ὡς ἐοίκεν ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις...γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής. Phileb. 20 d τὸδε γε μὴν, ὡς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖοτατον εἰναι λέγειν.  
Soph. Trach. 1238 ἀνὴρ ὃδ', ὡς ἐοίκεν, οὗ νεμεῖν ἐμοὶ | φθινοτε 
μοῖραν, Hdt. i. 65, iv. 5 ὡς δὲ Σκύθαι λέγουσι, νεωτάτον ἀπάντων ἐθνῶν εἰναι τὸ σφέτερον, Læsch. Pers. 188 τοῦτω στάσιν τιν', ὡς ἐγὼ 'δόκον ὄραν, | τεῦχεν ἐν ἀλλήλαις.

ἀρχὴ. For the singular after a plural, v. 344 B (ad fin.).

CHAPTER XIX.

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς...τὴν δὲ ἐξηλαυν—'for two sorts of payment I can recognise (viz. honour and money, inf. b), but the (payment which is a) penalty...I do not understand.'

The article τοὺς does not imply that the two sorts have been named, but is regular when a certain number is picked out and distinguished from the rest or opposed to some other number. Cf. Thuc. viii. 15 τῶν ἐν τῇ Πειραιῶ ἐφορμοσάων τὰς μὲν ὀκτὼ ἡδὶ πέμπειν...ἀλλὰς δὲ...ὑπερτον βοηθεῖν. 1. 116 ταῖς μὲν ἐκκαίδεκα τῶν νεὼν 
οὐκ ἐρχόμαιτο.

'Two sorts I recognise...the third I do not understand.'

ξυνῆκα—for aorist cf. ἔμαθον 339 a, note.

347 B. ξυνεῖς.

The question whether this or ξυνῆς should be read is one never likely to be settled. (ξυνεῖς would be imperfect, and is out of the question.) The best mss here give ξυνεῖς, as in Soph. 238 E, 243 B. Similarly in Ar. Lys. 895 and Eq. 717 the best ms. (Rav.) has διατηθεῖς and ἐντηθεῖς respectively. For other arguments establishing the 'thematic' form (*τίω) in the present see Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. ccxx, where it is remarked that 'the contracted second person singular, being unknown to late Greeks, was altered when possible into the participle, otherwise was converted into the imperfect or late ἤνης.' In the imperfect there is little doubt of the superiority of ἤνεις, ἤνει. The imperative is ἤνει only. [Inscriptions lend little help.]

tὸ φιλότιμον τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι—τε καὶ does not imply that the two qualities go together: rather='as the case may be.'
Cf. 332 d. For the sentiment cf. Arist. Eth. iv. 4. 3 τὸν γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέχωμεν ὑπὲρ καλὸν ἢ δεὶ καὶ ὅθεν ὅποι δεὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφίμευον, and ibid. iv. 1. 41 πάντες γὰρ ἔνεκα κέρδους ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσι.

οὕτε ... ἔθελοσιν ... οὕτε ... βούλονται. The distinction between ἔθελεν and βούλεσθαι is kept up here, as elsewhere in classical Attic prose. Cf. Gorg. 522 εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοι ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἔθελω λόγον λέξαι, Dem. Ol. ii. 20 ἄν οἶ τε θεός θέλωσι (‘consent’) καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε (‘desire’), De Fals. Leg. 348 οὔτ’ ἀκούεις ἠθέλετε (‘you refused to hear’) οὕτε πιστεῦεις ἤβούλεσθε (‘you wanted to disbelieve’). So in the present passage ‘they are unwilling to rule’ is followed by ‘they are desirous not to be called hirelings.’ In Protag. 309 β ἄτοτον μὲντοι τί σοι ἔθελω ἐπείν the thought is ‘I am willing to confess.’ Cf. Alc. i. 135 d.

αὐτοὶ...λαμβάνοντες—i.e. instead of waiting for it to be given.

347 C. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἔθελεν ἄρχειν—either (1) ‘compulsion must be brought to bear upon them and a (threat of) penalty, if they are to be willing to rule,’ like τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἔθελησεν ἄρχειν sup. α., or (2) ‘compulsion must be laid upon them and punishment, if they are slow in consenting (hesitate to consent) to rule.’ In the former sense μέλλω may be joined with present, future, or (less commonly, but certainly) with aorist; in the latter sense the future is inadmissible.

The change to ἔθελεν for ἔθελήσειν of sup. α. might therefore have a purpose, and the words ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν κ.τ.λ. correspond to ζημίαν εἰν μὴ ἄρχῃ of that context. Nevertheless the variation of the meaning of μέλλειν in two almost identical expressions so near each other is perhaps improbable. That the change in tense need have no effect on the meaning is clear from Protag. 334 d εἰπέρ ἐμελλέν μοι διαλέξεσθαι followed by εἰ μέλλω σοι ἐπέσταιθα in precisely the same sense. Cf. Alc. ii. 146 ε βιώσεσθαι...πλείων.

ὁδὲν κινδυνεύει...αἴσχρον νενοµίσθαι. The sentence is a remark by the way, parenthetical to the argument. ‘And that is probably the reason why the voluntary undertaking of office, instead of waiting for compulsion, has come to be regarded as unseemly.’ αἴσχρον must not be translated by too strong a term. It is turpe (‘ugly’), as the opposite of καλὸν.

Socrates may make the assumption more or less playfully, and it may be true of the attitude of certain superior minds, but we can hardly believe that the average Athenian actually looked upon office-seeking in the light of an unseemly proceeding. Moreover we should naturally expect ὡδὲν καὶ κινδυνεύει or ὡδὲν γε κινδυνεύει.
We may perhaps suggest an alternative rendering which materially affects the meaning, viz. 'whence it is probable that voluntarily undertaking office, instead of waiting for compulsion, is an unseemly custom.' For νενομισθαί in that sense cf. Ar. Nub. 962 ἐτ' ἐγὼ τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἦθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη νενομιστὸ ('was in vogue'): ibid. 1185 καὶ μὴν νενομισταί γ'. The adjective αἰσχρόν is then predicative; cf. Hdt. i. 173 ἐν δὲ τόδε ἑδιον νενομικασὶ, which would become in the passive ἐν δὲ τόδε ἑδιον νενομισταί. The same ambiguity exists in the same phrase αἰσχρόν νενομισταί Gorg. 520 e.

τῆς δὲ ξημίας μεγίστη—μεγίστη is an attraction for μέγιστον, cf. ἣ πολλὴ τῆς γῆς, τοῦ σιτοῦ τοῦ ἦμισων (Xen. Cyr. iv. 5. 1), τὴν πλειστὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς (Thuc. vii. 3). In Aesch. Ag. 1300 ὁ δ' ὅστατός γε τοῦ χρόνου προσβελεται should be explained in the same way. 'Of the penalty of which I spoke (τῆς) a very serious form (or 'portion') consists in being ruled by an inferior.'

ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἠθέλη ἄρχειν—αὐτὸς refers to an indefinite τιν with implied ἀρχεσθαι; 'if a man refuses to bear office himself.' Cf. 359 a ἐὰν ἄδικων (ἐκ τιν) μὴ διδῶ δίκην, Ἀριστ. 29 b ἡ (μανίά) τοῦ οἰκεῖται εἰδέναι ἄν οὐκ ἴδεν (τι), Gorg. 456 D τῇ ἀλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ τοῦ τοῦτον ἔνεκα δὲ πρὸς ἀπαντας χρήσθαι ἀνθρώπως, ὅτι ἐμαθε πυκτεύων, Crito 49 c, and elsewhere very commonly in Plato.

καὶ τότε—i.e. and when they do so take office. ἡρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν—cf. accedunt ad rem publicam. οὐκ ἔχοντες...ἐπιτρέψαί—' because they cannot leave the matter to....'

The addition of τῆς ἁρχῆς in some inferior ms is due to ignorance of the (sufficiently common) 'absolute' use of ἐπιτρέπειν='trust (things) to.' Cf. Gorg. 512 e ἄλλο ἐπιτρέπαντα περὶ τοῦτων τῇ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γνωσίζῃ, Hdt. iii. 81 Μεγάβυζος δὲ ὄλγαρχη ἐκέλευε ἐπιτρέπειν.

347 D. ρᾶς ὁ γυνώσκων—'every person of discernment.' τοῦτο μὲν...resumed by ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν in the next sentence, and answered by τολὸ δὲ...μεῖζον. Socrates has had enough of this point for the present, and turns to what Thrasymachus has said of the ἐδαμομοία of the ἄδικος and the troubles of the δίκαιος (sup. 343 v—344 c).

347 E. φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω—viz. 344 c ἱσχυρὸτερον καὶ ἐλευθερώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἄδικια δικαιοσύνης. ποτέρω...αἰρεῖ καὶ ποτέρων ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι;

The ms all give ποτέρωs in the first position, in the second the best shew πότερον ὡς, and a few inferior copies πότερον only. Ast's
transposition πότερον...ποτέρως seems hardly sound-principled criticism. Of the reading of the best mss in the second position we may take at least three views: (1) that πότερον is the correct reading, while πότερος ὡς is due to an emendation (ποτέρως), made in the belief that ποτέρως should naturally stand in both clauses: (2) that ποτέρως is the correct reading, but that the accent was misread and the copyist took the word as ποτερ' ὡς i.e. πότερον ὡς (v. Cobet, Var. Lect. p. xxvii.): (3) that πότερον ὡς is the original, ὡς belonging to ἀληθεστέρως. As, however, ὡς, though frequent with positive (ὡς ἀληθῶς) and superlative (ὡς ἀληθεστατα), is not found with comparative, the last view is less probable. πότερον and ποτέρως being equally possible, we may decide for the former on the ground of euphony.

εγώγε—sc. αἴροῦμαι.

348 A. βούλει σὺν κ.τ.λ.—ὡς follows πείθομεν, not ἐξευρεῖν (an order which would suggest deliberate contentiousness). ‘Shall we persuade him—if we can discover some satisfactory way—that he is wrong?’

ἐξευρεῖν, like Latin invenire, obtains later a technical meaning of discovering arguments. Here we should grammatically supply ὡς πείθομεν.

ἀντικατείναγτες—cf. inf. 358 διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βιον ἐπαινῶν, 367 ως δύναμαι μᾶλιστα κατατείνας λέγω, Arist. H. A. ix. 44. 4 ὁ λέων κατατείνας τρέχει.

In each case it should be noticed that the tense is aorist, the notion being that of a position taken up from the start; here, literally, ‘having drawn the rope tight’ (as in a tug-of-war). The literal sense is soon lost sight of (as in contendere), so that κατατείνας is practically equivalent to an adverb ‘with all one’s might.’

For other parts of the verb, as applied to vehement speech, cf. Eur. Hec. 130 σπουδαί δὲ λόγων κατατεινομένων, Xen. An. ii. 5. 30 &c.

ἀν...λέγωμεν λόγον παρὰ λόγον—cf. Hipp. Min. 369 ο ἐλ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὐτοπαράβαλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον.

διὰ αὐτό ἀγαθά κ.τ.λ. αὖ ‘on the contrary,’ i.e. as opposed to διὰ ἀγαθά διήλθε τῷ τοῦ ἄδικον (βλη) just above.

καὶ αὐθές οὗτος—sc. λόγον λέγη.

εν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν—‘in each of the two cases’ (or ‘conditions’), sc. εν τῷ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ εν τῷ ἄδικον.

348 B. δικαστῶν τινῶν—‘a kind of jury.’

αὐτός τε δικασταλ κ.τ.λ. The τε is trajected, as more often after prepositions or the article.
ρήτορες—not in the technical sense, which does not belong to the courts but only to the assembly. A well-known ρήτωρ like Demosthenes might often act as ἐννήγορος, but he is not called ρήτωρ in virtue of the latter function. The word here has its earlier general meaning (cf. orator and orare causam), i.e. ρήτωρ is simply the ‘speaker’ and stands as the agent in the scheme ἀγορεύω, ἔρω, εἰπω, εἰρήκα, ἔρρήθη, βῆσις, ρήτωρ.

ὁποτέρως οὖν σοι...ἀρέσκει. (1) an elliptical form of expression, putting a question in a milder tone. ‘(Will you be good enough to choose) in which way you would like to proceed?’ Cf. Lys. 212 c ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν; Euthyd. 271 A ὁπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾶς, ὃ Κρίτων; In fact the use of the ‘indirect’ interrogative amounts to an ‘if you please.’ We might supply e.g. βουλομένην ἂν εἰδέναι, or for the grammar simply αἴροι. In the familiar form of repeated questions e.g. Α. τίς ἐστίν; Β. ὅστις; the grammar is (ἐρωτᾶς με) ὅστις (ἐστιν);

(2) It is possible (and perhaps better) to explain the present instance otherwise than as a question, viz. ‘whichever way you like!’ i.e. ‘I am ready to adopt,’ or ‘let it be’ whichever &c., cf. inf. 353 c ἥτις αὐτῶν ἡ ἄρετή.

οὔτως—i.e. ‘in the way you suggest.’

CHAPTER XX.

tὴν τελέαν—‘omnes numeros habentem,’ ‘ideal.’ Cf. 344 A.

348 C. ἀρετὴν...κακίαν—see Introduction § 37 a.

εἰκός γε—sarcastically: ‘very likely indeed!’

ὁ ἡδιστε—see note on 337 D.

348 D. γενναίαν εὐθείαν—‘magnificent simpleness.’ No compliment is intended by γενναίαν, which simply=‘egregious’ (‘sublime’ Jowett).

The sense generous passes by metaphor into that of ‘fine’ or ‘prime’ in various applications, complimentary or ironical. Cf. inf. 372 β μάζας γενναίας. Legg. 344 ε τὴν γενναίαν νῦν λεγομένην σταφυλῆν ἢ τὰ γενναία σύκα ἐπονομαζόμενα, inf. 544 c ἢ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς (‘that magnificent thing, despotism’).

εὐθεία—cf. 400 ε ὁδι ἢν ἄνοιαν ὄσαν ὑποκορίζομενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθείαν. The change of implication in εὐθεία is illustrated by a remark of Thucydides III. 83 τὸ εὐθῆς, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλείτον μετέχει, καταγελασθέν ἡφαισθηθη, and by Xen. An. Π. 6. 22 τὸ δ’ ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸ ἄληθὲς ἐνόμιζε τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἥλιῳ εἶναι.
κακοῖθεναι—Socrates pretends to take εὐθεία literally, although he is well aware of Thrasymachus’ meaning. The temptation to score a point in passing is too great. “Then if justice is ‘good nature,’ injustice is ‘ill-nature’?”

At the same time the point is a real one. That εὐθεία could ever come to be treated contumaciously implies a tendency to treat κακοῖθεναι with respect. Thrasymachus may give the κακοῖθεναι another name, but Socrates interposes a caustic reminder of the unvarnished truth.

φρόνιμοι...ἀγαθοί. ‘Do the unjust seem to you to be men of wisdom and excellence?’ See Introduction. 

υφ’ ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. So Thuc. iv. 60 τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ σφάτ ποιεῖσθαι. The dative, however, is more common, e.g. Phileb. 58 A πάντα γὰρ υφ’ αὐτῆ δοθά...ποιοῖο. Sometimes mss differ, as in Hdt. i. 201. With the accusative the sense of bringing under is uppermost, with the dative the sense of the subjection itself, υπὸ τινι having become a fixed phrase accompanying any verb.

ἀποτείμονται—cf. inf. 575 in βαλλαντιστομώσι. The βαλλάντιον (marsupium) was a leather pouch hanging from the girdle. Thieves cut this pouch away (ἀπο-). Sometimes, however, the money was carried in the girdle itself; hence zona=‘pouch.’ Mayor on Juv. xiv. 297. In that case the girdle itself would be cut. Plaut. Trin. iv. 2. 20 sector zonarius. Cf. Gorg. 508 ε.

348 E. τοῦτο μέντοι κ.τ.λ.—‘I quite understand that,’ viz. that you are referring to the ἄδικοι in the grand style and not to the petty practitioners.

θαύμασα. For aorist v. έμαθον 339 A and note. Lach. 186 ὀ δὲ διαφέρεσθον ἀλλήλον θαύμασα. ει is not interrogative, but, as often after θαυμάζω, ἀσχένομαι &c., approaches the meaning ὤτ. ‘I am surprised at the thought of your putting...’

στερεώστερον—‘a more stubborn position (to take up).’ Otherwise ‘this is a stronger position (to attack).’ Either sense is involved in the notion of ‘firmer consistency.’

ὁ τι τις εἶπη. The deliberative subjunctive direct of the third person is comparatively rare, and mostly occurs in cases with τις, where τις is only another way of saying ἡγώ, as in Phileb. 15 ὀ πάθεν ὁν τις τειτη ἀρκεῖ τῆς μάχης; v. Goodwin M. and T. § 289. The deliberative indirect is less restricted. Goodwin M. and T. § 677. Cf. Protag. 348 ὁ περικύλ εἶπει ὃτι ἐπιδεῖξηται. Phaedo 115 ὃ καλ ἐρωτά δὴ πῶς με ὀρτῆ.

PL. REP. 11
349 A. ἣ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν—'which we were attributing to justice,' viz. in the general sense of 345 Α, 347 Ε, 348 Α. There is no express catalogue of praises ascribed in those passages.

τῷ λόγῳ ἐπέξεσθειν—a military metaphor, 'to come out to attack the position.' That this is the sense (τῷ λόγῳ not being instrumental) is seen from e.g. Prot. 345 ν οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ βήματι. Cf. 361 ν. Also immediately below the same sense is expressed by τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχειν.

349 B. δοκεῖ τι σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἐχειν, κ.τ.λ.—'Do you think the just man would be ready (ἐθέλειν, not so strong as βούλεσθαι) to have an advantage over the just man?' 'By no means, for (in that case) he would not have been the charming and simple person he is.' 'Well, (would he be ready to have an advantage over) the just action?' 'No, not even over the just one.' For the argument and the senses of πλέον ἐχειν see Introduction.

ἀστεῖος = lepidus. Cf. Phaedr. 242 Ε ἔτι τε ἢ ἐνῆθειν αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεῖα, Lys. 204 c ἀστεῖον γε, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ὅτι ἐρυθρᾶς, Ar. Nub. 1064 ἀστεῖον γε κέρδος ('a pretty piece of luck'). The meaning goes through the stages (1) 'town-bred,' (2) 'polite and charming,' (3) 'charming' (ironically).

ἀξιοῖν—v. note on εὐθοκιμοῖν 330 Α. In meaning the word corresponds to ἐθέλειν (sup.), and is accordingly opposed to βούλεσθαι (inf. c init.).

πλεονεκτεῖν—differs from πλέον ἐχεῖν as the habit or disposition of striving differs from the result. Whereas the δίκαιος does not think it right to have an advantage (πλέον ἐχεῖν) over the just man, he does think it right to claim (or seek) advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν) over the unjust man. The unjust man seeks advantage (πλεονεκτεῖ) in all cases.

ἀξιοῖν—it is conceivable that the mss reading ἄξιοῖ might here be indicative (as inf. c init.), but, in the light of the preceding sentence and ἢγαίτ’ ἂν in this, it is almost certainly optative.
CHAPTER XXI.

λέγωμεν—so best mss. It may be either interrogative, 'shall we put it thus?' or hortative, 'let us put it thus.'

Inferior mss have λέγωμεν, which, again, may be either a question or a statement of the position.

349 D. εί—sc. εξηκας.

πώς γάρ οὖ μέλλει...ό τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ.—either (1) 'of course a man who is of that character (viz. φρόνιμος καὶ ἁγαθός) must also be like people of that character, whereas the other must be unlike them'; or (2) 'of course a man of such and such a character must also be like people of the said character &c.' Editors generally choose the latter, but the addition of ὅν makes in favour of the former.

ὁ δὲ μὴ έουκέναι. ὁ δὲ, 'the other man,' is frequently thus written as if ὅ μὲν had preceded. For a peculiar instance see Theaet. 181 δ νῦν δὴ λέγω τοιῶ τε ἐδώ κινήσεως, ἀλλοωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.

This (the reading of the best mss) is both more idiomatic and more euphonious than the explicit ὅ δὲ μὴ, μὴ έουκέναι of some inferior copies (i.e. ὅ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτος ὅν, μὴ έουκέναι), which probably arose from an interpretation.

tοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος κ.τ.λ. ἄρα does not introduce a logical deduction (which would be egregiously inaccurate), but Socrates catches at Thrasymachus' word τοιοῦτος. 'Then (we are to understand that) each of the two is of the same description as those whom he resembles' [i.e. τοιοῦτος...(οἴοι ἐκεῖνοι οὐσερ έουκεν. Cf. Phaedo 92 B οὐ γάρ δὴ ἀρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις].

This formal admission, in which lies a fallacy, is required as a premise to the following argument (inf. 350 c). See Introd. § 40 a, g (iii).

άλλα τί μέλλει;—'Nay (why), what must be the case?' Cf. 332 c
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ἀλλὰ τι δει; 348 c ἀλλὰ τι μὴν; In such places τι becomes practically equivalent to τι ἀλλα, but it would be a mistake to suppose that ἀλλα is omitted. The thought is 'Nay, but what is it (if it is not this)ʹ In full Xen. Oec. 9 τι δὲ, εἶ μὴ...; (quid nisi...).

349 E. φρόνιμον—i.e. relatively to μονοική. τι δὲ λατρικόν; sc. λέγεις.
ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει κ.τ.λ.—which is a μονοική πράξις; v. note on 349 b sup. The one article, inasmuch as καὶ practically=ʻorʻ (ʻas the case may beʻ). Cf. 332 D. ʻThe act which consists in tightening or relaxing.ʻ

350 A. ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἡ πόσει—sc. which he prescribes. This sense is determined by the article, ʻin the food or drink (belonging to the special case).ʻ

ὀρίσεων—comes as a sort of emphasizing afterthought, τις having already been expressed. ʻIf any expect—no matter who...ʼ πλέω ἄν ἔθελεν αἱρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.—ʻwould be ready to adopt the course of either doing or saying more than another scientific man would do or say, instead of the same as his like.ʻ

αἱρεῖσθαι has something of the sense common with προαιρεῖσθαι and αἱρεσίς, viz. of adopting a policy or taking a line.

ἴσως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη—the assent becomes grudging as the consequences begin to appear.

ὀμολογεῖ μὲν...ὀμολογεῖ δὲ... Cf. Protag. 319 D ὀμολογεῖ μὲν τέκτων, ὀμολογεῖ δὲ χαλκεύς, Soph. O. T. 4 πῶς δὴ ὀμοῦ μὲν θυμαμάτων γέμει | ὀμοῦ δὲ παίανων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων. Latin similarly doubles pariter.

350 B. σοφός—i.e. in respect of his particular ἐπιστήμη.

ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἄγαθος; The usual Socratic position in any case, since ἄρετῆ comes of knowledge. Here, however, we have simply a laxity for the full expression of sup. 349 b οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἄγαθον;

350 C. τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἄγαθῷ—a good instance of the Platonic chiasmus is afforded by the reversed order τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἄμαθεί: cf. 328 ε.

ἀναπέφανται. Cf. sup. 334 Α. The word is used of that which turns up unexpectedly at the end of an argument. Cf. 487 B ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρῶτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.
CHAPTER XXII.

ο δή Θρασύμαχος κ.τ.λ.—'Thrasymachus, you must know,...'
The well-supported reading δέ is flat.

όμολόγησε μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position of μὲν shews that it was not intended to answer to ἐπειδὴ δέ,..., but to a thought which is actually expressed somewhat irregularly in οὐχ ὡς...ἀλλὰ ἐλκυμενος... The sentence began as if it would run ὀμολογήσε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, χαλεπῶς δέ καὶ ἐλκυμενος: 'he did acknowledge it all, but with reluctance.'

οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω—lit. 'not in the way in which I am now easily telling,' i.e. 'not in the easy way in which I am describing it.' The sense is practically οὐ ῥαδίως ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω.

350 D. ἀτε καλ. καλ belongs to ἀτε (cf. ὡς καλ, ὅπος καλ, ὅτε καλ &c.). 'Which was quite natural, seeing it was summer.' To join it with what follows 'since it was summer to boot (i.e. over and above his struggles) is to lose some of the irony.

τότε καλ εἴδων ἐγώ...Both καλ and ἐγὼ have their point. 'On that occasion I (moi qui vous parle) actually saw.' 'I saw with my own eyes, I did indeed....'

The punctuation of some mss (including Par. A) ἀτε καλ θέρους ὄντος τότε... must have been made in forgetfulness of the fact that the dialogue had only taken place the day before (vide init.). Also τότε is strongly opposed to πρότερον δὲ οὔτω.

ἐρυθρώντα. Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 297 A) and Hippocrates (Protag. 312 λ) are similarly seen to blush.

κελεύω—for τεθελεύω. See on ἐκείνῳ 328 c. 'Let it have been laid down,'='let it be taken as settled.'

ἐφαμεν—sc. 344 c and 348 e. Socrates with mock politeness identifies himself with the position of Thrasymachus (cf. 337 c ἐὰν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν κ.τ.λ.).

350 E. Δημηνορείν—'declaim': i.e. substitute rhetoric for dialectics. The word is used of ad captandum speeches, in which, by means of length and special pleading, the orator contrives to mislead the hearer.

Cf. Prot. 329 λ (with allusion to the practice of the sophists) ἐὰν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ρηθέντων, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἥχει καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἑρωτηθέντες δολικὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Gorg. 482 C ὡ Σωκρατες, δοκεῖσθαι νεανιῦεσθαι ἐν τοῖς
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taῖς τούς μύθους λεγούσαι. Cf. γραῶν θόλωs (Theaet. 176 ῆ), 'old wives' tales,' Gorg. 527 ά τάξα δ' οὖν ταύτα μύθος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὁσπερ γραός, Protag. 324 δ οὐκέτι μύθον σοι λέγω ἀλλὰ λόγον.

κατανεύσομαι. In the compounds of νεύω the future is middle in classical Greek, active in late writers. In the simple verb the classical future is νέυω.

ωστε σοι ἀρέσκειν κ.τ.λ. 'Just to please you.' The sense is 'I will nod or shake my head.' (S.) 'Do not do so against your real opinion.' (Th.) 'Very well; just to please you (I will nod honestly as I think). Pray what more can you desire (than such a nod, since you forbid me to speak)'

ἐπερ τόutto ποιήσεις—'if you are going to (mean to) do that.' Cf. Ἀρ. Αν. 759 αἴρε πλήκτρων, εἰ μαχεῖ ('if you mean to fight').

The more common expression would be ἐπερ τόutto μέλλεις ποιεῖν.
See Goodwin M. and T. § 71. Apol. 34 ν τί δή οὖν οὖδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; ('am going to do').

351 A. ὁποίον τι τυχάνει οὖν κ.τ.λ. For οὖν attracted from οὖσα to the gender of the predicate, v. sup. 333 ἐ, 336 ἂ.

οὐδέξι οὖν ἐτι κ.τ.λ.—some inferior copies have οὐδέξι γὰρ οὖν... from an objection to the asyndeton. οὐδέξι, however, is intended to be emphatic (cf. τότε sup. 350 ν), 'No one could fail to see it.'

οὔτως ἀπλῶς—'in this absolute way,' viz. by assuming the fact rather than proving it by logical process. The sense (like the order) probably differs from that of ἀπλῶς οὔτως sup. 331 c.

τόλιν φαίης οὖν...δουλοσαμένην. φαίης οὖν—'would you admit.'
There is no tautology in this account of the various steps of oppression. A city is unjust; it attempts unjust enslavement of others; it has succeeded; it keeps many (when once enslaved) in servitude.

κατα- implies complete success (cf. καταπολεμεῖν, debellare).

351 B. ἡ ἄριστη—explained by καὶ τελεωτάτα οὖσα ἄδικος:
'the best, that is to say, the one which is most completely unjust.'

ὁτι σος οὖτος ἦν ὁ λόγος—not 'that this was your position' = οὖτος ἦν ὁ σος λόγος, but, 'that this position was one you took up.' Cf.

Protag. 331 λ σος οὖτος ὁ λόγος ἐστι;

ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ—sc. τῆν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχειν.

εἰ μὲν ὁς σὺ ἄρτι ἑλεγεὶς ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, is the reading of the best mss. The authority for ὁς σὺ ἄρτι ἑλεγεὶς, ἐστιν ἡ δ. σ.
is much inferior. With ἐκεῖ there is plainly an anacoluthon of a kind very unlikely in so short a sentence, and it is possible that ἔστιν is an emendation to remedy the grammar. On the other hand it is equally possible to argue that both ἐκεῖ and ἔστιν are adscripts, and that ei μὲν, ὑς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἥ δικαιοσύνη σοφία (sc. ἔστιν) is sufficient in itself. With the next words ei δὲ ὑς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον we should then understand ‘but if (things are) as...

[ἐκεῖ cannot well have arisen from ἔστιν, and the latter reading may therefore be put aside, unless we are willing to suppose that Plato wrote ἐκεῖ, <καὶ ἔστιν> ἥ...]

If ἐκεῖ is not a gloss we may make grammar by inserting <ei> after it, with Baiter &c. (a reading which is cacophonous enough), or by inserting <καὶ>, or by omitting either σοφία or the whole phrase ἥ δικαιοσύνη σοφία as a note which has crept into the text.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

351 C. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν—‘Thank you’: ‘it is very good of you!’ Cf. Symp. 174 ε καλῶς γε, ἐφη, ποιῶν σὺ. The finite verb is to be understood from the preceding context; here εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν (χαρίζει μοι). Cf. Ar. Pax 285 (after ἀπώλεσαν αὐτὸν) εὖ γ’ εὖ γε ποιήσαντες.

In d inf. ἄλλα εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν the words to be supplied are to be extracted from the general sense of ἔστιν,... ''; soi μη δια- φέρομαι. Strictly speaking the phrase there has no grammar, but the sense is clear, viz. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν (οὐκ ἐθέλεις μοι διαφέρεσθαι). So Prot. 352 ε καὶ ἄμα, εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἔστι καὶ ἐμι σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μη οὐχί πάντων κριτιστον φάναι εἰναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. Καλῶς γε, ἐφην ἐγὼ, σὺ λέγων. The full expression occurs in e.g. Dem. Phil. iv. 141 ἥ τύχη καλῶς ποιῶσα (thanks to Fortune who) πολλαὶ πεποίηκε τὰ κοινά, and Ar. Pax 271 εὖ γ’, ὥς πότνια δέσποιν’ Ἀθηναία, ποιῶν | ἀπόλωλ’ ἐκείνος καὶ δέοντι τῇ πόλει.

In Plato γε is an essential part of the expression when it is used in replies (Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 7).

ἐθνος—‘class’ (cf. γένος). If the word is depreciatory it is only so from the context. Cf. 420 β δεῖς ἐν τι ἡμῶν ἔθνος διαφερούσως ἔσται εὐθαμον (i.e. of the various classes of a πόλις), Gorg. 455 β περὶ λατρῶν,... η περὶ ναυπηγῶν η περὶ ἄλλων τινὸς δημοοργικοὺς ἔθνους, Tim. 19 το μιμητικον ἔθνος. In Latin natio is depreciatory, as in Phaedr. ii. 5 est ardelionum quaedam Romae natio. Cf. Cic. pro Mur. § 69 natio candidatorum.
351 D. ἔργον ἀδικίας. Not in the meaning of its ‘special function’ (as in 335 D), a sense of ἔργον explained inf. 352 ε (init.). Here it is merely a function, or a result.

That injustice necessarily results in implanting hatred (εμποτειν is used of a disease sup. 338 ε &c.) is simply an observation from experience, assumed as an axiom. It is, of course, assuming too much.

οἱ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δοῦλοις κ.τ.λ. The first καὶ belongs to the sentence: ‘will it not also be the case that...?’ For the rest, there is no point in the usual rendering ‘whether among freemen or slaves.’ This, moreover, would normally be ἐν τε ἐλευθέροις καὶ δοῦλοις (cf. 343 c, 345 δ fin.). Rather we should render ‘in the case of (the relation between) freemen and slaves,’ ‘in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.’ Cf. 364 β περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς, ‘of the relation of the gods with virtue.’ The allusion is to 351 β, where the unjust state enslaves others. In a society composed of these two elements, where ἀδικία is present, μῶς and στάσεις will occur between the parties.

We thus obtain the three steps (1) ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δοῦλοις, i.e. between two parts of a society; (2) ἐν δυνατί, i.e. between two persons; (3) ἐν ἑνί, i.e. between two parts of a man.

351 E. ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις—‘not only to the just (to whom they are assumed to be necessarily hostile), but also to one another.’

ἐὰν...ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται. The notion of the individual at feud with himself is further dealt with inf. 444 λ, where στάσις and ἐπανάστασις μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὀλῷ τῆς ψυχῆς are expressions employed. There, however, the position has been led up to, whereas here the strange expression ‘if injustice occurs in an individual’ is sprung abruptly upon Thrasyvamachus. Thrasyvamachus assumes however that it has some satisfactory meaning, and therefore assents to the question, whereupon Socrates proceeds to explain what the meaning is and what conclusion results from it.

μῶν μὴ ἀπολείπει κ.τ.λ. ‘It will not lose its proper faculty, will it?’ The origin of μῶν (μὴ ὀνο) was forgotten, and since μῶν introduces questions expecting a negative answer, and μὴ also is employed in such questions, it comes about that μῶν and μὴ are sometimes combined. Cf. 505 c, Phaedo 84 c ὑμῶν τὰ λεγέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λελέχθαι;

[It is an error to suppose that in the combination μῶν οὐ the expectation of a negative answer no longer attaches to μῶν. Thus
in Sophist. 234 ά μῶν οὐ παίδιαν νομιστέον; πάντως τού, Aesch. Supp. 417 μῶν οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖν φροντίδος σωτηρίου; the combination = num non-putas, i.e. 'it is not the case (is it?) that we are not to consider (that it does not seem)...?''

ἡ οὐδέν ἡττον ἔξει;—sc. αὐτήν. This must be another half of the question, with punctuation as in the text: ἡ cannot be brought into the clause following μῶν μή.

toιανδε...τήν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.— well, the said faculty (which it is to retain in the individual case) is evidently something of this sort.'
oλαν, φ ἄν ἐγγένηται κ.τ.λ. If ποιεῖν (the easier but less supported reading) is correct, the construction is oλαν...πρῶτον μέν ποιεῖν αὐτῷ (sc. φ ἄν ἐγγένηται) ἀδύνατον πράττειν μεθ’ αὐτῷ, ετὶ δὲ (ποιεῖν αὐτῷ) ἐχθρὸν εἶναι εαυτῷ κ.τ.λ. ‘Such as, in the first place, to make it unable to act in concert with itself, and, furthermore, to cause it to be an enemy to itself.'

Some mss, however, (including Par. A) have ποιεῖ, which is certainly more euphonious immediately before πράττειν. If this is the genuine reading, we may either (1) suppose an anacoluthon, ποιεῖ being written as if ὠστε and not oλαν had preceded, or (2) eject oλαν and allow φ ἄν to begin a new sentence explanatory of τοιανδε. The latter course appears preferable. The sentence which results is neater, and the appearance of oλαν is easily accounted for. With τοιανδε fresh in his mind the copyist came upon ΩΙΑΝ (φ ἄν), which he might naturally misread as ΟΙΑΝ. It would soon be detected that φ ἄν was necessary to the sentence. When however φ ἄν was reinserted from the archetype, oλαν was left unexcised.

gένει—' set of men,' 'class.' Cf. έθνος sup. 351 c.

352 Α. έαυτῷ τε καλ τῷ έναντιόν ταυτί καὶ τῷ δικαλῷ—'to itself (i.e. inwardly), and to everything that opposes it, and (consequently, or necessarily) to the just.' Emphasis is laid upon the hostility to 'the just' both here and sup. 351 ε (ἄλλοις τε καλ τοῖς δικαλοῖς) because of the point which Socrates proposes to make immediately, viz. that hostility to the just means hostility to the gods.

cαλ ἐν ἐνι δῆ—i.e. to come to the application of the preceding statement. If the 'faculty' of δικαλα is what has been stated, then 'in the case of the individual also of course....'

dντων [έκστωσαν]—an answer made sullenly in view of the consequence.

[The proper Attic form of the 3rd plur. imperative is δντων, and Plato probably so wrote it. Later such forms were regularly
adapted to the shape then current, and it is often simply an accidental confusion with the genitive of the participle which has preserved an imperative -όντω in MSS where -έτωσαν would otherwise have been substituted. Metrical evidence is against the longer forms, except in Eur. Iph. Taur. 1480 (έτωσαν), and Ion 1131 (έστωσαν), where, however, the editors have something to say. Inscriptions do not shew -όσαν in either active or passive until 300 B.C. (v. Meisterhausn Gram. Att. Ins. § 61. 9), though the imperative in -ών is previously met with 111 times, among which ήντων itself occurs in B.C. 446 and 424, while an instance of έστωσαν is not met with till the 2nd century B.C. The Grammarians (Moeris, p. 13, Etym. Mag. 6. 56) lay down the rule ἀγόντων Ἀττικῶς, ἀγέτωσαν Ἑλληνικῶς. In Euthyph. 9 D MSS give πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθωσαν θεοὶ ἄδικοι καὶ πάντες μισούστων, but the second hand in B alters to ἡγείσθων. In μισούστων all agree. See some apt remarks by Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 327 sq.]

352 B. θεοὶ...έχθρός. Apart from the force of the two words regarded separately, there is a reference to their familiar sense, when θεοὶ—έχθρός is treated as a compound (whence the noun θεουεχθρα). θεοὶ έχθρός in that use involves a contempt which is the very opposite of the admiration which Thrasystratus claims for the ἄδικος. The same notion is brought home here.

ἐωξοῦ τοῦ λόγου: the partitive genitive (as with ἐσθείων, πίνειν τυόδ), no doubt assisted by the sense of ‘taking one’s fill’ (ἐμπίπλασθαι &c.).

For the comparison of discourse to a feast, cf. Lys. 211 c τι ύμεῖν αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἑστίσαθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτο τῶν λόγων; Soph. 251 B τοῖς νεοῖς...θοίνην παρασκευάκαμεν, Gorg. 522 A, inf. 571 D, and frequently in Plato. Inf. 354 A ταῦτα δὴ σοι...εἰσιτιάθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις. With the gen. as here Phaedr. 227 B ἡ δήλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Δυσίας εἰσίτια;

ίνα μὴ τοισδε ἀπέχωμαι. Thrasystratus sulkily pretends to believe that the audience is prejudiced.

ἀποπλήρωσον—combining the meaning of ‘satisfying the inquirer’ with that of ‘making the banquet complete.’ The object, being τὰ λοιπὰ κ.τ.λ., shews that grammatically the latter sense predominates; but for the former cf. Charm. 169 σ καμὲ τάχ’ ἂν ἀποπληρώσας ὦς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης δ ἔστιν, Polit. 286 A τὴν τοῦ πυθαγομένου ψυχῆν ἀποπληρώσαι, Prot. 329 c δ’ έθαύμασά σοι λέγοντος, τοῦτο μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπληρώσων.

ὁτι μὲν γάρ.... The sentence is unfinished, and the opening words are resumed in ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει (inf. Д). From οὐ γάρ ἀν... we enter upon a parenthetical note, which lasts down
to ...πράττειν ἀδύνατοι, and itself contains other parentheses. The outline is ‘for that the just prove to be wiser and better and more capable of action, while the unjust are quite unable to act in concert (...), this I perceive to be so, and not as you stated at first.’ ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕς φαμεν...τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν. This clause (still following δὴ) is slightly anacoluthic. Lit. ‘but in point of fact even persons of whom we say that, though unjust, they have at any time done anything vigorously in concert, we do not use the expression with entire truth’: i.e. ‘but when we say of people who are unjust that they have at any time...we do not use the expression with entire truth.’ Grammatically τοῦτο λέγομεν should have been e.g. οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθῶς λέγομεν τοῦτο πράξαι, i.e. ‘when persons of whom we say...we are wrong in declaring to do so.’ οὕς, however, is unconsciously treated as if it were εἰ τίνας.

352 C. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνήν κ.τ.λ. Literally, ‘but it is manifest that there was in them a kind of justice—one which prevented them from wrongdoing at one and the same time both one another and also those whom they were attacking—through which they accomplished what they did, and that consequently they set out in pursuit of their unjust ends with only a half-developed corruption by injustice, inasmuch as those who are wholly depraved and completely unjust are no less completely incapable of action.’ Thus the clause ἦ αὐτοῦ ἐπολει...ἀδικεῖν is an explanation in passing, while δὲ ἦν ἐπραξάν κ.τ.λ. carries on the main sense of the larger clause. The clause ὥρμησαν δὲ... is coordinate with ἐνήν τις κ.τ.λ. after δῆλον ὅτι.

μήτοι καὶ ἄλληλοις γε—‘at any rate not both one another and also....’ Cf. inf. 388 B πολοῦ δ’ ἐτε πολτῶν μᾶλλον δεσπομέθα μήτοι θεοῦ γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους...εἰ δ’ οὖν θεοῦ, μήτοι τὸν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν κ.τ.λ.

ἀδικιά ἡμιμόχθηροι—‘only half-depraved by injustice,’ opposed immediately by παμπόνηροι. Cf. Arist. Eth. N. vii. 10. 3 καὶ ἑκών μὲν, πονηρὸς δ’ οὖ. ἦ γὰρ προάλησις ἐπιεικῆς: ὡς’ ἡμιπόνηροι. The sense ‘only’ is obtained by emphasis upon ἡμι-. Cf. 333 e.

352 D. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. οὖν resumes after the digression; μὲν is answered by εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁμεινον ἡμῶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁμεινον ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ. Thrasymachus has strongly taken the ground that the ideally unjust man is made εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος (344 λ—c). In 347 e and 348 a the difference of view as
to which βίος is λυσιτελέστερος is brought forward as demanding detailed examination. In 348 ε Socrates finds that Thrasyteus takes up an uncompromising attitude in calling injustice καλὸν καὶ ἴσχυρὸν. He is compelled to refute this position, by proving that injustice is not καλὸν (being neither σοφὸς nor ἀγαθός), and that it is not ἴσχυρὸν (being incapable of single-minded action). He now turns back to the question as a whole—which life is the more profitable, in the sense of producing εὐδαιμονία? Socrates’ own summary of the course of the argument is given in 354 β.

τὸ άυτέρον—‘as our second question.’ The first question having been as to whether justice is ‘the interest of the stronger.’ See 347 δ (fin.) ε (init.).

φαίνονται—sc. ἀμείνον ἡμῶν (rather than ἴν, since the meaning is ‘they are shewn’).

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος κ.τ.λ. For the thought cf. 344 ε.

352 ε. ἀκούσας ἄλλων ἡ ὁσίν;—[For the form ἀκούσας v. sup. 338 δ κακουργήσας.] The loss of ἄν before ἄλλῳ would be easy, just as it has been lost from Par. A and other mss immediately below in ...μαχαίρα < ἄν > ἀμφέλου....

To say that ἄν is ‘readily’ understood from the preceding question is to ignore the repetition of ἄλλῳ. Thus in ἐσθ’ ὅτε ἄν ἄλλῳ ἰδοις ἡ ὁφθαλμοῖς; Οὐδαμῶν. Τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἡ ὁσίν; we might have understood ἐσθ’ ὅτε ἄν ἄλλῳ as common to both questions and capable of being so understood with a series of them. With ἄλλῳ expressed, however, and in its position after ἀκούσας, the case is different. Nevertheless an emphasis upon ἀκούσας, recalling the fact that ἰδοις had preceded, might suggest that ἐσθ’ ὅτε ἄν must be repeated, i.e. ‘Could you see with anything but eyes? No. Well, hear with anything but ears?’ Whether or not this is possible, is one of those questions about which scholars will differ. Goodwin (M. and T. § 226) accepts the ms reading here, and it is wiser to retain it. A case like 360 c οὔτω δὲ δρῶν, οὐδέν ἄν διάφορον τοῦ ἐτέρου ποιοίν ἄλλ’ ἐπὶ ταύτων ἵνεν ἀμφότεροι is, however, obviously much simpler. Cf. 398 λ for one equally natural.

A potential optative without ἄν at all is of course quite out of the question in Attic prose.

οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν...φαίμεν εἶναι. So Stallbaum for φαίμεν of mss. ἄν cannot belong to εἶναι, nor can it be joined with a present indicative: Goodwin M. and T. § 195. The one instance quoted, viz. Legg. 712 ε ἐ γὼ δὲ οὔτω νῦν ἐξαλφης ἄν ἐρωτηθεὶς οὕτως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω...εἴπειν shews an anacoluthon easily intelligible in a rather long sentence, but not so conceivable here.
CHAPTER XXIV.

353 A. νῦν δή—'well now...,' 'now at last' (nunc demum) [not, of course, as in 340 κ, where the tense is past].

πυνθανόμενος εἰ οὐ κ.τ.λ.—οὐ is naturally kept when εἰ is simply interrogative. The present instance is the indirect form of the direct οὐ τούτο ἐκάστου ἔστιν ἔργων; see Liddell and Scott, Lex. οὐ 
A 7 a, b.

οὐ is particularly common in the second member of such indirect questions. Cf. inf. 354 οὐ λέγωσα εἰτε (=πότερον) ἄρετη τις 
οὕσα πυγχάνει, εἰτε (=ἡ) καὶ οὐ. Soph. Aj. 6 ὅπως ἱδης εἴτε ἑνδον 
εἰτε οὖκ ἑνδον (where see Jebb’s quotation from Antipho de caed. 
Her. p. 131. 14). A collation of examples, however, warrants the 
belief that (to use Prof. Jebb’s imaginary sentence while differing 
from his explanation) in the second member of such questions as 
σκοπέω εἰ πρέπει η οὐ (μή) or σκοπέω εἰτε πρέπει εἰτε οὐ (μή) the 
choice is determined mainly by emphasis. The emphatic negative 
is οὐ. Thus the difference would be expressed by ‘See if it is 
becoming or not (οὐ),’ ‘see if it is becoming or not’ (μή). This 
distinction seems conversationally more practicable than the some-
what recondite discrimination between abstract conception and 
actual fact. Thus in Prot. 313 δ πολλά ἀν περισσεύσω, εἰτ' 
ἐπιτρέπτεον εἰτε οὐ (‘whether it is right to do so or not’)...followed 
by (β) οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιεί εἰτε χρῆ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτόν αὐτῷ εἰτε 
μή (‘whether you ought to do so or not’). Note in corroboration of 
this view that χρῆ ἐπιτρέπειν is substituted for ἐπιτρέπτεον.

δ ἀν η μόνον τι κ.τ.λ.—τι is subject.

κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων. This very common Greek idiom, the result 
of a confusion, is often supposed to have been deliberately imitated 
by Milton in his ‘the fairest of her daughters, Eve.’ The same 
confusion, however, is to be met with frequently in English 
writers, e.g. Sterne, Sentimental Journey (Calais) ‘of all others... 
the unfortunate of our own country surely have the first rights,’ 
and is daily heard.

353 B. ἄρετη. For the special meaning v. sup. 335 ἐ.

κωμεν δὲ ἔπλαντα—'have recourse to the same illustrations.'

ἀτων ἦν κ.τ.λ.—i.e. ‘did we not say that there was...?’ (352 κ). 

For the imperf. cf. Crito 47 δ ἀπαθερομεν ἐκεῖνο...δ τῷ μὲν 
δικαλφ ἐγγενετο (‘as we said’) τῷ δὲ ἀλήθεω ἀπαθλυτο.

ἐκε δή—So Gorg. 460 λ &c. ‘Stay now!’ Tiens donc. δή again 
implies that we have reached the vital point.

δηματα—a word used by Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and 
Aristotle, but not treated as current Attic by Aristophanes or the 
orators.
ἄπεργάσαντο—The plural is given in all the best mss. Cf. 503 δ, τὰ ἢθη...ποιεῖ ταῦτα...οπνοῦ τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται. There, as here and in other places, the insertion of a ν is palæographically easy to explain, but there are sufficient reasons for believing that even in prose the rule of attaching a singular verb to a neuter plural subject frequently broke down with its own weight.

The verb was apt to depend rather upon the thought than upon the actual word employed. In 503 δ the real subject of ἐμπίπλανται is the possessors of the ἢθη in question. In 365 β τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα... φανεν the subject is treated as if it were 'men in general.' Lach. 180 ε τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε...διαλεγόμενοι. See Jelf § 385, where the present case is explained as one in which ὀφθαλμοὶ (the word previously used) is in the writer's mind as the subject. How easily this might occur is shewn by such substitution as in Lach. 190 κε τυχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι ὄμη παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτιστοὶ ποιεῖ ἑκεῖνος οἰς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οὗτο ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ποιεῖν αὐτήν παραγίγνεσθαι ὀμμασίν.

The plural with neuter subject is found in epic and is especially frequent in Empedocles, occurs in Pindar and occasionally in Thucydides and Herodotus, often in Xenophon (though sometimes with discrepancy in the mss, probably due to editorial attempts to preserve the rule), and here and there in other writers. Jelf (loc. cit.) supplies examples, e.g. Xen. An. i. 2. 28 ἐνταῦθα ἦσαν τὰ Συμνέσων βασιλεία. Thuc. iv. 88 τὰ τήλη...αὐτῶν ἐξεπεμημαν. There is no truth in Porson's a priori canon, which limited the plural to cases with an animate subject; nor is it possible in most cases to regard the subject as a collective plural which is itself pluralized.

353 C. ἦτις...αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή—('I mean the special excellence in each case) no matter what the excellence may be': it is not our present concern to define these special ἀρεταί, but only to recognise that they are essential. The construction is ἦτις (= ἦτις ποτε, ἦτις δὴ οἱ ἦτις δὴποτε) αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή, (ταύτην λέγω). For the use of ἦτις cf. Ar. Ran. 38 τίς τὴν θύραν ἐπάταξεν; ὡς κενταυρίκος | ἐνήλιαθ' ὄστις (i.e. ὄστις δὴποτε ἤν). Crito 50 α εἰτὲ ἀποδιδάσκειν, εἰτ' ὁπος (= ὁπως δὴ) δεῖ δυναμάσαι τούτο. More fully Euthyph. 11 β εἰτὲ φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰτὲ ὅ τι δὴ πάσχει.

τῇ οἰκεῖᾳ μὲν ἀρετὴ...κακίᾳ δὲ...Both order and sense shew that the words τῇ οἰκεῖᾳ must not be repeated with κακίᾳ. Each thing has its own particular ἀρετή; there is no reference to its own particular κακία, but only to κακία in general. 'Thanks to its special excellence...but thanks to defectiveness...'

στέρομενα—The form στέρομαι (cf. οἴχομαι, ἦκω) frequently possesses the sense of a perfect. Cf. Thuc. viii. 1 § 2.
353 D. αὐτά—redundant (or resumptive) after τὸ ἐπιμελεῖος θαί κ.τ.λ. Cf. inf. 398 άνδρα δῆ δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμεῖσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἦμεν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν...προσκυνώμεν ἄν αὐτὸν. Eur. Bacch. 201 πατρίδος παραδοχὰς ἀς θ' ὀμφάλας χρόνῳ | κεκτήμεθ', οὖνδ' αὐτὰ καταβάλει λόγος &c. ἀποδοίμεν—'assign' (as belonging to its department), cf. Legg. 765 ήτις τοὺς κριτὰς ἀποδιδοὺς τὴν κρίσιν. See Cope on Arist. Rhet. 1. 7. 7 for the uses of ἀποδιδόναι.

ἐκεῖνης—for ἐκείνου, by an attraction (to the gender of ψυχή). There is a confusion of expression between (1) ἐσθι' ὅπω ἄλλῳ ἡ ψυχή...καί...φαίμεν...ἐκείνου εἶναι; and (2) οὐκοῦν (or ἄλλῳ τί οὖν ἦ) ψυχή...καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια...ἐκεῖνης εἶναι;

τί δ' αὐτό τὸ ζήν; That τὸ ζήν is ψυχῆς ἔργον is in one sense a truism, since the presence or absence of ψυχή means the presence or absence of life, ψυχή in fact often='life.' τὸ ζήν, however, has another meaning, 'the conduct of life,' i.e. the life which consists in the exercise of the faculties (κατ' ἐνέργειαν). Arist. Eth. N. 1. 7. 14 defines the 'function of a man' as ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, and says that it is the function of the σπουδαίος to carry on this life εὖ καὶ καλῶς. 'Virtue' in the soul (the special ἀρετή) enables life to be lived thus εὖ καὶ καλῶς.

353 E. εὖ βιωσται.—But, as has been pointed out in the last note, it by no means follows that because the soul performs well (εὖ πράττει) it also fares well (εὖ πράττει in the other sense).

354 A. μακάριος τε καὶ εὐδαίμων—v. sup. 344 b. δντων—[ἐστωσῖν], v. sup. 352 λ.

εἰστιάσων—cf. 352 b. σοι is the usual dat. of agent with perf. pass. Lit. 'let this have been the feasting done by you....'

υπὸ σοῦ γε—sc. ταύτα μοι εἰστιαται.

354 B. τοῦ ἄλη παραφερομένου—'the dish which happened to be (from time to time) brought on.' παραφέρειν, like παρατιθέναι = apponere, of dishes. Cf. Hdt. i. 119 παράφερον, τούτῳ προσέκειτο, τὴν κεφαλὴν τοῦ παιδὸς. The word is specially applicable, since it is also used of bringing forward arguments, cf. [Eur.] Iph. Anc. 981 λόγους παραφέρειν.
BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

357 A. λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι—not τοῦ λόγου 'the argument,' but 'that I had done with discussion.'

For τοῦ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς έσικε, προοίμιον. For τοῦ δ' ('but, as a fact'; lit. 'but on the other hand') v. sup. 340 D τοῦ δὲ, οἶμαι, ἐκαστὸς... οὖθεν ἀμαρτάνει (note).

For ἦν and ἄρα as familiar parts of the expression cf. 443 C τοῦ δὲ γε ἦν ἄρα,...εἰδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, Tim. 51 C τοῦ δὲ οὐδέν ἄρ' ἦν πλήν λόγον; Soph. Trach. 1171 καθόκουν πράξειν καλῶς' | τοῦ δ' ἦν ἄρ' οὐδέν ἄλλο πλήν θανεῖν εμέ. The two words may be separated, e.g. Symp. 198 D τοῦ δὲ ἄρα, ὡς έσικεν, οὐ τούτο ἦν τοῦ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιον.

προοίμιον—'a prelude (merely).' For the absence of ὁμοῦ n. note on 333 E πρὸς τὰ ἄρχηστα χρήσιμον. So here the effect is gained by a stress upon προοίμιον.

Γλαύκων. For Glaucon and his character see Introduction § 3 c. del te...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε.... For καὶ δὴ καλ... see 328 B.

ἀνδρείατος—cf. 368 A. For the use of ἀνδρείας in reference to moral bravery or pluck in argument cf. Meno 81 D ἐὰν τις ἀνδρείας ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν.
NOTES.

357 B. τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἁγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. There is nothing philosophically reconcile about Glaucou’s division of ἁγαθά into (1) harmless pleasures with no future results, (2) things pleasant in themselves and in their results, (3) things unpleasant in themselves but beneficial in their results. The classification is sufficiently exact for the character. It would be over-refinement to press the point that even ἡδοναλ ἀβλαβείς may leave good consequences.

[Aristotle (Eth. Nic. i. 6. 9) has ἰδιον νῦν ὄντι διετῶς λέγοντ’ ἄν τάγαθα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπ’α, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταύτα (i.e. goods desired in and for themselves, and a secondary class which are means to these). Ibid. 7. 5 he says that the chief good is εὐδαιμονία. ταύτην γὰρ αἰροῦμεθα ἵνα δια τάυτα (i.e. goods desired in and for themselves, and a secondary class which are means to these).] The second class of Glaucou.

καὶ αἱ ἡδοναλ ὀσαι ἀβλαβείς καὶ μηδέν εἰς τὸν ἔπεται χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται κ.τ.λ. This, the reading of the best mss., is sound and idiomatic. Greek habitually substitutes the personal or demonstrative for the relative in the second clause of sentences similar to the present. It is too much to say that καὶ δι’ ἂς μηδέν... is not allowable, but that form of expression would certainly be the exception rather than the rule. Cf. inf. 505 οἱ δὴ διόκει μὲν ἀπασα ψυχῇ καὶ τούτῳ ἐνεκα πάντα πράττει, 395 γ νῦν φαμέν κηδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοῦς ἄνδρας ἁγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, Enythd. 301 δ ἀρ’ οὖν ταύτα ἤγει σὰ εἶναι, ὡς ἄν ἄρξης καὶ ἐξή σου αὐτοῖς χρησθαι δ’ τι ἄν βούλῃ; Soph. Aj. 457, and see Jelf § 833. 2.

The negative μηδέν (rather than οὐδέν) shews that, despite the
change to the demonstrative, the force of the indefinite relative ὅσαι pervades the clause. The sense is καὶ δὲ ὅσας μηδὲν.... ἀλλο ἡ καῷ ἡμεῖς ἔχοντα. The words ὅ καὶ ἑρευν ἔχοντα might possibly be suspected by a certain school of critics. They are redundant and, of course, a little illogical: 'they have no future result other than enjoyment while one has them.' But neither of these objections amounts to much when we are dealing with a conversational style. The Greek use of ἄλλος is particularly idiomatic (χόρτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δινῷρα &c.). [An attempt to render καὶ ἑρευν ἔχοντα by 'keep on rejoicing' contradicts the bearing of the whole sentence.]

357 C. οἶνον αὖ: 'for example, again,' i.e. to give instances in this case as in the other.

eἴδος—'species.' From the general meaning of 'sort,' εἴδος in Plato may = 'genus' or 'species' according to context. Cf. Theaet. 148 D ὠσπερ ταύτας (sc. τὰς δύναμεις) πολλὰς οὕσας ἐν εἴδει περιέλαβες.

λάτρευσὶς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμὸς—'medical practice and other ways of making money' (or 'moneymaking in general').

There is no need, with Stallbaum, to call in the rendering 'and also money-making.' That idiom of ἄλλος is, of course, familiar enough, e.g. Eur. Med. 297, Euthyd. 273 A ὅ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσίδωρος (the Sophists) καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταί ἀμα πολλοί, Gorg. 473 C τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ('and foreigners as well'), Phaedr. 232 Ε &c.; but it is clear from what follows that Glauccon has in mind a benefit arising from the disagreeable exertion of λάτρευσις, and that benefit is the making of money.

tαύτα...ἐπίτυμον φαίμεν ἄν.—This construction of φημὶ (without εἰναι) = καλῶ is not very common. Yet cf. inf. 360 C καὶ τούτο μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἄν φαίη τις, Gorg. 481 C ποτερών σε φώμεν νυνι σπουδάζοντα ἢ παλίζοντα; Hom. II. viii. 153 ἐπερ γάρ στ Ἔκτωρ γε κάκων καὶ ἀνάλκιδα φήσει.

357 D. ἐστιν γὰρ οὖν...καὶ τούτο τρίτον: 'yes, there is this sort also besides the other two' (not τοῦτο τὸ τρίτον).

γὰρ οὖν in confirming = 'yes, indeed,' cf. Theaet. 170 A φησι γὰρ οὖν 'yes, he does say so.' In Parm. 148 c γὰρ οὖν δὴ is more emphatic still. οὖν in such connexion has its usual force, 'no matter (what the consequences may be),' 'anyhow.'

ἐγὼ μὲν οἴμαι...ἔν τῷ καλλιστῷ. (1) With this punctuation there is a slight irregularity of expression, it being necessary to supply αὐτὴν θετέαν εἰναι from τίθησ. (2) We may, however, treat
οἷς as parenthetical and expressive of a slight difference in deciding, i.e. ἐγὼ μὲν, οἷς, ἐν τῷ καλλιστῷ (τιθημι αὐτὴν). For μὲν without a δὲ-clause, carrying on the same difference of tone, see note on 334 c eἰκὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ. ‘I, for my part...’

358 A. οὖ τοῖνν δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.—‘Well, you must know, it does not...’ or ‘Now it does not...’

The absence of any qualifying or predicative word with δοκεῖ calls for remark. ‘It does not seem so’ would naturally be οὖ δοκεῖ τοιούτων, or οὔτω; or we should look for οὖ τούτων δοκεῖ (sc. τού eἰδους) or its equivalent.

It is therefore probable that δοκεῖ has the same value as in e.g. ἐδοξῆς τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, viz. ‘people in general do not approve,’ ‘they say No’: non placeat. In that case we may either (1) construe the whole sentence οὖ τοῖνν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλα (δοκεῖ) τού εἰπόνον εἶδους (τιθέναι αὐτήν), where the same words are supplied as with ἐγὼ μὲν sup.; or (2) repeat δοκεῖ with the personal subject (δικαιοσύνη) and understand eἰμαι with ἐπιτόνον εἴδους. (For laxity of δοκεῖ cf. 334 b.) The former seems much preferable.

The class-genitive ἐπιτόνον εἴδους is good in either case. Cf. 367 c ὑμολόγησα τῶν μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν εἰμαί δικαιοσύνην and 424 c καὶ εἰμὲ θέτειν τῶν πεπεισμένων. Eur. Bacch. 1317 τῶν φιλτάτων ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἀρετῆσθαι τέκνων.

μισθῶν θ’ ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπηθευτέον. We must join διὰ δόξαν ἐπηθευτέον, ‘to be practised because of appearances (and not for its own sake), with an eye to rewards in money and reputation.’ Δόξα as noun corresponds to the frequent sense of δοκεῖν ‘to be thought.’ See 361 b—d and 362 a for the part played by ‘having the name’ of being just.

[Another, but very unlikely, rendering would consist in joining εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν, ‘high estimation by reason of repute.’ The tautology is flagrant, and, though διὰ δόξαν is possible (cf. Gorg. 514 D η ἡδί τις ἄλλος εἰδι Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου?), διὰ δόξης would be expected. Apart from these objections (which are, however, sufficient, especially when the better construction is clear), the combination would be grammatical enough. Cf. 378 D ὁσµοὶ ὑπὸ νύεσ, Phaedo 99 b δίων ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 6 περὶ τοµαί κόσμων, Thuc. i. 18 1 τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἐλλάδος.]

εὐδοκιμήσεων—‘acquisitions of a good name,’ in various manifestations and instances.
CHAPTER II.

[ἀδικλα δ’ ἐπαινεῖται]—omitted in Par. A and some other mss. Whether the omission is due to homoeoteleuton with ψέγεται, or whether the words have been interpolated to complete the antithesis (cf. δ inf.), can hardly be decided.

ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τις, ὦς ἐοικε, δυσμαθής—‘but I am apparently a stupid person.’ Stallbaum compares Phileb. 23 δ ἐμι δέ, ὦς ἐοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοίος τις (‘a ridiculous creature’). Prot. 340 δ κακὸν ἄρα μοι εὑργασται, ὦς ἐοικε...καὶ ἐμι τις γελοίος ἱατρός (‘a ridiculous sort of doctor’).

358 B. ἄκουσον—ἐάν σοι ταύτα δοκῇ—i.e. ἄκουσον (καὶ σκέψαι) ἐάν κ.τ.λ. ; ‘listen and see if you will come to the same opinion (as mine).’ Cf. 434 λ ἵδε δὴ ἐὰν σοι, ὅπερ ἐμοί, ἐνυδοκῇ, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 12 σκέψαι ἐάν τὸδε σοι μᾶλλον ἄρεσκῃ, Cyri. ii. 4. 16 ἄκοντε τοῖνυν...ἂν τί σοι δόξω λέγειν, Hom. ii. xx. 172 γλαυκίων δ’ ἱδὼς φέρεται μένει, ἦν τινα πέφυη.

The notion with ἐάν (or Homeric αἳ κε) is that of trial or inquiry, in order to discover whether a result will turn out such and such, while with el the notion is of examining whether a thing is so (e.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 3. 37 σκέψαι el ὁ Ἐλλήνων νόμος κάλλιον ἔχει). Thus ἄκουσον εἰ σοι τὸδε δοκεῖ=‘listen and see whether this is your opinion,’ but ἄκουσον ἐὰν σοι τὸδε δοκῇ=‘listen and see whether you will come to this opinion.’

[A rendering ‘whether you will remain of the same opinion as now’ would require e.g. ἔτι δοκῇ.]

ἄσπερ ὁφίς κηληθήναι—i.e. your talk acted on him like a spell. The effect of an ἐπυθή on a serpent was to render it powerless, or even make it burst (Verg. Ecl. viii. 72).

αὕτο καθ’ αὐτὸ—with ἔχει δύναμιν, not with ἐνόν. ‘What faculty it possesses in itself by itself, when it exists in the soul.’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ should be read with stress.

ἐάν καὶ σοι δοκῇ: here, of course, quite different from ἐάν σοι ταύτα δοκῇ above. It is simply the protasis of the ordinary shape with an apodosis in the future. ‘Well, then, I will act as follows, if you have no objection.’

358 C. (πάντες) αὐτὸ...—referring to δικαιοσύνην. See note on 336 ε. In construction it belongs to ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, not to the participle, as the order shews.

αὐτὸ δρώστω—‘do it’ (the said thing)=‘do so’: le font. Cf. inf.
358 E.  

πολὺ γὰρ ἁμείνων ἄρα. The force of ἄρα is ‘after all’ (‘when you come to look at it’) = ‘as a matter of fact.’ Cf. 375 ὥσ ἐνοικίαν ὅτι ἐδώ ἄρα τοιαύτα φύσεις ολαὶ ἡμεῖς ὤν φήμην, 438 λά μήτοι τις ἁσκέσεως ἡμᾶς ὄντας δορυφόρης, ὥσ οὐδές ποιοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποιοῦ πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦν. The sense thus = ‘for (whatever may be urged against injustice on moral grounds) it is, after all,…’

ὡς λέγουσιν. The verb is emphatic: ‘so it is said; for I am not of that opinion.’

diatephulhmenos…akoúouν κ.τ.λ.—‘dinned…with hearing…’

A comma at ἀτα is misleading as to the construction. For one participle ‘subordinate to, or explanatory of, another’ (Jelf § 706. 2), cf. e.g. Apol. 31 ά τάχ’ ἄν ἄ κλιθομενοι κρούσαντες ἂν με πειθομενοι Ἀνύτω φραίως ἄν ἀποκτείνατε, Hom. Od. v. 374 καππεσε χείρε πετάσσας νηχέμεναι μεμαώσ.

358 D.  κατατείνας. See note on 348 λ (ἀντικατατείνατες).

εἰ σοι βουλομένω ἄ λέγω—sc. ἐστί. Cf. 370 ε ἄν ἄν αὐτοῖς χρεία (sc. ἐ), Thuc. i. 9 ε τῷ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριώσα (sc. ἐστί).

The omission would appear less harsh if an adjective e.g. εἰ ἰδέα ἄ λέγω had been written. σοι βουλομένω, however, is treated as such a predicate, being a frequent combination in the same sense. Cf. Phaed. 78 μ ὅθεν ἀπελπισμένοι ἐπανέθωμεν, εἰ σοι ἴδομένω ἐστίν, Hipp. Min. 363 β ε βουλομένω ἐστίν Ἰππίας, Ἁδ. ix. 46 ἴδομένωσι ἵμαί οἱ λόγοι γεγονόσι, Antiph. (περὶ τοῦ χρονετοῦ) 766 εάν ἵμαί ἴδομένων ἃ βουλήσομαι απολογίσθησαί, and, in Latin, Tac. Agr. 18 quibus bellum voluntibus erat. Sall. Ing. 100 uti militibus exaequatus cum imperatore labos voluntibus esset. So ἀσμένω, ἐλπικομένω.

358 E.  περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, *τί τῷ ὄντι* καὶ οὗν γέγονε δικαίοςύνη. The reading of the last clause is doubtful, but fortunately the meaning is quite clear. The position to be stated is given above (c init.) as δικαίοςύνη οὐν εἶναι φασι καὶ οὗν γεγονόναι, and inf. 359 λ the corresponding phrase is γένεσιν τε καὶ ὦσιαν δικαίοςύνης.

The best supported reading (Par. A &c.) is τί ὅν τε καὶ οὗν γέγονε δικαίοςύνη i.e. τί ὅν τε καὶ οὗν (ὡν) δικαίοςύνη γέγονε (with trajectory of τε for τί τῷ ὄν καὶ οὗν) ‘being what and whence, justice has come into existence.’ This is rather awkwardly obtained, and destroys the formal agreement of the expression with κ (init.)
and 359 A. The two questions are there equally prominent: 'what it is'; 'whence it comes.' Here the γένεσις is specially emphasized. No one can say that such a variation of phrasing is impossible, but, taken with the awkward construction, it appears unlike Plato's style.

Two related inferior mss have τί οἶνται καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, which may be set aside. The reading is obviously akin to another, τί οἶνον τε καὶ κ.τ.λ. of Ven. II. A little supported, but obvious (and almost certainly 'edited') reading is simply οἶνον τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, and τί οἶνον τε κ.τ.λ. may be a confusion of this and the τί ὃν τε κ.τ.λ. of Par. A.

We are thus, as actual texts stand, reduced to choosing between τί ὃν and οἶνον, or else determining a new reading from which all the texts may have been derived. We can, however, hardly start with the easy οἶνον and suppose the unlikely τί ὃν to have been derived from it, and even with οἶνον we cannot naturally supply ἔστι and preserve the formal agreement above-mentioned.

[The construction of a new reading is hazardous, but I have ventured τί τὸ ὃντι (sc. ἕστι) καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, 'what it is essentially (cf. ωὐσία 359 A) and whence it has arisen.' We should then look for the cause of the diversity in an old corruption of ΤΙΩΙΟΝΤΙ, which became ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΕ or ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΑΙ or ΤΙΟΝΤΕ. The substitution of τε for -τι (thanks to the following καὶ) would throw the rest into confusion. οἶνον τε is simply a scholar's easiest correction.]

πευκύκναι—emphatic: 'is naturally,' in its φύσις or ωὐσία.

ὡστε δοκεῖ. It is true that all the period is introduced by φασί, but Glaucon for the moment identifies himself with those who so argue and takes their words into his own mouth. It is quite in the conversational manner that he should speak as if the construction were ὡστε, ὥς φασί, δοκεῖ instead of what it actually is. With the new sentence he reverts to the dependent construction, i.e. ἀρξάσθαί (φασί).

It is surprising that anyone with an ear and a feeling for style should write (with Ast)...ἀιρεῖν δοκεῖν λυσιτελεῖν ἔυνθέσθαι...

ἀδικώσι—sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι, 'people.' Cf. Thuc. vii. 61 νομίζας, ὅπερ πάσχονσι ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγώσι, πάντα ἔργα ἐτι σφίων ἐνδεῖ εἶναι. This subject then runs on to ἀρξάσθαι following.

359 A. ἀιρεῖν—with the sense of 'catching' (in hunting &c.). Hence the opposition to ἐκφεύγειν. Cf. Tim. 64 B ταύτῃ γὰρ δὴ μεταδιωκτέουν πάντα, ὡσα ἐπινοοῦμεν ἑλεῖν.

For the doctrine (with the Sophists) cf. 344 c 0 ν γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀδικά ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβοῦμεν ὁνειδίξουσιν οἱ
It matters little whether we call the genitive possessive, or subjective (made by themselves), or objective (= ἀντων). These notions are indivisible in the Greek, 'appertaining to themselves.' Jowett and Campbell quote (as objective) Thuc. i. 140 τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα, but though the decree was, no doubt, πρὸς Μεγαρέας, the actual grammar is nothing more than 'pertaining to the Megarians.'

(2) with αὐτῶν. This admits of two renderings (a) with τίθεσθαι passive—'and hence laws and covenants belonging to them began to be established'—'began to be established among them.' This is less natural in itself, and is rendered altogether improbable by the necessity of changing the subject again at ὁνομάσαι: (b) with a neuter sense in αὐτῶν, i.e. 'they established laws and covenants concerning them,' viz. injuring and being injured (τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι), or, rather, matters connected therewith. So we might say 'they legislated about it.' [This rendering, though apparently overlooked, has much in its favour.]

τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα. The verbal sense is retained in the noun. There is no need to assume a mixture of τὸ...ἐπιτάχθην with τὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα. See note on 358 § εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ ὅδειν and the instances there quoted, and add from Stallbaum 390 c Ἀρέστε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμῶν, Xen. Cyr. iii. 3. 2 ἡδεσθαὶ τῇ ὑπὸ πάντων τιμῇ, inf. 366 § ἄρχειν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα.

ταύτην—for τοῦτο, by the usual attraction.

γένοιν τε καὶ οὕσιν. 'The origin and essence.' The one noun answers to δὴν γεγονέναι, the other to οἷν εἶναι of 358 c init. οὕσια=δ τυχώειν ἐκαστὸν δν (Phaedo 65 ν). It is similarly opposed to γένεσις in Theaet. 185 c, Soph. 232 c, &c.

ἐὰν ἅδικοῖν μὴ διδῷ δίκην—sc. τις. See note on 347 c ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἔθλη ἄρχειν.

ἀγαπᾶται—'is put up with,' 'acquiesced in,' a common sense of ἀγαπᾶν, as of στέργειν. Cf. 471 ν, 496 ν, &c.

’autó ποιεῖν—viz. ἀδίκειν. See αὐτὸ δρόσι, 358 c.

ξυνθέοσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδίκειν κ.τ.λ.—‘lay down as a compact the (said) principle of neither wronging nor being wronged.’ The article refers to previous mention, sup. Α (init.).

φύσει—as opposed to the doctrines of convention (νόμος). Cf. the antithesis φύσις πέφυκεν...νόμῳ, inf. c, Gorg. 482 έ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἀγείς φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, ά φῶςι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ κ.τ.λ.

CHAPTER III.

’autó—referring to δικαιοσύνην: cf. 358 c.

359 C. δόντες ἐξουσίαν...ἐπακολουθήσαμεν. The clause is in explanatory apposition to the expression τοιῶντες τοιῆσαμεν, and is under, or carries on, precisely the same regimen.

This construction, which is not rare after τόδε, τοῦτο and similar words, is well illustrated by Madvig Gk Syn. § 190. Cf. Phaedo 68 ε τί δέ; οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν οὐ ταύτων τοῦτο πεποίθασιν, ἀκολασία τινι σωφρονεὶς εἰσὶς; Gorg. 501 έ (η ἀνητικη) οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, τὴν ἵδουν ὁμοῦ διώκεις; Rep. 487 δ ὁράν...τοῦτο γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὐ ἐπαινέεις πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.

τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ. Plato’s style is marked by conversational fulness of expression for clearness’ sake. Here the words are by their position unmistakably an afterthought to explain ἐκατέρω.

ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν κ.τ.λ. οὖν = ‘well...’ the implication being ‘to cut a long story short.’ Cf. the use of οὖν after a parenthesis or digression.

Similar, but less conscious, because more stereotyped, is the Herodotean use of ἄν in such an apodosis as Π. 47 ἦν τις ψαύσῃ παριῶν υός, αὐτοῖσι ἵματοισι ἀπ’ ὁν ἐβαψε ἐσωτέον.

εἰς ταὐτὸν λόγον.—(1) ‘making for the same goal,’ while in 360 c επὶ ταὐτὸν λοιεν = ‘aim at the same object.’ But (2) Eur. Hec. 747 εἰ τολ μὲ βούλει τῶνθε μὴ δέν εἰδέναι, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἤκει, καὶ γὰρ οὖδ’ ἔγνω κλόεν suggests rather the sense ‘coming to the same
thing,' i.e. 'agreeing with,' 'meeting on common ground,' the opposite of διαφέρειν.

δ πάσα φύσις κ.τ.λ. δ, of course, has no reference to ταύτων in the phrase εἰς ταύτων ἱδώ ἡ. Nor is it strictly correct to say that its antecedent is πλεονεξίαν, although, so far as the neuter is concerned, there is no grammatical objection to that view: cf. Eur. Hel. 1687 γνώμης, δ πολλαῖς ἐν γνακίζων οὐκ ἐνι, Soph. O. T. 542 τυραννίδα | θηρᾶν, δ πλήθει χρήμασιν θ’ ἀλλοκετά, and (with a transition step) Legg. 937 ὑ καὶ δική πῶς οὐ καλόν, δ πάντα ἡμέρῳκε; Lit. 'through covetousness, a thing which....' As a fact, however, δ refers laxly to the sense, e.g. a πλέον ἔχειν understood from πλεονεξίαν. It is not πλεονεξία ('greed,' 'graspingness') which every φύσις διώκει, but rather 'gain,' 'advantage'; not the desire, but the gratification of the desire. Lit. 'because of the (vice of) greed: and this (viz. the satisfaction of greed) is the natural pursuit of every creature (as such).

τὴν with πλεονεξίαν does not look forward to the relative, but is the article familiar with abstracts. Jelf, § 448.

φύσις. From the sense 'nature,' and the variety of natures in different creatures, comes the concrete meaning 'creature as naturally constituted,' 'kind of creature,' or briefly 'creature.' Cf. Polit. 272 c μετά τε θηρίων καὶ μετ’ ἄλληλων ὦμλοντες καὶ πνευμόνιαν παρὰ πάσης φύσεως, and inf. 588 c τῶν τουτοῦν τινά, οἷον μυθολογοῦνται παλαιά γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἣ τε Χιμαράς καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου. In Isoc. 64 ν τῶν συμφορῶν εἰς αἰ τοιαῦτα φύσεις ἡμᾶς κατέστησαν Morus explains 'hominis hac indole prae- diti.' At the same time we should not miss the strong emphasis intended by the combination φύσις...πέφυκεν in opposition to νόμῳ (v. n sup.): 'every nature is—naturally, I say,—disposed....' νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται. The reading καὶ βία of some mss arose from forgetfulness that βία is simply the common adverb, while νόμῳ is instr. dat. Cf. 552 ε ὕστερελεία βία κατέχουσιν αἰ ἄρχαι (J. and C.). 'But is by convention forcibly driven aside to (=prevented and forced to) respect the claims of equity.'

For the thwarting of natural propensities by νόμος cf. Prot. 337 δ ὃ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὁν τῶν ἄνθρωπον, πολλά παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιαζεται. Arist. Eth. N. x. 9. 9 &c.

εἰ η δ’ ἄν...τοιαδέ μάλιστα, εἰ...—(1) 'and the power which I mean would be about like (μάλιστα = σχεδὸν τι, as often,) the following, viz. if...'; or (2), less well, 'and the power which I mean would exist most effectually in the following shape, viz. if....' The latter
would rather require e.g. ἐν δ᾽ ἄν μάλιστα...τοιάδε οὖνα. For another, though cognate, meaning of μάλιστα ν. 343 a. τοιάδε is explained by the following el αὐτῶς γένειον κ.τ.λ. τῷ τοῦ Λυδῶν προγόνῳ. The best mss give τῷ Γύγον τοῦ Λυδῶν προγόνῳ. The ring, however, is regularly known as the ring of Gyges, and inf. 612 b Plato expressly calls it by that name (ἐὰν τ’ ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγον δακτυλίον, ἐάν τε μή).

Cicero De Offic. iii. 9, 38, copying and to a certain extent translating this passage, has hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platonе &c.; and references to the ring of Gyges are frequent elsewhere (e.g. Lucian Nav. 42, Bis Acc. 21). The story of Gyges and his king Candaules is told (though with differences) in Hdt. i. 8 sqq., and Gyges, as founder of the dynasty of the Mermnadæ, is himself a πρόγονος of that dynasty (b.c. 716—546 and ending with Croesus), but there would not be likely to exist any story of his own πρόγονος. Inf. 360 b the finder of the ring τῆν ἀρχήν κατέσχε, and this makes him Gyges and no other.

A poorly supported reading, adopted by Stallbaum, is Γύγη, but this is quite ungrammatical for τῷ Γυγῆ <τ’ θω> τοῦ Λυδῶν προγόνῳ. Whether Γύγη is the mere adscript which originally caused all the error (Γύγον having arisen from it by adaptation to the following genitive), or is a correction of Γύγον by someone who saw that it was Gyges himself, or whether Γύγον and Γύγη were both adscripts by different persons (the one being wrong and the other right), cannot of course be determined.

It is best, however, to suppose that, in any case, the proper name is an adscript, and to render ‘the ancestor of the Lydian’ i.e. ‘the Lydian king.’ Cf. the familiar use of ὁ Πέρσης, ὁ Μηδὸς &c. for ‘the king of Persia, of Media.’ ὁ Λυδός is then used either (1) generically: ‘the Lydian’ = ‘the Lydian kings (in history),’ or (2) par excellence of the most famous Lydian, viz. Croesus. There is nothing unnatural in the use by Glaucon of such an expression: ‘the same sort of power which they say once came into the hands of that (famous) ancestor of the Lydian.’

In Hdt. i. 17 ὁ Λυδός = ὁ Λυδῶν βασιλεὺς. So iii. 7 πέμψας παρὰ τὸν Ἀράβιον, ibid. c. 9, vi. 49 ὁ Πέρσης &c.

359 D. παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι—viz. Candaules (Hdt. i. 8). παρὰ = ‘in the household (or service, familia,) of....’ ἰδέαν ἀλλὰ τῇ δὴ μυθολογοῦσιν—many (though not the best) mss have ἀ μυθολογοῦσιν. The reading of the text is obviously better. The construction is proceeding under the government of φασί, but at this point Glaucon wishes it to be understood that he does not commit himself to the truth of the narrative, in fact disbelieves it, but is simply repeating the old tale. Hence he
substitutes the deprecatory μυθολογοῦσιν for the neutral φασὶ. We should rather put it parenthetically ‘—so they romance—.’ In ἄλλα τε δὴ the δὴ is ironical.

θυρίδαι ἔχοντα—cuius in lateribus fores essent (Cic.).

ὅς φαίνεσθαι. It is debatable whether the qualifying ‘apparently’ belongs to the preceding νεκρῶν or the following μελίω κ.τ.λ. Its position is not decisive for the former. Thus in Lucian Nencym. 10 ὁ μὲν τὸ σκέλος, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι συντετριμμένος, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ἐκ τινος πολέμου παρώντες, and ibid. 17, the qualification refers to what comes after, and in Plato the phrase ὅς ἔγω οὖμαι regularly precedes rather than follows. On the other hand it may be argued that Gyges could easily see whether the body was of superhuman size, but not so readily whether it was a corpse, and on this ground it is probably best to join the phrase with νεκρῶν. Cicero has simply hominis mortui vidit corpus magnitudine insitutata.

ὅς φαίνεσθαι. The infinitive is explainable in two ways: (1) as restrictive (Jelf § 864), cf. 414 λ ὅς ἐν τῷ ποῖος ὁμός μὴ δὲ ἀκριβεῖαν, εἰρηνοῦσαι, Phaedr. 230 b ψυχρῶν ὄδατος, ὅς γε τῷ ποῖο τεκμήριασθαι, Hdt. π. 125 ὅς ἐμὲ ἐδὸ μεμνησθαί, and the frequent use of e.g. ὅς δοκεῖν, ὅς εἰπεῖν, ὅς εἰκάσαι: (2) as oratio obliqua for ἐφαίνετο, depending on the verb of saying (Jelf § 889 b). Cf. inf. 360 c ἐτελ...ἀδείκτω (Par. A), 408 c ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτῶν, 614 b ἐφι δὲ, ἐπείδη οὐ ἐκβησθήναι τῷ φυσικῷ, πορεύεσθαι. In Xen. Cyr. ν. 2. 4 ἀπῆγγελλεν τῷ Κύρῳ δῆτε τοσοῦτα εἰ τὴν ἔνδον ἀγαθά, δῶσιν ἐπι ἀνθρώπων γενέας, ὅς σφίζῃ δοκεῖν, μὴ δὲν ἐπιπείτεν τούτων ἔνδον ὄντος there is the same doubt as here.

τούτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὖδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον κ.τ.λ. is the reading of Par. A, while Ven. Ξ inserts φέρειν after δακτύλιον. The common reading is τούτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἐχεῖν οὖδέν κ.τ.λ.

The total may be taken as evidence that corruption had occurred very early, and that both φέρειν and ἐχεῖν are attempts at emendation by inserting the most obvious words. There seems, however, to be no reason why ἐχεῖν should have fallen out after μὲν or φέρειν after δακτύλιον. Moreover φορεῖν would be the proper word in the latter case. If ἐχεῖν was lost, it was more likely to disappear between χειρὶ and χρυσοῦν in the group ΧΕΙΠΙΧΕΙΝΧ. What was actually written by Plato is probably undiscoverable. It is, for instance, possible that περικεῖσθαι (‘to wear’ or ‘have about him’) was lost before περι..., the text thus being τούτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὖδέν <περικεῖσθαι>, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ κ.τ.λ.; but almost equal possibility attaches to so many other conceivable guesses that we
can do no better than retain the 'edited' text of Ven. II &c. with ἔχειν. Cicero has (freely) anulumque aurem in digito (sc. vidit), quem ut detraxit, ipse induit.

[For the version of Davies and Vaughan 'from which he took nothing but...' the necessary Greek would be τοῦτον δὲ ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χεὶρι χρυσὸν δακτύλιον <περικείμενου>, περιελόμενον ἐκβήματι. It would also be implied that he was naturally expected to take something.]

359 E. δακτύλιον. The magic ring is much in evidence in Oriental fable, and it should not be overlooked that the oriental horse also plays its part in the 'Arabian Nights,' as in the Indian stories of the Kashmir.

συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κ.τ.λ. Lit. (1) 'now a meeting having taken place among the shepherds—one they were accustomed to hold in order to report from month to month...': or (2) '...having taken place, one which the shepherds were accustomed to hold in order to...'; i.e. τοῖς ποιμέσιν may be construed with either γενομένου or εἰωθότος. The latter makes the more rhythmic sentence. No doubt the dat. is to a certain degree construed απὸ κοινοῦ.

[Editors before Jowett and Campbell seem to have overlooked the fact that ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν is to be taken closely with εἰωθότος (as above rendered), and not with γενομένου. It is not 'they met for the purpose of presenting their monthly report,' nor is it 'the usual meeting occurred' (D. and V.). The latter would require τοῦ εἰωθότος, and it is extremely doubtful whether ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μήνα could mean 'to make their report for the month.' The natural sense is 'to report month by month.']

tὴν σφενδόνῃ—properly the 'bezel' or 'collet,' the hoop holding the stone (σφραγίς). The stone is, as it were, in a sling. The transference of the word to the stone itself was easy. Cf. Eur. Hipp. 862 καὶ μὴν τύποι γε σφενδόνης χρυσηλάτου. Cicero translates by 'palam eius anuli.'

eἰς τὸ ἐῖσω. One ms has ἔσω, and therefore it is worth observing that ἐῖσω was the prose (and comic) form, while ἔσω is poetical. The metre of comedy makes for this view, and it is supported by Meisterhans Gr. Att. Insc. § 83. 14.

360 A. καὶ διαλέγεσθαι—sc. αὐτοῦς. For the change of subject see 333 c.

tῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι. The gen. as in 358 ἀ τοῦ ἐπιτόνου εἰδοὺς.

360 B. ὡς δέξεις—the reading of all mss. Whether it can
stand or not is one of those questions about which scholars are likely always to disagree.

That Glauceon is reporting the views of others can have nothing to do with the optative here, apart from the fact that if he were stating his own opinions directly, there could be no place for the aorist ἐδοξεῖν. He might say ὡς δοκεῖ and ὡς δόξειείν ἄν, or ὡς δοκεῖν (restrictive), but no amount of 'indirectness' could turn any of these into ὡς δόξειείν.

Views which may be advanced are; (1) that ἄν is to be understood from the previous oúdeis ἄν γένοιτο, as it is understood with ἀκούσαις (352 ε'), ἵοιν (inf. c), or in Aesch. Ag. 1049 πείθοι έν, εἰ πείθοι, ἀπείθοις δ' ἵσως. But in those and similar instances (e.g. Xen. Mem. π. 1. 18) the ἄν is omitted with a word which is in, and suggests, the same regimen with the word actually combined with ἄν: i.e. an oúdeis ἄν γένοιτο...οὔδε δόξειείν might afford to dispense with the second ἄν; but in the case actually before us the verb δόξειείν is not co-ordinate in construction with the verb γένοιτο, but is in a parenthetic and qualifying phrase: (2) that the expression ὡς δόξειείν is grammatical in itself. For this view might be quoted Ar. Av. 180 ΕΠ. πόλος; τίνα τρόπου; ΠΕ. ὡσπερ εἰποί τις τόπος. Eur. Andr. 929 πῶς σὺν τάδ', ὡς εἰποί τις, ἐξημάρτυνες; Editors are wont to condemn these examples, but it is curious that it should be the same colloquial phrase which occurs in each, 'as one might say,' ὡς δόξειείν may be equally colloquial, and both common expressions may date from a period when the optative was more freely used without ἄν (cf. ωκ ἐσθ' ὡποσ λέξαιμι and similar idioms). See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 241, 242. The translation 'as it might seem' appears quite feasible: (3) that the optative is irregularly 'assimilated' or attracted. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 558, 531. None of the instances there quoted are analogous to the present case.

[The second view appears sound enough to make emendation quite unnecessary. If there had been any need to correct the text, perhaps it would have been easiest to write ὡς δόξαι (restrictive infinitive), and to suppose that this was mistaken for the optative and re-shaped accordingly.]

ἀδαμάντινος—cf. 619 λ ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ δεὶ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχουτα εἰς' Αἰδοῦ λέγαι. The ἄρρητοι πέδαι of Prometheus are of adamant —the type of the unbreakable and unbreakable.

δς—instead of ὡςτε, after οὔτως. Cf. Hdt. iv. 52 κρήνη πικρή, οὔτω δὴ τῇ ἐνδόσα πικρή, ή μεγάδει σμικρή ἐνδόσα, κερνα τὸν 'Τιαν, iv. 28 (οὔτω...ἐνθα).

τολμήσειν—'steel himself to.'

360 C. οὔστινας βούλοιτο—the repetition of the same phrase
might be considered objectionable if it were not intentional for emphasis.

ὡς οὐκ ἄγαθον ἴδιον δύνατος—sc. τοῦ δίκαιου εἶναι, understood from the context.

ἴδιον—'to himself'; though it may be beneficial to the community (κοινῆ). Stallbaum quotes Eur. Heraclid. (init.) for the unjust man who is πόλει τ' ἀχριστός καὶ κυνικάλασσε εἴρης, | αὐτῷ δ' ἄριστος.

ἐπελ...ἀδικεῖν. So A. The ordinary reading is the less idiomatic ἐπελ...ἀδικεῖ. See on ὡς φαλνεῖθαι 359 δ for the common use of the infinitive in a relative clause in oratio obliqua. Cf. Hdt. v. 84 &c.

360 D. ὁ περὶ τοῦ τουτου λόγου λέγων—i.e. its advocate.
The sense 'about,' 'concerning,' is too flat.

With words of fighting περὶ introduces the object at stake, and hence often becomes indistinguishable from ὑπέρ. Cf. the Homeric ἀμώνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, Ar. Ran. 191 εἰ μὴ νεανιμάχη τὴν περὶ τῶν κρεών, and the expression περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τρέχειν. So with verbs of the sense ἀπολογείσθαι, where 'pleading about' often means 'pleading in behalf of.' Either sense is imparted here to λέγων, 'contending,' or 'pleading in defence.'

diὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβου—cf. Hor. Sat. i. 3. 111 Iura inventa metu iniusti fateare necesse est.

CHAPTER IV.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτῆν τοῦ βιοῦ περὶ ὧν λέγομεν—In 358 c Glaucn undertakes to speak after the popular style upon three points: (1) the nature and origin of justice, (2) the fact that it is practised under compulsion, (3) the superiority of the unjust life. The first two have been treated, and he here comes to the final question, the one which it is really vital to settle. Hence αὐτῆν, 'the actual (practical) choice.'

mss (if rightly reported) read περὶ, editors περὶ. ms authority is, indeed, of little account in the matter of accents, but editors have been hasty in condemning περὶ. The construction may very well be 'the actual choice of life in the case of those concerning whom we speak,' i.e. τὴν κρίσιν αὐτῆν τοῦ βιοῦ (ἐκείνων) περὶ ὧν λέγομεν (where ἐκείνων does not, of course, depend on βιοῦ, but is subjective with κρίσιν). The omission of ἐκείνων may appear harsh, but cf. Soph. Aj. 1050 δοκοῦντ' ἐμοὶ, δοκοῦντα δ' ὃς κραίνει στρατοῦ (i.e. ἐκείνων ὡς...). Similarly Tennyson ('Sir Galahad'):

'How sweet are looks that ladies bend
On whom their favours fall!' (i.e. on those on whom...)
With πέρι the construction is neater, viz. τὴν δὲ κρῖσιν αὐτὴν ἄν λέγουμεν πέρι τοῦ βίου ‘the choice made in the matter of life by those of whom we speak.’ Stallbaum quotes Phileb. 27 c κάλλιον ἄν ἵσος καὶ τὴν κρίσιν επιτελεσάμεθα πρῶτον πέρι καὶ δευτέρον, περὶ ὥν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιφισβητήσαμεν, a place which he rightly says is ‘simillimus.’ The copyists of mss were naturally led to connect the preposition with the genitive following.

The article in τοῦ βίου either (1) looks back to 358 c: ‘now for the choice as to the life (of which I spoke),’ or (2) = ‘the life (which results in the two cases).’

360 E. ἔδω διαστησόμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικωτάτου—sc. ἄνδρα, not βίον, as the following passage shows (...els τὸ έαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα). For τε...καὶ... in contrasts (‘on the one side...on the other...’) see note on 380 η μέσος...τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς.

tis oūν δὴ ἢ διάστασιν ήδη—This is Bekker’s punctuation for the earlier τις oūν δὴ ἢ διάστασις ήδη; In Phaedo 73 c λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόπων—έδω τις κ.τ.λ. there is the same room for choice as here; but in Legg. 780 λ τίνος δὴ χάρων ταῦτα εἰρηται; τοῦτο—δή τι κ.τ.λ. there is no doubt, and this, together with the Greek custom in conversation or oratory of answering one’s own question, makes for the punctuation given in the text.

tιθώμεν—‘assume.’ The sense ‘make’ (=ποιώμεν) only attaches to τιθέναι in poetry or in Ionic.

οἱ δενοὶ δημιουργοὶ =οἱ δενοὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν. For the sense of δημιουργός see 340 ε.


τὰ τὰ ἀδύνατα...καὶ τὰ δύνατα—the order of nearly all mss is answered, in the familiar Platonic chiasmus (v. 328 Ε), by τοὺς μὲν ἐπιχειρεὶ, τὰ δὲ ἑα.

It must have been ignorance of this figure which caused a couple of inferior mss (followed by Stallbaum) to reverse the order with τὰ τὰ δύνατα...καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. Cf. 431 Ε ἢ ἄνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία...ἡ μὲν σοφία, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία τὴν πόλιν παρεῖχετο. So Antiphon Tetr. 1. 3. 642 οἱ τε ἡςον κυδυνέοντες τῶν μᾶλλον ἐν φάσιν ὄντων οὐκ οἷόν υπὸν οὐκ μᾶλλον ἐπεβούλησαν αὐτῷ. τοῦτο μὲν (sc. the latter) ὃ τε φάσος ἢ τε αἰκία λκαὶ ἢν παῦσαι τῆς προθυμίας, τοῖς δὲ (sc. the former) ὃ τε κύνδυνος ἢ τε αἰσχύνη κ.τ.λ.

361 A. ἐσχάτη γάρ. Stallbaum quotes Cic. Off. 1. 13. 41
Totius autem inustitiae nulla capitalior est quam eorum qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur.

τῷ τελέως ἄδικῳ—i.e. subjectively: the man whose character and practices are ideally unjust. τῆν τελευτατὴν ἄδικαν—i.e. injustice with all external circumstances ideally in its favour (344 a). Cf. the expression ἐν βίω τελείω of Arist. Eth. N. i. 7. 15.

καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον—sc. οὔδεν: 'and no deduction must be made.' Cf. the absolute use of the opposite προσθεινα in 335 a and 339 b.

361 B. δυνατῷ—following δοτέον, the words καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον...δικαιοσύνην being parenthetical to the construction. δόσα—contained accus.: 'in all cases where force is needed.'

diá τὲ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ diὰ παράσκευην φιλων καὶ ὀνύσιας.

—The words ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην form one notion, that of his personal qualities; while φιλοὶ καὶ ὀνύσα are his external advantages. Hence diá τὲ... (...καὶ diά.... For the resources enumerated cf. Eur. Tro. 669 ἐννέσει ἑνεὶ πλοῦτῳ τε κάνδρείᾳ μέγαν.

θέντες—cf. τιθῶμεν 360 e.

κατ' Ἀισχύλον κ.τ.λ.—viz. S. c. T. 592 (of Amphaiaraus)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἀμιστὸς ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,

βαθεῖαν ἁλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,

ἐξ ἦς τὰ κεδνα βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

Hence ἐθέλοντα, for which strict prose would require βουλώμενον, since οὐ belongs to the stressed δοκεῖν—'not to seem, but to be.'

361 C. ἄθηλον οὖν, εἶτε...εἶ—see note on 332 a ἀποδοτέον...

ὀπὸτε τίς...ἀπαιτολη. We cannot supply ἐν εἶ, at least with the assumption that those words were actually intended to be understood.

ποιητέος...διακείμενος—'he must be represented (considered) as situated,' not = ποιητέος διακείσθαι 'he must be caused to be situated.'

βεβασισμουμένος—'tried as by the touchstone.' εἰς ='in regard to.'

Cf. Thuc. viii. 88 βουλώμενος αὐτὸν...ἐς τὴν...'Ἀθηναίων φιλῶν διὰ βάλλειν.

τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι—'by his refusing to unbend under ill-repute.'

The metaphor is of the softening of something rigid by moistening. Cf. Legg. 880 ἐν ἀτεράμοι πρωμένων τιν ψύχει καὶ μηδὲν τεγχθέντων ὡστε μὴ οὔκ ἐπὶ πάσαν ἐναι κάκην, Aesch. P. V. 1008 τέγγης γὰρ οὔδεν οὔδε μαλθάσσει κέαρ | λιταίς, and the adjective ἀτεγκτος.
τὼν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων. All mss have ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, which is, of course, defensible: 'brought on by means of it' (J. and C. quote Theaet. 200 e). But the confusion of ἀπὸ and ὑπὸ is among the commonest, and the phrase of 357 c and 358 a and n is most natural and likely.

ἀλλ’ ἱτω κ.τ.λ.—'let him go his ways unalterable....'

The best mss give ἱτω, an occasional late form of ἱστω, and ἱστω is actually read by Theodoret and Eusebius as well as by one or two mss of Plato. But ἱστω was very unlikely to be altered into ἱτω, and the ἱστω itself may with tolerable certainty be considered a correction of an earlier ἱτω, a false reading once common to all copies of Plato. The most natural emendation is Neukirch’s ἱτω, since it exactly suits the sense, and ἦ and ῶ were pronounced identically.

For the expression ἱτω cf. Soph. O. T. 1458 ἀλλ’ ἦ μὲν ἥμιῶν μοῖρ’, δοποπερ εἰς’, ἱτω.

CHAPTER V.

361 D. ὃς ἔρρωμένως κ.τ.λ.—'How vigorously you trim and polish each of them for the competition, as if he were a statue!' ἐκκαθαρίζεται is used of the removal of roughnesses and superfluous material and making the outlines distinct and vivid.

References to the art of the statuary were naturally frequent at Athens, or, indeed, anywhere in Greece. Cf. 420 c, 540 c &c. Moreover Socrates was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus. The tradition goes that he even executed works of sculpture himself (Diog. Laert. ii. 19, Paus. ix. 35. 7).

ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ—either (1) as in 349 a lit. 'to go out to grapple with the discussion,' or (2) λόγῳ is instrumental.

361 E. καὶ δὴ κἀν—lit. 'and, of course, even if....'

ἀγροικοτέρως—'somewhat boorishly' or 'coarsely.' In Aristot. Eth. N. ii. 7. 13 ἀγροικία (in the domain of παιδία) is the vice by defect in that of which βωμολοχία is the vice by excess, and of which τὸ μέσον εἶστρατησθήλα, viz. in τὸ ἑδύ. In life in general, he says, the corresponding exhibitions of τὸ ἑδύ are (1) the excess, 'complaisance and flattery,' (2) the mean, 'friendliness,' (3) the defect, 'contentiousness and quarrelsome.' Similarly here the position to be taken up appears to Glaucon to be Philistine and wanting in fine feeling.

μαστιγώσεται κ.τ.λ. For the form of future passive see note on φελῆσονται 343 n. δεδήσεται, of course, is not for δεθήσεται, but

PL. REP.
is the future of δέθημαι 'am a prisoner.' 'He will be kept in prison.'

έκκαυθήσεται.—So the best mss. Cf. Gorg. 473 c ἐὰν ληφθεὶς στρεβλώτων...καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάρτητος. Ἑάτ. vii. 18 ἑρμόσι σῶροςι ἐκκαλεῖν αὐτὸν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς. Inf. 613 ε ἕ α' γροικά ἔφησα ὅτι ἐστίν ἄληθή λέγων: εἶτα στρεβλῶσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται there is a distinct reference to the present place, and made in such terms that the very wording was evidently before the writer.

One or two mss have ἐκκοφθήσεται, and this is given also by Eusebius, Theodoret, and Clemens Alex. (Strom. iv. 7). A few have ἐκκοφθήσεται, for which the above mentioned ἐκκοφθήσεται was in all probability substituted at a date when (as is well known) the 'first aorist' passive forms had largely become obsolete in favour of forms of the 'second aorist' (e.g. ἀπαλλαγήνω αἰτήθω). We are thus confronted with an early divergence of reading ἐκκαυθήσεται and ἐκκοφθήσεται, the former having the better support. So far as the sense goes either is possible, both punishments being common. The more cruel practice is the more likely to be emphasized here. The pronunciation of π became that of the English f, and may have assisted, if not caused, the corruption.

[No argument can be based upon the passage of Cicero quoted by Lactantius (Inst. v. 12), which is simply a paraphrase of the general sense. The words in Lactantius form a good summary: Quaero, si duo sint, quorum alter optimus vir, aequissimus, summa iustitia, singulari fide, alter insignis scelere et audacia: et si in co sit errore civitas ut bonum illum virum sceleratum faci-norosum nefarium putet; contra autem, qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse summum probitate ac fide; proque hac opinione omnium civium bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique afferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat, postremo iure etiam optimo miserrimus esse videatur: contra autem ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes unique copiae conferantur, vir denique optimus omnium existimatione et dignissimus omni fortuna optima inducitur; quis tandem erit tam demens qui dubitet utrum se esse malit?]
σχισώ-ύλος (cf. κειρ-ύλος &c). σχισώδιλης is quoted by Galen from Hippocrates.

The meaning is the same as in ἀνασκολοπίζω, 'impale,' and hence the gloss ἀνασκολοπισθήσεται in one ms. In Gorg. 473 c ἀνασταυρώθη is substituted.

ἐθελαν—quoted. See on ἐθέλωντα 361 π. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀισχύλου κ.τ.λ.—'and, as a matter of fact (or 'after all'), it is, it seems, much truer to apply the saying of Aeschylus to the unjust man.'

ἡ ἄρα might be taken literally 'it was (when Aeschylus was saying it) a sounder thing to say of the unjust man,' in which case ἡ (like ἐρήν, ἐδεί &c.) stands where ἢ ἂν might have stood. But it is best to assume the usual idiom of ἡ ἄρα (Goodwin M. and T. 39) of a fact which had 'previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood.'

Whether τὸ τοῦ Ἀισχύλου is subject to ὀρθότερον ἢ λέγειν (like ἢ πόλις χαλεπῇ ἢ λαβεῖν), or is the object in ὀρθότερον ἢ λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Ἀισχύλου, can hardly be determined, but the former reads more naturally.

κατὰ τοῦ ἄδικου. It is a mistake to suppose that (λέγειν) κατὰ must always mean 'to the disadvantage of...'. Cf. Phaedr. 260 β συντιθέει λόγον ἐπαινον κατὰ τοῦ δινοῦ, Dem. Phil. π. 6. 9 μεγιστῶν ἐστι καθ' ύμων εγκώμιον. In a neutral sense Soph. 253 β καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τοιαύτα εὐρήσομεν ἑτέρα, Symp. 193 c λέγω δ' οὖν ἐγώγη καθ' ἀπάντων καὶ ἀνθρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν κ.τ.λ.

ἀληθέα ἐχόμενον—v. 329 λ. He practises his injustices because he is in earnest about them: he does not sham injustice. In being unjust he is not so for the sake of any good name it can bring him (οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ἔωντα). The inversion is humorous: the unjust man makes no parade of his injustice, he is quite willing to be, and not seem, unjust,—to be honestly unjust, even though the world knows it not.

ἀληθέας = 'genuineness.'

362 β. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν...δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι. The dative depends on βλαστάνει, with which αὐτῷ is to be supplied: i.e. ἐκ Ἱσ βλαστάνει (αὐτῷ) τὰ κενὰ βουλεύματα, viz. πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The series of advantages (ἄρχειν, γαμεῖν, &c.) are explanatory of βουλεύματα, with the difference that the sense 'good counsels' passes into that of 'results of good counsels.' A poetical quotation
brought into prose is treated with some liberty as to its precise meaning and its bearing on the construction.

γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἀν βούληται—'to marry a wife from whatever family he chooses.' The same expression occurs in 613 D. ὁπόθεν = ἕξ (ἁφ', παρ') ὄν. Cf. Eur. And. 974 ὃς φίλων μὲν ἂν | γῆμαιρι' ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν, ἐκτοθεν δ' οὐ ῥᾶδως, Rhes. 168 οὐκ ἔξ ἐμαυτοῦ μειζόνων γαμεῖν θέλω, Aesch. Suppl. 227 τῶς δ' ἂν γαμών ἀκούσαν ἀκοντος πάρα | ἀγνός γένοιτ' ἂν; Plat. Polit. 310 c κατὰ δόναμιν γαμοῦσι τε παρὰ τούτων καὶ τᾶς ἐκδομένας παρ' ἀυτῶν εἰς τούτους ἐκκέμπουν τάλιν. For ὁπόθεν of persons cf. Hor. Od. i. 12. 17 unde (= a quo) nil maius generatur ipso.

ἐκδιδόναι, sc. τὰς θυγατέρας. For the whole expression cf. Thuc. viii. 21 οὕτε ἐκδοίναι οὐδ' ἄγαγέθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐσ ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξήν.

εὐμπλαύνειν, κοινωνεῖν—cf. εὐμπλάλται...κοινωνήματα 333 λ (note). οἷς ἂν Θέλη. Though ἐθέλειν and βούλεσθαι are not synonyms (347 b) there must be many cases in which either might be used. 'Anyone he desires' and 'anyone he likes' may therefore be interchanged for the sake of variety. The same device is adopted in 613 D ἄρχουσι τε ἂν βούλωσαν τᾶς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσι τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωσαν, ἐκδίδοσι τε εἰς οὖς ἂν ἐθέλωσι.

παρὰ τάυτα πάντα—'all the time' (as in παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον, βίου &c.). Cf. 424 b ὅπως ἂν...παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι.

[Other possible renderings are (a) 'besides all these advantages.' Cf. 337 D, Phaedo 74 λ παρὰ τάυτα πάντα ὑπερὸν τι. (In its ultimate analysis this is identical with the foregoing, the sense being 'withal'): (b) 'because of all this.' See L. and S. παρὰ c. i. 6.]

κερδαίνοντα—with ὀφελείσθαι, = τῷ κερδαίνει. Cf. Thuc. ii. 39 ὅ μή κρυφθέν ἂν τις τῶν πολεμιῶν ἠδὼν ὀφεληθεὶ (i.e. ὧφ. τῷ ἠδίεν). The accus. participle is equally allowable with the dative δοκοῦντι (sup.). The construction is βλαστάνει αὐτῷ (τῷ) ὀφελείσθαι—κερδαίνοντα, which is interchangeable with βλ. αὐτῷ, κερδαίνοντι, ὀφελείσθαι.

It is otherwise possible to explain it as dependent on φήσοντι, but the reversion to that construction begins better with the next sentence (introduced by τοῖνυν).

εἰς ἄγωνας τοῖνυν ἐόντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία: 'and accordingly (i.e. in consequence of his resources) he is victorious in all his conflicts public and private,' i.e. in law-suits brought by or against him, whether as private δίκαι or public γραφεῖ.

εἰς ἄγωνας ἐόντα echoes the technical phrase εἰσεῖδον δικην.
362 C. ἰκανὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὸς: καὶ is corrective, 'nay.' ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον κ.τ.λ.: 'so that also (i.e. in addition to his being more favoured by men) he will naturally be more favoured by heaven.' Contrast the position with that arrived at by Socrates in 352 b. θεοφιλέστερον...μάλλον. μάλλον (though in any case redundant) is perhaps not to be joined immediately with θεοφιλέστερον, but with προσήκειν: lit. 'it is rather to be expected, so far as probability goes, that he will be more favoured by heaven than the just man.' In Gorg. 487 b ἀισχυντηροτέρω μάλλον τοῦ δέοντος='rather bashful, more than they ought to be.'

There is, however, no doubt that (as in Elizabethan English) double comparatives are frequent without any such excuse, cf. Phaedo 79 ε ὄλος καὶ παντὶ ὁμοίωτερον ἄτι ψυχὴ τῷ δὲ ὀφαντῶς ἐχωτι μάλλον ἡ τῷ μη. In Attic prose such cases generally shew μάλλον separated by some interval from the comparative, as here, Xen. Cyrt. iii. 3. 51 αἰρετῶτερον ἐκτὶ μαχομένους ἀποθησάκει μαλλόν ἡ φεύγοντας σφιέσθαι, and frequently elsewhere; but in Legg. 781 A λαθραίωτερον μάλλον occurs, and in verse the juxtaposition is common, e.g. Aesch. S. c. T. 673 τίς ἄλλος μάλλον ἐνδικώτερος; Suppl. 279, &c.

For προσήκειν, of appropriateness to the circumstances, see 332 b.

CHAPTER VI.

362 D. ἄλλα τῇ μήν;—'pray, why not?' See note on 349 τ ἄλλα τῇ μέλλει.

αὐτὸ...οὐκ εἰρηταί κ.τ.λ.—The clause δ Μάλιστα ἐδει ῥηθήναι is an explanatory amplification of αὐτὸ ('the very thing'), so that while the whole practically = αὐτὸ τὸ μάλιστα δεδεμένον ῥηθήναι in point of sense, the grammar is somewhat different.

It is not αὐτὸ τοῦτο δ μάλιστα ἐδει ῥηθήναι, and Stallbaum is wrong in treating αὐτὸ as ' id ipsum.' Rather αὐτὸ οὐκ εἰρηταί is complete in itself: οἱ τὸν 'the very (or 'essential') thing has not been said.' The relative clause amounts to 'I mean, what it was most essential to say.' Cf. Charm. 166 ε ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἤκεισ ἔρευνον, ὅτε διαφέρει: 'You have got to the vital point, namely,...', which, again, is not grammatically the same as ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.

to λεγόμενον.—For this absolute so-called accusative in apposition to the sentence see Jelf § 580. Cf. 422 ε τοῦ τῶν παιζόντων, Theaet. 183 το Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, το τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοίος τε...δεινός τε, Soph. O. C. 138 φωνῇ γὰρ ὄρω, το φατιζόμενον. So τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, τὸ κεφάλαιον, τὸ μέγιστον &c.
δὲλφος ἀνδρὶ παρεὶ. The source of the proverb is uncertain. The scholiast compares Od. xvi. 97

η τι κασιγνήτωις ἐπιμέμφεα, οἴστι περ ἀνὴρ
μαρναμένωι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ἄρρηται.

The words in the text bear much the appearance of having formed the end of a hexameter verse, and Shilleto (on Dem. Fals. Leg. 415 συγγνώμη ἄδελφῳ βοηθεῖω) therefore suggests that ἄδελφος should be read here. But, even if a familiar verse did contain that form, it by no means follows that Plato so quotes it. With παρεὶ cf. παραστάτης, παραστήναι, adesse. For the optative of an exhortation (=παρέστω) v. Goodwin M. and T. § 725. Here, however, it might be simply a wish (ibid. § 722). The sense, of course, is ‘a brother is a man’s best comrade.’

αὐδύνατον—masc., not neuter.

362. ἐτ γὰρ διελθεὶν κ.τ.λ.—lit. ‘for we must set forth (and examine) also the representations directly opposed to those of Glaucon, I mean the representations which praise justice, &c.’

ὁ grammatically refers to λόγοις, these being personified. There is no need to assume the harsh construction ὡς = τοῦτων ὡς, ‘the representations of those who...’ ὡς is probably masculine (=τοῦτων, ὡς...) but might very well be neuter (τοῦτων, ὡς).

[The representations made by those who praise justice and blame injustice now require examination. It will be found that the one is commended and the other discountenanced on the ground of expediency. Gods and men reward justice. But how is justice a good thing in itself?]


πατέρες τε νιέσιν κ.τ.λ. The full expression would be πατέρες τε νιέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδήμενοι τοῦτοις ὡν κηδονται: ‘and all who are in the position of guardians tell their respective charges...'

The flexion νιέσι is alone correct for Plato. Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 56. 14 gives the rule that, while νίστ and νιῶ belong to old Attic, the rest of the declension was based on the original νιῶ. It was not till 350 B.C. that the forms νιῶ, νίς, νιῶ, νιὸς &c. came into use by analogy with νιῶ, νιῶ.

363. οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαίοσύνην ἐπιανοῦντες: ‘not praising the thing itself, justice.’ Cf. 472 c ἐξητομέν αὐτό τε δικαίοσύνην οἶν ἐστι, Parm. 130 b αὐτὸ ὁμοίτης, χωρίς ἦς ἡμείς ὁμοίτητος ἔχομεν. More fully in Symp. 199 D ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἡρώτων, ἄρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος;
From this apposition it is but one step to the compounds of Aristotle αὐτοβούλησις, αὐτόππος &c., as in Eth. N. i. 6. 5 ἀπορήσει θ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βουλουται λέγεις αὐτοékαστον, εἰπερ ἣν τε αὐτο- αὐθρόπω ἐς καὶ ο ἀυτός λόγος ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ ἀὐθρόπου. Such compounds, however, do not belong to Plato. A fuller method of expression is the familiar αὐτό ὅπερ ἐστίν, and the fullest would have been δικαιοσύνης ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτό τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν. More emphasis is gained by the use of the neuter than by the feminine of 612 ὃ ἰνα αὐτή δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτήν κρυβεῖν. γίγνεται...ἀρχαὶ τε καὶ γάμουι κ.τ.λ. The singular γίγνεται is an instance of the schema Pindaricum, so named, it is said, because much used by Pindar (though in his extant odes and fragments there are very few examples forthcoming). Sometimes it is known as Boeoticum.

Of the extant Pindaric instances most are very dubious. Thus in Pyth. x. 71 κεῖται κεδναλ πολίων κυβερνάσιει there is a variant κειται, just as in Aesch. Pers. 49 στειναὶ δ’ ιεροῦ Τιμόλου πελάται there is almost as good authority for στειναι. In Pind. Ol. xi. (x.) 4 μελιγάρνεν ῥμοῦ υστέρων ἄρχα λόγων τέλεται (not ἄρχαὶ) is the correct reading, and, as Professor Gildersleeve remarks, ‘the example disappears.’ Nevertheless the construction was not rare in Greek writers, just as it is not rare in lax English conversation to begin with ‘there was...’ and to follow with a plural subject later in the sentence.

The verb ordinarily precedes, and in Attic writers the construction is almost (though not entirely) confined to ἔστι, ἦν, γίγνεται. The singular verb is used while the writer has a single or collective notion in his mind, whereas that notion is afterwards analysed or expressed otherwise. Cf. inf. 463 λ ἔστι μέν ποι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχαντες τε καὶ δήμος, Euthyd. 302 ὃ ἔστι γὰρ ἐρώτησα καὶ βυσσὸ καὶ ἵλαρα, Soph. Trach. 520 ἦν δ’ ἀμφιπλεκτοι κλίμακες, Eur. Ion 1146 ἐνήν δ’ ὑφανται γράμμασιν τοιαίδ’ ύφαλ, Bacch. 1350 αἰαὶ δέδοκται, πρέσβῃ, τῆμονυκς φυγαῖ, Ar. Vesp. 58 &c. The verb follows in Symp. 188 β πάχαιν καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρνῆσθαι...γίγνεται, but there has been an interval between the words and περὶ ἄλληλα has intervened.

ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. So all the best mss, while a few inferior copies give τῷ ἀδίκῳ. The latter is almost certainly a very natural conjecture of some reader who said ‘But Glauceon did not attribute all these advantages to the just man, but to the unjust. The just man was to be persecuted and the unjust man to flourish mightily in a false reputation for justice.’ This,
however, is to misconceive the meaning. τῷ δικαίῳ does not mean 'our just man (in the case above imagined)' but, generically, 'the just man (when he is recognised as such)'. Glaucon did enumerate a number of advantages which a just man will naturally obtain from his reputation for justice (see 361 c init.). It is only when the reputation is reversed that he is persecuted. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.: 'and these persons make still more of the (respective) reputations.' It is incorrect to render 'carry the advantages of a good name still further.' This would require τὰ τῆς δοξῆς. Literally we have 'the question of the reputations (on either side, good or bad).

τὰς παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις—not simply τὰς παρὰ θεῶς (apud deos), but pregnantly, 'the way in which they are looked upon from heaven (and affected therefrom).' Cf. Phaedr. 232 λ τῆς δοξῆς τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ἐμβάλλοντες—'throwing into the scale.'

τοῖς ὁσίοις—made emphatic by position.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσιοδός τε καὶ Ὀμήρος. In the mind of the speaker the two poets are closely associated in their work and in the character of their theology and ethics. Hence the single article for the single notion. Cf. Phaedo 111 c καὶ τῶν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα (= 'the heavenly bodies' τὰ μετέωρα), inf. 372 ἐ τῆν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν, Thuc. i. 36 τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται. Jelf § 459. 9 (b). γενναῖος has something of the sense of 'simple-minded,' 'good old.' Cf. 348 ὁ πάνυ γενναῖαν εὐηθειαν.

363 B. ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ.—sc. Hesiod Opp. 230, where the words are

τοῦτοι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βλον, οὐρεσὶ δὲ δρῦς ἀκρῆ μὲν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέση δὲ μελίσσας, εἰροπάκου ὁ διες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίσαι.

In shifting from his indirect quotation of the second line to the direct of the third Plato throws in the word φηγοῖν, which some mss wrongly omit in order to preserve the simple line and its metre.

βαλάνους = acorns, chestnuts and probably ἀκρόδρωνα in general, since δρῦς was the name for any of the larger trees. Cf. Theoc. xv. 112 πάρ δὲ οἱ ὑφα κεῖται, ὡσα δρῦς ἀκρα φέροντι.

τούτων ἐξόμενα—cf. 329 Α. The words ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἄγαθα, if they have any strict grammar, depend on τουεῖν. It is not Greek, of course, to attach them to φησίν. There is little doubt, however, that among his quotations Plato has retained no very clear idea of grammatical regimen. Hence ὁ μὲν is not followed by ὁ δὲ..., but by παραπληξία δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος (so. ἄγαθα φησι τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι or its equivalent).

ʿὡστε τεῦ γάρ φησίν κ.τ.λ.—Homer Od. xix. 109 sqq. The genitive τεῦ depends on the preceding unquoted words

...ἡ γὰρ σεῦ κλέος οὐρανῶν εὐρήν ἱκανῶν,

ὡστε τεῦ ἡ βασιλῆς κ.τ.λ.

363 C. τίκτη δ' ἐμπεδά μῆλα: 'and his flocks bring forth young ones without fail.' The usual rendering is 'bring forth strong young ones,' but ἐμπεδά can hardly bear this meaning, and it is awkward to separate the adjective from μῆλα. Rather the sheep 'can be relied on.' Cf. Od. viii. 30 πομπὴν δ' ὄτρυνε καὶ λασταί ἐμπεδόν εἶναι.

Μουσαῖοι—a legendary composer of oracles, gnomic sayings, directions for mystic purifications &c.

Like Orpheus, with whom he is so frequently associated (e.g. Aristoph. Ran. 1032, Plat. Ion 536 B, Prot. 316 D and inf. 364 E), he was supposed to have lived in, or come from, Thrace. His mother is generally given as Selene, while the name of his father varies, after the manner of legends and mythologies, between Orpheus, Eumolpus, Linus and others. All that can be said with any approach to certainty is that the early Greeks derived most of their 'Orphic,' i.e. religious and mystic, poetry vivid the Thracian parts, and that the various names (whencesoever derived) connected with such poetry were apt to be forced, consciously or unconsciously, into some Genealogical relation with each other. The names Orpheus, Musaeus, Eumolpus, Bakis &c. came to stand for collections of sayings and ordinances. An excellent summary of 'Orphism' is to be found in Prof. Murray's 'Ancient Greek Literature.' He there reckons among the 'cardinal tenets' a belief "in sin and the sacerdotal purging of sin; in the immortality and divinity of the soul; in eternal reward beyond the grave to the 'pure' and the 'impure'—of course, none but the initiated being ultimately quite pure."

In Plato's time the 'oracles' (χρησμολ) attributed to Musaeus were extant and registered (see Herod. vii. 6, ix. 43). His τελεταὶ and καθαρμολ are mentioned below (364 E).

The son alluded to is Eumolpus, the legendary founder of the
Euleusian mysteries. According to Suidas (s.v. Μουσάιος) the ὑποθήκαι or ‘precepts’ of Musaeus were addressed to this son. Compositions attributed to Eumolpus himself were hymns and writings on the mysteries.

νεανικότερα τάγαθα...διδάσασιν: i.e. ‘they represent the gods as giving their favours to the just in a still more magnificent style.’ So inf. ὃ εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν (=ποιοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κατορύττο-μένους).

νεανικότερα—‘splendidiora, magnificentiora’ Stallbaum. The word is not, however, one of unqualified praise, but contains a suggestion of excess, mostly in the direction of the ‘showy’ or ‘dashing.’ That which is characteristic of the νεανιας is something spirited, but lacking in sobriety and solidity. Cf. 503 c νεανικόι καὶ μεγαλοπρετεῖς τῷ διανόα, 563 ε, Alc. i. 104 λ (Alcibiades thinks he is) νεανικωτάτον γένους ἐν τῇ πόλει, Aristot. Pol. iv. 11. 11 ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης...γίνεται τυράννης.


For the joys of the best Stallbaum refers to Od. xi. 602, Pind. Ἀκμ. i. 100 (69), Verg. Aen. vi. 637 &c. The conception is that of Walhalla, with such differences as correspond to the tastes and circumstances of the Greeks and Teutons respectively.

ἐστεφανωμένους—i.e. wearing garlands (of myrtle, roses, pansies &c.) like those in the Greek σμυρνία.

363 D. ἡδη—almost = τὸ λαυτόν, ‘from this time forth.’ Cf. Hdt. iii. 5 ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡδη Ἀλυστος, ‘from this point onwards.’ The two expressions are combined in e.g. Soph. Phil. 454 τὸ λαυτόν ἡδη.

οἱ δὲ ἡδη = ἄλλοι δὲ: as if, instead of Μουσάιος καὶ ὁ νῦς αὐτοῦ, we had had οἱ μὲν.... Cf. 451 ε πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέρας χρώμεθα, τοῦ δὲ ὡς ἑαυτορέσως, 455 ε καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρική, ἡ δ’ οὐ, Hom. Π. ι. 536 ἃφ’ ἵππειον ὀπλέων ῥαθάμμυγες ἔβαλλον, ἔλθ᾽ ἀπ’ ἐπισσωτρων, &c. Inf. 364 λ τοὺς δὲ... ‘others.’ Cf. sup. 349 τ (ὁ δὲ).

μακρότεροις ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς: not μείζους: ‘draw out to still greater length (a list of) rewards from heaven.’ The expression is brachylogic for e.g. μακρότεροις ἀποτείνουι λόγους περὶ μισθῶν.

γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι—referring to Hesiod Opp. 282 sqq.

do δε κε μαρτυρίσων ἐκών ἐπίρκων ὄμισσας
ψεύσται, ἐν δε δίκην βλάψιν βήκετον ἄσοθη,
tοῦ δὲ τ' ἀμαυρωτήτῃ γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται,
ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείλυν.

ταῦτα...ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην. The same construction as
with αἰτιάσθαι, ψέγευν, διαβάλλειν, ὠνειδίζων, ἐπαίνειν &c. Jelf
§ 583. Carried further in Soph. Aj. 1107 τὰ σέµν᾽ ἐπη | κόλαζ'
ἐκείνου.

eis πηλὸν τινα—cf. Phaedo 69 c δο ἄν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτελέστος εἰς
Λίδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσται. Ar. Ran. 145 sqq. εἴτε
βορβόρον πολὺν | καὶ σκόρ ἀείνων, ἐν δε τούτῳ κειμένον | εἰ' που
Alex. 25 ἐρομένου γὰρ τινος τι πράττεν ἐν "Λίδου ὁ Ἐπίκουρος;
Μολυβδίνας, ἐφ' ἐχών πέδας ἐν βορβόρῳ κάθητα. Properly βορβορός
is mud and πηλὸς is clay, but these senses are apt to become
confused.

κοσκίνω ἄδορ...φέρειν. The case is still worse in Gorg. 403 b τῶν
ἐν "Λίδου...οὗτοι ἀδιωτατοί ἄν εἰεν οἱ ἀμύητοι καὶ φοροῦσειν εἰς τῶν
tετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἐτέρφω τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. The
allusion is, of course, to the punishment of the Danaids. Cf. Hor.
Od. iii. 11. 25 audiat Lyde scelus atque notas | virginum poenas et
inané lymphae | dolium fundo pereuntis imo &c.

363 E. ἄλλα δε οὐκ ἔχοντοι—sc. λέγειν. I.e. it is impossible
for them to devise anything further than the punishments
enumerated by Glaucon (361 ε—362 λ).

ἐκατέρων—‘of the two classes respectively,' viz. the just and the
unjust.

CHAPTER VII.

ἰδια τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν—‘in prose as well as verse.'

ἰδια (־υπ' ἱδιωτῶν) is preferred to ἱδιωτικῶς, which would be too
strong, inasmuch as it would imply a manner markedly devoid of
skill.

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For its opposition to τοιγής cf. Symp. 178 ν γανής γαρ ἔρωτος οὔτε εἰσὶν οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὐδενός οὔτε ἴδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, Phaedr. 258 δ ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς τοιγής ἦ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἴδιώτης. With the present passage particularly cf. inf. 366 ν οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ίδιοις λόγοις ἐπεξήλθεν.

364 A. ἔξ ἔνδις στόματος—'with one accord,' uno ore. Often joined with πάντες: cf. Legg. 634 Ε μακ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἔξ ἔνδις στόματος πάντας συμψωνείν. Ar. Eq. 670 οἶ δὲ ἔξ ἔνδις στόματος πάντες ἀνέκραγον. So Aesch. Cho. 72 πόροι τε πάντες ἐκ μιᾶς ὀδοῦ βαίνοντες (where, as here, ἐκ is modal). The same modal preposition occurs in e.g. Aesch. Pers. 462 τέλος δὲ ἐφορμηθέντες ἔξ ἔνδις ἐκβολήν.

ὑμνοῦσιν—not ᾠδοῦσιν, but including the ἰδιώται as well as the ποιηταί: 'they repeat the same (old) tale.' See note on 329 ν.

ἡ σεφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαίοσύνη—one notion. See note on 363 λ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσιοδός τε καὶ Ὄμηρος.

χαλεπὸν μέντοι κ.τ.λ. On μέντοι for δὲ see 327 λ. The substitution is all the more desirable here because of the δὲ in the next clause.

For the commonplace itself cf. Prot. 339 β, where the words of Simonides are quoted ἀνὸρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσαθι χαλεπῶν κ.τ.λ. (where, however, ἀγαθὸν is used in the ordinary Greek sense, of which morality forms but a part). The shape in which it is most frequently cited is that of the passage (inf. c—ῦ) from Hesiod.

ἀκολασία—the recognised antithesis of σεφροσύνη (Arist. Eth. N. π. 10. 1 &c.).

ἡδὺ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The adjectives are arranged, as so often in Plato, with chiasmus: ἡδὺ (ἐπιπονον: εὐπετεῖς) χαλεπῶν. So immediately below

πλούσιοι καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας

ἀσθενεῖς πένητες

and the verbs εὐδαιμονίζειν (ὑπεροπάν: τιμᾶν) (ἀτιμάζειν. See note on 328 ε.

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος—'in general,' ut plurimum. Cf. Phaedr. 275 β ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος οὖντε. More fully in Aristot. Gen. Αν. ν. 6. 11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ παμφαγωτέρα ποικιλωτέρα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος εἰπεῖν. Inf. 389 ν we have ὡς πλήθει in the same sense. More commonly ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.
πονηροὺς πλουσίους κ.τ.λ.—'wicked men, if rich or possessed of other sources of power.' Though it would be easy to explain ἄλλας by the common idiom as = 'means of power in general,' it is more natural to regard πλοῦτος as itself a δύναμις, just as ἀσθενῆς often means, or connotes, πένης.

εὐχερῶς θέλουσιν—not βούλονται: 'they are quite ready to,...' 'they have no objection.' Cf. inf. 475 c τῶν εὐχερῶς θέλοντα

παντὸς μαθήματος γεύσθαι. In Phaedo 117 c Socrates drinks the poison μᾶλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως. The word is one of reproof here as in Dem. 248. 11 ὁ λέγων εὐχερῶς ὃ τι ἀν, βουληθῆς, and inf. 535 ε ἂν...εὐχερῶς ὀσπερ θηρὸν ἦσθεν ἐν ἁμαθή μολύνηται. It implies the absence of a fine conscience or a proper self-respect.

τοὺς δὲ.... See note on οἱ δ’ sup. 363 d. 'And others, who happen to be uninfluential and poor, they are prepared to dis-honour and slight, though they acknowledge them to be better than the former.'

364 B. τούτων δὲ πάντων—sc. τῶν λόγων.

οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς—'the statements about Heaven and virtue,' i.e. about the way Heaven treats virtue. The position of τε distinguishes this sense from the inapposite 'concerning the gods and (concerning) virtue,' which would be expressed rather by περὶ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς with the regular trajectory (see note on 343 c). Here θεῶν-τε-καλ-ἀρετῆς forms one notion, 'the relation between Heaven and virtue.'

θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται—'take the most wonderful shape.'

πολλοῖς...ἐνεμαν: 'have often ere now allotted.' The aorist with πολλοῖς as in the gnomic (or iterative) use with πολλάκις, ἡδη &c. Goodwin M. and T. § 156.

βίων κακῶν—life on the material side, in respect of livelihood and circumstances.

ἀγύρται—'mendicants' or 'vagabonds,' originally often priests, and very similar to mendicant friars.

The best known were the μητραγύρται, who collected (ἀγείρω) money ostensibly for the worship of Cybele. This term became one of great contempt (Aristot. Rhet. iii. 2. 10) in consequence of the worthlessness of the men and women who practised such mendicancy, and who added low arts like those of the later gipsy fortune-teller, the quack, and the indulgence-vendor. In Soph. O. T. 387 the μάντις Teiresias is thus spoken of: ὑφεις μάγον τοιύθε μηχανορράφον, ἵ διλόν ἁγύρτην, ἄστιν ἐν τοῖς κέρδαις | μάνον δέδορκε. Similarly Aesch. Ag. 1273 (of Cassandra) καλούμενη δὲ φοιτάς, ὥσ
αὐγορτια. In both these passages (as here) the αὐγορτίς has a sham religious character. Later, however, the word became more general, e.g. Pseudo-Eur. Rhes. 503 (of Ulysses) ἤδη δ’ αὐγορτίς πτωχικίν ἐχων στόλιν | ἐπάλθε πύργους, and ibid. 715 βίον δ’ ἐπαίτων εἰρτ’ αὐγορτίς τις λάτρις.

ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας λίντες—a common expression for begging. Cf. 489 b, Phaedr. 233 e kal ἐπὶ θύρας ἰξοταί (sc. οἱ προσαίτηστες), Symp. 203 b προσαίτησουσα, οίον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης, ἀφίκετο, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας, Aesch. Ag. 1195 ἦ̃ γυνήμαντίς εἰμι θυροκότος φλέδων; Ar. Nub. 467 ὥστε γε σοῦ πολλοὺς ἐπὶ ταῦτι θύρας ἀεὶ καθῆσαί τι.

The same and kindred phrases are applied also to other needs and solicitations. Cf. 489 c ἐπὶ λατρῶν θύρας λέναι. Xen. Hell. I 6. 7 aļ ἐπί τὰς θύρας φοινίσεις (= ‘danglings about court’).

πείθουσιν ὡς ἐστίν κ.τ.λ.: ‘try to persuade them that they possess a power acquired from the gods by sacrifices and incantations, on the one hand to cure amid indulgences and feastings any crime which may have been committed by a man himself or his ancestors, and, on the other, if one is willing to incur a trifling expense for the purpose of damaging an enemy, (they undertake) to injure just or unjust with equal ease, working upon the gods by charms and spells to serve their purposes.’

It is hoped that this rendering, when once seen, will commend itself. Hitherto the passage appears to have been wrongly construed by editors. For instance θυσίας τε καὶ ἐπιθώδας is usually taken with ἀκείσθαι, instead of with ποριζομένη (which obviously requires it), despite the clumsy order which results. Next ἐτε is generally made to answer to ἦ instead of to ἐαν τε. Again θέλη is made to be synonymous with βούληται and μετά σμικρῶν δαπανῶν is taken with βλάψειν.

The true construction is ὡς ἐστὶ παρὰ σφίσι δόνως θυσίας τε καὶ ἐπιθώδας ποριζομένη ἐκ θεῶν, (viz. a power) ἐτε τι ἄδικημα του γέγονεν, ἀκείσθαι (αὐτό) μεθ’ ἴδιων τε καὶ ἐσπετῶν, ἐαν τε τινα ἑχθρόν μετά σμικρῶν δαπανῶν θέλη (τε) πιθήκαι, (φασὶ) βλάψειν κ.τ.λ.

The only difficulty lies in the fact that nearly all mss have βλάψειν, while βλάψειν is given in only two inferior copies. If we like to suppose very considerable laxity of construction we can retain βλάψει, making it depend on πείθουσιν ὡς... and referring it to the subject of θέλη. This is quite conceivable, but it involves an ugly anacoluthic termination to the sentence in the participle πείθουσε. On the other hand it is easy to supply φασὶ (from πείθουσι) with βλάψειν, or perhaps it is fairer to the Greek to say that the grammar is simply πείθουσι...βλάψειν. The claims of βλάψειν
would have been more favourably considered if this had been perceived, instead of attempting to make the future infinitive depend on ἐστι δύναμις. The loss of final υ is always easy, or a very early editor may have missed the construction and altered the text.

σφίστι—used for ἐαντοῦς in dependent object-clauses (i.e. after δι, ὥς) and final clauses (ίνα, δειτις &c.).

364 C. ἀδίκημα του...αὐτοῦ ἡ προγόνων: i.e. 'if a crime attaches to a man, committed by himself or his ancestors.' του is qualified by a sort of afterthought in partitive apposition: 'a crime belonging to a man, (that is to say, belonging to) himself or his ancestors.'

ετε...ἐάν τε...: sive...sive. ἐάν τε is used for the second ετε because in direct narration the quack would say ετί τι ἀδίκημα γέγονεν, ἀκείσθαι δύναμι, ἐάν τε πημήναι ἐθέλης, βλάψω, according to the usual manner of conditional sentences.

[The ordinary rendering makes ετε answer to ἢ, and this is no doubt allowable in itself. Cf. Legg. 862 d, Eur. El. 896, and conversely ἢ...ετε in Eur. Alc. 114. But the sense can obviously be bettered.]

ἀκείσθαι—sc. αὐτό. For ἀκείσθαι in reference to the taint or disease of a sin cf. Hdt. 1. 167 οί δὲ Ἀγγυλαιοί ἐσ Δελφοῖς ἐπεμπον βουλήμενοι ἀκέσθαν τὴν ἀμαρτάδα. Antiphon Tetr. 3. 3, 7 ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν τὸ μηνια τῶν ἀληθρήν ἀκεσαμένους πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρῶν τοῦ μιᾶςματος καταστήσαι. So in Soph. O. T. 98 α μιᾶςμα is called ἀνήκεστον.

μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν—cf. inf. e. The sinner will be put to no discomfort. ἐρωτῶν are sacrificial feasts.

ἐθλη—sc. τις, supplied from του. For the omission cf. 347 c. ἐθλη cannot mean βούληται in Plato, and its proper sense is retained by joining it to μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν. The ἀγορὴς would put it 'if you are willing to spend a trifle.'

ἐπαγωγαίς τισιν καὶ καταδέσμους. Cf. Legg. 933 δ ἐάν δὲ κατα-δέσσειν ἢ ἐπαγωγαίς ἢ τισιν ἐπιδίδαις κ.τ.λ. The addition of τισι is contemptuous. ἐπαγωγαί are properly 'incantations,' by which supernatural powers (particularly of χθων) are drawn to one's aid, while καταδέσμου (or καταδέσεως) are 'spells' (defixiones) which may simply have a negative effect. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 306 ἦμεν δ' ἄκουσει τόνδε δέσμιον σέθεν. In popular use, however, it is probable that 'incantations and spells' were not distinguished, the terms being combined for comprehensiveness.
lems The enormity of the notion causes the speaker to add promptly ὑφ σαρι.
oi μὲν...ἐνπετειασ διδόντες...οἱ δὲ...μαρτύρονται. The expected oi δὲ...μαρτυρομενοι gives place to the finite verb, the construction having been broken by the quotation (cf. 363 b).
ἐνπετειασ διδόντες—‘granting facilities’—‘representing facilities as being given.’ Cf. 363 c τάγαθα παρὰ θεῶν διδάσκων.
ὡς 'τὴν μὲν κακότητα κ.τ.λ.' ὡς does not belong to the quotation, but introduces it, ‘to the effect that...’ In Hesiod (Opp. 285) the lines are

τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ λαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι ῥηδίως. ὅλγη μὲν ὄδος, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναλει: τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρώτα θεό προπάροιβεν ἐθηκαν ἀδάνατοι μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀρβίως ὁμίοις ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ τρηχός τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῆν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἔκπηται, ῥηδίη δὴ ἐπείτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἔοισα.

It is curious that the mss of Hesiod should give ὅλγη, while Plato (here and in Legg. 718 e), Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 77 d) agree in λεῖν. It is no unmotivated conclusion that the current version in Greece was from early times λεῖν, while ὅλγη was unrecognised. Yet it is not likely that one arose simply from the other. It may therefore be suggested that Hesiod wrote λυτη ‘smooth.’ For this the current Greek was λεῖν. In later times λιτὸς came to mean ‘small,’ and hence ὅλγη in the mss by a gloss.

The passage was a favourite in Greek and is often partially quoted by Lucian. Its resemblance to the ‘strait gate’ and ‘narrow way’ of the New Testament can hardly be missed.

364 D. τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς—see 358 λ, note on εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν.
ἐκεῖνος ἐπεν—sc. II. ix. 497 sqq.

στρεπτολ δὲ τε καὶ θεοι αὐτοι,
tῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμὴ τε βία τε•
καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέσσοι καὶ εὐχωλῆς ἀγανήσων κ.τ.λ.

The second line is away from Plato’s purpose, and is therefore omitted.

Par. A has λιστολ δὲ στρεπτολ τε and some other mss also give both words, but with some variation in the particles. The mss of Homer have στρεπτολ, not λιστολ. It is possible that στρεπτολ was capable of being misunderstood, and was therefore glossed by λιστολ, so that both words came to appear in the text. On the
other hand λιστωκ is ἀπαξ λεγόμενον and therefore not a very probable gloss (ἄλλιστος and τρίλλιστος are found), and it might be argued that λιστοι was actually written by Plato (and perhaps in the true Homer), whereas στρεπτοι was a correction by someone who had verified the reference in his copy of the Iliad.

364 E. βεβλων κ.τ.λ.—containing the rites of the Orphic telestae. Cf. sup. 363 c, note on Musaeus. For Orpheus cf. Ar. Ran. 1032 'Ὀρφέως μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμίν κατέδειξε φύων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, | Μουσαῖος δ᾽ εξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμοῦ, Eur. Alc. 967 Θρήσσαις ἐν σαλισθ., τάσ 'Ὀρφεία κατέγραφεν γῆρος. Orpheus was reputed to be the son of Calliope; hence Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων. The plural Μουσῶν and the use of ἐγγόνων (‘descendants’) rather than ἐγγόνων (‘children’) are intended to express a certain indifferenceness as to the exact legendary relationship, ‘descendants of Selene and Muses, as they allege...’

παιδιάς ἡδονῶν—lit. ‘pleasures of the nature of amusement (or play),’ i.e. mirthful pleasures, or ‘jollities.’ For the whole phrase cf. Hdt. viii. 99 καὶ αὐτόι ἦσαν ἐν θυατηρίῳ τε καὶ εὐπαθήσι οἱ πάλιν. The construction is ‘persuading them that not only are there expiations and purifications from their sins by means of sacrifices and mirthful pleasures while men are still alive, but also for their good when they are dead there are (ceremonial) rites, the same, you know (δὴ), which they call mysteries...’

The meaning is not, of course, that after a man is dead τελεταί can be performed to act as a καθαρμός for his soul, but that if, while still alive, he is initiated in the purificatory τελεταί, his lot after death is assured. It is only the ἀμύτος and ἀτέλεστος who will lie ἐν βορβόρῳ (cf. 363 d). Phaedo 69 c ὅ ἂν ἀμύτος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς"Αἰδοὺ ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κεῖται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρ-μένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. Isoc. Pan. § 23 τὴν τελετὴν ἦς οἱ μετασχόντες περί τι τῆς βίου τελευτής καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ὡθῶς τὰς ἑλπίδας ἔχουσιν. Antisthenes (sp. Diog. Laert. vi. 4) ἡνυμένον ποτε τὰ Ὄρφικά, τοῦ ἱερείου εἰπόντος ὅτι οἱ ταύτα μυοῦμενοι πολλῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐν "Αἰδοὺ μετίσχουσιν. Τί οὖν, ἐφι, οὐκ ἀποθνησκεῖς; Soph. Frag. 719 ὅσ τρισόλβιοι | κεῖσαι βροτῶν, οἱ ταύτα δερχθέντες τῆν | μόλον' ἐς "Αἰδοὺ τοῖς γάρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ | ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

365 A. ἥκοι—in Hades. See note on 330 d. μὴ δύσοντας κ.τ.λ.; after πείθοντε...ὡς...
CHAPTER VIII.

tavra pantα k.t.l. (1) The subject of poiēn is ψυχας, tavra pantα being dependent on ἀκονούσας: 'and when the souls of young people hear all these statements, what do we suppose they do?' or (2) the subject is tavra pantα and ψυχας is accus. after poiēn: 'what do we suppose all these statements do to the souls of young people when they hear them?' The position of ἀκονούσας makes for the former. poiēn is used of the conduct of the soul, which is personified. Cf. Ar. Nub. 319 tavr' ἀρ' ἀκονουσ' αὐτῶν τὸ φθέγμ' ἡ ψυχή μου πεπότηται, Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 27 ἡ γάρ μοι ψυχή οὐχ ὡς βουλεύοντα παρεσκεύασται, ἀλλ' ὡς ποιήσουσα. Hor. Sat. 1. 2. 69 diceret haec animus.

[The whole passage may be rendered 'and when young people hear all these authoritative statements made concerning virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men are disposed to respect them, how do we think the minds of those of them act, who have good natural parts and are capable of flitting, as it were, from statement to statement and gathering therefrom what sort of character and what sort of walk in life one must adopt in order to live his life in the best possible way?']

toiavta kal tosoavta: i.e. statements of such a kind (referring to the eιδη λόγων 363 ε) and made with such an accumulation of authority (ιδη τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν 363 ε). In construction the words go predicatively with λεγόμενα 'statements made in this shape and with all this warrant.'

ὡς...περὶ αὐτά ἔχουσι τιμῆς: lit. 'namely, as to how gods and men are disposed in the matter of respect to be paid to them (respectively).' τιμῆς as in 359 c ἐπὶ τήν τοῦ ἱσοῦ τιμήν. For the genitive (which is ultimately partitive) cf. 456 δ πῶς οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τουιοῦτος πέρι; 571 οὔταν ὑγιεινώς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ and the common expressions ὡς ποδών ἔχει, ὡς τάχους ἔχειν, εὖ ἥκειν βιον. Hdt. v. 20 καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντας ὑμέας ὁρέως μέθης. Similarly Legg. 869 δ κατὰ ταύτα ἐστώ τοῦ καθαρὸς εἶναι.

τι οἶμεθα…; So τι φαμεν often in place of τι φάμεν; and e.g. ἦ πῶς λέγομεν; (373 δ).

eυφυεῖς. The word is used either absolutely or relatively (εὐφυὴς πρὸς τι). It is explained inf. 455  

b ἀρα οὖτος ἔλεγες, τὸν μὲν εὐφυὴ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφῆν, ἐν ὦ ὁ μὲν βραχίως τι μανθάνω, ὁ δὲ χαλεψώς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὐφαντικὸς
The metaphor (from bees) is qualified by öσπερ, after the Greek manner.

[The appearance of ἐπιτάμενοι in a correction of Par. A perhaps makes it desirable to state that the Attic prose forms are πέταμαι, πτήσομαι, ἐπτάμυν (πτέσθαι, πτόμενος). Tragedy uses also ἐπτήν (πτήνα, πτᾶς), ἐπτάμυν. But πέταμαι and ἐπταμαι are unclassical.

See Rutherford New Phryn. Art. ccxxvii.]

συλλογισάσθαι—with a play upon the notion συλλέγειν. The ‘gathering’ of a logical inference is the literal sense, but the notion of gathering honey is, of course, suggested by the metaphor. πη πορευθής: the ποι of some is is less good. The sense is quae ratione rather than quorum: ‘in what manner of walk?’ Cf. Hdt. viii. 67 ἐκαραθόκεον τὸν πόλεμον κὴ ἀποθήσεται. πορευθής is not simply interchangeable with πορευόμενος, but—’having bent his steps.’

365 B. λέγων γὰρ ἄν... sc. τις, from the τις preceding.

ἐκείνο τὸ... ‘that well-known saying’ (cf. honestum illud Solonis, Cic. Senec. § 50).

Though the passage does not occur in any extant ode, ἐκείνο is justified by the evident vogue of the quotation in antiquity. Thus it appears in Maximus Tyrius (circ. 150 B.C.) xviii. 1, Cicero ad Att. xiii. 38 and 41, Dionysius Halic. de Compos. Verb. 21, and in a citation from Atticus Platonius by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. xv. (5). 798 d).

The whole fragment (Fr. 232) is reconstructed by Bergk as

πότερον δίκα τείχος υψόν
ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει
ἐπιχθόνιων γένος ἀνδρῶν,
δίχα μοι νδος ἄτρεκειαν εἰπείν.

πότερον δίκα κ.τ.λ. ‘Shall I mount to a loftier castle by means of justice or by means of crooked wiles?’ τείχος is not a ‘wall,’ as may be seen from the following words, but = arcem or castellum. Cf. Hdt. iii. 14 παρέλαβε τὸ τείχος τὸ ἐν Μέμφι Καμβόσης, and iii. 91 Λευκὸν Τείχος. So ’Ἀβωνον τείχος &c.

ὑψόν, not for υψηλόν, nor for ‘more than usually high,’ but a true comparative. The question is ‘which offers the loftier stronghold?’

ἀναβαίνει is therefore not to ‘mount upon’ but to ‘go up into,’ as to an acropolis. Cf. Hom. II. 1. 497 ἱερὴ δ’ ἀνέβη μεγαν οὐρανον.
The expression is quoted directly from the poet, whereas Plato himself might more probably have written ἀναθαλίνευς ἐσ... τά...λεγόμενα...φασίν.—For the plural verb used κατὰ σύνεσιν see note on 353 c.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ: ‘if at the same time I am thought not to be so.’ οὐ δοκῶ is ‘I seem not...’ rather than ‘I do not seem.’ Cf. οὐκ ἔθελον, οὐ φημί (= ἄρνομαι), οὐκ ἔω (= κωλῶ) &c. Similarly in English ‘I don’t think’ ‘I don’t want to....’ The sense therefore becomes the same as if the words had been ἐὰν καὶ δόξαι ἔχω ἀδικίας. Hence ζημίας φανερᾶς immediately, these being the consequences of a positive reputation for injustice (cf. 361 ε, 362 λ).

One or two ms and many editors, through missing the sense of καὶ and of μὴ δοκῶ, have reversed the order to the weaker ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ.

θεσπέσιος—a word of poetical colour, used by Plato mostly with a suggestion of satirical exaggeration. In Euthyd. 289 ε the λογοποιοῦ are ὑπέροφοι and their τέχνη is θεσπεσία. Inf. 558 λ θεσπεσία καὶ ἠθεῖα ἡ τιοιατὴ διαγωγὴ (sc. in a perfect democracy). The word does not belong to other Attic prose writers. It occurs, however, in Hdt. iii. 113 ἀπόζει δὲ τῆς χώρης τῆς ‘Ἀραβῆς θεσπέσιον ὡς ἦδυ.

365 C. οἱ σοφοὶ—see 340 ε. The ‘sage’ here is Simonides, from whom the words are quoted by the scholiast on Eur. Or. 782.

The ms there give the corrupt τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰ μάλα θεῖα βιάτα, where ΤΑΜΑΣΑΘΕΙΑ stands for ΤΑΜΑΣΑΘΕΙΑΝ. The error shows that ἀλάθειαν and not ἀλῆθειαν is the proper form, as in Par. A.

πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κ.τ.λ.: i.e. περιγραπτέον περὶ ἐμαῦτον σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς (ὡς or ὡστε εἶναι) πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα. καὶ is corrective or explanatory (351 b): ‘a front (façade) or show.’

The passage cannot be acquitted of an incongruous combination of images. ‘For my outward appearance in front—(i.e. rendering πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα as a hendiadys)—I must sketch round myself a sham picture of virtue—[which will look very well if not too closely examined]—while behind I must trail the fox of Archilochus in all its guile and cunning.’ However free the sense of πρόθυρα may have become, it never wholly lost its connexion with building or sank into the mere equivalent of τὰ ἐπίπροσθεν μέρη. Moreover the painting of a σκιαγραφία implies a wall. It is therefore impossible to make any clear mental picture out of the sentence as a whole. Whether we call the expression a mixed metaphor or a combination of incongruous metaphors is of little importance. ‘In
front I shall be a whited sepulchre: behind will be the fox's tail' is a fair English equivalent. Unfortunately we know nothing of the original context in Archilochus.

σκιαγραφίαν. Properly σκιαγραφία is used of colourless outline in light and shade. It is without finish of detail and can only look passable at a distance. Like scene-painting, it becomes meaningless when approached too near. Cf. Parmen. 165 σ ολον ἕσκιαγραφήμενα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν τάντα φαινόμενα...προσελθόντι δὲ πολλά καὶ ἑτερα, inf. 523 ἡ τὰ πέρρωθεν, ἐφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὧτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἕσκιαγραφήμενα. Thence there attaches to the word a special implication of pretence or falsehood. Cf. inf. 583 ὡ οὖδε παναλήθης ἐστιν ἢ τῶν ἀλλων ἥδον...οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἕσκιαγραφημένη τις, Aristot. Met. iv. 29. 2 τὰ δὲ ἕσειν...δοκεί φένεισαί ἢ μὴ οὖδ ἐστιν ἢ ἢ μὴ ἐστιν, οὖν ὡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια, Crit. 107 σκιαγραφία ἁσαρεί καὶ ἀπατηλοῖ.

περιγραπτέον—either (1) 'paint round me,' or (2) 'draw in outline.' The latter sense of περιγράφεων, as opposed to ἀναγράφεων ('fill in'), is seen in e.g. Aristot. Eth. N. 1. 7. 17 περιγραφήθω μὲν οὖν τάγαθον ταύτη...δει γὰρ ίσως ὑποτυπώσαι πρῶτον, εἰθ' ἱστερον ἀναγράψαι, and would relieve the pleonasm in κύκλῳ περι...περιγραπτέον.

tὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου κ.τ.λ. The same reference underlies Themistius Orat. xxii. 279 λ φὺνται δὲ τινὲς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλώπεκες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνθρώπια σμικρά τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερα τὰς ἀλώπεκας ὅπισθεν ἐφελκόμενα. There is obviously no connexion between this and the fragment of Archilochus τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἀλώπης κερδαλῇ συνήντερο | πυκνῶν ἔχουσα ὑδον.

ἀλώπεκα—It is an error to say, with Stallbaum, that this = ἀλωπηκῆν 'the fox's skin.' The adjectives would be inappropriate. Moreover the point that the hinder part should be 'fox.'

κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην—sc. οὖσαν. Not τὴν κερδαλέαν κ.τ.λ. 'In all its guile.' Cf. Thuc. i. 49 ἐνέπρησαν τὰς σκῆνας ἐρήμους. Soph. El. 1143 τῆς ἔμης πάλαι τραφής ἀνωφελτοῦν. The words probably form part of the quotation. Cf. κερδαλῆ just cited. Aelian has ἢ κερδαλῆ ἀλῶπης, and κερδῶ is frequent. Pind. P. ii. 78 κερδοὶ δὲ τι μᾶλα τούτο κερδαλέων τέλεθει; ἀλλά γάρ, φησὶ τίς, κ.τ.λ. = at enim, ἀλλὰ νῦν Δια. So ἀλλὰ δὴ (inf. d). The words φησὶ τίς are not necessary to the sense. οὔδὲ γάρ κ.τ.λ.—'No, nor yet...'. For γάρ, see note on 340 ά. The notion is that of the familiar proverb χαλεπᾶ τὰ καλά (497 ε).
365 D. ταύτη ἱτέον, ὡς τὰ ἔχει τῶν λόγων φήμει: 'we must go in that direction (i.e. the direction above mentioned, the way of hypocrisy and τὸ δοκεῖν), as (= 'for so') the track of the arguments leads us (or 'if we are to follow the track of the arguments').'
This is, of course, very different from ταύτη ἱτέον, ἥ... τῶν λόγων
is not the same as τοῦ λόγου but 'all the data,' or 'arguments,'
almost = τῶν λεγομένων of sup. a. φήμει: as in ἡ ὄδος φήμει, and
the English 'this road takes you to....'
ξυνωμοσύνας τε καὶ ἐταίρειας — 'cabals and clubs.' On these see

Such associations were bound by oaths like the one recorded in
Arist. Pol. v. 9. 11 "καὶ τῷ δόμῳ κακὸνοι ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω
ὁ τι ἂν ἔχω κακῶν," For their purpose cf. Thuc. viii. 54 καὶ ὁ μὲν
Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσύνας, ἀλάτε ἔτυχεν πρὸτερον ἐν τῇ
πόλει ὦσαί ἐπὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ἀρχαι ("to control trials and
offices"), ἀπάσας ἐπελθῶν καὶ παρακελευάμενος, ὅπως ξυστρα-
φύνετε καταλάτουν τὸν δήμου κ.τ.λ., ibid. c. 81. So Theaet. 173 D
σπουδαῖ ἐταίρειῶν ἐπὶ ἀρχαί, Isoc. 56 καὶ τάς ἐταίρεις
συνήγον, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων συμφερόντων (which was the usual
custom), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πλήθους ὑφέλια. The members of a
ἐταίρεια were called ἐταίροι. Dem. Mid. 521, Lys. Erat. 412 πέντε
ἀνδρεῖς δῆφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλομένων ἐταίρων.
The same kind of clubs existed in Rome under the name of coitiones,
factiones, sodalitates, and in the Middle Ages we have coniurationes
amicitiae.

πειθοῦς διδάσκαλος κ.τ.λ.: i.e. sophists, at whom Plato once more
has a passing fling, as he does also at rhetoric, an art distasteful
to him. Cf. Gorg. 453 A λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς ἐστὶν ἡ
ῥητορική, Phaedr. 271 A &c.

In the Gorgias σοφιστική and ῥητορική are the κολακεύει opposed
to νομοθετική and δικαιοσύνη, two virtues which have their spheres
in δημηγορία and δίκη respectively (cf. here σοφίαν δημηγορικῶν
tε καὶ δικανικῶν).

With πειθοῦς cf. Quintil. Inst. Or. ii. 15. 18, Gorgias apud
Platonem (sc. Gorg. 453 A) persuadendi se artificem in iudicis et
in aliis coetibus esse ait. The third (epideictic) division of oratory
is one with which we are not here concerned.

Though a proper function of the rhetorical teachers is θεωρῆσαι τὸ
ἐνδεχόμενων πιθανὸν in a given subject (Aristot. Rhet. i. 2. 1), they
went too far in undertaking (as did Corax, Aristot. Rhet. ii. 24. 11)
tὸν ἥπτων λόγον κριτῆσεν ποιεῖν — a charge brought against Socrates
himself by Aristophanes (Nub. 112 sqq. μικῆν λέγοντά φασι ταδι-
κότερα).
In διδάσκαλοι there is satire. The sophists taught for money. Socrates declared himself no teacher, but only a fellow-learner, or at best a μαθητής of knowledge. σοφίαν is equally satirical. See Protag. 312 c for σοφία in this connexion.

εσ ὄν τα μὲν πείσομεν κ.τ.λ.—'with which resources...,' 'and thus equipped...,' i.e. by means of these clubs and this rhetorical wisdom.

There is chiasmus in the arrangement, the sense being ἐκ τῶν ξυνωμοσύνων βιασμένα (sc. ἀν βίας δένται 361 b), ἐκ δὲ τῆς πειθοῦς πείσομεν.

ὡς...μη διδόναι: 'so as to overreach and yet not be punished.' ὡς for ὠστε is rare in Attic prose, but is familiar in Xenophon and in the Ionic of Herodotus. It occurs once in Thucydides (vii. 34). Plato has it again Symp. 213 β παραχωρήσαί γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκεῖνον καθίσεων. In Lucian it is common. See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 608 sq.

ἄλλα δὴ—v. sup. c, ἄλλα γὰρ.

οὐκοῦν... <οὐδὲν> καλ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν. The reading of Par. A and most ms is οὐκοῦν...καλ ἡμῖν μελητέον κ.τ.λ. But this could only mean 'we, on our side, must take care to be undetected.'

An alteration to οὐκοῦν is of no value, since οὐκοῦν καλ ἡμῖν μελητέον would be unnatural Greek for οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μελητέον. It should mean 'it is not the case that we also should care,' whereas what is required is 'we also need not care.' The latter sense is given by the very poorly supported οὐδὲν ἡμῖν which J. and C. adopt. But how came καλ to be substituted for οὐδὲ? It is also given by the καλ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον of one inferior ms. This, however, is manifestly a correction only. Again, there is slight support for οὐκοῦν...τι καλ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; but, even though we may admit the question after οὐκοῦν ('well then'), it is evident that καλ is impossible. 'If the gods do not care... why should we also care?' is as bad in Greek as in English. A conjecture of Baiter is ἄμελητέον, which may be right, although, as J. and C. perceive, it rather suggests a duty of neglecting than an opportunity of not troubling.

The evidence of the ms goes to prove an early corruption. The conjecture in the text is based (1) upon a comparison of the two readings οὐδὲν and καλ, (2) upon the belief that οὐδὲν was omitted in most ms because of being misread in the hypothetical clause already containing μηδέν.

The appropriateness of καλ becomes obvious if we look simply at
the words εἰ θεοῖς μὴδὲν μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν οὖδὲν μελητέου 'if the gods care nought, we also need care nought.'

365 E. αὐτοῦς ἵσμεν ἢ ἀκηκῶμεν—'know or have heard of them.' The sense is, more fully, αὐτοῦς ἵσμεν ἢ ἀκηκῶμεν, ὁποῖοι τινες εἰσι.

[When it is said that εἰδέναι τινὰ is not Greek for connaître quel- qu’un, the remark is true; but εἰδέναι τινὰ is perfectly good and ordinary Greek for savoir ce qu’un est, i.e. εἰδέναι τινά, ὡστε (ὡποῖος &c.) ἔστι. Thus in Eur. Med. 39 ἐγώδα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ νυν and Ar. Ran. 836 ἐγώδα τούτων καὶ διέσκεμαι πάλαι, the meaning is 'I know what to expect of her, him.]

ἀκηκόαμεν αὐτοῦς is made possible by the intervening ἵσμεν. The combination would hardly occur alone.

τῶν λόγων = τῶν λεγομένων, 'tradition.'

τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν—e.g. Hesiod and Homer. Cf. Hdt. ii. 53 'Ἡλόδον καὶ Ὄμηρο...οὕτοι δὲ εἰσί οἱ ποιησάντες θεογονίαν "Ἑλληνικα, καὶ τούτι θεοτίς τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ὁντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἰδεὰ αὐτῶν σημηνάντες (on which see Baehr’s Excursus, Herod. Vol. i.). Legg. 886 b.

εἰςν οἷον...παράγεσθαι: i.e. τοιοῦτοι οἷοι, ν. 334 d.

ἀγανήσικ—so best mss, though they have ἀγαναίσιν in 364 d. Similarly at that place there are variants εἰκωλής and ἀγανήσι. In all probability the true Homeric forms were written in some of the texts of Plato by persons who recalled the original passage. As no decision can be final on such a point, it is best to follow the authority of the better mss.

παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι. The participle defines or specialises the wide παράγεσθαι, which might mean 'deceive' or 'mislead,' as well as 'pervert.' Cf. inf. 383 τα ἡμᾶς πεέδεσι παράγεσι (Legg. 885 b εἴπαραμυθήσω τίνας θυσίας τέ καὶ εὐχαίς παραγομένους. The notion here is of being 'turned aside' from the exercise of strict justice by means of bribes.

ἀναπείθειν is frequently used of bribing: e.g. Ar. Pax 622 κανέ- πείθον τῶν Λακώνων τοὺς μεγάλους χρήμασιν. Cf. the saying of Hesiod ὅπα τοῖς θεοῖς πείθει (which, however, is meant in a more pious sense).

εἰ δ’ οὖν παντέτοι—'well, admitting (as we must of course) that we are to believe them.' Σ’ οὖν implies that the matter must be cut short.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων—'out of our ill-gotten gains,' 'out of the results of our injustices.' Cf. Xen. Hell. iv. 8. 9 τρέφειν τὸ
ναυτικῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νῆσων (‘from the resources of the islands’). Ar. Plut. 569 πλουτίσαντες δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν.

366 A. ἀξήμοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. Par. A omits μὲν (which is due to Muretus), but many of the better mss read μόνον. The latter is probably derived from μον’ (where the accent would represent the final syllable on), a misreading of μὲν. On the other side Par. A might easily omit a second μὲν after the μὲν which introduces the sentence.

With the construction ἀξήμοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα (=οὐ ζημιωσόμεθα ὑπὸ θεῶν) cf. Thuc. i. 130 ὡν ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν (=μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν), and sup. 364 ὁ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῇ.

ἀδικοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.: ‘but, as unjust men, we shall not only make gains, but also get off scot-free, by bribing them with prayers when we transgress and commit sin.’ The construction of the participles is πελθοντες αὐτοὺς λισσύμενοι (=τῷ λισσεσθαί) ὑπερβαλλοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες (=οπόταν ὑπερβαλυμεν κ.τ.λ.).

An awkward congestion of participles will be found in Gorg. 494 c λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν (if the text is sound).

λισσύμενοι is, of course, poetical. The speaker is recalling the Homeric line of 364 ε, λισσύμενοι δεῦ κέν τις ὑπερβηθή καὶ ἀμάρτη.

ἀξήμοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. The rule is laid down (by Cobet and others) that with the active ἀπαλλάσσω an adverb is required, but with the middle an adjective. No doubt custom did favour this distinction, but with the present instance to the contrary cf. Soph. 254 δ ἐστιν ἀθώοις ἀπαλλάσσειν. So with participle Hdt. iii. 69 οὗ τοί μὲν δεῖ χαίροντα ἀπαλλάσσειν. Lucian Alex. 27 ἀπέλλαξεν...κατακοπεῖ. On the other hand Gorg. 457 ν καὶ ἐνοί γε τελευτῶντες ἀσχιστα ἀπαλλάσσονται.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ—v. 365 c.

ἡ αὐτὸς ἡ παῖδες παῖδων—cf. 364 c εἰ τι ἀδικήμα του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἡ προγόνων. The descendants are not punished directly for the crimes of their ancestors, but the μύσος or μάσμα attaching to an unexploited crime leads to an ἄτη in the family, from which proceed sins and penalties from generation to generation. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1565 τὶς ἄν γονὲς ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων; | κεκόλληται γένους πρὸς ἄτη.

ἀλλ’, δ’ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος κ.τ.λ.: ‘but he (sc. our young εὐφυής), following out his reasoning, will say...’ cf. λέγοι γὰρ ἄν πρὸς αὐτῶν 365 π.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, II. [366 α—

αὐ μέγα δύνανται—these words are accidentally omitted by Par. A and some other mss (presumably because of the similar ending τελεταί—δύνανται).

The article αἱ τελεταὶ and αὐ refer to 364 ε: 'here is where the effect of our mystic rites once more comes in.'

οἱ λύσιοι θεοὶ—especially those presiding over the τελεταί, e.g. Demeter and Dionysus. Cf. Soph. Ο. T. 921 Δύκει 'Ἀπολλον... ὄρως λύσιν τυ' ἥμνιν εἰαγῇ πόρης.

366 B. ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις λέγουσι—i.e. there are purifying gods—at least all the greatest communities, the centres of illumination, tell me so, and it is not for a humble individual to dispute their word. [There is a special reference to Athens and the Eleusinian mysteries.]

οἱ θεῶν παιδεῖς: e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus (364 ε).

ποιηταὶ κ.τ.λ., 'having become poets and mouth-pieces of the gods,' cf. Ion 534 οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ ἣ ἑρμηνήσαι εἰσὶ τῶν θεῶν κατεξώμενοι εἰς δυτὸν ἄν ἐκαστὸς κατέχηται. So in Aesch. Enm. 19 Δῶρο προφήτης ἐστὶ Λοξίας πατρός.

μηνύονον—more than λέγουσι. They are in the secret and disclose it to the outside world.

CHAPTER IX.

ἐτο—i.e. after all these arguments.

πρὸ μεγάλης ἀδικίας—'in preference to an injustice of the amallest kind' (τελεωτάτης 361 λ). Not strictly identical with πρὸ τῆς μεγάλης.

ἡν ἐὰν...κτησώμεθα. The expression κτήσασθαι ἀδικίαν could hardly occur alone, but the addition of the superlative makes the sense 'to secure the results, or profits, of ideal injustice.'

ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἂκρων λεγόμενοι λόγοι. The participle adds something to λόγοι: 'the statement commonly made by (=the traditional statement of) people in general and supported by the highest authorities.' The sense is, of course, very different from that of ὁ πολλῶν καὶ ἂκρων. The τε καὶ gives the meaning 'not only general, but including the highest authorities.' The article is not repeated because the ἂκρωι are included with, not opposed to, the πολλῶι. With τῶν πολλῶν cf. ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις λέγουσι (c. viii. fin.). For ἂκρων cf. 360 ε. The reference is to the poets and sages (αἱ σοφοὶ of 365 c and αἱ θεῶν παιδεῖς of sup. b
The whole expression recalls 363 ε ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. τίς μηχανὴ κ.τ.λ. The substantive verb is usually omitted in this expression. Cf. Phaedo 72 δ τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθήναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

366 C. ὁ τίς δύναμις ὑπάρχει: ‘the man who has the advantage of special resources in the way of...’ For ὑπάρχει (ἐστὶν v. 343 ε.) δύναμις is not ‘ability’ but παράσκευή of 361 β. ψυχῆς—so the best mss. The variant τύχης is due to the similarity of ψ and τ (Cobet, Var. Lect., p. 6), and is too general.

The superiority in τύχη is sufficiently implied in the particulars enunciated. Moreover δύναμις ψυχῆς corresponds to ἀνδρεία of 361 β, just as σώματος answers to ῥώμη, γένους to παράσκευή φίλων, and χρημάτων to οὐσίας.

ἄλλα μὴ γελάω—v. 344 ε (note).

ὡς δὴ τοι—‘since, as you must admit...’ nam profecto. Cf. Phaedr. 242 c ὡς δὴ τοι, ὥ ἐταίρε, μαντικῶν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή. By itself ὡς would assert a fact too positively. δὴ τοι softens the assertion. Later τοι is added to emphasize the deferential tone.

ψευδὴ μὲν ἀποφήμαι κ.τ.λ. Properly μὲν should follow ἔχει, but Plato writes as if the sentence were to proceed with e.g. εἰ τίς ἔχει ψευδή μὲν ἀποφήμαι ἐλεήμονα, ἰκανῶς δὲ δηλώσαι δτι κ.τ.λ. The laxity is slight and frequent.

ἰκανῶς ἔγνωκεν: ‘has made up his mind on satisfactory grounds.’ ἀριστον: not=ἄμεινον (sc. ἀδίκλα), but ‘that justice is (always) the best policy.’

θέλα φύσει—For the dat. of cause v. 359 ἐ (ἀρρωστλή). For the words cf. Aristot. Eth. N. x. 9. 6, γίνεσθαι δὲ ἀγαθοὺς οἴωνται ὁι μὲν φύσει, οἱ 3' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δήλον ὡς ὡκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἄλλα δὲ τινας θελεις αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέων ὑπάρχει. In the present passage ἐπιστήμην λαβῶν corresponds to Aristotle’s διδαχῆ. For virtue and τὸ θέιον cf. inf. 492 ε.

366 D. ψέυς—the subject πᾶς τίς is to be supplied from οὐδεις. So in Latin quiesque is often to be supplied after nemo (Hor. Sat. i. 1. 3). Stallbaum quotes Symp. 192 ε ταῦτα ἀκούσας οὐδ' ἀν εἰς ἐξαρπηθείη...ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς οἴουτ' ἀν ἀκηκολύναι. αὐτὸ δρᾶν—v. 358 c.

ὡς δὲ, δήλον: cf. Dem. Timoc. 730 τὴν διοίκησιν ἄναιρε, τὴν θ' ἑράν καὶ τὴν ὄσιαν' ὡς δὲ, ἐγὼ ψφάσω. In such brachylogies it
is equally possible to regard ὡς as (1) = διῶς 'and how (it is so)....' or (2) = ὦτι, cf. the brachylogy δηλοντί, i.e. ὦτι οὖνος εἰχε. εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν—sc. τοῦ ἄδικεων.

ἡθεντερ...ό λόγος...ἀρμήσει...εἴπειν, ὦτι κ.τ.λ.—viz. 358 B and 362 ε. The sentence may be construed in two ways: (1) ὡθεντερ ἀπᾶς ὁ λόγος ἀρμήσε...εἴπειν (ὦτι), ὡ δαιμόνια κ.τ.λ.: "whence all this argument, both on Glaucon's part and mine, began to say 'my good sir'....," i.e. ὁ λόγος is personified: (2) ὡθεντερ ἀπᾶς ὁ λόγος ἀρμήσε καὶ τῦδε καὶ ἐμοὶ...(ὦστε ημᾶς) εἴπειν κ.τ.λ. 'whence all this argument started both on his part and mine against you, (whence, I mean, we started) to say....'

The latter is probably the nearer to Plato's mind, although there is little doubt that in reality the sentence is the result of some confusion between the simple ἐκεῖνο, ὡθεντερ ὁ λόγος ἀρμήσε... πρὸς σέ, ὦτι...'the fact (with which this argument began) that'... and the simple ἐκεῖνο, ὡθεντερ ἀρμήσαμεν καὶ τῦδε καὶ ἐμοὶ...εἴπειν ὦτι κ.τ.λ. Similar in expression is Ἡδτ. vi. 86 τοῦ δὲ ἐλεφά ὁ λόγος ὧδε ἀρμῆθη λέγεσθαι ἐς ἴμεας εὑρίσκεται (J. and C.).

By omitting εἴπειν we make the construction clear, but the interpolation was improbable.

366 E. ἀπὸ τῶν εξ ἀρχῆς ἡρῶν κ.τ.λ.: 'down from all the earliest demigods whose utterances have been preserved.' λόγοι λελειμμένοι are not 'accounts of them handed down to us.' This would rather have been the singular λόγος, and it is away from the sense.

The words μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων should be joined with ἀρξάμενοι, not (as by Stallbaum) with λελειμμένοι: 'all of you, from the earliest heroes down to the present generation.' Cf. Legg. 771 ο μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρξάμενος.

By ἡρώων are meant the legendary personages to whom various moral sayings were attributed by poetry or tradition. From these we pass through the more historical sages μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων. Among the ἡρωες the speaker is probably thinking of Heracles, for whose 'choice' (as told by Prodicus) see Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21.

ἀλλως ἡ δόξα, sc. ἐπαινῶν ἡ φέγγων. Cf. 363 λ οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμῆσες.

αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον κ.τ.λ. It is no doubt just possible to make this accus. depend on ἔπεξηλθεν, the words τῷ λόγῳ being instrumental. But ἔπεξηλθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ is so familiar an expression in Plato that we are scarcely justified in breaking it apart in this instance and attaching to it an unfamiliar usage. See 349 λ (note). In reality
the accus. is κατὰ σώνειν. Plato wrote αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον as if it were to be governed later by e.g. οὐδεὶς ἴκαρως ἐδήλωσεν ὁ τε ἐστι. By the time he reaches οὐδεὶς...λόγοι he is no longer alive to the exact way in which the sentence began. Literally 'as for each in itself, regarded as existing with its essential quality in the soul of its possessor and unperceived by gods or men, no one, either in prose or verse, has satisfactorily grappled with the argument that....' Such anacolutha are particularly frequent in sentences which begin with the accusative and delay the verb. Cf. Legg. 819 το ἐνοῦσαν τῶν φύσεων γελολαύν τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἁγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις...ταύτης ἀπαλλάττουσι.

τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει—dat. of attendant circumstances. Cf. Thuc. viii. 27 οἱ 'Αθηναίοι...ἀτελεῖ τῇ νίκῃ...ἀνέστησαν, and the familiar ἡ ναῦς αὐτῶτε ναύτοι αὐτράσι.

ἐν ἴδιοις λόγοις—v. note on ἴδια λεγόμενον 363 ε.

tὸ μὲν...δικαιοσύνη δὲ—clearness is gained by the substitution of the precise name instead of τὸ δὲ. Cf. Charm. 161 λ ἐπερ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν τυγχάνει δὲ, αἰδὸς δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἁγαθὸν ἡ καὶ κακὸν.

367 Α. ξύνοικος ῃ. So A and other mss. A variant is ξύνοικοτ. Either is allowable, but the subjunctive is more idiomatic and the adjective preferable.

The expression is somewhat poetical. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1133 ὁ τὶς ὀνκ ἐν Ἴ καὶ κακῶν ξύνοικος; El. 784 ἴδε γὰρ μεῖξων βλάβη ἡ ξύνοικος ῃ μοι, Α. 611 θεία μανία ξύναυσος. Elsewhere in Plato, Symp. 203 ν ἐνδέλεξε ξύνοικος, Philcb. 63 δ ἡσυχαίς ξύνοικους.

ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδίκλας. Though περι may often be used for ὑπὲρ (see note on 360 β), there is no clear instance of ὑπὲρ in the simple sense of περι. Examples quoted from Aristotle and Demosthenes need closer examination.

In Hdt. ii. 123 τα λεγόμενα ὑπὲρ ἐκάστων ἄκοι γράφω the reading is doubtful, variants being ὑπ' (which is probably correct) and περι. In Hom. ii. vii. 524 ὧν ὑπὲρ σέθεν αἰσχε' ἄκοιον the meaning is 'I am reproached for your sake.' In Apol. 39 ἐ ἴδες ἄν διαλεξθέην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος='on behalf of what has occurred.'

The sense here is 'they would say this on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.' For this use of τε καὶ cf. 364 β περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς 'the relations of the gods to virtue.'

φορτικώς, ἢς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ: 'in a vulgar manner,—at least so I think.'
The word φορτικός expresses 'vulgarity in person, manners or intellect...want of cultivation, especially philosophical cultivation...a coarse habit of mind which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared by the rest of mankind' (Cope, Aristot. Rhet. ii. 21. 15). In fact the meaning comes very near to 'Philistine.' Cf. Apol. 32 A ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαικά, ἀληθῆ δὲ (i.e. not χαρίεντα). Inf. 581 ν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἱδονίν φορτικὴν τινα ἤγείται, Phaedr. 256 b φορτικό-κλητέρα τε καὶ ἑρεθισοῦφι, Aristot. Eth. N. i. 5. 1 οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικωτατοί...οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες, ibid. iv. 8. 3 connected with βωμολόχοι, and Pol. viii. 7. 6 opposed to πεταιδευμένος.

In the later Greek (of Lucian, for example) its meaning shifted somewhat, and it often = ἑπαχθῆς, of pedantic affectation.

diekeloustatο—'challenged you.'
oύ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν κ.τ.λ.: 'we shall say that you are not praising justice, but semblance, and that you do not blame the being unjust, but the seeming so.' Of course έων cannot be supplied after δίκαιον.

367 C. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἁγαθὸν κ.τ.λ.—sup. 343 c. ὡμολόγησας—viz. 358 A.
tῶν μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν—for the gen. cf. 358 A δοκεῖ...τοῦ ἐπιτόνου εἴδους.
tῶν τέ ἀποβαίνοντων...πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον.... The speaker begins the clause as if he would end with αὐτά τε αὐτῶν, but, wishing to insist more upon the second point, he substitutes πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

The addition of extra emphasis to the second member very frequently causes a slight deviation in expression. Cf. Pol. 270 ὡλα τέ παθήματα πολλά, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε, inf. 394 c ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐτῶν ποιήσει πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλου, Thuc. i. 25 ἄμα δὲ καὶ after τε, and in Symp. 186 ε Plato writes ἥ τε ὀν ἱατρικὴ...κυβερνᾶται, ὦ σαυτώσ δὲ καὶ γυμναστική.

καὶ ύγιαίνειν δ'—No climax is intended in δ', which merely ends the enumeration. Cf. Meno 87 ε ύγιεια καὶ ἱατρός καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλούτος δ'. Its force is something like 'and here we will stop.'

367 D. γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει: 'effective (productive) in their own nature and not made so by reputation.' Hearing, seeing, &c. are productive of good in themselves; to possess...
them is enough; their effectiveness does not depend upon whether we are thought to possess them or not.

That which is γόνιμον is that which has a δύναμις in itself. Thus γόνιμαι φῶς are opposed to ὑπηνέμια (‘wind eggs’), as containing a δύναμις of producing chickens. Cf. Theact. 151 ε γόνιμον ἡ ἀνεμοιαῖον. It is probable that Plato has this application of the word in mind.

From this sense we pass to that of ‘genuine.’ Cf. Theact. 150 c γόνιμων τε καὶ ἄληθές ἐλθολον. καὶ ψεύδος, Ar. Ran. 96 γόνιμος ποιηθής.

τοῦτ’ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαύνεσον δικαίαςύνης: the construction as with θαυμαζόν τί τινος. In full ἐπαύνεσον δικαίαςύνης αὐτὸ τοῦτο (‘simply that’), δ’ ὁνύην τὸν ἔχοντα (contained acc. as with ὑφελεῖν) αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτήν. οὖν brings the matter to the point (cf. 359 c), as after a parenthesis. The sentence which begins with ἐπείδη οὖν... has grown to some length, and οὖν resumes the intention with which it began. Cf. Apol. 29 e εἷ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἰποτε...εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἴπον, ἐπὶ τούτου ἁφίοιτε κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει—a brachylogic, not to say ungrammatical, attachment (‘vel si mavis neglegentia’ Stallbaum). The thought is καὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ψέγε ἀδικίας δ’ αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτήν τὸν ἔχοντα βλάπτει. ἀνασχομήν—with gen. inf. 564 δ καὶ οὖκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, 613 c &c.

A better supported reading (given also by Par. A in the margin) is ἀποδέχομην, but that should mean ‘admit that they are right,’ ‘accept it from them’ (cf. 329 e), whereas ἀνέχομαι possesses the required sense ‘put up with,’ ‘tolerate.’ In the text Par. A gives ἀποσχομήν, which is plainly meaningless and is due to the frequent confusion of prepositions in compounds.

περὶ αὐτῶν—not with δόξας, but with the participles.

εἴ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις of Par. A is perhaps slightly better than κελεύεις. ‘I would not put up with it from you...unless you were to bid me,’ and that, he thinks, is improbable.

367 E. αὐτῇ δ’ αὐτήν—Par. A and others have αὐτῆν δ’ αὐτήν through (apparently) a false notion that the words should depend on ἔχοντα. This is obviously much less elegant, and the expression of ν (sup.) is best here also.
CHAPTER X.

Besides the second member of the sentence would naturally answer with ὅτε δὲ the place of δὲ is often taken by ἀτὰρ, which is somewhat stronger. Thus ἀτὰρ τὸτε would naturally answer to ἄν ῶν. To this is added καὶ, which emphasizes τὸτε with something like the sense of 'particularly,' as in the familiar ἄλλως τε καὶ... and in the καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὅπασύμαχον of 328 B. ὅν is hardly translatable (cf. 359 c), but contains the notion of 'however' or 'at any rate' (i.e. 'I always did admire them, but, whatever may be said of that, I did then &c.'),

Cf. Prot. 335 δ ἄν ῶν ἐνῳγώγε σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπανω καὶ φιλιωδές, Theaet. 172 c καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὡς δαιμόνια, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενήθησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν γελοίου φαίνονται, Hipp. Mai. 282 c πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφικετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα κ.τ.λ.

A very literal rendering of the particles would give 'I always indeed (μὲν) as a matter of fact (ὅτι) admired them, but, however that be (ὅν), I was especially at that time (καὶ τὸτε) exceedingly delighted.'

φύσιν—'ability.' Cf. εὐφυὴς 365 a.

368 A. ἔσ ὑμᾶς—'in regard to you': 'wrote verses ὑπὸν you....' Cf. Phaedo 61 ἐσ τὸν θεόν ἐποίησα. Hdt. iv. 98 γνώμη ἀποδεχθεῖσα ἐσ τὴν γέφυραν, 1. 86, &c. The poet was probably Critias.

ὁ παῖδες ἐκεῖνου τοῦ ἀνδρός: 'ye sons of an illustrious sire,' ἐκεῖνου being used like illius ('that famous'). Some translators take it to mean 'of the man there named,' i.e. of Ariston in the line quoted. Not only is this a clumsy anticipation, but in Phileb. 36 ὁ Socrates calls Protarchus ὃ παῖ τε ἐκεῖνου τὰνδρός, where the language shews that the expression was current, being probably a complimentary catch-phrase or stock quotation from some source now unknown.

περὶ τῆς Μεγαροί μάχην. The particular battle is unknown. War between Athens and Megara was very frequent. The article τῆς need not mean 'the great' or 'famous' battle, but simply 'the battle in which you were engaged' and to which the poet refers.
Some mss give τὴν ἐν Μεγαρῷ μάχην, wrongly combining ἐν with a true locative form. So in Gorg. 472 A mss give ἐν Πυθοῖ, except for one which has ἐν Πυθοῦν. Where the locative-dative form was used ἐν might or might not appear. Cf. Menex. 245 A αἰσχυνομένη τὰ τρόπαια τὰ τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιάις. Though copyists certainly had a habit of inserting ἐν where it was not necessary, there is no doubt that the use of ἐν in such places was quite as good Greek as the single locative-dative. Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 201) is too dogmatic. Compare Ar. Frag. 363 διὰ τοῦ Μαραθῶν τρόπαιον (where τὸ could not stand) with Eq. 781 σὺ γαρ, ὅτι Μήδοις δίεξείσῳ περὶ τῆς χώρας Μαραθῶν. A large array of instances of both usages is given by Blaydes on Ar. Eq. 1334 (crit. note).

εὐ δοκεῖ ἐξειν—'seems apt.'

θειὸν πεπόνθατε: 'you have in you something divine.' The expression refers to their mental state (=πάνυ θείως διάκεισθε). Cf. 329 B κἂν ἐγώ τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐπεπόνθη καὶ ἄλλο. For θεῖον =θεῖον τι cf. Gorg. 485 θομοδοτόν πάσχω, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 30 ὅτι ὑδαῖν αὐτῷ δοκολὴ πάσχειν. Plato Symp. 175 Α ἄτοπον λέγεις, Meno 97 e, Aesch. Ag. 261, Soph. O. T. 516 sq. εἰ...νῦν νομίζει πρὸς γ’ ἐμῶν πεπονθέναι | λόγουσιν εἰτ’ ἐργοῦσιν εἰς βλάψιν φέρον.

ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ—sc. ἀδικεῖ. For the gender cf. 358 c.

δοκεῖτε δὴ κ.τ.λ. The sense is not as Ficinus renders it 'videmini autem,' but 'iam videmini.' δὴ = 'now, as a matter of fact....'

368 B. τοῦ ἀλλοῦ τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου—'your character in general.'

ἀπορῶ δ’ τι χρήσωμαι: the precise dative can hardly be supplied. It is not ὑμῶν, nor τῷ λάγῳ, but rather the sense of τῷ πράγματι: 'what to do with (the matter).'</p>

The same absolute use appears in Protag. 321 c λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἑτὶ αὐτῷ ἥν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἥπορει δ’ τι χρήσατο, Lys. 213 c τί οὖν δή χρησώμεθα; δὴ δ’ ἐγώ, Gorg. 465 e.

[χρήσωμαι is the reading of Par. A, but many mss have χρησόμαι. Both are good Greek (for the future cf. Soph. O. C. 1739 ὑπὼς μολούμεθ᾽ ἐν δόμους οὐκ ἔχω &c., Thuc. iii. 109 ἀπορῶν ὅτε τρόπῳ πολιορκίσεται...ἡ καὶ ἀναχωρών διασωθήσεται. The senses non habeo quod faciam and nescio quid faciendum sit are very near to each other, and as apt to be interchanged in the 'indirect deliberative' as the future and the subjunctive in direct questions e.g. εἰπομεν; ἡ σιγῶμεν; ἡ τί δράσομεν; Hence οὐκ ἔχω δ’ τι χρήσωμαι 'I do not know what I ought to do,' and οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι 'I do not know what I shall do' (or 'I have nothing which I shall be able to do'). Cobet's dictum (Var. Lect. p. 105) that only the future is used when there is no negative with ἔχω, and only the subjunctive

PL. REP.
when there is such negative, is true only in the first half, and is but one example of his excessive love of idiomatic rules without exceptions.]  

οὔτε γὰρ... (οὔτ' αὖ...(inf.)  
σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ., ι.ε. σημεῖον δὲ (τούτου) ἐστὶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθε μον (τάντα) αἱ λέγων πρὸς Ὀρασύμαχον ἠμην ἀποφαίνειν κ.τ.λ.  
μὴ οὔτε ὅσιον ἦ—'lest it be actually wicked.' See 328 λ ἁρὰ...οὔτ' ἔστε κ.τ.λ.;

368 C. ἐτι ἐμπνέοντα, i.e. ἔως ἄν ἐτι ἐμπνέων.  
ἐμοὶ—not μοι. "Accordingly I said—just what my own opinion was—'the inquiry we are taking in hand is no light one.'" ὅτι introduces the exact words (cf. 366 ν), and ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἐδοξέν is to be treated as parenthetical.  
τὸ ξήτημα—'the matter in quest,' while below ξήτηςιν='the method of inquiry.' The distinction is one of τέλος and μέθοδος.  
oὐ φαύλον=οὐ φάβιον. Cf. 527 ὁ τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ πάνυ φαύλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεύσα, Αρ. Εq. 213 φαυλότατον ἔργον ('the easiest thing in the world'). Inf. 374 ε &c.

368 D. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινόλ: either (1) ἡμεῖς=ἐγὼ,  
a use which occurs (a) freely in poetry, (b) in prose, when a writer is speaking of himself (the editorial 'we'), when a king so speaks (the royal 'we'), when a modest tone is assumed, and when a speaker is voicing the views of a profession &c.  
or (2) ἡμεῖς is true plural, Socrates regarding the quest as one conducted, not by himself, but by the company. This is in keeping with ἐπιχειροῦμεν above and with the singular in δοκεῖ μοι immediately. 'Since you and I are not experts' (after the manner of the sophists) contains nothing offensive to the interlocutors. Cf. 337 λ ἡμῶν τῶν δεινῶν (of the sophists), addressed to Thrasymachus. Moreover the same inclusion of his company is distinctly expressed in Theaet. 154 ν οὖκοιν εἰ μὲν δεινόλ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σοὶ ἡμεῖν κ.τ.λ.  
ἐπειδῆ οὖν...ἐν μεῖζον. No difficulty would have been found in this passage if editors had punctuated at μεῖζον. 'We must conduct the inquiry in the same way in which we should have done, if some one had bidden us read small letters a long way off ...and then (ἐπειτα ὧν, ἐπειτα δὲ, as often) someone had noticed that the same letters exist somewhere else in a larger form and on a larger ground.' Then follows, with an asyndeton common in
Plato, 'It would have seemed (in such a case) a godsend.' Indeed, with οἶμαι, there can hardly be said to be an asyndeton at all. οἰαντερ ἂν, sc. ἑπονεσάμεθα. The ellipse is very common in ὅπερ ἂν ἐλ, κἂν ἐλ &c. Cf. Gorg. 479 A φοβούμενος ὅπερ ἂν ἐλ παῖς. With relative, as here, Eur. Med. 1153 φίλους νομίζοντες, ὅπερ ἂν πόσις σέθεν.

ἐπείτα = ἐπείτα δὲ v. 336 B.

ἐρμαίον ἂν ἐφάνη—cf. Phaedo 107 c ἐλ μὲν γάρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἐρμαίον ἂν ἢν τὸς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ σώματος ἀπηλλάχθαι. For ἐρμαίον ('windfall' or 'godsend,' attributed originally to Hermes) v. Cope on Aristot. Rhet. ii. 24. 2 (κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς).

ἐκεῖνα—'the latter.' They are more remote in consideration, hence ἐκεῖνα, 'those others.'

368 E. πλεῖων—not πλέων (v. 330 A). 'On a larger scale,' used of quantity, while μελζὼν would express degree, and is therefore out of the question here. Though the state is μελζὼν than the individual, the justice in the case of the individual is as great as the justice in the case of the state. The state, however, contains a wider field for its exercise and a greater aggregate of its exhibition.

369 A. οὗτος ἐπισκεψώμεθα—'when that is done, let us examine.' Cf. οὗτος ἐπισκοπέων 368 D.

τὴν τοῦ μελζονος ὑμοιότητα κ.τ.λ.: 'observing in the less the likeness of the greater,' i.e. 'finding the analogy which the less bears to the greater.'
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